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Abstract 
As part of the Islamic financial development, Islamic capital markets have been developing in 
terms of structures and instruments in the last two decades. In particular, sukuk or Islamic bond 
market has proved to be a successful instrument for long-term project financing. While 
developments in sukuk market have demonstrated success, sukuk structures are not immune to 
various risk dimensions including Shari’ah, legal and regulative risks as well as financial risks. 
This study, hence, aims to explore and examine three particular non-financial risk areas relating to 
sukuk structures in the case of SABIC sukuk, which was issued in three tranches in Saudi Arabia 
in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. In doing so, this research particularly examines the risks 
emerging from the performance of Shari’ah Board in charge of the Shari’ah compliancy of 
SABIC Sukuk as well as Shari’ah compliancy and legal risks.  
In order to examine the identified risk areas, in addition to rendering an in-depth literature based 
critical analysis in discursive nature, elite interviews were conducted with the Shari’ah scholars 
involved in the issuance of SABIC sukuk. In addition, in an attempt to provide non-Shari’ah 
perspective, finance professionals, lawyers, academics and technocrats were also interviewed to 
explore their understandings of the three identified risk areas in the case of SABIC sukuk in 
particular, and sukuk in general. 
Since the AAOIFI standards have asserted that the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) has to be 
involved in controlling as well as monitoring sukuk structures from the time of issuance until 
maturity, which is expected to provide guarantee of the performance of the product in a Shari’ah 
compliant manner. This aims to ensure that the progress and performance will not veer from the 
right track of Shari’ah through close investigation and follow up by the members of SSB. This 
study found that one of the risks emerging from the SSB is that the Shari’ah supervision based on 
AAOIFI standards is still not observed and implemented by many SSBs. The findings indicate that 
a clear method and mechanism for the SSB members to conduct their examination for Shari’ah 
complicacy has not been established; and for this end, a comprehensive fatwa will play an 
essential role in ensuring sukuk structure Shari’ah compliant. Another finding is that the failing of 
issuing a binding and a comprehensive standard for SSBs to follow as well as clear methods to be 
implemented have resulted many Shari’ah and legal risks. 
With regards to Shari’ah risks, the findings show that any inconsistency with the rules and 
principles of Shari’ah will lead sukuk to be Shari’ah incompliant. The inconsistency between 
sukuk structures issued in the Saudi Arabian market and AAOIFI standards is considered as a 
Shari’ah risk, as there still exist some major similarities between SABIC sukuk structure and riba-
based bonds structure. Therefore, an array of Shari’ah issues needs to be resolved, which include 
ownership and the related issues in the sense of ‘real ownership’, the guarantee of the capital and 
returns, distribution of profits based on LIBOR instead of the performance of the project, the 
reserve account and the related issues. 
As for legal risks, this research established that the absence of a special law featuring sukuk in 
Saudi Arabia is considered to be the main legal risk faced by Islamic capital markets in the 
country. The findings also show that the rules and regulations issued by the CMA have failed to 
provide a specific law related to sukuk, which might expose sukuk holders to the risk of treating 
sukuk as riba-based loan bonds. However, failure to differentiate between sukuk and bonds might 
lead to certain risks such as the failure of sukuk holders to become incapable of proving their 
rights regarding their ownership of the assets they carry. Consequently, the legal position of sukuk 
holders is unclear in the Saudi Arabian market, which is due to the absence of a sukuk law. 
Therefore, it is necessary that the regulatory and legislative bodies in Saudi Arabia should provide 
a suitable legislative and regulatory environment for the issuance of sukuk taking in consideration 
the legal and Shari’ah risks that sukuk structures might be exposed. 
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Chapter 1                                  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
While Islamic banking in its commercial form emerged in 1975, the formation of 
Islamic financial and capital markets is rather new. As part of the Islamic capital 
markets, the emergence of sukuk or Islamic bonds in late 1990s has contributed to the 
expansion of Islamic financial development globally. 
The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI), one of the main standard setting body in Islamic banking and finance 
(IBF) industry, in its accounting standard describes sukuk as an investment grade 
product in order to delineate them from shares and bonds. It defines sukuk as 
(AAOIFI, 2010): 
certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of 
tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the ownership of) the assets of 
particular projects or special investment activity, however, this is true after 
receipt of the value of the sukuk, the closing of subscription and the employment 
of funds received for the purpose for which the sukuk were issued.  
Sukuk have become a prominent type of financing for corporations and also 
governments over the years, and hence the sukuk market has been receiving 
encouraging support from all walks of financial industry beyond the Muslim 
countries. Being the main instrument and constituents of the Islamic capital markets, 
it has provided additional financial flexibility to Islamic financing (Mohamad and 
Shah, 2010). Therefore, it has become a premier investment mechanism all over the 
world. 
In the short period of time, initially from 1990 when the first sukuk issued and since 
2000 when sukuk has become a popular capital market tool, sukuk have played a 
significant impact in the development of Islamic finance as well as in contributing to 
the economic growth and success of Muslim economies and others around the world 
(Asutay, 2010). The success of sukuk can be attributed to a number of factors, such as 




instruments for their businesses and the effort of Muslim scholars to find alternatives 
with the objective of eliminating all the prohibited investments in Shari’ah, and 
importantly also the need for the operationalizing of Islamic capital markets 
(Duaabah, 2009). 
All these factors were behind the prosperity and the emergence of Islamic financial 
products in general and sukuk in particular. Despite having a relatively new Islamic 
capital markets with sukuk, the emergence of IBF can be traced back to early 1970s 
with the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 1974 and Dubai 
Islamic Bank, as a commercial Islamic bank, in 1975 with the objective of supplying 
Shari’ah compliant commercial and retail banking activities and services (Usmani, 
2002). After the success of IBF institutions since then, there has been demand, from 
different corners of the financial system mainly in the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) region as well as South-east Asia, for capital market instruments for the 
management of their balance-sheet liquidity (Tariq and Dar, 2007). 
In responding to the demand for the development of capital market instruments, the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy held a conference in Saudi Arabia in 1988 (Adam and 
Thomas, 2004). As a result of the conference, proposal for sukuk were upheld and 
legitimized, namely considered as Shari’ah compliant, which has facilitated the way 
for Islamic issuers and investors to invest their placements under the Shari’ah 
principles without any need for dealing with the conventional debt securities since 
then. 
Sukuk is considered as indispensable vehicle for resource mobilisation for liquidity, 
long-term project financing and infrastructure financing, whether in the public or 
private sector (Adam, 2005). However, this type of investment finance differs from 
the conventional bonds, as sukuk are principally structured to be backed by real assets, 
rather than be simply paper derivatives or dependent on issuers guarantee to pay back 
the debt with the stated interest as stated on the prospectus (Al-amine, 2008). 
Conventional bonds that are primarily based on interest are prohibited under the 
Shari’ah law, as one of the essential principles of IBF is the prohibition of interest, 




The main characteristics of conventional bonds are as follows (Adam and Thomas, 
2004; Ayub, 2005; Usmani, 2007; Al-Amine, 2008);  
(i) bonds do not represent ownership on the part of the bondholders, rather, they 
document the interest-bearing debt owed to the holders;  
(ii) bonds holders are entitled to a regular amount of interest determined as a 
percentage of the capital and not as percentage of enterprise’s profit; 
(iii) the issuers of the bonds have to guarantee the return of principal when due, 
regardless of whether the commercial enterprise is making profit or not. It is basically 
a financial claim to a cash flow.  
Due to such features, conventional bonds cannot be considered as lawful under the 
Shari’ah law, which provides the basis for IBF in general and sukuk in particular. 
Consequently, one of the distinguishing features of Islamic finance is that it must 
involve the funding of trade in, or the production of, real assets (Wilson, 2004). 
Therefore, sukuk is defined as “an entitlement to right in certain assets inclusive of 
some degree of asset ownership” (Adam and Thomas, 2004:42). This implies that the 
investors have a beneficial interest in the cash flow generated by the underlying 
assets. The cash flow represents a proportion of the returns generated by the assets in 
one of the following sukuk structures or contracts: ijarah, mudarabah, musharakah, 
murabahah, istisnaa and salam (Al-amine, 2008). 
In terms of trajectory of development, the first sukuk was issued in Malaysia in 1990 
with USD30 million by a foreign company (Ahmad and Radzi, 2011). In the year 
2000, the first sovereign sukuk was issued by the Sudanese governments in the form 
of musharakah sukuk with Sudanese Pound 77 million. Since then, the financial and 
corporate sectors as well as sovereigns have been exploiting the benefits of sukuk. 
During the period between 2001 and 2007 the issuances of sukuk increased gradually 
from USD 1,172 million to USD 50,041 million (IIFM, 2010). The volume and the 
magnitude of issuances in the period in question indicate the success of sukuk market 
as well as the confidence of both sukuk issuers and sukuk holders. However, as a 
result of global financial meltdown, the sukuk issuance was declined dramatically to 
USD 24,264 million in 2008 and USD 37,904 million in 2009 (IIFM, 2010). While 




industry and in particular the sukuk market was impacted by the adverse 
developments in the financial markets all over the world and in particular in the GCC 
region (Kumah et al., 2010). 
It should, however, be noted that with the global financial markets recovering, in 2010 
sukuk market regained its vitality and activity with USD 52,978 million (Zawya, 
2015). As can be seen from the Figure 1.1, there is an increasing trend in the global 
sukuk issuances after the decline accrued in 2008. Such a development has to be 
considered in spite of all difficulties and challenges in the global capital and financial 
markets. Thus, the developments indicate that the volume of sukuk issuance has 
returned to pre-crisis issuance level after establishing confidence in the market. 
Figure  1.1: Global Sukuk Issuances, 2001- 2015 ($M) 
 
Data Source: IIFM Sukuk Database (2014); Zawya Database (2015) 
In terms of sukuk issuances, as depicted in Figure 1.1, the total global sukuk issuance 
rose from USD 1,172 million in 2001 to approximately USD 120,854 million at the 
end of 2014 with total USD 787,704 million from 2001 to 2015 (IIFM, 2014; Zawya, 
2015). According to IIFM (2014) and Zawya (2015), the development of sukuk 
market is more concentrated in Malaysia in terms of both value and volume. The 
largest domestic sukuk issuance remains in Malaysia with 78.09% by value of 
domestic sukuk, whereas the second country is Saudi Arabia with 6.08%. The other 
countries such as UAE, Indonesia, Bahrain, Sudan, Brunei, Pakistan and Turkey 
claims about 21% of the total sukuk issuance so far by value of domestic sukuk. Saudi 
Arabia in this respect in 2014 was the leading sukuk issuance country in the Middle 

















In Saudi Arabian market, sukuk were initially transacted in an over-the-counter 
market, meaning that they were executed through bank treasuries and settled by Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul). However, Tadawul has launched an automated order-
driven secondary market. The introduction of the new platform is intended to 
encourage investors to participate more actively in the sukuk trade, which implies that 
with the new system, investors can buy and sell sukuk through their brokers (Al-Jasser 
and Banafe, 2002). However, it is aspired that Saudi Arabia being one of the leading 
economies in the Muslim world should engage more with IBF in general and sukuk 
and Islamic capital markets in particular.  
There is no doubt that the global financial crisis was a test for the Islamic financial 
products such as sukuk (Kayed and Hassan, 2011). Therefore, Islamic financial 
institutions have benefited from the global crisis significantly, as the financial crisis 
helped to diversify the products in the Islamic financial markets and not solely 
focusing on only one product as well as to review and re-examine a number of issues 
such as ownership rights. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
While the global financial crisis affected the performance of Islamic finance industry 
in general, IBF industry in general and the sukuk market in particular was hit strongly 
by the global financial crisis in 2007-2008 despite having no main or major failures or 
bail outs but some sukuk defaults. In investigating the impact of the crisis on the sukuk 
market, as mentioned above, issuance fell to a near four-year low of USD 0.9 billion 
in the final quarter of 2008 and prices dropped by 18% in the fourth quarter and 
bottomed a further 5% lower in mid-February (IIFM, 2011). Thus, the issuances had 
slowed throughout 2008 as problems in banking sector intensified and leading 
scholars questioned the Shari’ah-compliance of some sukuk structures (Van 
Wijnbergen and Zaheer, 2013). Despite the recovery of sukuk market during 2009, 
there are on-going challenges. It is because during 2008 and 2009, the sukuk market 
was tested in several instances by its ability to deal with several defaults (Radzi, 
2011). Recent data indicate that the sukuk markets globally have picked up again and 
issuance of sukuk in terms of volume and the magnitude is getting better as indicated 
in Figure 1.1(IIFM, 2014; Zawya, 2015). However, dramatic decline in the oil prices 




Since 2009, after a number of sukuk defaults, the financial markets and investors have 
been concerned about the efficiency of the existing laws and regulation to deal with 
sukuk, its structure and its level of Shari’ah compliance as an asset (Ab Majid et al., 
2011). Other concerns include ability of the structure to be supported by enabling 
legislation, contract enforcement measures and effective settlement dispute 
mechanisms (Ahmed, 2006). In addition, sukuk require a legal and regulative 
framework, which takes on board the distinctive characteristics of sukuk. This 
necessitates a competent legal and financial framework to achieve the following 
(AAOIFI, 2010; Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decisions No 177(3/19), 178(4/19), 
188(3/20); Tariq and Dar, 2007; Idris, 2008; Salah, 2010; Oseni, 2014; Nazar, 2015): 
(i) to identify the right of each parties involved in sukuk contract; 
(ii) the validity of sukuk from Shari'ah perspective, as it assumes that the practice of 
sukuk call for primarily for strict Shari’ah-compliance to be integrated into the 
structure; 
(iii) enabling legislation for its creation and the authorisation of sukuk, establishing 
shari'ah governance, and addressing conflicts between existing law and Islamic 
law; 
(iv) enforceability of the contract by assurances that the legal documentation of any 
transactions or instruments comply with both Shari’ah and local law; 
(v) formation of an appropriate mechanism for dispute settlement; 
(vi) catering for risks underlying sukuk structures. 
These issues are fundamentally important because they have given rise to legal 
uncertainty in the recent sukuk defaults. In addition, such issues have demonstrated 
the exposure of Islamic finance and in particular sukuk for Shari’ah and legal risk 
along with financial risk, which undermines the moral high ground of Islamic finance 
but also the performance of sukuk. It is, hence, the aim of this study to explore the 
Shari’ah and legal risk exposures of sukuk issuances in Saudi Arabia by focusing on    
Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) sukuk, which is mainly one of the 





1.3 AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This study aims to explore and examine Shari’ah and legal risks associated with 
sukuk structures that have been issued in Saudi Arabia. Such an investigation is 
located within the contemporary regulatory and legal framework in Saudi Arabia by 
focusing on a main sukuk issuance namely SABIC sukuk. In other words, the related 
laws and also of the process of sukuk issuance as well as Shari’ah requirements and 
standards are examined in the case of SABIC sukuk, which is the largest issuance in 
Saudi Arabia by one of the largest holding company in the country. 
To fulfil the aims of this study, the following objectives have been developed: 
(i) to identify the dominant sukuk structures in practice in general and in Saudi 
Arabia in specific; 
(ii) to highlight the main functions of the Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSB) from the 
issuing of sukuk to the time of maturity; 
(iii) to evaluate the extent to which the current practices of sukuk fulfil the Shari’ah 
principles with consideration to AAOIFI rules;    
(iv) to analyse the justifications or fatawa of Saudi Shari’ah scholars on the practice 
of various sukuk structures; 
(v) to examine how sukuk are perceived by existing laws in Saudi Arabia and 
identify the existing gaps in the legal framework and financing structures with the 
objective of determining legal risks associated with sukuk; 
(vi) to identify regulatory and legislative framework for sukuk in Saudi Arabia; 
(vii) to critically examine the legal, regulative, Shari’ah and Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board related risks in the case of SABIC sukuk. 
Based on the aim and objectives the following research questions are developed: 





(ii) What are the main risks associated with the functioning of the Shari’ah 
supervisory boards or SSB, which are in charge with structuring and monitoring the 
current sukuk issued in Saudi Arabia? 
(iii) What are the main Shari’ah risks faced by these sukuk structures in particular the 
SABIC sukuk? 
(iv) What are the main legal risks faced by these sukuk structures in particular the 
SABIC sukuk? 
(v) What have been the consequences of Shari’ah and legal risks faced by Saudi 
sukuk structures in particular SABIC sukuk? 
1.3.1 Mapping and Matching the Objectives and the Research Questions 
It should be mentioned that there are seven research objectives and five research 
questions identified in this research. The following, aims to present the match 
between objectives and research questions and identify the particular chapter where a 
particular objective is tackled and a particular research question is responded. 
Objective 1: to identify the dominant sukuk structures in practice especially the sukuk, 
which have been issued in Saudi Arabia. This is dealt with in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
by responding to the following research question: (i) What are the salient 
characteristics of the sukuk structures issued in Saudi Arabia? 
Objective 2: to highlight the main functions of the Shari’ah supervisory boards from 
the issuing of sukuk to the time of maturity. This objective is explored in Chapter 5, 
which provided interviews, with Shari’ah supervisory board members who were in 
charge of approving SABIC sukuk as well as with specialists in sukuk structures with 
regard to the significance of SSB, to answer the following research question: (ii) What 
are the main risks associated with the function of the Shari’ah supervisory boards 
who are in charge in structuring and monitoring the current sukuk issued in Saudi 
Arabia? 
Objective 3: to evaluate the extent to which the current practices of sukuk fulfil the 
Shari’ah principles with consideration to AAOIFI rules. In responding to this 




members who were in charge of approving SABIC sukuk, which attempts to answer 
the following research question: (iii) What are the main Shari’ah risks faced by these 
sukuk structures in particular the SABIC sukuk? 
Objective 4: to analyse the justifications or fatawa of Saudi Shari’ah scholars on the 
practice of various sukuk structures. Chapter 6 focuses on this objective by responding 
to the following research question: (iv) What are the main Shari’ah risks faced by 
these sukuk structures in particular the SABIC sukuk? 
Objectives 5 and 6: to examine how sukuk are perceived by existing laws in Saudi 
Arabia and to identify the existing gaps in the legal framework and financing 
structures with the objective of determining legal risks associated with sukuk; as well 
as to identify an infrastructure in terms of regulatory and legislative frameworks for 
sukuk; These two objectives are addressed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7 that attempted 
to answer the following question: (v) What are the main legal risks faced by these 
sukuk structures? 
Objective 7: to critically examine the legal, regulative, Shari’ah and Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board related risks in the case of SABIC sukuk. In responding to this 
objective, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 provided the main recommendations, which addressed 
the following research question; what have been the consequences of Shari’ah and 
legal risks faced by Saudi sukuk structures? 
1.3.2 Structural Design of the Research 
It is important to state that due to the nature of the research, three main empirical 
chapters (Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) have been developed following two 
literature review chapters (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3).   
This thesis, therefore, represents a hybrid thesis structure, as in addition to empirical 
chapters as independent essays; there are two literature review chapters for providing 
a foundation. Each of the empirical essays provides its own particular literature 
review on the specific aspect of the theme discussed in the respective chapter, 
followed by empirical analysis and concludes by critical reflections. Thus, three of the 




strategy, facilitated a better presentation of the identified individual arguments in an 
efficient manner. 
It should be noted that a general Research Methodology is presented in Chapter 4, 
which has implications for each of the essays.  
1.4 RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION 
In the last few years, Islamic finance has developed significantly despite all the 
domestic and international; challenges as well as competitions with conventional 
finance sector. With such unprecedented developments, Islamic investment 
instruments have become more attractive for many investors, whether individuals, 
companies or governments because of its compliance with the Shari’ah law. The 
success of sukuk in the capital markets in many Muslim countries such as Malaysia 
and Bahrain has led many investors as individuals or companies in Saudi Arabia to 
invest their money via sukuk. 
This study, hence, focuses on sukuk in a response to the increasing use and popularity 
of sukuk as an asset class and investment tool. However, the attractiveness of sukuk in 
the international financial markets as evidenced from the large number of issuances in 
the last decade in different countries is one of important reasons to study sukuk in this 
research. This is further substantiated by the successful performance of sukuk in short 
period to compete with conventional instruments, which are forbidden in Shari’ah. 
Despite the impact of the crisis, the capacity of sukuk to return to pre-crisis issuance 
levels in 2014 with total global sukuk issuance amounting to just over USD 120,854 
million at the end of 2014 has shown that it is an asset class, which has proved its 
resilience, sources of which should be studied through academic rigour. 
It should also be stated that there is not enough literature in the field of sukuk with the 
urgent need for the existence of these studies especially for the Saudi Arabian case, 
where the largest number of issuances have taken place.  
An important motivation has been the impact of the financial crisis, which has had 
consequences of sukuk market, as the default observed in the GCC region, namely in 
Dubai. This clearly identifies that sukuk, despite its identified salient features being 




order to locate the sources of these risk exposures and the sources of failures in 
relation to risk management, this research should be considered as a welcome 
contribution. 
It should also be noted that as even before the financial crisis, a number of sceptical 
voices raised on the Shari’ah based nature of sukuk; indicating the legal risks 
associated with it. Thus, a rigorous research needed to examine and explore such 
issues, as aimed by this study. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Since mid-20
th
 century, there has been an increasing interest in research in relation to 
interest-free banks or IBF, which has seen a significant increase in the recent years. 
Over the past few years, Islamic finance has become a prominent competitor in the 
global financial markets. The success of Islamic financial institutions in the world 
markets has led many researchers to pay attention to this new paradigm.  
Among the Islamic financing tools, sukuk are considered as one of the most important 
Islamic finance investment tool. The significance of this research is to contribute 
something new to the existing literature with regard to the risk issues related to sukuk 
within Islamic finance sector, which have not been studied extensively. This research, 
hence, is part of this emerging academic attempt in understanding the nature of sukuk 
with its legal, Shari’ah and regulative dimensions and the risks exposures. 
Equally important is the fact that this study throws new light and makes suggestions 
on Shari’ah and legal issues concerning issuance of sukuk and securitization in Saudi 
Arabia, a country that as of present does not have any special laws regarding Islamic 
finance in general. Furthermore, researching sukuk is still very rare and therefore it is 
hoped that this research could be useful for Islamic financial institutions, investors 
and governments. This research could also be helpful in decision making and policy 
formulation. 
The contribution of this research stems from three main areas which can be 
summarised in the following points, which also explains and articulates the methods 





(i) Contributions in exploring Shari’ah risks associated with the structure of SABIC 
sukuk 
This research also contributed in identifying and discussing the most significant risks 
to which sukuk structure in general and SABIC sukuk in particular might be exposed 
through the following approach: 
(a) Reviewing the previous research studies 
In this regard, this research tends to explore the most significant Shari’ah issues 
associated with sukuk structures that have been argued and discussed in the previous 
research studies. These critical issues will be presented to SBSS in order to 
understand their opinions. 
(b) Interviewing the members of SBSS 
As has already been mentioned above, the interview was conducted with members of 
the SBSS to explore their opinion in relation to sukuk in general and SABIC sukuk in 
particular, which is considered as a major contribution provided by this research. 
Accordingly, the members of SBSS will be interviewed to explore their views 
regarding the structure of SABIC sukuk that has been approved by them in order to 
understand the most significant problems in terms of Shari’ah to which SABIC sukuk 
might have been exposed and that have already been discussed in previous research 
studies. 
(c) Critical and analytical study of SABIC sukuk structure in terms of Shari’ah   
This research should also be considered for its contribution in rendering a critical 
study on Shari’ah risks for the Saudi Arabian sukuk namely SABIC sukuk, whose 
structure was approved by most prominent scholars of Islamic finance particularly in 
Saudi Arabia. 
In this regard, the main contribution of this study is the empirical analysis of the sukuk 
issuances in Saudi Arabia and the examination of their Shari’ah compliance .
Particularly, the framework developed to examine the Shari’ah compliance of the 
SABIC sukuk represents another contribution with regard to the originality of this 




current sukuk structures and the related Islamic financial contracts. It should be noted 
that this research contributes to the current efforts to develop and improve knowledge 
and perceptions on the existing state of Islamic finance instruments generally and 
sukuk structures specifically and the compliance of both with Shari’ah. 
Hence, this study is anticipated to provide as a reference for people whether 
individual Shari’ah scholars, Shari’ah supervisory board members or researchers 
seeking to understand how sukuk structures and related contracts are structured and 
how can the necessities and principles of Shari’ah be implemented and realised in 
practice. Importantly, they will understand as to how particular risks emerge in sukuk 
cases by examining the finding on SABIC sukuk related explored risk issues. 
Therefore, the empirical findings will be beneficial to the decision makers of the 
Islamic banks and institutions as to have a clear perceptions and understanding of the 
existing status of sukuk structures.  
(ii) Contributions in exploring legal risks associated with the structure of SABIC 
sukuk: 
Identifying the legal risks to which SABIC sukuk have been exposed is also deemed 
as an important contribution made by this study through the following approaches; 
(a) Reviewing the previous research studies 
These researches also explored and render a critical discussion on the most important 
issue presented by previous literature review featuring the legal risks to which sukuk 
structures might be exposed including SABIC sukuk. 
(b) Interviewing the legal expert in sukuk and sukuk market 
In exploring the legal risks were faced by SABIC sukuk, this study presented the 
opinion of the top three persons representing bodies related to sukuk, namely Capital 
Market Authority (CMA), the Shari’ah court and one of the legal specialists in sukuk. 
Those specialised interviews tend to identify and explore the most significant legal 
risks in relation to sukuk issued in Saudi Arabia. 
The most important contribution in this study is that it has determined an evaluation 




associated with sukuk structure. Thus, by considering such risks in SABIC sukuk 
structures, and also other sukuk structures, one could manage to understand, examine 
and evaluate the most Shari’ah and legal risks.   
(iii) Contributions in exploring the risk associated with SSB 
This research provides benchmark standard points featuring the most important risks 
associated with Shari’ah boards. In other words, this study attempted to raise the 
awareness of those involved in sukuk particularly the members of Shari’ah boards, 
decision makers of banks and Islamic institutions and investors with regard to the 
risks associated with SSB. These are through the following ways: 
(a) Reviewing the previous research studies 
This research contributes to the relevant literature by identifying the most important 
risks stemming from SSB through reviewing the previous literature review. Those 
risks could be associated with a clear understanding of the exact role of SSB or 
otherwise the nonexistence of international standards issued by trustworthy 
organisations that make those standards binding to SSB in terms of commitment to 
those standards in relation to the approval of sukuk. Furthermore, by reviewing the 
previous studies, this research explored the risks that might be associated with the 
failure of the members of SSB to play their role in relation to the approval of the 
products of Islamic financing in general and sukuk in particular. 
(b) Interviewing those concerned with Islamic sukuk 
Another contribution is that this study attempted to review and discuss the views of 
Shari’ah scholars, academics and judges in Saudi Arabia as well as Shari’ah scholars 
as members of SSB who were in charge of approving the Islamic financial 
instruments particularly sukuk that have been issued in Saudi Arabia. Such primary 
data and its critical analysis shed a great deal of light on the identified risk issues by 
people who have involved in SABIC sukuk issuance at first hand. In addition, this 
research contributes through the analysis of the interviews to understand the main 
risks emerged as a result of failure of SSB to fulfil their expected role in relation to 




(c) Interviewing the members of Shari’ah board of SABIC sukuk (SBSS) 
Given the fact that this study focused on a specific case study featuring SABIC sukuk, 
another contribution of this research relates to the interviews involving the members 
of Shari’ah board that approved SABIC sukuk, which is made up of three members 
considered the most prominent Shari’ah scholars in Islamic finance not only in Saudi 
Arabia but in the world as a whole. Having the opinions of such Shari’ah scholars 
through first-hand experience renders this research as original. In other words, those 
interviews definitely contributed to the understanding of the views of the most 
important three experts in Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia regarding the nature of 
their work in relation to the approval of SABIC sukuk and other matters associated 
with that SSB.  
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
While a detailed Research Methodology is provided in Chapter 4, this section presents 
a short section. In responding to the aims, objectives and the research questions, this 
research utilised qualitative and descriptive research methods. Through qualitative 
research method, interview schedule is utilised to gather data relating to risks aspects 
of sukuk. In this, professional lawyers as well as financiers but also Shari’ah scholars 
were interviewed to benefit from their knowledge and experience so that the 
responses can be developed for the identified research questions. Such primary data 
constitutes the main substance of the research in this study. 
In addition, SABIC sukuk was taken as a case study. Therefore, an attempt was made 
to examine their structures and the relevant documentation (including legal/shari’ah 
documents) to identify the potential risk areas through descriptive documentation 
analysis of the paperwork of the structures. 
As a data examination method, this study uses analytical critique method to examine 
the existing sukuk structures and legislations as well as the relevant documents of the 
SABIC sukuk. 
1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH  




After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 highlights an introduction to sukuk and 
sukuk structures with regard to the conception definition of sukuk, sukuk types, basic 
structure of existing sukuk, AAOIFI`s ruling in relation to sukuk, issues in sukuk, 
critical perspective, trends and developments in the global sukuk market. 
Chapter 3 outlines the Islamic capital market and sukuk in Saudi Arabia and evaluates 
the sukuk market in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the legal and regulative environment 
and institutions for sukuk in Saudi Arabia are identified. 
Chapter 4 describes the research methodology. In this chapter qualitative and 
descriptive research method aspects are explored through research methodology, 
research design, research strategy, and data collection and data analysis methods. 
Chapter 5 introduces the main risks associated with Shari’ah supervisory boards. This 
chapter is divided into four sections, as the first one will highlight the importance of 
the Shari’ah supervisory board and the risks associated. The second part presents the 
primary data collected through interview survey from the field with the specialists in 
sukuk structures with regard to the significance of SSB by using a thematic analysis. 
The third section presents the primary data collected through interview survey from 
the field with the Shari’ah board members who were in charge of approving SABIC 
sukuk (SBSS) regarding their duty in approving and structuring SABIC sukuk as well 
as related issues. The last part of this chapter discusses and explores the risks which 
SABIC sukuk could be exposed from the time of issuing till the maturity. 
Chapter 6 explores the main Shari’ah risks in relation to sukuk structures in general 
and SABIC sukuk in specific. The first part discusses and explores the critical issues 
associated with Shari’ah non-compliance risks, while the second section reports and 
discusses the position of the SBSS, particularly with regard to the issues related to the 
structure of SABIC sukuk. The third section discusses and examines the SABIC sukuk 
structure and the related documents from Shari’ah perspective to identify Shari’ah 
risks. Interview data were critically utilised to respond to the research questions 
identified in this research. 
Chapter 7 explores and examines the main legal risks associated with sukuk structures 
issued in Saudi Arabia. This chapter is divided into three sections; section one 




risks related to the sukuk holders, sales of assets, default, bankruptcy etc. are 
highlighted and identified. Section two provides a critical understanding of the 
identified issues in the SABIC sukuk, through the interviews were conducted with 
those who are specialised in the legal side of Islamic finance especially sukuk such as 
lawyers, judges of Shari’ah courts, researchers and academic staff. The third part of 
this chapter attempted to explore and identify the legal risks related to SABIC sukuk.  
Chapter 8 presents the conclusion of the research by summarizing the findings and 
highlighting the most important results in the research. As well as the 























Chapter 2                                               
AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE AND SUKUK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Islamic banking and finance (IBF) sector has become one of the fastest growing 
sectors in the world as well as it has received great acceptance by both Muslim 
countries and non-Muslim countries. While initially developments in the sector has 
been around commercial banking, in the recent years, developments of Islamic 
financial and Islamic capital markets have shifted the development trajectory of 
Islamic finance towards more sophisticated institutions, operations and transactions.  
In this regard, sukuk can be considered as one of the most popular Islamic financial 
instruments. This chapter aims to provide an overview of Islamic financial principles 
and then will focus on sukuk with its aspects, definition and types before concluding 
the chapter with the global developments and trends in relations to sukuk. In addition, 
the types as well as the structures of investment sukuk and the AAOIFI’S ruling in 
relation to sukuk are also discussed.     
2.2   THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Since the mid-20
th
 century a group of Muslim scholars from various countries 
endeavoured to reformulate the financial instruments historically used by of Muslims 
in their trading activities (Warde, 2000). However, those scholars had to take the 
initiative to develop an alternative financial system with an authentic understanding of 
Islamic teaching, while Shari’ah rules have been re-interpreted to open new outlets 
for investment to cope with the significant advance in the Western financial systems. 
Consequently, the old financial instruments have been re-invented according to 
Shari’ah rules such as excluding riba or interest and gharar or uncertainty to ensure 
Shari’ah compliancy (Usmani, 2002). 
The idea of IBF is considered part and parcel of the concept of Islamic moral 
economy (IME), which features a set of divine and moral rules that control economic 
activities and financial transactions so that the overall social good can be achieved 
(Asutay, 2010). It should be mentioned that Islamic financing is shaped by fiqh in the 




constitutes the reference for Muslims with regard to financial transactions (McMillen, 
2001). In addition, it is shaped by Islamic morality in providing the moral 
underpinning. Thus, the concept of Islamic finance and economics should necessarily 
incorporate the norms and forms relevant to the Islamic doctrine (Wardiwiyono, 
2013). 
It can be noted that the failure of economic development programmes in the third 
world countries in general and the Muslim countries in particular have motivated the 
search for modernising the financial and economic institutions in the latter (Ayub, 
2009). Thus with the emergence of Islamic economics and finance, the main aim is to 
establish a Muslim approach in economic development as oppose to the western 
materialistic economic approach. In this regard, the capitalist and socialist systems are 
deemed as morally inadequate by Muslim standards (Asutay, 2010). Therefore, the 
emergence of Islamic finance and economics is related to the development list needs 
in the Muslim world. In addition, in the wake of public grievances featuring Muslim 
countries to explore new financial transactions that refrain from practices that do not 
comply with Shari’ah, the idea of Islamic banks has come into existence in mid-1970s 
(Ibrahim, 2007). With the idea of exploring new modes of Islamic financing as to help 
Muslim capable of investing their money or otherwise dealing with financial 
transactions without offending the Shari’ah. 
The initial experience in modern times in Islamic banking was in 1963, when the idea 
of Islamic banks came into application through the establishment of a social bank in 
the town of Mith Gamr to the north of Cairo (Mayer, 1985), which was based on 
accepting deposits from individuals provided that those deposits meet the minimum 
amount defined by the bank. The bank then managed to invest those deposits directly 
or indirectly through experienced partners. At the end of every year, the bank 
distributed the profits or losses between account holders. In addition, the bank 
established a fund for mandatory charity (zakat) and social services (Sairally, 2007). 
Within one year of establishing the bank, the number of clients exceeded 18 thousand 
leading to the promotion of the idea all over the region. However, in mid-1967 
traditional banks took control of this bank. The introduction of interest damaged the 
Islamic reputation of such Islamic social and saving banks (Siddiqi, 2006). That 




under Law 66 of 1971 featuring the establishment of Nasir Social Bank Corporation 
with the objective of boosting social objective among the public, accepting deposits 
and providing help to those in need (Perry, 2011) on the condition that the bank 
should not be involved in interest-based transactions. 
Another attempt in institutionalisation of Islamic finance came with Tabung Haji in 
1967 in Malaysia in the form of saving association, which mainly aimed at investing 
the savings of potential pilgrims to enable them to undertake their pilgrimage with full 
financial confidence (Sairally, 2007). 
It should be stated that the establishment of the IDB in 1974 was a landmark 
achievement of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) (or Organisation for 
Islamic Co-operation as it is known), which is considered as the ‘World Bank’ version 
for the Muslim world. In October 1974, the bank was established in Saudi Arabia 
based in Jeddah, and eventually started its activities in October 1976 with a 
subscribed capital of USD750 million. The main aim of the Islamic Development 
Bank was to encourage socio-economic progress for the people of member countries 
and Muslim communities at large in accordance with Shari’ah principles (Usmani, 
1998; Warde, 2000), which also took the task of developing Islamic banking and 
finance. 
Apart from the fully Islamised banking system of Iran in the post 1979 period, initial 
experiment in Islamic commercial banking came with Dubai Islamic Bank and the 
Kuwaiti Finance House in 1974 and 1977, respectively (Wilson, 2009). In addition, 
the first international conference in Islamic Economics was held in the Holy city of 
Makkah in 1976 under the auspices of King Abdul Aziz University. It should be 
mentioned that the conference was considered the first scientific conference bringing 
together researchers concerned with issues pertaining to the Islamic economy 
including Islamic banks (El-Gamal, 2006). 
Furthermore, Faisal Islamic Bank was established in Sudan on April 1977 to serve the 
community there in accordance with the principles of Shari’ah.  In the same year, 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt was established, followed by the establishment of the 
International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development in 1979. Then 




Starting from 1985 onwards, Pakistan began a program to incorporate its banking 
system into the Islamic system in the aftermath of the execution of a five-year-plan 
(Khan and Bhatti, 2008; Visser, 2013). 
It is important to note that the growth of IBFs in terms of finances and asset base has 
been unprecedented since the 1990s: there were 176 IBFs in 1997 (Algaoud and 
Lewis, 2007), which increased to 261 in 2006 according to Boudjelal (2006). By 
2015, the number rose to over 500 institutions operating in 75 countries (The Banker, 
2015). During this period, the growth in the asset size of Islamic financial institutions 
has been unprecedented as well; as despite the political, legal and regulative 
hindrances in each of the countries in which they exists, the Islamic banking asset 
base has reached over USD 2 trillion by 2015 with double digit annual growth rates 
(The Banker, 2015). 
The advance of the Islamic banking industry and its expansion in the Muslim world 
has drawn the attention of some countries in Europe and America to the experiment of 
Islamic finance as an alternative for traditional financing particularly for Muslim 
minorities. In fact, the Islamic banking business has become a main focus of attention 
around the world as the assets of Islamic banks are becoming so huge compared with 
the short duration of the experiment (Ahmed, 2011). In particular in the aftermath of 
global financial crisis during 2007-2009, the success of Islamic finance with its 
observed resilience against the crisis increased the demand from non-Muslim quarters 
towards Islamic finance. This process encouraged Western countries particularly the 
United Kingdom (UK) to develop Shari’ah compliant financial environment to attract 
capital from Muslim countries particularly from the GCC countries. Secondly, they 
have been motivated to satisfy the desires of the Muslim communities in those 
countries as to comply with Shari’ah law in terms of financial transactions whereby 
increasing the financial inclusion by overcoming religious exclusion in financial 
activities. With such motivations, IBF started to operate in Europe as early as the 
1980s; however, European banks have been operating in the Middle East since the 
1920s (Wilson, 2008; Ahmed, 2009). 
According to Ayub (2009) Islamic financial institutions have been recognized and 
their credibility has been witnessed across the world with the assistance of global 




international Islamic financial market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Centre 
(LMC). 
However, despite the significant achievement made by IBF over the last 40 years and 
yet in the wake of the wave of globalization, the beset the world in the 1990s IBF has 
compromised its Islamic identity in favour of traditional commercial banking (Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2005; Asutay, 2007). Thus, in order to cope with the traditional 
system of finance, efficiency and profitability rather than social justice has become 
the main focus of IBF (Asutay, 2012). In doing so, IBF has become part and parcel of 
the global financial system leaving aside its Islamic values. In other words, IBF no 
longer provides an alternative for the conventional system, but instead operates as a 
component of that system (Asutay, 2007). 
2.3 THE CONCEPTION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
The Islamic system of finance provides a potential alternative to the conventional 
financial system, not only for Muslim countries but also for the rest of the world 
(Iqbal, 1997). The interest-free Islamic banking is based on prohibition of riba 
(interest), which constitutes one of the main features of the concept of IBF (Saeed, 
1996). However, the exact definition of the term riba has been a matter for debate 
among Islamic scholars, and yet the majority of Muslims believe that all interest-
based transactions should be considered as riba (Ahmad and Hassan, 2007). 
Nonetheless, some scholars such as Mohammed Sayyed Altantantawi, who used to be 
Sheikh of Al-Azhar, one of the oldest Islamic learning institutions in the world, 
argued that a reasonable interest rate would be allowed in Islam (Warde, 2000), 
which, however, as a position, has not gained any momentum. 
In an attempt to provide a definition, it can be stated that any financial practice 
consistent with Shari’ah law should be described as Islamic finance (Tayyebi, 2008). 
In this regard, Islam has its own code of moral practice in business that makes the 
Muslim societies take their place among civilised societies (Ayub, 2009). 
The concept of Islamic finance is mainly based on the idea of refraining riba or 
interest-based transactions as well as avoiding all practices that could be ambiguous 




Muslims are encouraged to make their earnings through permissible means (halal) 
yearning for social justice as their main goal (El-Gamal, 2000).  
In shaping the principles of Islamic finance, Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet 
Mohammed (pbuh) remain the main ontological sources. The moral and legal 
principles driven from these sources along with historical and classical sources of 
Islam tend to make a clear distinction between those institutions and conventional 
financial institutions. However, the definition of Islamic finance should go beyond the 
prohibition of riba to include all controversial business activity that could be socially 
and ethically unacceptable according to Islamic standards (Warde, 2000; Asutay, 
2007, 2012). 
In relation to the main principles of Islamic finance, risk sharing remains an important 
distinguishing nature of Islamic finance in the sense that all the parties involved in the 
financial transaction should equally share any potential risk (Ahmed and Khan, 2007; 
Ahmed, 2010). This is not the case with traditional financing where the borrower 
takes all the risk while the lender is guaranteed to receive a pre-determined profit on 
top of the sum he has given away (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). Therefore, this is a kind 
of exploitation of one party to another which is socially and ethically unacceptable, 
whereas profit and loss sharing would be a fair deal for both parties (Iqbal, 1997; 
Asutay, 2008). Thus, as a natural consequence of risk sharing, profit-and-loss sharing 
constitutes the second main operational nature of Islamic finance. Thirdly, social 
development should be the top priority for individuals as well as financial institution 
through giving charity and paying zakat (mandatory charity) to the needy and the less 
fortunate as well as Islamic finance goes beyond simple transactions and banking 
services to include other services such as: security firms, insurance companies and 
mutual funds (Warde, 2000). Therefore, through Islamic finance, Islamic economic 
principles would be put into practice (Visser, 2013) by developing a socially and 
financial optimal outcome in the process. 
Islamic social accountability in the form of ‘hereafter’ helps Muslim individuals to 
shape their financial behaviour along with in other spheres. Thus, Muslims should 
always bear in mind that they cannot escape the divine justice, and that should make 
them avoid all malpractices in their business dealings. This implies that people should 




should help others for the sake of Allah. Thus, Islamic ethical principle and moral 
articulations in everyday practice remain an important paradigm in shaping the nature 
of Islamic financing, which pays attention to the society at large as to avoid greed and 
social injustice (Asutay, 2007; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011).  
2.4   ISLAMIC FINANCING PRINCIPLES  
Islamic finance features any business practice based on the principles of Shari’ah or 
more precisely consistent with the rules of Islamic commercial jurisprudence 
(Usmani, 2002). However, it should be noted that business transactions and practices 
that are socially and ethically unacceptable according to Islamic standards are 
considered prohibited as prescribed by Shari’ah. The prohibited practices include 
interest (riba), uncertain transactions (gharar), and gambling (maysir or qimar). In the 
meantime, Islam encourages individuals to practice trade with all the due honesty and 
credibility (El-Gamal, 2006). In addition, financial transactions should also consider 
positively contributing to social good and human well-being as established by 
maqasid al-Shari’ah (Ahmed, 2009;Dusuki and Bouheraoua, 2011). These principles 
are discussed in the following sections: 
The Prohibition of Riba 
The first major principles of Islamic finance is that the prohibition of riba or interest.  
Muslims unanimously agree that riba is considered as a major sin in Islam as well as 
any kind of financial transactions involved riba is impermissible (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2011). In this regard, Ayub (2009) defines the word riba as unlawful gain as opposed 
to profit from sale. Therefore, the word riba literally means ‘excess’, referring to any 
increase in capital through giving loans to others or any other interest-based deal and 
transactions (Iqbal, 1997). 
In this respect, according to Archer and Abdel Karim (2002), Shari’ah rejects interest-
based business transactions as morally unacceptable amounting to the exploitation of 
one party to another. In other words, Islam considers a return or rent on money is 
immoral and unfair (El-Gamal, 2006). In addition to considered as morally and 
socially unlawful, riba prohibition is also rationalized on the ground of economic 




The Islamic solution for overcoming riba has been through focusing on real economy 
embedded financial transactions. Accordingly, money should be invested through the 
purchase and sale of tangible assets, and income streams should be derived from the 
economic use of those assets (Usmani, 2002). 
According to Iqbal and Tsubota (2008), the prohibition of riba should not be confused 
with other business returns on capital. Moreover, Islam always encourages people to 
work and become actively involved in business provided that the business does not 
harm or offend others as this is not the case with riba where one party is offended and 
exploited by the other. 
In terms of developing the embedded economy in overcoming interest, the ‘profit-
and-loss sharing’ and ‘risk sharing’ type of financing is considered (Archer and Abdel 
Karim, 2002; DeLorenzo, 2006). Such principles aims at developing real economy 
based financing in the sense that financing is embedded in the real economy and 
Islamic norms. This should imply that money does not produce money without effort 
or taking risks (Asyraf, 2011). This should make a clear distinction between profit 
from sales and interest from loans (Vogel and Hayes, 1998). In aiming to overcome 
the interest and its impact, it should be noted that IME does not allow money to be 
generated via the credit scheme, as money is considered not having any intrinsic value 
(Iqbal, 1997).  
Prohibition of Gharar 
Gharar is the second major prohibition in the principles of Islamic finance, which 
involves an uncertain or risky deal as the deal is made for a future product which 
could or could not materialize (Ayub, 2009). Therefore, any deal involving gharar is 
prohibited by Shari’ah.  
Literally, gharar means risk or uncertainty (Iqbal and Llewellyn, 2002). According to 
El-Gamal, (2001) gharar involves the sale of items whose existence is uncertain or 
doubtful. For this reason, gharar deals amount to gambling, which is prohibited by 
Shari’ah. Some examples of gharar include selling fish in the water, a calf in the 
womb, birds in the air, a runaway animal, un-ripened fruits on trees, a crop before 
harvest, etc. In all of the above cases, the sold item is uncertain which makes the trade 




where gharar strongly affects common practice in contemporary financial 
transactions: insurance and financial derivatives (Siddiqui, 2008). 
According to jurists, three types of gharar are identified: major or excessive gharar, 
minor gharar and the third type is in the grey area between the two other types 
(Aldarer, 1993). Accordingly, involvement in excessive gharar should invalidate the 
contract unless there is a public needs such as salam contract, while the minor one 
could be tolerated (Al-saati, 2003; Ahmed, 2011; Lahsasna, 2013). It should be 
mentioned that since any transaction cannot be entirely gharar-free, the validity or 
otherwise invalidity of any contract or transaction could be variable depending upon 
the level of uncertainty (Al-Suwailem, 1999). Nonetheless, scholars have put three 
conditions for invalidating a transaction or contract as gharar. Firstly, there must be a 
clear evidence that the contract or transaction belongs to excessive gharar category. 
Secondly, the subject of the contract or transaction must be commutative financial 
contract-like sale. Thirdly, the subject of dispute must be the principle component of 
the sale such as the case with an unborn calf as the parties involved have no idea 
whether the infant will be born alive or dead (Al-Suwailem, 1999; Al-saati, 2003; El-
Gamal, 2006).   
It should be noted that the rationale behind the prohibition of gharar is that such 
transactions could become a cause of potential disputes between the parties involved 
and could possibly disrupt social peace (Ayub, 2009). 
Prohibition of Gambling (Maisir-Qimar) 
In cases where gambling (maisir or qimar) is involved, one can earn easy money 
without making any effort (El-Gamal, 2000), which implies that big gain is simply 
made at the expense of others who are unfortunate. The only requirement for 
gambling is the extent to which a gambler is prepared to take risks (Vogel and Hayes, 
1998). In other words, the gambler usually risks a small amount of money to earn 
huge amounts in no time provided that luck plays in his favour, with the possibility 
that he might lose. In this sense, gambling in Islam is deemed as a sort of gharar as 
the gambler relies on luck and nothing else, i.e. either wins it all or loses it all (Ayub, 
2009).  However, it becomes obvious that gambling is prohibited in Islam as it tends 




without making any effort (Chapra, 2009). It should be noted that some perceive 
gambling as a form of gharar featuring the sale of items whose existence is uncertain 
and specifications unclear, which casts doubts on the validity of the transaction 
(Zahraa and Mahmor, 2002). 
2.5   ISLAMIC FINANCING INSTRUMENTS 
Over the centuries, a number of Islamic financing products have been developed and 
used in different parts of the world. These can be classified into three main categories: 
‘profit and loss sharing contracts’ or PLS; ‘debt-based contracts’; and ‘others.  In the 
first group mudarabah and musharakah can be considered, murabahah, ijarah and 
other debt oriented financial contracts classified under the second group; and the third 
group cover the instruments which are not the main financing instruments such as 
quard-al-hassan. 
2.5.1 PLS Based Modes of Financing  
(i) Mudarabah 
According to El-Gamal (2006), the high potential of Islamic financial industry is 
greatly a function of the model of mudarabah (silent partnership) due to its embedded 
nature of financing. Therefore, it is a venture capital type of financing, which, as 
Islamic moral economy articulates, it is the best solution to financing problem. Thus, 
mudarabah features a business partnership (shirkah) between a company and an agent 
in which case the former provides money for investment by the latter. The profit is to 
be shared in accordance with agreed terms, whereas the loss is to be borne by the 
provider of capital as long as the terms of partnership are being met by the agent 
(Siddiqi, 1985). However, the agreement should not refer to fixed profits or 
percentages to be returned to the provider otherwise it will be a form of usury (riba), 
which is prohibited in Islam (Ahmed, 2015). 
The fact that a contract involving mudarabah gives the two parties the right to 
withdraw from the agreement at any time on reasonable notice, could create serious 
problems in modern commercial enterprises. In case of mudarabah, however, profit 
can only be distributed after clearing all liabilities and commitments (Iqbal and 




highlighted by (Siddiqi, 1983; El-Husseini, 1988; Usmani, 2002; DIFC, 2009) as 
follows; 
(i) The process of financing in relation to mudarabah should not mean advancing of 
money; 
(ii) The provider should be ready to bear the losses or otherwise share those losses 
with the agent in accordance with the contract; 
(iii) Allocation of profit is a matter of agreement between the parties involved, and yet 
the distribution of profits should take into account the efforts made by each of those 
parties; 
It should be noted that mudarabah is not a popularly utilised Islamic financing mode 
in the contemporary world; due to the agency problem, moral hazard and adverse 
selection related issues (Kahf and Khan, 1992; Ahmed, 2002), despite the fact it is 
one of the most essentialised moral economy oriented Islamic financing method. 
(ii) Musharakah 
Musharakah involves a contract between two or more parties to establish a business, 
whereby all parties will make contribution in terms of labour and capital (Usmani, 
1999). Consequently, the profits will be shared by the partners involved on an agreed 
basis, while the sharing of losses will be in proportion of capital contribution (Iqbal 
and Llewellyn, 2002). Nonetheless, fixation of sum lump profits will not be allowed 
by Shari’ah (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).  
It should be noted that musharakah provides a real alternative for interest-based 
financing operations undertaken by traditional banking institutions (Khan and 
Mirakhor, 1989). In this regard, it constitutes one of the main methods of financing in 
accordance with Islamic principles (Usmani, 2002). Accordingly, businesses 
involving musharakah should avoid activities that are prohibited by Shari’ah such as 
selling alcohol products, pork, drugs, gambling, etc. In this respect, syndicates 
featuring Islamic and conventional banks should feature contracts taking Shari’ah into 




partnership the value of assets involved should be specific beyond doubt (Usmani, 
2002). 
(iii) Muzara’ah  
This is an agricultural contract where one party provides the land for cultivation and 
the output is shared between the parties involved (Kahf and Khan, 1992). In this 
contract, the land plot and the period of the agreement must be specified (Rahman, 
and Othman, 2012). However, generally speaking muzara’ah and mudarabah both 
seem to resemble one another with a difference (Shaikh, 2013). In practice, 
muzara’ah contract is considered another version of mudarabah in the area of farming 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). 
(iv) Musaqat 
Musaqat contract involves the sharing of arable land provided by one party, while the 
other party provides the labour (Ahmed, 1990). However, both parties contribute 
towards costs including fertilisers’ seeds, pesticides, machinery, etc. (Kahf, 1992). In 
this method of financing, the production is distributed between the two parties in 
accordance with an agreed-upon ratio (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). In addition, the 
bank could be also the provider of orchard and gardens which he owns or otherwise in 
his possession (Ahmed, 1990). The harvest which may be fruits, flowers, leaves, etc. 
could be shared in accordance with a ratio stipulated by the agreement (Ahmed, 
1993).  
In fact, musaqat is a form of musharakah involving a garden or orchard, which 
belongs to one party. The other party provides labour with respect to farming duties 
and the harvest is shared between the two parties in accordance with an agreed-upon 
ratio (Kahf and Khan, 1992). Therefore, in musaqat, a fixed asset featuring a land 
with trees in put at the disposal of a working partner without paying for it. Thus, 
instead of financing, one partner only provides the asset. However, in both musaqat 
and muzara’ah, the output is shared and the contract should show flexibility with 





2.5.2 Sale based Products 
(i) Murabahah 
Murabahah constitutes one of several business contracts that are becoming 
increasingly popular among Islamic financial institutions (Ahmed, 1993). Moreover, 
contracts involving murabahah could be modified as a means of extending credit 
without the need for the principle of interest-based loans, which is prohibited by 
Shari’ah (Usmani, 1998). However, murabahah could be used by Islamic banks to 
finance businesses involving raw materials, machinery, consumer goods etc. (Khoja, 
1995).  
The term murabahah originates from the Arabic word ‘ribh’, which means profit, 
gain or addition (Hamzah et. al, 2014). According to Ayub (2009), murabahah 
implies that the cost of the commodity needs to be known so that an agreed margin of 
profit can be decided. As far as Islam is concerned, murabahah is considered a lawful 
transaction, and yet the practice has its own limitations.  
In medieval ages, however, murabahah per se’ was deemed as a mode of trade rather 
than a method of financing (Ayub, 2012). However, despite the associated limitations, 
jurists of contemporary times accepted murabahah as an alternative for interest-based 
financing. In this regard, jurists argue that despite its limitations murabahah tend to 
protect the needy, the less skilful and inexperienced among purchasers against 
powerful and greedy businessmen. Nonetheless, as long as no reference in Qur’an or 
Sunnah that clearly prohibit the practice exists, then it can be adopted subject to the 
conditions set by jurists and scholars. Accordingly, murabahah has been allowed as 
an alternative of interest-based transactions, which are not compatible with Shari’ah 
principles (Hussain, 2012).  
It is noteworthy that for murabahah transactions to be valid two discrete contracts 
should be considered by the bank involved: a purchase contract and selling contract 
featuring the subject commodity (Ayub, 2009). Additionally, the selling contract 
should include detailed specifications of the commodity in terms of price and delivery 
time schedule as well as the methods of payment so that those specifications should 




Being the mark-up type of financial contract, murabahah is the most popular 
instrument used by Islamic banking and finance in the contemporary world as when it 
is compared to the PLS modes it is less risky (Tariq and Dar, 2007; Ahmed, 2002). 
(ii) Ijarah 
‘Ijarah’ per se is not considered a mode of financing but rather a normal business sale 
activity. However, according to Usmani (2005), for one reason or another, most likely 
for reasons having to do with taxation, this kind of transaction is becoming popular in 
Western countries as a method of financing. Usmani (2005) states that ijarah can be 
best defined as a form of leasing where the usufruct of a particular property or service 
is transferred from the original owner to another person under a special contract or 
agreement. 
According to Anwar (2003), two forms of lease contracts exist in relation to IF’s 
investment, i.e. operational lease and financial lease. In case of the former, the 
usufruct of a particular asset, which could be machinery, trains, ships, cars etc. is sold 
to a lessee for a fixed price and a fixed duration of time. In most cases involving such 
leasing any unexpected breakdown would be the responsibility of the lessor, while 
regular maintenance of the leased item is the duty of the lessee. Subsequently, short 
periods of sudden breakdowns will increase the risk to be taken by the lessor. On the 
other hand, in case of finance lease, it involves a longer period of time favouring the 
lessor in terms of amortizing costs of the assets with profit and retaining relatively 
higher financial security. The lessee can buy the asset at the current market price 
when the contract terminates. However, finance lease can terminate at any time by the 
mutual consent of the parties involved. According to some scholars finance lease 
could be financially infeasible as it leaves the lessee far worse-off compared to 
interest-based financing which is not allowed by Islam (Ibrahim, 2007). 
It should be noted that some key differences exist between ijarah and traditional 
leasing. To mention but a few of those differences is that the original owner has to 
take all risks in relation to the leased item at all times (Hanif, 2014). Moreover, at the 
end of the lease sale to the lessee is not a condition of the contract. The bank gains its 
profits from the profit charges on the cost of the leased asset and that profit is incurred 




ijarah is that it is not an interest-based transaction. For this reason, even though ijarah 
is not a mode of financing in the real sense of the word, it is widely used by Islamic 
banks to acquire assets for their clients.  In certain countries ijarah could be useful for 
gaining tax concessions. However, whether or not transaction related to leasing can be 
used as a mode of financing in terms of Shari’ah depends on the terms and conditions 
of the contracts (Kamali, 2007). 
(iii) Salam 
Salam is a contract involving the purchase of specified goods to be delivered later for 
a prepaid price (Khoja and Abo Ghuddah, 1995). In other words, the quality, quantity 
and delivery time of the goods will be agreed upon in the contract between the two 
parties (Mohammed, 1988). It should be noted that salam is exactly the opposite of 
‘bai mu’ajjal’ or ‘differed sale’ whereby the goods will be delivered in advance for a 
late payment (Hanafi and Kasim, 2006). According to Ayub (2009), bai mu’ajjal 
could be described as being similar to an interest-free loan. However, salam contract 
nonetheless, is valid only in case of fungible commodities.   
It should be noted that salam and istisnaa are considered free from gharar provided 
that the relevant conditions of each are being met (Paldi, 2014). Yet, both istisnaa and 
salam are deemed as forward sales as the delivery of goods in both cases takes place 
later in future (Usmani, 2002). Therefore, in terms of Islamic principles, a sale deal 
can be made whereby the subject item can be delivered in future as the case with 
istisnaa and salam sales (Ayub 2009). 
(iv) Istisnaa 
In the case of Istisnaa, a deal is made featuring a commodity that does not physically 
exist (Usmani, 2005), which implies that the deal could be in the form of an order 
where a manufacturer has to produce a specific product for a purchaser. Therefore, in 
case of istisnaa, the manufacturer is committed to provide a product, while the 
purchaser has to pay nothing in advance. However, such sale contracts nonetheless, 
become valid only in cases where the two parties initially agree on the product in 




It should be noted that istisnaa and salam contracts resemble each other in the sense 
that both are exceptional cases to the rule that prohibit selling something that is non-
existent at the time the deal is being made (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). However, the 
main difference between the two is that istisnaa only involves goods to be 
manufactured, while salam contract can feature any type of goods to be manufactured 
or otherwise (El-Gamal, 2000). Furthermore, in case of salam, a full payment of the 
price is required, whereas in case of istisnaa payment can be made later (Zarqa, 
1997). Finally, in terms of delivery time that must be specified in salam contracts, 
which is not necessarily the case in contracts involving istisnaa (Iqbal, 1999). 
2.6 SUKUK: CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION AND AAOIFI STANDARDS 
RELATING TO SUKUK 
Previous discussion presented the main principles of Islamic financing as well as the 
main Islamic financing instruments used in contemporary Islamic banking and finance 
industry. An important extension of Islamic financing since the beginning of this 
century has been the developments in Islamic capital and financial markets. In 
particular, for the need of long term and for infrastructure financing, Islamic capital 
markets have developed along the identified Islamic financing principles and 
instruments. Sukuk or as commonly known Islamic bond, being the main thrust of 
Islamic capital markets, has been singled out as a dynamic sphere of expansion of 
Islamic financial industry. Since this research is particularly focused on the legal and 
Shari’ah risks associated with sukuk, the following sections aim provide a conceptual 
definition and explain the working mechanism of sukuk with sukuk types and 
concludes with the developments and trends in sukuk markets. 
According to Adam and Thomas (2004), the term sukuk presently used to describe 
Islamic bond is derived from the Arabic language and it is a plural of another Arabic 
word sakk. The term sakk is derived from striking one’s seal on a document or tablet 
representing a contract or conveyance of rights, obligations and or monies (McMillen, 
2006). As a modern concept in the corporate world, sukuk refers to a financial 
instrument that carries with it specific property rights and obligations including some 
form of asset ownership (Adam and Thomas, 2004).  
In financial terms, sukuk are described as asset-backed certificates of participation 




(usufruct), entailing the granting to an investor of a share of an asset along with the 
cash flow and proportionate risk equal to the ownership or level of financial 
participation in the enterprise (Tariq, 2004). 
The AAOIFI in its accounting standard describes sukuk as an investment product in 
order to delineate them from shares and bonds. It defines it as: 
certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of 
tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the ownership of) the assets of 
particular projects or special investment activity, however, this is true after 
receipt of the value of the sukuk, the closing of subscription and the 
employment of funds received for the purpose for which the sukuk were issued. 
(AAOIFI, 2010) 
Equally, the AAOIFI standard goes on to distinguish investment sukuk from shares, 
notes and bonds, within the confine of the standard, as an instrument with an intrinsic 
value. The standard also emphasises that unlike other investment grade securities like 
shares and bonds, investment sukuk do not represent debts owed by the issuer or 
certificate holder and that such sukuk may not be issued with the intention for use for 
a pool of receivables. Finally, the standard notes that that the underlying business 
contract or arrangement for such sukuk must be consistent with Islamic principles 
represented by the Shari’ah (Adam and Thomas, 2004). 
In another definition, sukuk are likened to entitlement scrip with each sukuk (scrip) 
representing a proportional ownership in an underlying asset or project, which may be 
an investment project like a motorway project, energy project, or a property 
development project or a collection of underlying assets (e.g. real assets like a 
factory’s inventory or vehicles held under ijarah scheme of financial institutions) 
(Zohra and Javed, 2007). In other words, an item is bought or financed in such a 
manner that each investor invests a certain amount to its price and operations, and in 
turn becomes owner of the proportion contributed, by holding the sukuk scrip of that 
value.  
It should be noted that sukuk are like stocks (shares) of a company, they represent 
ownership entitlement of assets and the returns on the sukuk ought to be based upon 
the returns from those underlying assets. However, the similarity ends there. Without 
tangible assets or rights of usage of the assets, there can be no sukuk (Yean, 2009). 




property brings them closer to bonds. Hence, sukuk can be defined also as ‘equity 
bonds’, while defeating and negating the primary definition of bonds being debt- 
based instruments (Jabeen, 2007).  
It should be mentioned that sukuk represent a source of generating funds that is 
Islamically permissible based on Islamic finance rules represented by the Shari’ah 
and derives (should derive) its returns from the underlying assets they represent 
(Hassan and Shahid, 2010). 
The Shari’ah board of AAOIFI (2008) has issued six recommendations with regard to 
proper sukuk structure, which are: 
(i) For purposes of marketing, sukuk must be owned by the sukuk holders who retain 
legal right for ownership. In this regard, the task of the management should be 
confined to the transfer of sukuk ownership rather than keeping them as part of their 
assets;  
(ii) Apart from cases where a financial institution is folding or otherwise dealing with 
an urgent financial obligation, sukuk must not feature receivables or debts; 
(iii) Where sukuk are involved, managers are not allowed to offer loans to holders, 
unless they make sure that their actual earnings are in excess of their expected 
earnings. Yet, in some cases managers are allowed to establish a reserve investment in 
order to cover shortfalls as mentioned in the prospectus; 
(iv) Managers, partners as well as investment agents should not re-purchase assets 
from sukuk holders at nominal value when their expiry date is due. Nonetheless, 
assets could possibly be purchased at their net value, market value, fair market value 
or for any price to be agreed upon at the time of purchase provided that the rules of 
Shari’ah in relation to partnership and subject of guarantees are taken into account; 
(v) In cases where ijarah sukuk is involved, the lessee is allowed to purchase the 
leased assets when the sukuk expire in terms of nominal value. However, that should 
only happen on condition that the lessee is neither an investment partner nor is he an 




(vi) Rather than limiting their role to issuing fatawa with regard to sukuk structure, 
Shari’ah supervisory boards should necessarily become concerned with 
implementation and compliance with the rules. 
2.7 TYPES OF INVESTMENT SUKUK 
After identifying the nature and definition of sukuk in the previous section, this 
section presents the types of sukuk. 
As mentioned above, AAOIFI (2010) issued Shari’ah standards for different types of 
sukuk, the common types of investment sukuk in regard to the issuances and trading   
include sukuk of ownership of leased assets, ownership of usufructs, ownership of 
services, murabahah, salam, istisnaa, mudarabah, musharakah, investment agency 
and sharecropping, irrigation and agricultural partnerships; some of these are 
discussed in general in this section. 
2.7.1 Ijarah Sukuk 
According to AAOIFI (2010), the ijarah sukuk can be classified into two types, which 
include sukuk of ownership of leased assets and sukuk of ownership of usufructs 
(manfa’ah). The definition of each type can be included as follows;     
Sukuk of ownership of leased assets 
“These are certificates of equal value issued either by the owner of a leased asset or a 
tangible asset to be leased by promise, or they are issued by a financial intermediary 
acting on behalf of the owner with the aim of selling the asset and recovering its value 
through subscription so that the holders of the certificates become owners of the 
assets” (AAOIFI, 2010). 
Sukuk of ownership of usufructs 
This kind of sukuk structure can be classified into four types according to AAOIFI 
standards, which include; 
(i) Sukuk of ownership of usufructs of existing assets 




(a) “Certificates of equal value issued by the owner of an existing asset either on 
his own or through a financial intermediary, with the aim of leasing the asset 
and receiving the rental from the revenue of subscription so that the usufruct 
of the assets passes into the ownership of the holders of the certificates”. 
(b)  “Certificates of equal value issued by the owner of the usufruct of an existing 
asset (lessee), either on his own or through a financial intermediary, with the 
aim of subleasing the usufruct and receiving the rental from the revenue of the 
subscription so that the holders of the certificates become owners of the 
usufruct of the asset”. 
(ii) Sukuk of ownership of usufructs of described future assets  
“These are certificates of equal value issued for the purpose of leasing out tangible 
future assets and for collecting the rental from the subscription revenue so that the 
usufruct of the described future asset passes into the ownership of the holders of the 
certificates” (AAOIFI, 2010). 
(iii) Sukuk of ownership of services of a specified party 
“These are certificates of equal value issued for the purpose of providing services 
through a specified provider (such as educational benefits in a nominated university) 
and obtaining the service charges in the form of subscription income so that the 
holders of the certificates become owners of these services” (AAOIFI, 2010). 
(iv) Sukuk of ownership of described future services 
“These are certificates of equal value issued for the purpose of providing future 
services through described provider (such as educational benefits from a university 
without naming the educational institution) and obtaining the fee in the form of 
subscription income so that the holders of the certificates become owners of the 
services” (AAOIFI, 2010). 
The most popular underlying asset of the manfa’ah sukuk structure used is the rights 
to the commercial activities, allowing for the intangibles assets to be used in the 
structure of sukuk. The manfa’ah structure can be used when the issuer does not have 




regard, there are deferent examples of manfa’ah used as an asset include the rights of 
intellectual property, the vouchers of airtime which representing minutes of airtime as 
well as the future receivables as result of the marketing contracts (DIFC, 2009; 
Latham and Watkins, 2015).   
It should be mentioned that the structure of ijarah sukuk is deemed by some as the 
basis of other structures, as the simplicity involved in this structure makes it 
compatible with Shari’ah as well as it is preferred and popular among Shari’ah 
scholars as the key contributing factors (Thomas, 2007). However, as far as the 
Islamic financial principles is concerned, the term ‘ijarah’ involves the transfer of the 
usufruct of an asset or property from one person to another in return for rent or lease 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). On the other hand, ijarah sukuk is a kind of securities 
defining the ownership of an asset associated with a specific lease contract so that the 
rent generated from hiring the asset becomes payable to the holders of the sukuk.  
Thus, securitising ijarah sukuk contracts constitutes a key element in solving 
problems in relation to liquidity management paving the way for the process of 
financing public sector projects in developing countries (Ayub, 2005). 
However, the efficiency of the asset and the associated arrangements featuring in the 
contract are the key factors for sukuk structure as to generate good returns in favour of 
potential investors. The main advantage of ijarah sukuk structure is that it provides 
means for regular payments within the life span of the financial contract (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2011). In addition, the flexibility of the structure with regard to tailoring a 
payment profile as well as readjusting methods of calculation to generate the 
anticipated profits is another advantage of this type of sukuk.  Nonetheless, in terms of 
Muslim faith, the structure is widely accepted as being compatible with the spirit of 
Shari’ah Law (Ayub, 2007). Therefore, bearing in mind the above characteristics, 
ijarah becomes a very reliable structure for sukuk. 
In case of ijarah rentals, the arrangement of payment has to be made irrespective of 
the usufruct of the asset by the lessee.  In other words, it is at the discretion of the two 
parties involved in the contract to decide the commencement of the payment 
involving ijarah.  Such a condition renders ijarah contracts more flexible to the 




(1998), this could provide an alternative for interest-borrowing assets useable in the 
process of performing government are durable. 
It should be noted that there are many features of ijarah sukuk, which are as follow 
(Ayub, 2005; Usmani, 2007; Merah, 2008; AAOIFI, 2010): 
(i) Where ijarah contract is involved, the least asset as well as the amount should be 
clearly defined. In this regard, ijarah contracts could include things like buildings 
under construction as long as they are clearly defined in the contract. This is on 
condition that the securitization, sukuk and fund management are capable of 
acquisition, construction or purchase of the asset being leased by the time set for 
delivery to the lessee. The assets can be sold by the lesser as long as that does not 
affect the rights of the lessee, in which case the remaining period of rent will be 
transferred to the new owner.   
(ii) As far as ijarah contracts are concerned, the terms of lease should be clearly 
stipulated in detail with all the possible conditions. For example, benchmarking the 
lease to variables such as inflation rates, periodic price index or otherwise any settled 
percentage. However, the process of benchmarking has been permitted by mainstream 
Shari’ah experts, even though they do not consider the practice as ideal.   
(iii) According to Shari’ah rules, the owner is responsible for the condition of the 
asset at the time of lease, while the lessee bears the responsibility of maintenance and 
running costs. Consequently, that arrangement will affect the returns from the 
associated sukuk, which cannot be fixed or determined in advance. Therefore, as far as 
Islamic finance is concerned, ijarah sukuk could be taken as quasi-fixed return 
instrument. The parties involved in the contract could break up the rentals into two 
parts, one to be paid to the lesser, and the other to be held back by the lessee to cover 
costs in relation to asset ownership. 
(iv) Where ijarah sukuk are involved, the Special purpose vehicle (SPV) as purchaser 
of the asset, issues sukuk to the investor, and thus enabling him to pay for his 
purchase. The asset is then leased to the government or any organisation and in any 
case the SPV receives periodical rental payments from the lessee and distributes them 




(v) The rentals can be stipulated in the contract in advance and so can rentals on sukuk 
with possibly very insignificant variations due to ownership-related matter, or 
unpredictable expenses incurred by the lesser or possible any default by the lessee.  
2.7.2 Istisnaa Sukuk 
AAOIFI (2010) defined istisnaa sukuk as “certificates of equal value issued with the 
aim of mobilizing funds to be employed for the production of goods so that the goods 
produced come to be owned by the certificate holders”. It should be noted that where 
istisnaa sukuk are involved, equally valid certificates are issued to generate funds for 
producing items to be owned collectively by those who buy the certificates, who will 
then be known as sukuk holders. The manufacturer of the items, sometimes known as 
supplier or seller, issues the certificates. Those who purchase the items are the buyers 
or subscribers, who then pay the money to fund production costs (Ayub, 2005). 
Eventually, the item to be manufactured is to be owned by the holders of sukuk, who 
can get their money back from the sale of sukuk or otherwise from the sale of the 
items. As a matter of fact istisnaa sukuk become a good idea in cases where large 
projects need financing. In case of istisnaa, however, it is possible that a parallel 
istisnaa contract be made with subcontractors, which makes it suitable for financial 
intermediation (Wilson, 2004). In this regard, a specialised firm could become 
involved as a subcontractor with a financial institution. According to Shari’ah, a debt 
should not be sold to third party for profit. In other words, istisnaa certificates cannot 
be sold in the secondary market (Shaikh and Saeed, 2010). 
2.7.3 Mudarabah Sukuk 
According to AAOIFI (2010) mudarabah sukuk is defined as “certificates that 
represent projects or activities managed on the basis of Mudarabah by appointing one 
of the partners or another person as the Mudarib for the management of operation”. 
Mudarabah is a type of specialised investment in which the contributor and the 
beneficiary of the contribution share profits. Although the risk of failure or loss is not 
ruled out and yet in case of success the contributor becomes eligible to payments in 





According to AAOIFI (2010), the issuer of these certificates is the mudarib, the 
subscribers are the owners of capital and the realized funds are the mudarabah 
capital. The certificate holders own the assets of mudarabah and the agreed upon 
share of the profits belongs to the owners of capital and they bear the loss, if any. 
The fact that this structure involves no interest payments on sukuk makes it consistent 
with Shari’ah principles. Thus, instead of being fixed periodic payments returns 
depend on the efficiency of the relevant transactions featuring mudarabah (Al-Amine, 
2008). In other words, the structure does not violate Shari’ah in terms of prohibition 
of riba. The sukuk also differ from conventional bonds in that they are not fixed in 
terms of principal amount (Ayub, 2005). However, in the event of investment 
featuring mudarabah, the purchase price of the shares will be paid to sukuk holders as 
the value of shares may increase or decrease with respect to the principal amount 
depending on the way mudarabah goes (Usmani, 2007). Furthermore, sukuk must 
feature in tangible assets to avoid trading in debts (bai al-dayn) (Salah, 2010). In this 
regard, a tangible asset is traded in the capital market rather than a mere debt. Sukuk 
holders are considered Rab al-maal as they are the actual beneficiaries of the shares 
featuring the tangible assets to be issued by SPV. 
2.7.4 Murabahah Sukuk 
AAOIFI (2010) defines murabahah sukuk as “certificates of equal value issued for the 
purpose of financing the purchase of goods through murabahah so that the certificate 
holders become the owners of the murabahah commodity”. 
The idea of murabahah sukuk is to be used as an alternative for loans, where banks 
make profits from selling sukuk to customers (Siddiqi, 2006). In other words, the bank 
introduces the profit margin with the initial consent of customers (El-Gamal, 2000).  
However, apart from the agreed upon profit margin, the bank should not charge any 
other costs as a result of the devaluation of money as a result of inflation. In fact, the 
idea of murabahah sukuk represents the Islamic version of the traditional mortgage in 
non-Muslim countries, as the main idea is that contrary traditional mortgage contracts, 
instead of lending money to the client to purchase the asset, the bank purchases the 
asset, and then sells it to him/her for an agreed profit margin, provided that the clients 
pays the price by instalment (El-Gamal, 2006). Where murabahah is involved, the 




potential profit charges to be incurred, the bank could give warrantees to clients for 
unexpected break down or defective assets (Wilson, 2008). 
Therefore, in murabahah sukuk contract the bank initially owns the item, which is 
later transferred to be registered in the name of the buyer who will benefit from it by 
receiving tax credit (El-Gamal, 2000). However, from Shari’ah point of view, 
murabahah sales are to be excluded from interest-based transactions for the following 
reasons (Kahf and Khan, 1992; Al-Amine, 2001; El-Gamal, 2007): 
(i) The bank bear responsibility of any risks involved as an initial owner of the asset 
or property; 
(ii) The bank plays the role of a trading agent rather than financier; 
(iii) The transaction involves an asset or commodity rather than cash loans. 
It is worth mentioning that murabahah contracts represent the dominant transactions 
with increasing popularity in the Islamic world (Iqbal, 1997). In terms of advantages 
with respect to the banking business, murabahah transactions have shorter risk 
duration as compared to other financing techniques. In case of murabahah contracts, 
the profit margin is determined at the completion of the sale, and according to 
Shari’ah principles the asset or property involved cannot be resold as they represent 
receivable (debts), and that the liquidity of investment remains an impending concern 
for Islamic banks (AAOIFI, 2010). 
It should be noted that murabahah sukuk only become legally valid in primary 
markets. In terms of Shari’ah principles, the validity the sukuk in secondary markets 
is questionable (AAOIFI, 2010). This is for the simple reason that the certificates 
feature money owed by the subsequent buyer of the asset to holders of the certificate, 
and that makes such practice similar to trading in debts on deferred basis which 
amounts to riba (Shaikh and Saeed, 2010). 
Despite their debt-based structure murabahah sukuk could be acceptable provided 
they constitute a small part of a package featuring other structures such as 
mudarabah, musharakah and ijarah. Nonetheless, in countries such as Malaysia 




more popular, as in such countries a debt sale (bai al-dayn) at negotiated prices is 
allowed by jurists (Thomas, 2007). 
2.7.5 Musharakah Sukuk 
According to AAOIFI (2010) musharakah sukuk is defined as “certificates of equal 
value issued with the aim of using the mobilized funds for establishing a new project, 
developing an existing project or financing a business activity on the basis of any 
partnership contracts so that the certificate holders become the owners of the project 
or the assets of the activity as per their respective shares, with the musharakah 
certificates being managed on the basis of participation or mudarabah or an 
investment agency”.  
It should be noted that musharakah sukuk is currently used by financial corporations 
to develop projects as well as other business activities (Tariq, 2004). Thus, in 
musharakah-based activities, SPV funds corporations through issuing musharakah 
sukuk for this purpose. Corporations could make in kind contributions to the capital in 
form of land to be used to establish projects on behalf of SPV. In the process, the 
corporation purchases shares from SPV for an agreed price and time duration. 
Proceeds then generated from the business activity are to be distributed among sukuk 
holders in accordance with musharakah agreement (Ayub, 2005). 
2.7.6 Salam Sukuk 
AAOIFI (2010) defines the working mechanism of salam sukuk as “The issuer of 
the certificates is a seller of the goods of salam and the subscribers are the buyers of 
the goods, while the funds realized from subscription are the purchase price (salam 
capital) of the goods. The holders of salam certificates are the owners of the salam 
goods and are entitled to the sale price of the certificates or the sale price of the 
salam goods sold through a parallel salam, if any”. 
It should be mentioned that salam sukuk normally issued for generating a capital, 
therefore, the goods or assets to be delivered in return for that capital will come to the 
ownership of sukuk holders who subscribe to the capital as the certificates will be sold 
by the issuer to the buyers who will then be known as subscribers (Ayub, 2005). In 
other words, subscribers provide salam capital to assist the purchase of goods or 




and they can redeem their money from the sales of goods or otherwise the sale of 
certificates provided the goods have already been delivered. In this regard SPV may 
join the arrangement of salam sukuk.  The SPV can sell salam sukuk to investors and 
the money to be generated could be paid to companies by SPV to deliver commodities 
in future. Marketing of commodities can either take place directly by SPV or 
indirectly by through an agent to generate profits favouring SPV and sukuk holders 
(El-Gamal, 2005; Ahmad, 2009). 
It should be noted that salam sukuk can be described as the Islamic version for the 
traditional forward or future contracts (Haider and Azhar, 2011). 
2.7.7 Wakalah Sukuk (Agency Sukuk) 
Wakalah sukuk are considered innovative structures and the most recent structure in 
comparison with other sukuk structures (El Shazly and Tripathy, 2013). ‘Wakalah’ is 
an Arabic word, which is translated as an ‘agency’. The concept of the agency 
structure is that it comprises two parties where the first party entrust the second party 
to act in his behalf as an agent. In the agency sukuk structure, the sukuk holders 
appoints an investment manager as wakel to manage and invest the underlying sukuk 
assets whether the assets represent tangible assets or usufructs and services. The 
wakalah agreement in most cases is constituted for a period limited and it is 
irrevocable. Moreover, the wakel normally receive a payment in return for his 
management as well as he can be eligible to obtain a percentage of the profit for his 
good management at the end of the agency agreement as incentive (Latham and 
Watkins, 2015).  
The structure of the wakalah sukuk is considered useful when the sukuk holders have 
tangible assets as the wakel manages directly these assets in exchange for a payment 
and an incentive. In fact, there is to some extent similarity between the structure of the 
wakalah sukuk and mudarabah sukuk. The main difference between the two structures 
is that the whole profits in the mudarabah structure will be divided between the sukuk 
holders and the mudarib according to the percentage agreed upon in the contract of 
the mudarabah. However, in the case of the wakalah sukuk, the sukuk holders will 
receive only the percentage of profit specified in the prospectus of issuance and 




expectation of any risks. However, any amount that is kept at the reserve account will 
be given at the end of the agency agreement to the wakel for his good management 
(DIFC, 2009). 
2.7.8 Istithmar Sukuk (Investment Sukuk) 
Istithmar sukuk is sometimes referred to as al-wakalah bel-Istithmar sukuk 
(investment agency sukuk). In most cases, the underlying sukuk assets whether 
tangible or intangible should be considered when the appropriate sukuk structure is 
selected (Latham and Watkins, 2015). In this regard, the tangible assets can be 
structured easily as there is no disagreement among Shari’ah scholars in this regard. 
However, if the underlying sukuk asset is intangible then the controversy can emerge. 
The disagreement between the Shari’ah scholars is according to the real possibility to 
transfer and evaluate these intangible assets legally as well as financially; and whether 
such transferring and evaluation are acceptable from the Shari’ah point of view, this 
issue will be discussed in details in Chapter 6.   
One of the most widespread structures of investment sukuk is the ‘rights sukuk 
structure as it has been indicated above. These rights will be represented as future 
financial dues (receivables), which can be structured, based on deferent Islamic 
contracts. These rights are gathered and formed as an asset and can be sold and 
owned. However, caution should be taken when drafting and forming contracts of 
such intangible assets so that it should not be similar to trading in debt which is 
considered riba based transaction (DIFC, 2009; Latham and Watkins, 2015). 
The Arabic term ‘istithmar’ is literally means ‘investment’ as the most widespread 
Islamic contract under the investment structure is ijarah as the murabahah and 
istisnaa receivables can also be used. The share of each sukuk holder and the 
certificates of sukuk can also be gathered as a package and sold as an investment 
based on intangible assets. The future profits as result of the investment structure will 
be distributed according to the sukuk structure issuance (DIFC, 2009; Latham and 






The term ‘istithmar’ is recently used when many financial institutions turned to the 
adoption of intangible underlying assets instead of tangible assets such as the right to 
receive future proceeds. Accordingly such structure often indicates that the structure 
is designed based on intangible assets. In contrast, the wakalah sukuk structure is also 
considered as new inventions in the Islamic financial industry; however, this structure 
often designed on tangible asset (DIFC, 2009; Latham and Watkins, 2015).   
Due to the emergence of innovative structures such as wakalah structure, which is 
based on underlying intangible assets or on a mixture of tangible and intangible 
assets, the wakalah bi istithmar structure appeared as a new concept among financial 
institutions especially the IDB. In this regard, the sukuk holders appoint the issuer as 
wakeel bil istithmar based on the nature of Shari’ah contract. The issuer of sukuk is 
the wakeel bil istithmar and the subscribers are the clients; the IPO proceeds in the 
principal is the amount to be invested and the sukuk holders, which will be the owner 
for what sukuk represent in the form of gains and loose and they have the right for 
profit, if any. 
Therefore, it could be said that the term ‘sukuk al istithmar’ is considered as a general 
term which other types of Shari’ah contracts fall below the term ‘sukuk al istithmar’  
such as ijarah, mudarabah, musharakah etc., considering that the underlying assets 
under the term sukuk al istithmar are tangible assets. However, the wakalah bil 
istithmar sukuk structure is considered as a new innovation designed when the 
underlying asset of sukuk is intangible or a mixture (DIFC, 2009; Latham and 
Watkins, 2015).   
That is probably what made the ZAWYA database to differentiate between the term 
sukuk al istithmar and the sukuk al wakalah bil istithmar. In this regard, it should be 
noted that the wakalah and the wakalah bil istithmar contracts are investment 
contracts between the sukuk holders and the wakeel, which is in most cases the issuer, 
and then the Shari’ah contracts come later between the wakeel and a third party. 
It should be mentioned that the istithmar sukuk structures have recently become 
popular, which also used in the structuring of SABIC sukuk which constitutes the case 
study in this research. Therefore, the structure of istithmar sukuk is depicted in Figure 





Figure  5.1:   The Steps for the Structure of Istithmar Sukuk 
 
Source: DIFC (2009:52) 
According to the DIFC (2009:52), the steps for the structure of istithmar sukuk can be 
summarised as follows: 
(i) “Issuer SPV issues sukuk, which represent an undivided ownership interest 
in an underlying asset or transaction. They also represent a right against 
Issuer SPV to payment of the Periodic Distribution Amount and the 
Dissolution Amount. 
(ii) The Investors subscribe for sukuk and pay the proceeds to Issuer SPV (the 
“Principal Amount”). Issuer SPV declares a trust over the proceeds (and 
any assets acquired using the proceeds – see paragraph 3 below) and 
thereby acts as Trustee on behalf of the Investors. 
(iii) Originator enters into a sale and purchase arrangement with Trustee, 
pursuant to which Originator agrees to sell, and Trustee agrees to 
purchase, a portfolio of certain financial assets (the “Sukuk Assets”) from 
Originator. 
(iv) Trustee pays the purchase price to Originator as consideration for its 
purchase of the Sukuk Assets in an amount equal to the Principal Amount. 
(v) Trustee appoints Originator as its wakeel (or agent) with respect to the 
Sukuk Assets for a term that reflects the maturity of the sukuk. Originator 
is responsible for servicing the Sukuk assets and, in particular, collection of 




(vi) Originator collects income in respect of the Sukuk assets from the relevant 
customers/clients and will deposit these amounts into a collection account 
(the “Collection Account”). 
(vii) At regular intervals, corresponding to Periodic Distribution Dates, 
Originator will be required to make income payments to Trustee in respect 
of the Sukuk assets. This will be achieved through a target amount (the 
“Required Income”), which is agreed for each collection period. The 
amount of Required Income during a collection period will be equal to the 
Periodic Distribution Amount payable under the sukuk at that time. This 
amount may be calculated by reference to a fixed rate or variable rate (e.g. 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or Singapore Interbank 
Offered Rate (SIBOR) depending on the denomination of sukuk issued and 
subject to mutual agreement of the parties in advance. 
(viii) During a particular collection period, if the income amount collected in 
respect of the Sukuk assets (as reflected in the Collection Account) is in 
excess of the Required Income such excess can either be: credited to a 
reserve account (the “Reserve Account”) with Originator; or in a case 
where a financial asset has matured (and principal therefrom has been 
repaid by the customer/client), and in order to avoid excess cash in the 
structure, used to purchase additional financial assets under the purchase 
arrangement referred to in paragraph 3 above (and which will then become 
Sukuk assets). 
(ix) The balance in the Reserve Account (if any) can also be used to cover a 
shortfall in collections to meet the Required Income in any given 
collection period. In the event that there is a shortfall in both collections 
and the Reserve Account, it may be permissible for Originator to make an 
on-account payment or to provide Shari’ah-compliant liquidity funding to 
bridge any gap in funding. 
(x) Issuer SPV pays each Periodic Distribution Amount to the Investors using 




(xi)  Upon redemption of the sukuk (see paragraph 11 below), the balance of 
the Reserve Account (if any) will be paid (being the “Distributed Reserve 
Amount”) to Trustee in order to enable the payment of the Dissolution 
Amount to the Investors. The excess (if any) will be retained by Originator 
as incentive fees. 
(xii) Upon an event of default or at maturity (at the option of Trustee under the 
Purchase Undertaking); or the exercise of an optional call (if applicable to 
the sukuk) or the occurrence of a tax event (both at the option of Originator 
under the Sale Undertaking), Trustee will sell, and Originator will 
purchase, the Sukuk assets at the applicable Exercise Price, which will be 
equal to the Principal Amount plus any accrued but unpaid Periodic 
Distribution Amounts owing to the Investors less the Distributed Reserve 
Amount (if any) Payment of Exercise Price by Originator (as Obligor). 
(xiii) Issuer SPV pays the Dissolution Amount to the Investors using the 
Exercise Price and the Distributed Reserve Amount (if any) it has received 
from Originator’. 
(xiv) ‘Issuer SPV issues sukuk, which represent an undivided ownership 
interest in an underlying asset or transaction. They also represent a right 
against Issuer SPV to payment of the Periodic Distribution Amount and 
the Dissolution Amount. 
(xv) The Investors subscribe for sukuk and pay the proceeds to Issuer SPV (the 
“Principal Amount”). Issuer SPV declares a trust over the proceeds (and 
any assets acquired using the proceeds – see paragraph 3 below) and 
thereby acts as Trustee on behalf of the Investors. 
(xvi) Originator enters into a sale and purchase arrangement with Trustee, 
pursuant to which Originator agrees to sell, and Trustee agrees to 
purchase, a portfolio of certain financial assets (the “Sukuk Assets”) from 
Originator. 
(xvii) Trustee pays the purchase price to Originator as consideration for its 




(xviii) Trustee appoints Originator as its wakeel (or agent) with respect to the 
Sukuk assets for a term that reflects the maturity of the sukuk. Originator is 
responsible for servicing the Sukuk assets and, in particular, collection of 
the income (comprising principal and profit) therefrom. 
(xix) Originator collects income in respect of the Sukuk assets from the 
relevant customers/clients and will deposit these amounts into a collection 
account (the “Collection Account”). 
(xx) At regular intervals, corresponding to Periodic Distribution Dates, 
Originator will be required to make income payments to Trustee in respect 
of the Sukuk assets. This will be achieved through a target amount (the 
“Required Income”), which is agreed for each collection period. The 
amount of Required Income during a collection period will be equal to the 
Periodic Distribution Amount payable under the sukuk at that time. This 
amount may be calculated by reference to a fixed rate or variable rate (e.g. 
LIBOR or SIBOR) depending on the denomination of sukuk issued and 
subject to mutual agreement of the parties in advance. 
(xxi) During a particular collection period, if the income amount collected in 
respect of the Sukuk assets (as reflected in the Collection Account) is in 
excess of the Required Income such excess can either be: 
(a) credited to a reserve account (the “Reserve Account”) with 
Originator; or 
(b) in a case where a financial asset has matured (and principal 
therefrom has been repaid by the customer/client), and in order 
to avoid excess cash in the structure, used to purchase additional 
financial assets under the purchase arrangement referred to in 
paragraph 3 above (and which will then become Sukuk Assets). 
 The balance in the Reserve Account (if any) can also be used to cover a 
shortfall in collections to meet the Required Income in any given collection 
period. In the event that there is a shortfall in both collections and the 




account payment or to provide Shari’ah-compliant liquidity funding to 
bridge any gap in funding. 
(xxii) Issuer SPV pays each Periodic Distribution Amount to the Investors 
using the Required Income it has received from Originator. 
(xxiii) Upon redemption of the sukuk (see paragraph 11 below), the balance of 
the Reserve Account (if any) will be paid (being the “Distributed Reserve 
Amount”) to Trustee in order to enable the payment of the Dissolution 
Amount to the Investors. The excess (if any) will be retained by Originator 
as incentive fees. 
(xxiv) Upon an event of default or at maturity (at the option of Trustee under 
the Purchase Undertaking); or the exercise of an optional call (if applicable 
to the sukuk) or the occurrence of a tax event (both at the option of 
Originator under the Sale Undertaking), Trustee will sell, and Originator 
will purchase, the Sukuk Assets at the applicable Exercise Price, which will 
be equal to the Principal Amount plus any accrued but unpaid Periodic 
Distribution Amounts owing to the Investors less the Distributed Reserve 
Amount (if any) Payment of Exercise Price by Originator (as Obligor). 
Issuer SPV pays the Dissolution Amount to the Investors using the Exercise 
Price and the Distributed Reserve Amount (if any) it has received from 
Originator’’. 
2.8 BASIC STRUCTURE OF PREVAILING SUKUK DOMINATING 
MARKETS 
According to AAOIFI (2010) there are various kinds of sukuk depending on the type 
of Islamic models of financing and trade utilized in the structure. The most common 
types include ijarah, musharakah, mudarabah, murabahah, salam and istisnaa. In 
this regard, sukuk investment can be classified into three types: sukuk for trading 
purposes, sukuk for sale, and sukuk held up to maturity (Abdulrahman and Abdul 
Rahim, 2003). However, Shari’ah law featuring trade commodities for the purpose of 
sukuk constitutes the basis for the above classification (Ahmed, 2011). 
It should be mentioned that in any arrangement involving sukuk three parties are 




sukuk certificates SPV), and the investors who buy the certificates (Tariq and Dar, 
2007). According to (Adam and Thomas, 2004; Usmani, 2007; Al-Amine, 2008; 
DIFC, 2009), the basic structure of existing sukuk could be understood in the 
following points; 
(i) The Originator of the sukuk sells assets to be leased to the SPV who is the issuer 
of the sukuk; 
(ii) The payment for assets sold will be received by the Originator; 
(iii) The Originator leases back assets from SPV; 
(iv) Rent payments will be received by SPV from the originator under the terms of a 
special contract; 
(v) In order to finance the purchase of assets from the originator, the SPV collects 
funds from issuances of sukuk certificates; 
(vi) Rent payments from the originator are utilized by SPV for dispersing 
distributions on sukuk certificates; 
(vii) Conventional investors as well as Islamic investors tend to secure sukuk 
certificates; 
(viii) Distributions from SPV tend to provide periodical reimbursements for investors.  
In the meantime, rental payments given out by the originator featuring leased assets 
provide funds for SPV. Finally, at the end of the term of sukuk; the collective sukuk 
holders would become owners of the assets, and eventually owners of the lease of the 
assets. At this point the holders would find out as to whether they have gained or lost 
on their assets depending on the market price at the time. Consequently, in case the 
assets in question have no viable market, then the originator has to incur higher costs. 
However, it is most likely that the originator may be unwilling to give up the assets 
when the contract expires. For this reason, it is recommended that any sukuk contract 
should feature a provision indicating the originator’s willingness to re-purchase the 
assets at their face value. The SPV on the other hand, can be described as lonely and 
separate entity from the originator. However, the fact that the originator has to 
channel payments through a clearing house could provide a consolation for the SPV, 
and also for certificate holders who will then be paid by the same arrangement as well 




2.9 GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ISLAMIC CAPITAL 
MARKET (SUKUK) INVESTMENTS 
Since the early 1990s, the IBF has been popular in Muslim countries and beyond in 
the international stage. That has become obvious from the number of Islamic banks 
that have been established across the Muslim world: the Banker (2015) put the 
number of IBF institutions worldwide at 500 institutions. In the institutional 
development trajectory, initial institutionalization was very much Islamic retail 
banking, while the second institutional development was marked with commercial 
and investment banks and Islamic fund management. It should be noted that there has 
been important improvements in the developments in the Islamic financial markets as 
from 2007 to 2014, the total assets in Islamic banking have increased by 15.73% at 
compound annual growth rate (The Banker, 2014). 
In the third development stage, Islamic finance has witnessed the emergence of 
Islamic financial, capital, and money markets since the beginning of this century. In 
particular, global developments and appetite for sukuk should be taken into account as 
the emerging thrust of Islamic financial development.  
Given the current instability and changeability in the financial markets worldwide, 
which definitely tend to increase the risks associated with the traditional bond 
markets. This could provide a real chance for the Islamic financial system to dominate 
the markets as a rescuer. In this regard, Islamic bonds or sukuk should be able to do 
fulfill such an expectation without the need for speculation or exploitation of 
resources a characteristic associated with the traditional financing system (Sheikh and 
Saeed, 2010). 
The first sukuk issued in 1990 in Malaysia, which rapidly flooded the financial 
markets by playing a major role in capital investment as since their emergence into 
the financial markets sukuk have made major contributions to the process of economic 
development in many Muslim countries (Akram, 2008). The success of Islamic 
capital markets or sukuk has been motivated by a number of factors, such as: 
economic need, providing Muslim investors with reliable means as an alternative to 
religiously un-sounding financial practices, and most importantly the need for 
activating Islamic capital markets. Thus, the idea of sukuk has emerged to raise the 




further confirmed by Iqbal Mirakhor and (2011), who deem the idea of sukuk as the 
most popular product in relation to the Islamic system of finance. 
In response to the increasing demand for Islamic financial services particularly in the 
GCC countries, a conference was held in Saudi Arabia in 1988. The conference was 
supervised by the Islamic Fiqh Academy to discuss the means of developing capital 
markets (Nathan and Pierce, 2010). Eventually, the conference approved sukuk as a 
financial practice consistent with the principles of Shari’ah. That approval has given 
the chance for Islamic investors to practice their financial activities without offending 
Shari’ah law contrary to conventional financial practices such as debt securities, 
which are offensive to Shari’ah (Wilson 2004). 
Consequently, sukuk were issued for the first time in Malaysia, in the form of Shell 
NDS, for a total value of USD 30 million by a non-Muslim institution (IIFM, 2010). 
In another development in the year 2000, the Sudanese government issued 
musharakah sukuk for a total value of SP 77 million. It should be stated that salam 
sukuk were the first to reach international markets issued by the Kingdom of Bahrain 
in September 2001. That was followed by first dollar-dominated international 
sovereign ijarah sukuk for a total value of USD 100 million by Malaysia. Again in 
Malaysia, an organisation referred to as Kumpulan Guthrie issued a five-year quasi-
sovereign ijarah sukuk for a total value of USD 150 million (IIFM, 2010).  
After the initial success with sukuk, many Muslim countries started to issue sukuk 
whether sovereign or corporate and whether at domestic or international level. As a 
result of this expansion, the sukuk markets have become one of the robust foundations 
of the Islamic financial industry. In addition, as a result of financial engineering and 
innovation, different structures of the sukuk issued recently such as ijarah, 








Figure  5.2: Global Sukuk Issuances, 2001-2015 ($M) 
 
Data Source: IIFM Sukuk Database (2014); Zawya Sukuk Database (2015) 
Figure 2.2 depicts the trends in the global sukuk issuances for the period of 2001-2015; 
as can be seen from a very humble beginning and despite the impact of global 
financial crisis from 2007 to 2009, sukuk market has successfully picked up and 
reached its peak in 2013 with USD 138 billion. 
Figure 2.3, on the other hand, displays the international sukuk issuances, in the sense 
that companies in a certain country or government of a certain country issues sukuk in 
different jurisdiction. Trends observed in Figure 2.3 are also seen in international 
sukuk issuances. As can be seen from a limited international issuance, and despite the 
adverse impact of the global financial crisis, it peaked to approximately USD 30 
billion in 2014. 
Figure  5.3: Global Sukuk Issuances, International Jurisdictions, 2001- 2015 ($M) 
 

































The trends in domestic sukuk issuances can be seen in Figure 2.4, which demonstrates 
a very similar trend by reaching its peak in 2012 at USD 117 billion after overcoming 
the adverse impact of the global financial crisis.  
Figure  5.4: Domestic Sukuk Issuances, 2001-2015 ($M) 
 
   Data Source: IIFM Sukuk Database (2014); Zawya Sukuk Database (2015) 
In overall, since 2001, particularly after the global financial crisis in 2007, domestic 
as well as international sukuk markets have substantially flourished. As can be seen, 
2014 is considered distinctive, especially in relation to the issuances of international 
sukuk, as the value of issued sukuk reached nearly USD 30 billion compared with the 
year 2013, when it reached approximately USD 26 billion. Once again, the increase in 
the issued sukuk in the years 2013-2014 as compared with the issuances took place 
before the financial crisis in 2007 is considered a considerable benchmark and a good 
benchmark of the prosperous future that will be witnessed by sukuk market. 
Figure  5.5: Total Size of The Large Sukuk Issuers, 2001-2015 ($M) 
 
Data Source: Zawya Database (2015) 
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Figure 2.5 depicts the breakdown of sukuk issuances according to countries. The 
remarkable increase in the demand for sukuk issuances, especially in Asia such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia as well as the GCC such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and 
Bahrain is considered as the major drive that led to the booming and continued 
development of the sukuk market at international level. Additionally, the entering of 
new issuers, the increase in the liquidity level at different Islamic financial Islamic 
institutions as well as the increase of issuances in various currencies and issuance of 
short term sukuk, all these factors led the international sukuk market to achieve this 
remarkable development. As result of the expansion and progress, the value of sukuk 
issuances has escalated from USD 1.7 million in 2001 to approximately USD 121 
billion in 2014, as it can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
Figure  5.6: Total Size of Issues, 2001-2015 ($M) 
 
Data Source: Zawya Database (2015) 
Another positive trend that can be witnessed for the progress of the sukuk market, as 
can be seen in Figure 2.6, is that the idea of the sukuk has widely spread in non-
Muslim countries. These countries include UK, Hong Kong, South Africa and others 
which joined the market in 2014. This trend has a significant impact on supporting 



































































sukuk. Likewise, investment in sukuk market made the sukuk as a financing 
instrument and a competitive tool with conventional interest-based bonds. 
Another positive trend which the sukuk markets have witnessed recently is the wide 
spread issuances of foreign currencies based sukuk in as it can be seen in Figure 2.7. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.7, sukuk markets witnessed escalation in the issuance of 
sukuk in foreign currencies, especially in USD whereas Malaysia has attracted foreign 
issuances from Turkey and Singapore according to Global Sukuk Report GSR (2015). 
Figure  5.7: Global Sukuk Issuances Currency Break-Up, Jan 2001-2015 ($M) 
 
      Data Source: Zawya Database (2015) 
As can be seen in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, in the period between 2001-2015, Malaysian 
market topped the list of the countries issuing sukuk, with an estimated total value of 
USD 365 billion at domestic and international markets. The Saudi Arabian market 
ranked second with the volume of issuance with approximately USD 68 billion, 
followed by the UAE with USD 60.75 billion. In addition, Malaysian sukuk market 
still occupies the leadership in the Islamic finance industry because its market is 
characterised by stability, well-establishment and confidence of investors. However, 
this leadership can be affected in future due to the large issuances of sukuk by 
countries that have significant economic value, such as KSA, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, 
Indonesia and Turkey. 
As regards to domestic sukuk markets, Malaysia is again considered on the top of the 
list of the largest countries in issuing sukuk. The volume of the domestic Malaysian 
sukuk market is estimated to constitute 78% of the percentage of the total volume of 
the other sukuk markets despite the presence of large markets such as those in 
















domestic markets, which are active in issuing sukuk, especially in Indonesia, Turkey 
and Pakistan as it has been mentioned above. Such progress has come as the result of 
facilities and support given to Islamic banks and institutions by both central banks as 
well as investors who were interested in investing the liquidity they possess in the 
sukuk issued by the government. This positive trend by these central banks has been 
augmented by the opening of new markets such as Senegal sukuk market and the 
Gambia sukuk market, which have opened recently. This is itself considered also a 
positive direction which is due to the wide spread and acceptance of sukuk. The 
announcement for many sukuk issuances at foreign currency markets such as London, 
Irish and Luxembourg Stock Exchange is in fact considered another positive direction 
which the sukuk markets have witnessed internationally (IIFM,2014; Zawya, 2015). 
In terms of the popular structures used (number and size) in the period between 2001-
2015 whether at the domestic or international markets is murabahah sukuk structure 
as the estimated value was approximately USD 252,139 million with 39% of the total 
issuances as it can be shown in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.8. This followed by structures 
of ijarah sukuk with the volume of approximately USD 141,110 million with 22% of 
total sukuk issuances and musharakah sukuk with 11% of the total issuances. 
Figure  5.8: Sukuk Issuances Breakdown by Type and Size, 2003-2015 ($M) 
 
        Data Source: Zawya Database (2015) 
In general, the diversified issuances of sukuk and their international spread in addition 
to the remarkable development in sukuk structures have impact on assisting sukuk to 
reach high records in a relatively short span of time especially after the global 























Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 depicts domestic sukuk issuances by issuer status for the 
January 2001- March 2015 (in USD Millions) and international sukuk issuances by 
issuer status for the January 2001- March 2015 (in USD Millions), respectively. At 
domestic market, the volume of issuance of sovereign and quasi-sovereign sukuk in 
the period from January 2014 to March 2015 reached approximately 71% and 23% 
respectively of the total issuances. This percentage is close to some extent to the 
period between 2009-2013, when the volume issuance of sukuk of this particular type 
of sukuk reached 71% and 22% respectively (IIFM, 2014). This indicates 
conspicuously that there is a significant activity in the issuance of sovereign and 
quasi-sovereign sukuk, while the percentage of issuance of corporation sukuk is 
considered les when compared with this kind of sukuk as it can be seen in Figure 2.9.  
However, the period between 2001-2008, the share of issuance of corporation sukuk 
in the domestic market comparing to others was historic with 69% of sukuk issuance 
as it can be seen in Figure 2.9.    
Figure  5.9: Domestic Sukuk Issuances by Issuer Status,2001-March 2015, ($M) 
 
Data Source: IIFM Sukuk Database (2015) 
As depicted in Figure 2.10, the volume of the issuance of sovereign and quasi-
sovereign sukuk in the International markets has witnessed significant increase. For 
instance, in the period between 2009- 2013, it constituted approximately 54% of the 
total issued sukuk, while in the period from January 2014 to March 2015 there was a 
notable increase and the percentage reached 78% (IIFM, 2014). This means that the 
percentage of corporate sukuk at the global markets is still below the desired target, as 








 2001-2008  
















2014-March 2015  




Figure  5.10: International Sukuk Issuances by Issuer Status, 2001-Mar 2015 ($M) 
 
Data Source: IIFM Sukuk Database (2015) 
As consequences of the repeat issuances of sukuk by non-Muslim countries, the sukuk 
markets can be developed in the future in regard to the progress and spread of sukuk 
issuances. In addition, the rules and laws that will regulate issuances and circulation 
of sukuk will be considered as result of the new non-Muslim countries entering to the 
sukuk market recently. Additionally, these non-Muslim countries will have their 
impact on considering of sukuk structures, particularly in terms of risks and methods 
for its mitigation, as sukuk related risks have not been given due attention in many 
deferent Muslim countries in terms of examination and scrutiny. 
Among the reasons also that led to the increase of volume of the sovereign sukuk 
issued recently is the tendency adopted by certain governments in certain countries for 
taking advantage of the increase in demand for Shari’ah compliant financial assets as 
well as the increase of the support for the objectives of their internal policies for 
Islamic finance. In this regard, it should be noted that sukuk attracted different type of 
investors from the Middle East and Asia with 39%, UE with 32% and US with 29% 
(GSR, 2015). 
Another positive trend adopted by certain jurisdictions in many countries is issuing 
the short term sukuk in domestic as well as international markets. This particular 
strategy and this has already been adopted by Bahrain in 2001. The impetus behind 
such move was to secure as well as support the liquidity and achieve the required 
diversity that help meet the needs of the Islamic financial institutions and the 
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Furthermore, the adopting of the determining of the percentage of profits in sukuk 
markets as well as the issuance of sukuk at domestic markets in foreign currencies are 
another practice which has had a positive impact on the development of secondary 
markets in many countries. 
The decline that occurred in sukuk issuances in 2014-2015, however, cannot be 
ignored as the success and development that accompanied sukuk markets after the 
financial crisis in 2008 is considered as well as appreciated. In this regard, it can be 
said that the decline in sukuk issuances can be attributed to the fall in the price of oil 
on the global level as well as the economic fluctuations at the emerging markets as a 
result of wars and the so-called Arab spring (GSR, 2015). 
Despite such positive development, in recent years a decline has been observed in 
sukuk issuance and the total amount. In 2014, there was somehow a recession in the 
global sukuk issuances compared with 2013, as the value of sukuk issued was 
approximately USD 120 billion compared with USD 138 billion in 2014 as it has been 
shown in Figure 2.2. It could be argued that the issuances of sukuk in 2014 might have 
been affected by the decrease in the volume of issuance that took place in Malaysian 
market by nearly 20%, as normally issuances of sukuk in Malaysian market accounted 
for approximately one-third of global issuances. It is also important to note the impact 
of dramatic decline in the oil prices on sukuk market might be long lasting in 
particular for the GCC countries. The impact of post Arab Spring developments and 
regional wars in the Middle East should also be considered as reasons of such a 
relatively poor performance. On the other hand, dramatic increases in the public 
sector deficit may encourage such countries to issue sukuk in the GCC to respond to 
their public borrowing requirement for infrastructure financing and long-term project 
in particular through project financing based ‘built-operate-transfer’.  
Furthermore, entering of new investors in global sukuk markets such as UK and South 
Africa among others have lessened the negative impact that is attributed to the decline 
in the international volume of issuance that happened in the Malaysian market due to 





In concluding, the remarkable progress at global sukuk markets has a major impact on 
the development of financial systems in the Muslim countries. Despite the 
development of the sukuk markets and the widespread in both Muslim and non-
Muslim countries, the formidable challenges confronting such markets should be 
taken into consideration. To secure due stability, strength sustainability and 
transparency in the sukuk markets, Islamic institutions such as AAOIFI and IFSB 
should regulate required relevant laws and standards. This will have its substantial 
impact on overcoming potential obstacles that impede the application of sukuk 
structures without having negative consequences and risks. Hence, there is indeed a 
dire need of both new sukuk structures to be engineered based on well-established 
sukuk regulations and standards to cope with the spread and flourishing of the sukuk 
issuances in Muslim or non-Muslim jurisdictions.  
2.10 RISKS IN SUKUK 
Sukuk as investment and financing tools are exposed, like other financial instruments, 
to different type of risks of either financial or non-financial risks. While this research 
focus on the Shari’ah and legal risks as indicated previously, however, it may be 
appropriate to address an overview of the financial risks that may face the sukuk 
structures as follows; 
2.10.1 Credit Risk 
Credit risk accrued when there is a failure of the debtor to meet his obligations as this 
will lead to the situation of loss to the creditor in most cases (Al-Amine, 2008). 
According to El-Gari (2003) credit risk is the one of the most important types of risks 
that confront the institutions in their operations that generates assets on the basis of 
debts and obligations to others  
The conventional institution is confronted by the credit risks in almost all its 
transactions. This is because the relationship between conventional institution and its 
customers is a continuous debtor and creditor relationship, whatever the nomenclature 
and the transaction might be. Similarly, the Islamic financial institution is facing this 
type of risks in most of the models of the financing that it uses. For example, it is a 
common knowledge that murabahah and Istisnaa’ and bay’ al-taqsit ‘instalment sale’ 




in this is the credit risk. Salam contract also generates commodity debts, not cash 
debt. However, it also involves credit risks.  On the other hand, Khan and Ahmed 
(2001) pointed out that Islamic financial institutions are not confronted with credit 
risk. This is because there is no credit in the Islamic financial institutions and banks. 
However, it is confronted with other risks that are known as financing risks, 
investment risks or operational risks.  
2.10.2 Market Risks 
According to Al-Amine (2008), the instruments, models or assets that are traded 
between banks and Islamic financial institutions are a major source of this type of 
risk. These types of risks arise as a result of the changes that may occur in the macro 
and micro-economic variables or partial. Market risks cover a wide range which 
includes the levels of interest rates, exchange rates or commodity prices in certain 
markets. However, the risk of the changes that occur in interest rate levels is one of 
the most important market risks that threaten the position of the conventional finance. 
Thus, since there is close correlation between the rates of profitability in the Islamic 
strictures and, for example, LIBOR, the changes of the levels of interest rates 
constitute concrete risks in the performance of the Islamic finance (Ahmad, 2011). 
2.10.3 Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk arises in the situation of the absence of adequate liquidity and necessary 
operating requirements for routine activities of the Islamic banks, which will reflect 
negatively in the ability of the banks to meet its cash obligations toward investors and 
customers (Al-Amine, 2008).   
This risk often occurs when there is a huge demand for deposits by depositors, or the 
financing of long-term loans in the bank by demand deposits or the occurrence of 
liquidity crisis in the financial market. The occurrence of any of these can be regarded 
as that the bank is facing liquidity risk (Sayyed, 1999). That is that, its effect on 
Islamic banks in the case of occurrence of this type of risk is the inability to grant 
loans or sell debt more than the face value, for the purpose of addressing the liquidity 





2.10.4 Operational Risks  
Operational risks are embodied in the possibilities of the change in operation cost in a 
very big magnitude more than the expectation, which may cause the decrease in the 
returns. Operating risks is associated closely with the burdens and the number of 
departments or branches and the number of staff in the institution. It also includes 
human error, fraud, forgery, or failure of the system, etc. (Tariq, 1999).  
In the same vein, operational risk can be caused by various technical errors and 
accidents, which are often man-made because of insufficient human or technical 
equipment that are needed on a technical level and also the risks may also be caused 
by direct or indirect losses at a designated bank (Al-Amine, 2008). 
2.10.5 Exchange Rate Risk 
These are risks that arise when there are changes in the rate of the exchange between 
two currencies in an unexpected manner during the intervening period between the 
processes of decision making on a specific time of payment. The rate of exchange is 
subject to fluctuations which source might be the changes in interest rate on the assets 
that are represented by such currency or changes in the centres of the balance of 
payments or deficits in the budgets of the countries that own the major currencies or 
in the political events, etc. This means that exchange rates fluctuate as a result of 
economic factors and uneconomic factors. It is not possible, hence, to predict the 
impacts on the exchange rate. due to this the banking risks of exchange is embodied in 
the exposure of banks to various risks that are associated with fluctuations in the 
market levels of currency as a result of its trading in foreign currencies or to use it for 
the operations that contain payments in foreign currencies (Addel Karim and Archer, 
2011). 
2.11 CONCLUSION 
In the course of this chapter, the emergence of Islamic finance is discussed. In this 
respect, the Islamic financial principles as well the capital market investments (sukuk) 
global development and trends were explored. Additionally, the structures of different 
types of sukuk are identified and clarified. The next chapter explores developments 























Chapter 3                                                                                                                 
ISLAMIC CAPITAL MARKET AND SUKUK IN SAUDI ARABIA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is considered as one of the most developed and largest 
economies in the Middle East mainly due to being biggest oil exporter in the world as 
wealth generated from oil industry has financed the economic development of the 
country in a rapid manner. Until recent years, the Saudi economy has grown 
significantly as result of the high oil prices, which is the main determinant of Saudi 
economy. Consequently, the Saudi government expended increasingly on public and 
private sector as well as servicing the debt of government which declined to the low 
level. However, the recent dramatic decline in oil prices has caused concern on the 
sustainability of the growth of Saudi economy. Since the Saudi economy is largely 
based on oil exports at the rate about 90%, the decline in oil prices since mid-2014 
and its continuation until now will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the Saudi 
economy. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the Saudi government to diversify its 
income sources and investment to reduce the risks faced due to the continued decline 
in the oil price (Aboudah, 2015). Among the sectors are considered to be affected by 
the declining oil prices include Saudi Islamic banking and finance (IBF) sector and in 
particular sukuk market.  
Although the Islamic finance sector has made considerable progress to become a well-
established sector in Saudi Arabia and around the world, the recent liquidity issues 
due to the declined oil revenues has caused concern for the sustainability of the sector. 
Despite this, the failure of conventional banks to cope with the recent global financial 
crisis in 2008 strongly favours the IBF as to provide a potential solution for the 
worldwide economic crisis. In other words, the model of IBF with its ethical 
philosophy in basing on a ‘sharing’ economy philosophy could provide a real 
alternative for millions of Muslim as well as non-Muslim customers around the world 
(Al-Darwish et al., 2015).  
As regards to the potential role of IBF in Saudi Arabia, there are real prospects for the 
industry to grow through developing new products including Islamic capital markets 




which could become the world leading country in the area of IBF. Accordingly, it can 
be argued that the main factors that can be the reasons for the recent development of 
the IBF market in Saudi Arabia are the size of the local economy as well as the 
environment of the IBF in Saudi Arabia (NCCR, 2011). Thus, given its flourishing 
economy coupled with its approximately 100% Muslim population; Saudi Arabia has 
good prospects in terms of its Islamic financial industry especially in sukuk market as 
it can be seen in Figure 3.1.  
However, compared with many Muslim and non-Muslim countries around the world 
including the GCC, Saudi Arabia is considered one of the top economies in the world.  
According to Ramady (2010), Saudi Arabia maintains a stable steady economic 
growth giving the country the edge as a potential promoter of the Islamic finance 
industry. In this respect, some of the top Islamic financial institutions among 500 
Global IBFs around the world in 2015 were based in Saudi Arabia as illustrated in 
Table 3.2 (The Banker, 2015), which will make significant contributions to the 
development of the Islamic finance industry through their Shari’ah-compliant assets. 
In addition, the Saudi market has become globally one of the biggest markets in terms 
of Shari’ah-compliant assets matching countries such as Malaysia and Iran in the 
Muslim world (The Banker, 2015). Therefore, the IBF sector in Saudi Arabia has 
been a great advantage for the country given the profitability and stability of the 
associated financial institutions, not to mention the prospects for future economic 
growth especially in the sukuk market giving it a competitive advantage worldwide. 
Therefore, the Saudi regulators as well as the decision makers should provide a well-
established market for the continuous promotion of the IBF industry.  
This chapter, hence, aims to identify the developments and trends in IBF industry in 
Saudi Arabia, which also aims to present the regulative and legal environment in 
relation with IBF development in the country. This chapter, hence, serves a 
foundational chapter for the empirical chapters later in the thesis. 
3.2 ISLAMIC FINANCE ENVIRONMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA 
Saudi Arabia has been the last country within the GCC to develop and implement 
strategies to develop its IBF sector, which has been strongly opposed in the early 
stages by many Arab countries. While initially the use of small amounts of investment 




2004), the establishment of the IDB, as a pan-Islamic bank for the Muslim World in 
Saudi Arabia in 1974 under the auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference – or as known now Organisation for Islamic Cooperation - (OIC) marked 
the begging of the IBF activities in Saudi Arabia. One of the main purposes of the 
IDB has been promoting the socio-economic development in the Islamic world in 
general and in member states in particular in accordance with Shari’ah principles. 
Thus, the IDB has provided financial assistance to many countries in the Muslim 
world (Iqbal, 2007). The developments and trends in the GCC IBF industry in terms 
of asset size growth are depicted in Figure 3.1, which substantiates the success of the 
sustainable growth. 
Figure  3.1: Total Shari’ah Compliant Assets in the GCC (2009-2015) ($M) 
 
      Source: The Banker (various issues) 
The evolution of the IBF sector in Saudi Arabia featured the introduction of Shari’ah-
compliant transactions into a number of several conventional banks, whereby Alrajihi 
Banking and Investment Corporation was the first to transform its activities to become 
consistent with Shari’ah law (Khan and Bhatti, 2008). That move was followed by 
Alahli Trade Fund established by the National Commercial Bank (NCB) to become 
the first Shari’ah-compliant fund in the country (Wilson, 2009). In 1992, a specialized 
department was established by National Commercial Bank to provide supervision to 
its Shari’ah-compliant branches (NCCR, 2011). Then, other banks soon followed suit 
whereby in 1995 the Saudi-Hollandi bank established the department of IBF, and 
Saudi Financial Group set the Islamic banking services in 1996. As part of the 
developments, Al-Jazerah bank in 1998 approved its strategic plan to transform itself 
gradually into an Islamic bank by the end of 2005. The bank of Al-Riyadh also 
managed to open an Islamic window in 2000 before establishing its first Islamic 
branch in 2003. This trend was followed by Al-bilad and Al-inma banks, which were 
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established in 2004 and 2008, respectively, to raise the number of Islamic banks in 
Saudi Arabia to four Islamic based banks (NCCR, 2011). Despite the fact that the 
international financial market has been badly hit by financial crisis, the crisis has 
provided a good opportunity for the IBF in Saudi Arabia to fill the gap that has been 
created by the troubled institutions in Western countries even though the former have 
to cope with many challenges ahead. In fact, the Saudi financial markets could 
manage to overcome the financial crisis through enhancing customers’ confidence in 
the Islamic finance as well as improving liquidity in the debt markets.  
In terms of the market size and trends, the Shari’ah-compliant assets have grown and 
increased significantly in recent years in the GCC (The Banker, 2015). As depicted in 
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2, Saudi Arabia has the largest IBF market in the GCC so far 
with total USD 306,807million, which is considered the second market compared to 
Iran (USD 316.423 million) in terms of Shari’ah-compliant assets (The Banker, 
2015). In a comparative perspective with other GCC countries, Saudi Arabian 
Shari’ah compliant assets grew by approximately 135% over 2009-2015 periods as it 
can be seen in Table 3.1. While in the same period, Qatar’s Islamic finance assets 
grew by almost 260% despite the Saudi Arabian Islamic assets are the largest in the 
region. 
Table  3.1:  Developments and Trends in Shari’ah Compliant Assets in the GCC, 2009-2015 ($M) 










KSA 127,896.1 138,238.5 150,945 185,223 227,173.72 257,054 306,807 139% 1 2 
UAE 84,036.5 85,622.6 94,126.66 89,390.38 87,321.58 105,780 111,294 32% 2 4 
Kuwait 67,630.2 69,088.8 79,647.85 78,587.25 72,464.97 80,448 84,448 24% 3 5 
Qatar 27,515.4 34,676.0 52,322.38 45,301.30 53,125.16 59,254 70,898 157% 4 6 
Bahrain 46,159.4 44,858.3 79,647.85 62,171.53 56,471.67 56,593 65,068 40% 5 7 
Data Source: The Banker (various issues) 
Figure  3.2: Total Shari’ah Compliant Assets in the GCC (2009-2015) ($M) 
 














In terms of individual Saudi Arabian Islamic banks, as it can be seen in Table 3.2, Al-
Rajihi Bank has the largest Islamic assets totalling around USD 82,056.41 million in 2015 
an equivalent of almost one third of the total assets of banking market in Saudi Arabia, as 
the Alrajihi Bank is considered as the top bank among 500 global institutions that have 
Shari’ah-compliant assets during 2015 (The Banker, 2015). Moreover, 12 Saudi IBF 
institutions among the Top 50 Financial Shari’ah-compliant assets institutions are based 
in Saudi Arabia as shown in Table 3.2. This can be an indication for success and progress 
of the Islamic financial market in Saudi Arabia.  





































16,135.5 17,112.5 18,676.0 21,591.2 27,794.4 33,106 46,366.61 4 
Saudi British 
Bank 
12,288 11,198.0 9,339.7 14,721.9 17,202.7 20,981 44,022.13 13 
Alinma Bank 1.114.4 6,652.7 8,665.9 9,808.0 14,403.0 16,800 21,563.00 16 
Samba Financial 
Group 
1.124.1 6,151.7 7,865.1 9,544.8 12,729.1 14,625 18,393.87 19 
Riyadh Bank 10,809.1 11,912.5 12,080.3 14,018.4 15,151.5 17,043 18,188.00 21 
Benque Saudi 
Fransi 
1,445.4 8,124.8 8,866.1 11,926.4 14,210.7 16,652 17,915.47 22 
Bank Al Jazirah 7,338.6 7,993.8 8,804.9 10,382.0 13,588.0 15,993 17,747.00 23 
Arab National 
Bank 
8,933.3 8,505.7 9,040.0 10,586.0 13,146.7 14,080 17,626.67 24 
Albilad Bank 1.554.1 4,643.0 5,631.1 7,393.0 7,940.0 9,686 12,061.00 31 
Saudi Holandi 
Bank 
5.255.1 3,052.3 3,613.3 3,653.3 5,413.6 6,485 8,560.00 43 
Saudi Investment 
Bank 









115.5 1,927.3 2,008.4 1,969.0 2,191.4 2,657 2,650.27 80 






Table  3.2a: Percentage Share of the Assets of Top Islamic Financial Institutions in Saudi 
Arabia to Assets of Total Banking Sector and Islamic Banking Sector, 2009-2015 
Percentage of Individual Islamic Bank Assets to Banking Sector Total Assets 
Institutions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Alrajihi Bank 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 
National Commercial Bank 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Saudi British Bank 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Alinma Bank 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Samba Financial Group 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Riyadh Bank 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Benque Saudi Fransi 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Bank Al Jazirah 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Arab National Bank 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Albilad Bank 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Saudi Holandi Bank 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Saudi Investment Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Islamic Development Bank 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The Company for Co-operative 
Insurance (NCCI) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Percentage of Individual Islamic Banking Assets to Islamic Banks' Total Assets 
Institutions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Alrajihi Bank 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18 
National Commercial Bank 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 
Saudi British Bank 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.10 
Alinma Bank 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Samba Financial Group 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Riyadh Bank 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Benque Saudi Fransi 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Bank Al Jazirah 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Arab National Bank 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Albilad Bank 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Saudi Holandi Bank 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Saudi Investment Bank 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Islamic Development Bank 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
The Company for Co-operative 
Insurance (NCCI) 
0.003 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Data Source: The Banker (various issues); Bankscope 
As depicted in table 3.2, while Islamic banking asset size demonstrated a growth, as shown in 
Table 3.2a its share in the total banking asset size seems to be decreasing. This implies that in 
Saudi Arabia, conventional banking asset size has been increasing with a higher pace 




Figure  3.3: The Development of the Shari’ah-compliant Assets in the Top 14 Institutions in 
S.A, 2009-2015 ($M) 
 
   Data Source: The Banker (various issues) 
In addition, the increasing in the Shari’ah-complaint assets in all financial institutions 
in Saudi Arabia, which represent a high demand for Islamic financial services, can 
also be seen in the Figure 3.3, which indicates a gradual increase. This shows that 
there is a potential need to make the Islamic financial sector in SA more sophisticated, 
regulated and profitable. 
3.3 SUKUK MARKET IN SAUDI ARABIA 
Saudi Arabia has recently witnessed an unprecedented economic growth through 
supporting the expanding monetary and financial policies (Ramady, 2010). In 
addition, it has resorted to ambitious expansionary fiscal and monetary initiatives in 
responding to the concerns stemmed from the international financial crisis and Arab 
spring. The impact of these policies has been reflected in the figures of gross domestic 
product (GDP) of the country in the last five years (Iqbal and Bin Zarah, 2013). 
Government expenditure, initiatives for reforming fiscal policies, promulgation of 
new laws and regulations, availability of adequate liquidity, all these are factors that 
have contributed to the expansion of the financial market for sukuk and bonds that 
will meet the needs of public and private sector in Saudi Arabia (Al Elsheikh and 
Tanega, 2011). In consideration of the notable expansion in the activities of 
companies, whose policies necessitate provision of liquidity without exposing shares 
holders to Shari’ah and financial risks, big companies including Aramco, SABIC and 
Saudi Electricity etc. have dealt with sukuk as one of the important financing 
methods. In this respect, it should be mentioned that sustaining efforts are being made 











efforts culminated in the approval to promote the Saudi Stock Exchange Company 
(Tadawul) to join the annual meeting of the World Federation of Exchanges 
convening on 6
th
 October 2009 in Vancouver, Canada. As a qualified member of the 
meeting, Tadawul was expected to provide its customers with new financial products 
and services including an online market for sukuk and bonds commencing on 13
th
 
June 2010. The new electronic market Tadawul features with various services 
includes sukuk listing to pricing information. As for sukuk and bonds in the new 
market; they would be traded through licensed brokerage firms that would use an 
investment portfolio similar to that used for stock trading (CMA Web, 2013). 
 It could be argued that in the aftermath of the Saudi stock market crunch in 2006; and 
coupled with global financial crisis; investors have become aware of the secure 
approach of investment by focusing on sukuk as more realistic and predictable asset in 
terms of risk management (Al Elsheikh and Tanega, 2011). However, despite the 
limited options for investment in Saudi Arabia, sukuk could become a main player in 
portfolio diversification as result of the Shari’ah objections of raising finance from 
conventional interest-based sources. As a matter of fact, bank loans and initial public 
offering constitute the main source for financing companies in the Saudi market. 
Nonetheless, with dwindling bank loans and inadequate initial public offerings, sukuk 
can become as an alternative financing method for funding companies. However, it 
should be noted with concern that, the financial crisis in the stock market in 2006 in 
Saudi Arabia made the (conventional) financial market less attractive to investors 
(Ramady, 2010). Therefore, the major Saudi companies include ARAMCO, SABIC, 
SADARA etc. considered sukuk as a potential method for finance in the face of the 
financial meltdown in the conventional sector.  
However, it is noteworthy that the sukuk market has made a major contribution to the 
trading activities. In this respect, the website of the Tadawul, which is based on CMA 
provides information relevant to the sukuk market as to enhance transparency, and in 
effect, this will attract more customers to the sukuk market. However, there is no limit 
on sukuk prices, with the tick size unit equivalent to 0.001 % of the sukuk value, and 
that the sukuk market remains open from 11.30 am to 3.00 pm from Sunday to 




3.3.1 Evaluating Sukuk Market In Saudi Arabia 
As can be seen from the Figure 3.4, the sukuk issued in Saudi Arabian market since 
2003, making the Saudi Arabian market the second largest sukuk market globally, 
while Figure 3.5 depicts the increasing trends in the sukuk markets. 
Figure  3.4: Total Size of Sukuk Issuances, 2001-2015 ($M) 
 
Source: Zawya (2015) 
Figure  3.5: Trends in Saudi Arabian Sukuk Market, 2003-2015($M) 
 
Source: IFIS Database (2013); Zawya Database (2015) and Tadawul Database (2015) 
The total value of sukuk issuances in Figure 3.5 shows a sustained growth in the Saudi 













































































period in 2012. After reaching its peak in 2013, the decline in the oil prices have 
shown its impact in 2014 and 2015 by decreased sukuk value.  
Thus, as regards the local Saudi sukuk market, it is considered inactive as the 
issuances of sukuk are not frequent as it can be seen in Figure 3.7. However, since 
2012, a significant increase in the number of sukuk issuances has been observed, 
which reached approximately 23 in 2013. The estimated value in 2013 was 
approximately USD 18 billion as is depicted in figure 3.5.  
As can be seen in Figure 3.6, in 2014, the value of sukuk issued declined by 
approximately 30%, although, the number of sukuk issued in the same year were 
almost the same. However, the KSA sukuk market witnessed in 2015 a sharp decline 
of the value of sukuk issuances with approximately 65% as it has been shown in 
Figure 3.5. This can be as consequences of the low prices of oil as it has been 
mentioned above. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.6, the Saudi Arabian sukuk market, there are around 106 
issuances of sukuk between 2003-2015 with an approximate total value of USD 
67,847.22 million.  
Figure  3.6: Sukuk Market Trends in Saudi Arabian Market (Sukuk Issuances (Listed and Not 
Listed in Tadawul), 2003-2015 ($M) 
 
Data Source: IFIS Database (2013); Zawya Database (2015); Tadawul Database (2015) 
The Saudi Arabian domestic sukuk market is divided into two sections; one for the 
sukuk listed in the Tadawul which are considered as public issuances. Another type of 
domestic sukuk market is located for sukuk that are not listed in the Tadawul, which 
are issued as private issuances. As can be seen in Figure 3.7, 29% of the total sukuk 
were being listed in Tadawul in comparison with 71% were being not listed as it can 
be seen in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
not 400 417.733 500 18 2,250 540.297 1190.48 1823.33 1380.69 10839.5 11866.3 10928.5 5,953













Figure  3.7: The Number of (Listed-Not Listed) Sukuk Issued in S.A, 2003-2015 
 
Data Source: IFIS Database (2013); Zawya Database (2015); Tadawul Database (2015) 
Figure  3.8: The Total Value of (Listed-Not Listed)Sukuk Issued in S.A,2003-2015 
 
    Data Source: IFIS Database (2013); Zawya Database (2015); Tadawul Database (2015) 
 
In Saudi Arabia while sukuk market is still being inactive, 15 sukuk have been issued 
and listed in Tadawul since the establishment of the sukuk market by a few 
companies. It is worth mentioning that the value of all listed sukuk presented in 
Tadawul was approximately USD 19,736 million as it can be seen in Figure 3.6 and 
3.7. While the details of all listed sukuk can be reviewed on Tadawul website, 91 
sukuk issuances were not listed in Tadawul making the value worth approximately 
USD 48,107 million as identified. This indicates the inactiveness of the Saudi sukuk 
market as result of the preference of the Saudi companies to not to list their sukuk in 
the Tadawul and rather opting for private placements. 
In this regard, Rabindranath and Gupta (2010) note that despite all the development 
and changes that have been made by the government, the market activity for sukuk 
remains modest in Saudi Arabia. In their opinion, the small number of listed sukuk 
compared to not listed issuances could be explained by the high annual registration 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
LISTED 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 1
NOT 1 3 1 1 3 3 3 6 4 17 20 14 15













fees with Tadawul amounting to USD 27,000 plus a further USD 13,000 for 
uploading issuances. According to the Collaborative Sukuk Report (2010), the high 
registration costs tend to make foreign investors closely examine the economic 
feasibility of sukuk, not to mention the fact that it constitutes a major deterrent for 
other companies to issue such financial instruments.  
As a matter of fact, the progress of sukuk market in Saudi Arabia can be hampered by 
the inadequacy of the local rating agencies, thus, complicating the process of 
assessing the risk involved with such investment. For that reason, investors always go 
for initially rated securities; as such securities can be attainable in terms of risk 
management (Al Elsheikh and Tanega, 2011). Currently, ratings can be done by 
foreign agencies even though several companies could find the costs unaffordable to 
them. Nonetheless, according to Rabindranath and Gupta (2010) foreign agencies use 
foreign markets as a reference; this is a disadvantage for Saudi market. Moreover, Al 
Elsheikh and Tanega (2011) point out that complexities involving sukuk may 
negatively affect risk assessments in relation to sukuk market. At the present, the 
situation has favoured Islamic banks, as the restrictions on debt issuance tend to 
increase demand for sukuk (Wilson, 2009). This might destabilise prices of any new 
generation of sukuk that might be issued in Saudi Arabia as banks might fail to get the 
sukuk they yearn for. Another concern is that only a few long-term sukuk will be 
available in the market despite their importance for long-term investment, particularly 
for pension purposes.  
In reflecting on the jurisdictions, the Saudi sukuk market can be divided into two 
categories: locally issued sukuk SAR and the second category is the international 
issuance of sukuk denominated mostly in USD. In this respect, SAR accounts for 60% 
of the issuances, while USD issued sukuk accounts for 29% comparing to other 
currencies in Saudi Arabian sukuk market, which is depicted in Figure 3.9. 
Figure  3.9: Saudi Arabian Sukuk by Issuance Currencies, (2003-2015) 
 






















Regarding the most used structures since the first sukuk issued in the Saudi sukuk 
market, sukuk al-istithmar structure with 35% of the total issuances has been the most 
popular structures, as it can be seen in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11. In addition, 
mudarabah with murabahah based structure and ijarah are also considered another 
most used structure, which have chosen by the issuers among another structures in the 
Saudi Arabian market with 27% and 20% respectively.  
Figure  3.10: Saudi Arabian Sukuk Breakdown by Type of Structures, 2003-2015 
 
Data Source: IFIS Database (2013); Zawya Database (2015); Tadawul Database (2015) 
Figure  3.11: Saudi Arabian Sukuk by Number of Structures, 2003-2015 
 
Data Source: IFIS Database (2013); Zawya Database (2015); Tadawul Database (2015) 
On the other hand, the first sovereign sukuk issued in the Saudi Arabia market was the 
sukuk issued by the General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) in 2012 guaranteed 
by the Ministry of Finance of Saudi Arabia with total value of USD 4,000 Million. 
This issuance was followed by the second sovereign sukuk issuance of GACA, which 
is considered as the largest issuance in the Saudi market with total value of USD 
4,055.94 million, as it can be seen in Table 3.3 (see the end of the Chapter). In 
addition, SABIC Company issued three issuances with total value of USD 4,233.157 




















































domestic market. All the sukuk issued in Saudi Arabian sukuk market whether by 
number, issuer, issue date, type of sukuk or currency, between 2003 and 2015 can be 
seen in Table 3.3. 
Since IDB is based in Saudi Arabia, its sukuk activities should also be considered. 
However, IDB adopts general trend to issue sukuk at the international level rather than 
domestic market. According to Zawya database (2015), the numbers of sukuk issued 
by IDB were 22 issuances with total value of USD 12,389.5 million. In addition, Dar 
al-Arkan is considered also one of the prominent issuers of sukuk at the international 
level with 7 issuances worth approximately USD 3,400 Million. 
It should be mentioned that the international sukuk issued in the Saudi Arabian market 
is characterised by two features according to Iqbal and Bin Zarah (2013). The first 
feature is that sukuk issued in Saudi market are classified and rated either according to 
the solvency of the issuer or based on the issuance itself. This classification can help 
the investor to be familiar with the regulations and policies of the Saudi market. The 
second characteristic for the international issuances in the Saudi Arabian market is 
that most of the international sukuk were being listed in foreign exchanges. These two 
features will encourage investors to deal easily with their sukuk. 
As regards to the most of the structures used in the international sukuk issuances, the 
sukuk al-wakalah bel-istithmar and ijarah are considered the most used structures in 
the KSA market. 
It can be said that the idea of sukuk in the Saudi market emerged as an Islamic 
substitute for interest-based bonds. Therefore, most Saudi companies as well as some 
banks in Saudi Arabia adopted the sukuk as method for securing long-term financing 
for their expansion as the sukuk is considered one of the most applicable finance 
approaches. This tendency has had a significant impact on the remarkable progress in 
the Saudi sukuk market.   
Although, there were a significant efforts offered through CMA for the purpose of the 
development of the Saudi sukuk market, various Shari’ah and legal obstacles still 
need to be resolved. In this regard, it could be argued that one of the challenges, 
which can affect the development of the sukuk market in the country, is the credit 




issuer (credit classification) as the main issue that should be taken into account when 
they tend to involve into any financial transaction, especially credit-based 
transactions. In this respect, it can be said that credit rating strategy has now become a 
source of guarantee for attracting investors particularly in the financial markets. 
Through this kind of method, the solvency of any issuer can be recognised.      
In Saudi Arabian sukuk market, international sukuk issuances dominated in foreign 
currency are usually rated by special agencies, as the credit rating is crucial for 
investors, as it has been noted above. However, the domestic sukuk issuances 
dominated in Saudi Riyal are still not rated, which is justified on the ground that there 
is no urgent need for the issuances of sukuk to be rated. This can be supported by the 
large demand for sukuk issued in the Saudi domestic market even though those sukuk 
were not-rated. Additionally, the number of sukuk issued in the Saudi sukuk market 
are limited compared to the liquidity in the Saudi market which created a large 
demand for investment in sukuk, even if they are not rated. Furthermore, it can also be 
stated that most of the Saudi companies issued sukuk are considered well-known 
companies among the investors in terms of their solvency as well as their activities. 
This reputation can be considered as a benchmark for investors. However, the recent 
entry of foreign companies to the Saudi Arabian market may have positive impact on 
the CMA’s regulations as well as motivating the sukuk issuers to consider their sukuk 
to be rated. Thus, the credit rating has become an urgent need and an important factor 
in the Saudi sukuk market. This trend will attract sukuk investors, as it will provide 
them the transparency of the issuer. 
Despite the success in the Saudi sukuk market, in 2015, the total number of 
transactions recorded in the Tadawul was only 20 transactions according to Tadawul 
web, which is comparatively very small compared to other financial markets as the 
shortage of the issuances and lack of frequent transactions can be resulted in 
undermining the confidence of sukuk investors whether locally or internationally. 
While the decline in oil based liquidity and economic impact can be considered for 
the decrease, considering the need for project financing in the country, sukuk should 
be considered as an important instrument. 
In this regard, a number of suggestions can be made to improve the Saudi Arabian 




solid platform and a yield curve in the sukuk market. Enhancing the transparency in 
the Saudi Arabian market from the beginning of the issuance to the time of maturity 
has become also essential particularly pricing the value of sukuk. There are many 
other factors, which will be discussed in details in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
3.3.2 Comparing the Saudi Arabian and the GCC Sukuk Markets 
Sukuk markets in the GCC have grown rapidly in the last few years with deferent type 
of issuances include sovereign and quasi-sovereign as well as corporate issuances. 
Therefore, it is considered one of the largest global sukuk markets. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.12, Saudi sukuk market is considered as the leader market 
in the GCC with an approximate total sukuk value of USD 67,847.22 million. The 
UAE with total value of USD 60,375.57 million is the second market in the GCC, as 
it has been indicated in Figure 3.12. However, Omani market is the last among the 
GCC markets with an approximate total value of USD 780.031 million. This can be 
justified by the late entering of the Oman in the sukuk market, as it has been noted 
above. In terms of the number of issuances, the Bahraini sukuk market is considered 
the active market in the GCC with 330 issuances representing 56% of the total 
issuances in the GCC markets. This followed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE market 
with106 and 96 issuances respectively as it can be seen in Figure 3.13. As depicted, 
Saudi Arabian sukuk market accounts for nearly 13% of the number of sukuk as 
compared to other GCC markets. In terms of the value, the Saudi market accounts for 
37% of sukuk in the region as it can be seen in Figure 3.14. 
Figure  3.12: Total Value of Sukuk Issued in the GCC, 2003-2015 ($M) 
 











Figure  3.13: Total Number of Sukuk Issued in the GCC, 2003-2015 
 
                    Data Source: Zawya Database (2015) 
Figure  3.14: Comparison of S.A Market to the GCC Markets, 2003-2015 ($M) 
 
Data Source: Zawya Database (2015) 
As for the type of the type of issuance, corporates are considered the most issuers of 
sukuk in the GCC market followed by sovereign sukuk as it is illustrated in Figure 
3.14. As regards to the sectorial distribution, as depicted in Figure 3.15, the most 
sukuk issued were in the financial services and real estate sectors. However, the 
Government bodies are more active in the GCC markets as opposed to the sluggish 
attitude of the financial authorities in the Saudi Arabian market (Zawya, 2015).   
Figure  3.15: GCC Sukuk by Type of Issuance, Size and Number, 2003-2015, ($M) 
 







































As regards to the most frequently used sukuk structures at the GCC level, as depicted 
in Figure 3.16 (with three panels), ijarah structure is the most popular structure 
among the issuers with the total value of USD 69,660 million representing 40% of all 
the issuances in the GCC compared to other structures. This is followed by 
mudarabah and musharakah structures with total value of USD 17,509 million and 
USD 15,316 million respectively. However, sukuk el-istithmar can be the second most 
popular structure as the sukuk el-istithmar and sukuk alwakalah bel-istithmar can be 
the same structure with different name, as it has been stated by Latham and Watkins 
(2015).  
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As the discussion indicates, there are quite strong potential for the development of 
sukuk market in the GCC countries; while the decline in oil revenues can be 
considered as an adverse development, the financial engineering and financial 
ingenuity can contribute to the expansion of the sukuk market for the years to come. 
3.3.3 LEGAL AND REGULATIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR ISLAMIC 
FINANCE AND SUKUK IN SAUDI FINANCIAL MARKET   
The preceding section presented the dynamics of sukuk market in the GCC region 
with a particular focus on the Saudi Arabian market. The development of capital 
markets such as sukuk market, however, requires facilitatory regulative and legal 
environment. This section, hence, aims to discuss legal and regulative environment 
for the Islamic financial development in Saudi Arabia.  
It should be noted in the beginning that the law of Saudi Arabia is Shari’ah -based 
inspired by Quran and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad as the main source of 
legislation (Hanson, 1987). However, as far as the financial matters are concerned, 
Saudi Arabia stops short of a fully established Islamic financial sector, as the state 
seems to be not keen to promote the principles of the Islamic banking system (Wilson, 
2007). In this regard, the Saudi government would appear to be hesitant to use the 
‘Islamic’ label in relation to the banking system lest any failure could tarnish the 
image of the Islamic financial institutions across the world (Warde, 2000). However, 
the point is that the government of Saudi Arabia may attempt to set the balance right 
between Islamic and non-Islamic institutions so that labelling of some institutions as 
being Islamic will by definition exclude the rest as being non-Islamic, which will 
cause a state of confusion in the financial system (Warde, 2000).  
Recalling that backed by the Saudi government, the OIC established the IDB in 1974 
with the purpose of providing financial assistance to promote the process of economic 
and social development in the Muslim world in general and the member states in 
particular in accordance with the principles of Shari’ah (Chapra, 1996). Therefore, to 
reach that end Article 2 of the Royal Decree highlights the prohibition of interest-
based transactions, where banks are involved in response to the principles of Shari’ah. 
However, such legal positioning contradicts the traditional approach featuring 
conventional banking where trading and financing processes are based on fixed 




3.3.4 Main Legal Bodies in the Saudi Financial Market 
The management and supervision of the activities of the financial sector in Saudi 
Arabia are organized by two regulatory bodies (Alsmamrani, 2014). The first one is 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which was established in 1952 to 
undertake the function of the central bank including issuing the national currency, the 
Saudi Riyal, supervising commercial banks, managing foreign exchange reserves, 
promoting price and exchange rate stability, and ensuring the growth and soundness 
of the financial system, operating a number of cross-bank electronic financial systems 
such as Tadawul. The second institution is the CMA which was established under the 
‘Capital Market Law (CML)’, promulgated by Royal Decree No. (M/30) dated 
31/7/2003, to assume the supervisory and regulatory role over the parties falling under 
its authority (SAMA Web, 2015). The CMA is a government entity that enjoys 
financial and administrative autonomy and reports directly to the Head of the Council 
of Ministers. The Authority is vested with the regulation and development of the 
Saudi capital market and issuance of regulations, rules and instructions essential to 
applying the provisions of the CML. 
CML defines CMA’s main functions, the most important of which are to (CMA 
Webpage): 
(i) “Regulate and develop the capital market, and seek to develop and improve the 
practices of entities trading in securities; 
(ii) Protect investors in securities from unfair and unsound practices, or acts 
involving fraud, deception, cheating, manipulation or insider trading; 
(iii) Seek to achieve fairness, efficiency and transparency in securities transactions; 
(iv) Develop control mechanisms that mitigate the risks associated with securities 
transactions; 
(v) Regulate and monitor the issuance of and trading in securities; 
(vi) Regulate and monitor business activities of parties subject to the CMA’s 
supervision; 
(vii) Regulate and monitor the full disclosure of information pertaining to securities 
and their issuers, the dealings of informed persons and investors, and specify and 
provide the information that should be disclosed by participants in the market to 




However, neither of the two bodies has retained powers as to provide Shari’ah-related 
supervision, as their duty has been focused on improving performance according to 
their law and regulations. Unlike countries such as Bahrain and Malaysia, the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board or SSB’s in Saudi Arabia have no specific rules for 
regulating the Islamic financial services. Instead, financial institutions are given a 
broad margin of freedom to choose their Shari’ah-compliant products assisted by 
their supervisory boards acting on the advice of Shari’ah scholars who constitute part 
of the membership of those boards. 
In this regard, the main players are the Shari’ah scholars who have a duty to review 
the new products especially sukuk and services for Shari’ah compliancy (Bhambra, 
2007). Thus, more efforts need to be made to improve employment standards for 
those scholars for better performance. 
The current disagreement among scholars can result in confusion and misinformation. 
To avoid such implications highly qualified Shari’ah scholars need to be employed 
who must be knowledgeable in the area of finance and other related subjects including 
accounting and economics especially in Saudi Islamic finance market particularly 
sukuk market which has not been regulated yet (Alkhamees, 2013). The issues related 
to the SSBs are discussed in details in Chapter 5. 
3.3.5 The Working of Islamic Finance in Saudi Arabia 
Article 7 of the Constitution of Saudi Arabia provides that the government of Saudi 
Arabia drives power from the Holy Quran and the Prophet Muhammad’s tradition 
(The Basic Law of Governance, 1992). That should mean that every aspect of the 
state governance including the banking and other finance activities should be 
consistent with Shari’ah principles. Accordingly, the Islamic label as it has been 
mentioned above should be a travesty in making no difference. In addition, Article 2 
of the Royal Decree prevents SAMA from becoming involved in interest-based 
transactions so that the Islamic label has nothing to do with the nature of the bank’s 
activities. In practice that should give more room for deviation from both the regular 
constitution and the Royal Decree so that conventional and Islamic financial 
institutions can operate side by side.  However, neither the Royal Decree nor SAMA 
have made any reference to the Islamic character, and yet as indicated by SAMA 




services in Saudi Arabia where all banks have become involved in Shari’ah-
compliant business practice that entire operations to some extent are being conducted 
in an Islamic manner. According to SAMA regulation, similar to traditional banking; 
Islamic banking should be subject to the same control measures; and hence, it does 
not recognise exceptionalism for Islamic finance. Therefore, both Islamic and 
traditional finance are subject to the same rules.  
In reflecting, the difficulties experienced by Alrajihi Bank to be libelled as ‘Islamic 
Bank’ should indicate the attitude of SAMA towards Islamic banks. Alrajihi is the 
largest institution for foreign exchange and remittance transfer in the country. 
However, the application of Alrajihi to transform the label into an Islamic bank was 
rejected by SAMA in 1989 on the grounds that such a move could by definition 
define other financial institutions as being non-Islamic. For that reason Alrajihi was 
given the license on condition that it would not be labelled as an Islamic institution 
(Wilson, 2007).  
It should be noted that most traditional judicial affairs in Saudi Arabia are a matter for 
Shari’ah courts besides a number of quasi-judicial committees depending on the 
nature of the case involved (Hasan, 2009). It could be argued that the committees 
become important in cases that fall beyond the authority of Shari’ah courts (Wilson, 
2007). Those committees include the commercial Papers Committee, the Banking 
Disputes Settlement Committee (BDSC), the Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes (CRSD) featuring the Saudi Capital Authority (McMillen, 2001; 
Wilson, 2008). In this regard, Chapter 7 will discuss in details the important issues 
related to legal authorities controlling the Islamic financial activities in Saudi Arabian 
market by particularly focusing on sukuk market.   
3.3.6 Shari’ah Courts with Islamic Finance Cases  
The fact that riba is strictly prohibited by Shari’ah law has an impact on court’s 
decision regarding disputes in relation to cases involving banks and companies 
dealing in interest-based transactions. Therefore, the judges to be appointed to 
Shari’ah courts should always focus on Shari’ah compliancy. Accordingly, any 
claims to be made against clients who are in debt to banks that deal in interest-based 




For example, Resolution No 291 of the Supreme Judicial Council rules out Shari’ah 
tribunals to become involved in mortgage disputes featuring loans given by 
commercial banks. That resolution mainly excludes Shari’ah courts from becoming 
involved in any interest-related bank disputes. Nonetheless, banks are still hopeful on 
the ground that the resolution will be reversed based on the argument that refusal to 
consider such disputes will pose a major risk to banks and clients. A case in point is 
the refusal of the Commercial Circuit at the Board of Grievances in 1996 to rule in a 
case involving bank shares where the contractual obligations between the defendant 
and the plaintiff involved is ribawi (Aljarbou, 2004). The Shari’ah courts are still 
adamant in not becoming involved in cases featuring interest-based transactions, as 
that would be a sinful practice in violation of the Islamic principles.  
Given the increasing need for a body to settle disputes between banks and their 
clients, the Banking Disputes Settlement Committee (BDSC) has been established by 
SAMA (Al Homoud, 2011). In the same context, Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes (CRSD) was established in 2004 (Gouda, 2012).  
The BDSC deals with disputes featuring the provisions of the CML by implementing 
the rules and regulations involving public and private matters. Nonetheless, in Saudi 
Arabia, interest is frequently referred to by different labels such as special 
commission income, service charges or book keeping fees (Wilson, 1991). Initially, 
BDSC was established by the Royal Order 729/8 of 1987 as an entity for resolving 
legal disputes in relation to banking. However, since its establishment, the BDSC as a 
legal entity, has managed by one way or another to avoid legal issues involving 
interest in relation to Islamic law, as from the technical point of view BDSC is not 
considered as judicial body, and so cannot be compared to the Shari’ah courts in 
terms of powers and privileges. Thus, the main purpose of the BDSC is to settle 
disputes between banks and their clients (Arafah, 2009). According to the regulation 
of BDSC’s, which consists of three-member committee, main mission is mediating 
between the parties involved in the dispute, and that its decisions are not binding to 
either of the parties involved. In other words, by taking into account the 
circumstances of the disputing parties and the local traditions, the committee should 
be able to negotiate a settlement to resolve disputes otherwise it should refer the case 




establishment of the committee. However, the committee should endeavour to enforce 
its decision through executive authority with no right of appeal in case the decision is 
unsatisfactory to one or both parties. It should be noted that from a legal perspective, 
a legal arrangement governing banking operations does not exist so far in the country 
and that the general law is the only reference for the committee to settle disputes 
featuring banking matters (Alghadyan, 1998). However, the rulings involving BDSC 
are subject to be backed and enforced by the appropriate government authorities 
provided the Civil Rights Directorate is being initially informed to follow up the 
enforcement procedures.  
In this regard, Articles 3 and 4 of the Royal Decree Order of 728/8 of year 1987 
would secure the power of enforcement of the procedures to be determined by BDSC 
for the settlement of potential disputes. Those powers include the right for the 
committee to seize or otherwise freeze the debtor’s assets or to label the defendants as 
black listed as a measure to prevent from travelling abroad or from doing business 
with other banks (Tuck, 1991).  Furthermore, the committee has the right to ban the 
debtor from doing business with government agencies and banks in case if he fails to 
cooperate with the committee in its efforts to reach a final settlement for the dispute 
(Tuck, 1991).  
The authority of the BDSC is confined to cases involving disputes featuring banking 
activities as stipulated by Article One (b) of the banking control law. Thus, in cases of 
non-banking activities that banks are involved, the authority refers to the law courts 
and other legal tribunals. However, in theory, SAMA committee should resolve 
banking disputes according to Shari’ah standards. However, in practice, the 
committee has an obligation to force debtors to honour the terms of the agreements no 
matter that agreement involves interest-based transactions or not. The only important 
condition is that the transaction should be consistent with the law of Saudi Arabia. In 
other words, the committee should spare no efforts to make the parties involved 
respect their agreements even though those agreements are not Shari’ah compliant 
(McMillen, 2000). 
3.3.7 Legal Environment for Sukuk in Saudi Arabia 
Until today, the sukuk marketplace especially in Saudi market needs to be developed 




featuring standardisation and regulation of sukuk have been issued so as to enhance 
the confidence of both investors and issuers in the market (Alexakis and Tsikouras, 
2009). However, there is still more work to be done across the world in general and in 
Saudi Arabia particularly to secure a sustainable growth and stability of sukuk market.  
It should be noted that by CMA and under the Securities Regulations code; no 
reference has been made to sukuk as Shari’ah compliant product. In fact, the rules 
tend to focus on the procedures rather the substance with regard to sukuk issuance 
(Capital Market Authority, Offers of Securities Regulations, dated 04/10/2004 
amended 28/01/2008). 
As mentioned above, a suitable environment conducive to sukuk has yet to be created 
by regulators in Saudi Arabia. In this regard, particular attention should be given to 
the resolution of disputes, whereby a clear mechanism for resolving disputes should 
favour investors who would otherwise remain hesitant to become engaged in any 
vague deals involving sukuk (Al Elsheikh and Tanega, 2011). In countries where 
sukuk legislation is more advanced usually jurisdiction is a matter for the relevant 
regulator of securities. However, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, jurisdiction over 
sukuk is indefinite, whereby many organisations become involved in the matter 
including Shari’ah Courts, the Grievances Court, SAMA, and the CMA. This results 
in a state of confusion and uncertainty for both investors and issuers of sukuk by 
making sukuk deals less attractive to businessmen and investors in Saudi Arabia. 
From the this discussion it becomes obvious that a clearly defined and standardised 
regulatory system for sukuk market needs to be established in Saudi Arabia as to 
facilitate Islamic financial expansion in general and sukuk market in particular, which 
can create an efficient and competitive environment for promotion of sukuk as a 
source for financing government and corporations. Thus, issues relating to regulative 
and legal environment are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
3.4 AN INTRODUCTION TO SABIC SUKUK 
This section focuses on rendering an introduction to SABIC sukuk with the objective 




3.4.1 The Description of the Structural Steps of SABIC Sukuk 
Figure 3.17 is developed by examining and deconstructing the mechanism of the 
SABIC sukuk from initial step to the distribution of returns, which hence depicts the 
entire structure and process of SABIC sukuk. 
Figure 3.17: The Description of the Structural Steps of SABIC Sukuk
 
After a close examination of the issuance prospectus, the issuance structure, as 
depicted in Figure 6.1 can be summarised through the following points: 
(i)  The SABIC sukuk represents 22.94% of the rights and obligations featuring the 
marketing agreements between SABIC and the subsidiary companies for 20 years.  
However, after 20 years or otherwise in any case, when the sukuk expires, even before 
the 20 years, then the SABIC will be the sole claimant of all the rights and obligations 
as referred to by the marketing agreements. 22.94% of the rights and obligations, as 
defined by the marketing agreement between the issuer (SABIC) and the subsidiary 
companies, have been transformed by the former to sukuk before being put forward 
for subscription by the public. 
(ii)  All investors have subscribed to this issuance, and accordingly have paid the par 
value of sukuk to the issuer in cash. i.e. SR 10,000 per one of the sukuk – for owning 
one of the sukuk representing a common share in 22.49 % of the rights and obligations 




subsidiary companies. In other words, sukuk holders will receive 22.49% of the total 
bonuses and fees, which will be generated from marketing the products of SABIC 
subsidiaries. However, it should be noted that in theory in order to become eligible for 
the marketing fees featuring the returns from sukuk, the sukuk holders have a duty to 
undertake the marketing process in relation to the selling of the products of SABIC 
subsidiary companies. 
(iii) Prescribing in sukuk implies that the investor (sukuk holder) should as a condition 
to designate SABB Bank (Saudi Arabia) as a commission agent to represent him in all 
matters pertaining to sukuk. Accordingly, the bank will be labelled as ‘the agent of 
sukuk holders’ and in return the bank will be eligible for a total annual payment of SR 
750,000.  
(iv) The contract between the agent of sukuk holders (SAAB Bank) and SABIC is 
described as a hire contract for doing a job, whereby the hirer is sukuk holders and 
SABIC is the worker. Accordingly, SABIC should be committed to undertake the 
marketing and selling of the products of the subsidiary companies on behalf of sukuk 
holders, in return for a payment of 1% of the total returns of the marketing the 
products to which the sukuk holders are entitled. That agreement is known as ‘the 
agreement for the management of sukuk assets’. 
(v) According to the ‘agreement for the management of sukuk holders’, one of the 
duties of the ‘manager of sukuk assets’ – SABIC – is the collection of money 
pertaining to sukuk holders, i.e. the collection of 22.49% of marketing fees to be paid 
by SABIC subsidiary companies to sukuk holders. The money will be paid into a 
virtual account in the name of sukuk holders labelled as ‘reserve account’ for the sake 
of SABIC accounts records, rather than an independent bank account for sukuk 
holders. 
It is also, worth mentioning that the ‘manager of sukuk assets’ – SABIC – has set a 
condition for sukuk holders by preserving the right of using any funds in the reserve 
account featuring the virtual account in excess of the sums due to be distributed 
among sukuk holders on the defined dates. In this case, SABIC is considered as a 
borrower of the excess money, so that SABIC will become the sole claimant of any 




It is also, imperative to highlight the fact that according to the prospectus of issuance, 
the quarter-yearly periodic profits as well as the additional sums (10%) to be 
distributed to sukuk holders every five years. This should be covered by the money 
belonging to sukuk holders in the reserve account. However, in case of expiry of 
sukuk (either by being purchased by the issuer in response to a request from sukuk 
holders after five years have passed, in case of failure, or otherwise at the end of the 
20 years when the sukuk expire), in case some funds remain in the reserve account 
after the expiry of sukuk, no matter the amount remaining in excess of funds that have 
been distributed as shown above, SABIC has set a condition to take those sums as an 
incentive for its good management of sukuk assets. 
In case, sufficient amounts of money are available in the virtual account of sukuk 
holders ‘the reserve account’, then the amount available will cover the periodic 
profits. However, in case the amount is insufficient to cover the full amount agreed 
upon, i.e. SIBOR + 48 basing (0.48%) points, then the amount available will be 
distributed proportionally among sukuk holders, and the remaining unpaid sums will 
be considered as deficit to be paid later should the money available in the virtual 
account (the reserve) allow that payment. In other words, the issuer, i.e. SABIC, will 
not pay anything of the quarter-yearly profits from its own funds, but rather pay from 
whatever is available for sukuk holders from the rights featuring the fees collected 
from marketing the products of the contracting subsidiary companies of SABIC. 
(vi) On the dates of the distribution of quarter-yearly periodic profits, the manager of 
the assets of sukuk will distribute the profits among sukuk holders after allowing for 
discounts featuring the management fees and other costs. The profits will be 
calculated according to the interest rates, i.e. the rates of deposits in Saudi Riyals for 
three months – (SIBOR) + 48 basing points (0.48%) of the par value of sukuk valid 
until that date, at the expense of the virtual account belonging to sukuk holders 
referred as ‘the reserve’ in Article 5 shown above. 
(vii) An additional profit known as ‘additional amount’ at the rate of 10 % of the total 
par value of sukuk, valid until that date, will be distributed among sukuk holders by 
the ‘manager of sukuk assets’ at the expense of the virtual account belonging to sukuk 




(viii)  The issuer, i.e. SABIC, commits itself by giving an irreversible promise that 
they will purchase all or some of the sukuk at the end of every five-year period with at 
the request of sukuk holders.   
The issuer has promised to purchase the sukuk from sukuk holders as following price: 
(a) 90 % of the par value of sukuk at the end of the year five. 
(b) 60 % of the par value of sukuk at the end of year ten. 
(c) 30 % of the par value of sukuk at the end of year fifteen. 
At the end of year 20, the sukuk will eventually expire and the value will be zero. 
(ix) The issuer, i.e. SABIC has made a commitment by giving an irreversible 
promise to purchase all or some of the sukuk with at the request of sukuk holders in 
the event of emergency or what is known as ‘cases of failure’ such as: 
(a) Failure of SABIC to pay the periodic quarter-yearly profits or otherwise in 
cases of deficits in profits to be distributed among sukuk holders as to become 
less than the amount agreed upon – SIBOR+ 48 basing points – or in case of 
failure of SABIC to pay the ‘additional amount’ to be distributed every five 
years or deficits in the distributed amount as to become less than the amount 
agreed upon, i.e. 10%, provided that failure is directly linked to the negligence 
of the manager of sukuk assets – SABIC – to his duties or his failure to live up 
to his commitments as provided by the provisions of ‘the management of sukuk 
assets agreement’. 
(b) Failure of the issuer, namely SABIC, to meet deadlines with regard to 
paying its debts to donors, whoever those donors are, provided that the unpaid 
debts should not exceed SR 175 million or an equivalent of that amount in 
foreign currency. 
(c) Insolvency of the issuer or otherwise the dissolution of the issuer by a court 
order. 
It should be noted that many details could be found in the issuance prospectus 




at the time of failure. Nonetheless, the most important point is that, sukuk holders 
should be paid their sukuk value in full, i.e. 100 %, on top of any periodic quarter-
yearly profits due in case of failure in the first five years, in response to a request of 
sukuk holders from SABIC to buy their sukuk. 
From the forgoing the issuance structure can be summarised in the following points: 
(i) The investor has to pay SR 10,000 to SABIC to obtain one of the sukuk on offer 
for investment. That sum represents a specific percentage of the rights and 
commitments of SABIC featuring in 14 of the marketing agreements between SABIC 
and its subsidiary companies in Saudi Arabia.  
(ii) SABIC has been chosen by sukuk holders as to represent them in the marketing 
and selling of the products of the subsidiary companies. In return, SABIC will be 
eligible for 1 % of the profits of the marketing contracts which have become the sole 
right of sukuk holders. 
(iii) SABIC has to collect the fees after making a discount of 1% to go to a virtual 
account as a reserve in the name of sukuk holders, so that SABIC should pay sukuk 
profits every three month from that account. That profit represents the index of 
interest rate for Saudi banks in three month, i.e. SIBOR + 48 basing points – 0.48 %. 
(iv) From its part SABIC is committed to purchasing the sukuk from investors upon 
request – after five years the price will be 90 % of the par value of sukuk, i.e. SR 
9,000 per one suk.  In the meantime, SABIC has to pay sukuk holders from the reserve 
account an equivalent of 10% of sukuk value or what is known as the ‘additional 
amount’.  Through that arrangement, the sukuk holder will be paid back his due debts 
in full, i.e. 100% of the par value of sukuk at the end of the first five years period on 
top of the quarter-yearly profits that has already been paid during the five years. 
(v) In addition to the above arrangement, the sukuk will be secured from any potential 
risks before the expiry date is due. In this regard, SABIC is fully committed to buying 
the sukuk, and that commitment is irreversible, so that the sukuk holders will be able 
to get 100% of the par value of sukuk by the end of the first five years before the 





The Saudi sukuk market is still considered the second largest market after the 
Malaysian market despite the sharp fall in the sukuk issuances in the past two years. 
While the contraction is attributed to the dramatic decline in the oil prices, such a 
financial shortage be a benefit in disguise as government may opt for sukuk to 
overcome the observed contraction in the revenues. For example, the government of 
Saudi Arabia announced recently that there is a deficit in its budget for 2016. This 
shortage, as it has been stated by the Minister of Finance, could be financed by 
issuing sukuk in particular for public sector long term project financing. Since 
government seems to be considering such an option, there might be expansion in the 
Saudi Arabian sukuk market.  
Regardless of the positive developments in the sukuk market, there are number of 
other challenges which include Shari’ah and legal criticisms by creating Shari’ah and 
legal risks. These risks are related to the structures applied in the Saudi sukuk market 
or related to the jurisdictions that approve these structures. However, beyond such 
risks, considering the potential of sukuk, SAMA and CMA should promote the 
financial sector by improving the regulatory procedures in relation to the international 




Table  3.3: The Number of Sukuk Issued by Issuer, Issue Date, Type of Sukuk, Currency, Maturity Between 
2003 and 2015 in Saudi Arabia 
No Date Issuer 
Currency 
Type of Issued Sukuk Listed-Not Amount 
(US$m) 
 
1.  18-12-2015 Al Bayan Sukuk (IMTN 3) MYR Wakalah Not Listed 23.326 
2.  19-10-2015 APICORP Sukuk(Tranche 1) USD Wakalah Not Listed 500 
3.  08-10-2015 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk (Series 24) EUR Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 340.68 
4.  08-09-2015 Arab National Bank Callable Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 533.333 
5.  26-08-2015 Almarai Senior Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 426.849 
6.  09-09-2015 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk (Series 23) EUR Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 112.68 
7.  31-08-2015 Al Othaim Real Estate and Investment Company Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 266.667 
8.  28-07-2015 Bahri Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Listed 1,039.97 
9.  15-07-2015 NCB Tier I Perpetual Sukuk SAR Mudarabah Not Listed 533.291 
10.  09-07-2015 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk (Series 22) EUR Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 109.65 
11.  25-06-2015 Saudi Binladin Sukuk SAR Murabahah Not Listed 266.667 
12.  24-06-2015 Riyadh Bank Sukuk II SAR Al-Istithmar Not Listed 1,066.67 
13.  22-06-2015 NCB Subordinated Tier I Sukuk SAR Mudarabah Not Listed 266.667 
14.  10-05-2015 Najran Cement Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 106.661 
15.  28-05-2015 SABB Tier 2 Sukuk 2025 SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 399.989 
16.  01-05-2015 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk (Series 21) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 1,000 
17.  17-11-2014 Advanced Petrochemical Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 266.539 
18.  31-10-2014 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 20) EUR Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 375.72 
19.  18-09-2014 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 19) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 1,500 
20.  17-06-2014 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 18) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 1,000 
21.  26-06-2014 Alhokair Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 133.319 
22.  23-06-2014 National Petrochemical Company (Petrochem) Sukuk SAR Al-Istithmar Not Listed 319.94 
23.  18-06-2014 Banque Saudi Fransi Tier 2 Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 533.234 
24.  10-06-2014 Saudi Telecom Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 533.262 
25.  5-06-2014 Saudi Investment Bank Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 533.248 
26.  20-05-2014 DAAR Al-Arkan Sukuk V(Tranche 3) USD Wakalah Not Listed 400 
27.  1-04-2014 Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk III(Tranche 1) USD Ijarah Not Listed 1,500 
28.  1-04-2014 Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk III(Tranche 2) USD Ijarah Not Listed 1,000 
29.  9-03-2014 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 16) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 1,500 
30.  19-02-2014 NCB Subordinated Tier II Sukuk SAR Mudarabah Not Listed 1,333.23 
31.  30-01-2014 Saudi Electricity Company Sukuk IV SAR Al-Istithmar Listed 1,199.90 
32.  17-12-2013 SABB Tier 2 Sukuk 2020 SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 399.979 
33.  15-12-2013 Saudi Hollandi Bank Tier 2 Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 666.631 
34.  20-11-2013  DAAR Al-Arkan Sukuk V(Tranche 2) USD Wakalah Not Listed 300 
35.  11-11-2013 Riyadh Bank Sukuk SAR Al-Istithmar Not Listed 1,066.58 
36.  08-11-2013 Al Bayan Sukuk(IMTN 2) MYR Wakalah Not Listed 37.766 
37.  24-09-2013 General Authority of Civil Aviation SAR Murabahah Listed 4,055.94 
38.  25-09-2013 Almarai Perpetual Senior Sukuk SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 453.297 
39.  10-06-2013 Saudi Binladin Short Term Sukuk IV SAR Murabahah Not Listed 266.645 
40.  04-06-2013 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 15) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 1,000 
41.  22-05-2013  DAAR Al-Arkan Sukuk V(Tranche 1) USD Wakalah Not Listed 450 
42.  21-05-2013 Marafiq Sukuk SAR Al-Istithmar Not Listed 666.578 
43.  24-04-2013 Al Bayan Sukuk(IMTN 1) MYR Wakalah Not Listed 65,595 
44.  08-04-2013 Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk II(Tranche 1) USD Ijarah Not Listed 1,000 
45.  08-04-2013 Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk II(Tranche 2) USD Ijarah Not Listed 1,000 
46.  16-03-2013 Sadara (Aramco) Sukuk SAR Musharakah Listed 1,999.89 
47.  30-03-2013 Almarai Sukuk(Tranche 2) SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 209.85 
48.  30-03-2013 Almarai Sukuk(Tranche 3) SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 136.789 
49.  27-03-2013 Saudi Binladin Sukuk IV SAR Ijarah Not Listed 346.648 
50.  27-03-2013 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 14) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 700 
51.  17-03-2013 Bahri (formerly- National Shipping Company) SAR Not known Not Listed 1,300.00 
52.  22/01/2013 Savola Group SAR Not known Not Listed 399.92 
53.  01/01/2013 Sadara Chemical Company (SADARA) SAR Not known Not Listed 1400 
54.  08-01-2013 Orix Sukuk 2015 SAR Al-Istithmar Listed 63.985 
55.  18/12/2012 Banque Saudi Fransi - BSF SAR Mudarabah-Murabahah Not Listed 506.56 




Source: IFIS database (2013); Zawya database (2015) and Tadawul database (2015) 
   
57.  11/10/2012 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 13) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 500 
58.  10/10/2012 Al Marai Company SAR Not known Not Listed 346.61 
59.  01-10-2012 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 12) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 300 
60.  07-08-2012 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 11) GBP Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 156.177 
61.  31-07-2012 Saudi Binladin Short Term Sukuk III SAR Murabahah Not Listed 266.645 
62.  01/07/2012 ACWA Power International USD Murabahah Not Listed 300 
63.  27/06/2012 Olayan Group SAR Investment Sukuk Not Listed 173.3 
64.  10-06-2012 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 10) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 800 
65.  21/05/2012 National Industrialisation Company (Tasnee) SAR Mudarabah  Murabahah Not Listed 533.24 
66.  15-05-2012 Saudi Fransi SAR Wakalah  750 
67.  14-04-2012 AJIL Sukuk SAR Al-Istithmar Not Listed 133.323 
68.  28/03/2012 Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk(Tranche 2) USD Ijarah Not Listed 1,250 
69.  28/3/2012 SABB SAR Mudarabah  Murabahah Not Listed 400 
70.  07/03/2012 Al Marai Company SAR Mudarabah  Murabahah Not Listed 266.6 
71.  30-01-2012 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 9) GBP Al-Wakala Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 157.085 
72.  18/01/2012 General Authority Of Civil Aviation (GACA) SAR Murabahah Not Listed 4000 
73.  12/09/2011 Arabian Aramco Total Services Company (AATSC) 
SATORP Sukuk 
SAR Musharakah Listed 1000 
74.  16-07-2011 Saudi Binladin Short Term Sukuk III SAR Murabahah Not Listed 266.652 
75.  14/06/2011 Saudi International Petrochemical Company (Sipchem) SAR Mudarabah Listed 480 
76.  12-05-2011 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 8) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 750 
77.  29/03/2011 Bank Al Jazirah SAR Mudarabah  Murabahah Not Listed 267 
78.  17-02-2011 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 7) GBP Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 97.04 
79.  27-10-2010 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 6) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 500 
80.  20-09-2010 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 5) SAR Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 249.993 
81.  20-09-2010 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 4) SAR Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 249.993 
82.  05/10/2010 Saudi Electricity Company SAR Investment Sukuk Listed 1900 
83.  12-01-2010 Saudi Binladin Short Term Sukuk SAR Murabahah Not Listed 186.682 
84.  02/07/2010 Al Aqeeq Real Estate Development Co. SAR Not known Not Listed 186.66 
85.  18-05-2010 Dar Al-Arkan International Sukuk Company II USD Wakalah Not Listed 450 
86.  13/12/2009 Saudi Hollandi Bank SAR Mudarabah Listed 193.30 
87.  16-09-2009 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 2) USD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 850 
88.  14-09-2009 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 2) SGD Al-Wakalah Bel-Istithmar Not Listed 140.479 
89.  10/06/2009 Saudi Electricity Company SAR Investment Sukuk Listed 1866.66 
90.  05/15/2009 Dar Al Arkan Real Estate Development Company (Dar 
Al Arkan) 
SAR Sukuk Al Ijarah-
Murabahah 
Not Listed 200 
91.  29/12/2008 Saudi Hollandi Bank SAR Mudarabah Not Listed 206.457 
92.  17/09/2008 Saudi Binladin Group SAR Mudarabah Not Listed 267 
93.  28/04/2008 Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) SAR Investment Sukuk Listed 1333.20 
94.  03/16/2008 Tajeer SAR Investment Sukuk Not Listed 66.84 
95.  09-07-2007 Dar Al-Arkan International Sukuk Company USD Ijarah Not Listed 1,000 
96.  25-06-2007 Saudi Electricity Company SAR Investment Sukuk- 
(Ijarah, Zawya) 
Listed 1,333.19 
97.  08/06/2007 Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) SAR Investment Sukuk Listed 2100 
98.  15-05-2007 Golden Belt 1 Sukuk USD Manfa'a Not Listed 650 
99.  7-03-2007 DAAR  Al-Arkan  International Sukuk USD Ijarah Not Listed 600 
100.  18/07/2006 KSA MBS I International Sukuk Company Limited USD Sukuk Al Ijarah 
Istisnaa 
Not Listed 18 
101.  03-07-2006 Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) SAR Investment Sukuk Listed 799.957 
102.  16-06-2005 Islamic Development Bank MTN Sukuk(Series 1) USD Ijarah Not Listed 500 
103.  10/12/2004 Munshaat Real Estate Projects Company USD Sukuk Al Ijarah Not Listed 390 
104.  05/08/2004 Tajeer USD Sukuk Al Ijarah Not Listed 1.60 
105.  01-05-2004 CARAVAN I Limited SAR Ijarah Not Listed 26.133 




Chapter 4                                                                                           
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims at discussing the research methodology issues related to the conduct 
of this research, which includes a detailed description of the research methods in 
terms of collecting and analysing the acquired data in an attempt to generate 
responses and answers for the identified research questions. As far as this research is 
concerned both qualitative and descriptive methods have been used given the fact that 
the main objective of the research is to investigate the risks involved in sukuk 
structures that have been issued in Saud Arabia through qualitative data.  
This chapter is subdivided into six sections, as follows: after this introduction, the 
research methodology section is presented, which is followed by research design and 
research strategy sections. The chapter also presents the research methods and 
research limitations in fifth and sixth sections.  
4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research methodology is defined as solving research problems in a systematic 
manner in a procedural and rational manner (Rajendra, 2008). According to Collis and 
Hussey (2013), the overall perspectives and procedures as well as other research 
activities including data acquisition and data analysis should constitute an important 
component of research methodology. 
As Kerlinger (1973:703) puts it, research methodology could be referred to as 
“controlled investigation of theoretical and applied aspects of mathematical and 
statistical measurements, as well as ways of analysing and obtaining data”. In this 
regard, in a functional manner, McNeill and Chapman (2005) argue that research 
methodology tends to enable the researcher to develop a clear research framework as 
to achieve the research goals and objectives. Thus, research methodology refers to the 
framework through which the research is articulated philosophically and theoretically 
to make it operational. The choice of particular research methodology nonetheless is 




The existing literature shows that research methodology can be qualitative or 
quantitative in its nature (Kumar, 2008). Quantitative research implies principles 
featuring positivist philosophy as a guide, as according to some researchers an 
objective reality always exists as a separate entity from the observers’ perceptions, 
and understanding that reality becomes the sole target of scientific research (Bryman, 
2015). Qualitative research studies, on the other hand, tend to focus on words mainly 
social relations and describing realities as perceived by the appropriate respondents 
(Bryman, 2015). Thus, both qualitative and quantitative research implies a different 
way of thinking. In other words, quantitative research is related to ‘examining’ and 
‘evaluating’ a particular fact or issue; while qualitative research method relates to 
‘explorations of opinions’, ‘perceptions’ and ‘behaviours’ in a sense to locate how the 
participants are making sense of their realities. Therefore, qualitative research relates 
to social constructivism and interpretativism as an ontological base, while quantitative 
research remains within positive philosophical position in the sense of examining 
facts. 
As far as this study is concerned, a qualitative methodology is deemed to be 
appropriate; as this study focuses on how social reality, namely risk relating to sukuk 
from shari’ah and legal perspective, is perceived by scholars, lawyers and 
banking/finance professionals. This research, therefore, is an explorative study, in the 
sense of exploring the opinion, evaluation, and perceptions of the participants on legal 
and Shari’ah risks aspects of SABIC sukuk, whereby it is located within the 
interpretative approach within social constructivism. 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design constitutes an important aspect of research activities, where the 
research questions are to be properly organised to be put into perspective featuring a 
general plan to achieve the research aims, objectives and questions (Saunders et al., 
2007; Bryman and Bell, 2015). The research design provides a framework that would 
enable the researcher to gather information and data in the desired area of 
investigation; thus, providing a structure for data collection and data analysis 
(Bryman, 2015). In fact, a well-structured research design will enable the researcher 
to organise the various parts of the research featuring methods of data collection and 




a well organised research design should mean poor and unreliable research findings 
due to inability to answer the research questions as required (Vases, 2001).  
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996), thus, refer to research design as a 
‘blueprint’ of a specific study, where the research design becomes as an instrument to 
assist and monitor the researcher through the various phases of study. That should 
imply every research project is unique in terms of its research design featuring the use 
of appropriate tools and methods to reach the most accurate results and conclusions.  
This implies that the process of answering the research questions should become a 
function of the right research strategy, and the right research design that would lead to 
the achievement of the research objectives (Kumar, 2002). In other words, an 
appropriate methods needs to be used in order to provide an accurate description of 
the phenomenon under investigation. 
The available literature indicates that research design can be classified as exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory types of research (Kothari, 2004; Saunders et al., 2007), 
which are described as follows: 
(i) Exploratory research is mainly associated with issues that have not been clearly 
identified (Sekaran, 2003), implying that the subject matter is new at least in a 
particular case and context. According to Stebbins (2001), exploratory research would 
manage to gather preliminary information to define problems and suggest hypothesis, 
which therefore relates to a particular issue requiring explorations. Due to such a 
nature, flexibility and adaptability to change constitute an important feature of 
exploratory research, so that a researcher can easily change his or her line of thought 
as result of new findings that appear along the way. However, Adams and 
Schvaneveldt (1991) suggested that the flexibility associated with exploratory 
research should not mean the loss of direction to the inquiry, but should rather mean a 
narrower focus as the research progresses.  
(ii) Descriptive research where researchers use past incidents to explain existing 
observable facts in order to establish an accurate profile of persons, events or 
situations (Robson, 2002). Descriptive research necessitates a clear picture of the 




preceding phase to exploratory or explanatory research as to draw further conclusions 
and synthesise ideas from the description of data. 
(iii) Explanatory research relates to studies featuring casual relationships as to 
explain the reasons behind the existence of specific phenomena (Saunders et al., 
2007), and therefore is mainly utilised by quantitative methods in establishing 
relationships. 
In addition to these three main research design areas, there are other research design 
types found in the literature: 
(i) Survey research is commonly linked to studies related to business and management 
to answer questions featuring who, what, where, how much and how many. In other 
words, this strategy is most appropriate for exploratory and descriptive research.  The 
main advantage of this approach is that it allows the collection of a large amount of 
data through questionnaires and interviews from a relatively small population at the 
minimum cost possible (Saunders et al., 2007). 
(ii) Grounded theory, as a research design, aims to provide the best example of the 
inductive approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Nonetheless, some believe that this 
approach is a product of a combination of inductive and deductive approaches. 
According to Goulding (2002), the grounded theory is useful for predicting and 
explaining behavioural matters.  Moreover, in cases where grounded theory becomes 
important, data collection can be done without the need for a theoretical framework, 
whereby the theory can be developed from data observations. Then prediction could 
be made to be further tested to be confirmed or rejected by more observation along 
the way. 
(iii) Case study is another design commonly used in social sciences. Eisenhardt 
(1989:534) points out that “case studies combine data collection methods such as 
archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations, and in addition they are used to 
accomplish various aims such as providing description, testing or generating theory”. 
However, through case study, a researcher will be able to address a particular research 
question as to explore the subject matter via the participants’ perceptions (Yin, 2003). 
In other words, strategies involving case studies tend to seek answers to questions as 




happened, making case studies the most appropriate for exploratory and explanatory 
research.  In order to establish facts about specific subject that should establish an in-
depth investigation in relation to the subject involved no matter that being an 
individual, an institution or even a community at large, investigation should be based 
on careful observation of the subject in question. The researchers have to focus on the 
facts related to the subject rather than seek their own hypothesis. However, given the 
flexibility and resilience of case study approach, it tends to leave the door wide open 
for researchers rather than restricting their views on the subject under investigation 
(Kumar, 2002). 
Considering all the research designs presented, this research is constructed as an 
exploratory and survey based case study. It is exploratory, as it aims to explore the 
opinions of various Shari’ah scholars, Islamic finance experts, judges, lawyers, 
academic staff and people involved in CMA on the subject matter. In addition, this 
study is framed as a case study, as this study focuses on sukuk issued in Saudi Arabia, 
particularly SABIC sukuk referring to a particular sukuk issued by a company called 
SABIC. Since primary data for this research is collected through an interview 
schedule, this study should also be considered within survey design. It should also be 
noted that this research benefits from descriptive research through primarily based on 
library-collected information, such as textbook, journal articles, reports and sukuk 
brochures. The majority of these resources can be accessed via libraries as online 
material. Within this descriptive nature, this research utilises analytical critique as an 
interpretative research method to examine the existing sukuk structures and 
legislations offered to deal with sukuk. 
4.3.1 Rationalising the Selection of Case Study 
Since this research is a case study, the choice of SABIC sukuk as a case should be 
rationalised. Given that SABIC Company is one of the biggest companies in Saudi 
Arabia associated with petrochemicals, whose shares are also heavily traded in the 
Saudi stock market, Tadawul. Thus, the size and operational level of the company 
indicates its importance and hence rationalise its choice in this study. In addition, 
given the fact that SABIC has issued three sukuk in the Saudi market, the size of the 
issues have been rather large which again provides another rationale for choosing this 




to choose SABIC sukuk as a case is the fact that the three members of Shari’ah board 
that has approved SABIC sukuk are considered among the most reputed scholars in 
Saudi Arabia in the area of Islamic finance in general and particularly in relation to 
sukuk, as those members have been members in a many Shari’ah boards all over the 
world that deal with sukuk structures. Moreover, they are without exception also 
members of AAOIFI so that their knowledge and views tend to contribute towards 
improving the quality of the study. 
Moreover, among the reasons that have encouraged the researcher to choose SABIC 
sukuk is the similarity between the structure of SABIC sukuk and those of the other 
structures such as the sukuk of the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) with its three 
issues. In particular, given that the Shari’ah board of the SEC is the same as that of 
SABIC sukuk so that SABIC and the Saudi electrical company become the biggest 
two companies in the Saudi market with regard to the number of issues and the values 
that have been approved by one single Shari’ah board.  
Consequently, as far as the exploration of SABIC sukuk is concerned, it renders great 
value regarding structuring of SABIC sukuk and the way such structure has been 
consistent with the AAOIFI standards, which helps understanding highly important 
views of the Islamic finance related Shari’ah scholars in Saudi Arabia, which in many 
aspects has been associated with sukuk structures. 
4.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Research strategy constitutes another important aspect of research process, which 
functions to connect theory and data. In other words, mechanism and direction of 
establishing a connection between data and theory defines research strategy. 
As far as social research is concerned two research strategies exist: deductive and 
inductive methods of reasoning (Saunders et al., 2007). In this respect, Bryman 
(2015:21) suggested that “deductive theory represents the commonest view of the 
nature of relationship between theory and social research. On the basis of what he 
knows about in a particular domain featuring the theoretical consideration in relation 
to that domain, the researcher deduces a hypothesis that must be subject to empirical 
scrutiny”. He goes on to elaborate that the researcher initiates his research with a 




be investigated.  In the end that will enable the researcher to examine the hypothesis 
against specific information with the objective of drawing conclusions favouring or 
otherwise disfavouring the hypothesis. In the same context, Miller (1998) suggests 
that in deductive analysis the researcher moves from the more general to the more 
specific through testing the validity of the hypothesis.  
As regards to inductive approach, the reverse is true as the researcher moves from the 
more specific to the more generalised (Bryman and Bell, 2003). To be more precise, 
the researcher starts with specific observations to produce tentative hypothesis to be 
investigated to develop a general theory (Blaikie, 2007). Thus, the researcher can 
draw conclusions featuring the behaviour and characteristics of an entire population 
through studying a random sample of that population and by using inductive method 
of reasoning.   
As regards to this research, inductive research strategy is considered to be the most 
efficient research design, as this research aims to collect data from the field and then it 
aims to make some generalisations through meaning making and establish some 
patterns that governs the responses provided in relation to the subject matter. In other 
words, since this research does not aims to deductively developed hypotheses, but 
rather aims to explore the patterns governing the field or the subject matter, it is, 
therefore, designed as an inductive research. 
4.5 RESEARCH METHOD 
Research design and research methods are important elements of any research study 
featuring the overall research planning and means of data collection and data analysis 
(Saunders et al., 2007). In line with this, Cohen et al., (2007), and Payne and Payne 
2004) describe research methods as a set of tools to be used by researchers to collect 
and analyse data, which assists in answering the research questions. Therefore, 
Jankowicz (2000) refers to research methods as tools for gaining information through 
a systematic and orderly approach featuring data collection and data analysis. Thus, 
regardless of the way it is defined; research methods feature data collection, data 
analysis as well as the sampling of the relevant variables.   
It should be mentioned that Miles and Huberman (1984) identify two types of 




type of data collection methods to be used.  Those are either quantitative or qualitative 
research. 
Qualitative research features descriptive data that does not include numbers or 
questions (Sekaran, 2003).  In other words, qualitative research usually uses inductive 
methods of data collection such as interviews and observations. Quantitative research 
on the other hand, features numerical data that can be represented in a graphical 
format. According to Creswell (2013), the idea of using variables is considered central 
for quantitative research design so that quantitative methods need to be used for 
measuring and comparing variables. It should be noted that regardless of the type of 
research method, Silverman (2000) points out that research method is always a 
function of research strategies. 
Concerning this research, as mentioned above, qualitative methods of data collection 
featuring interviews is employed, which is consistent with the purpose of research, as 
it aims at examining the validity of sukuk contracts with respect to Shari’ah law and 
legal frame in Saudi Arabia as well as with respect to the AAOIFI standards through 
the perceptions, opinions and positioning of the Shari’ah scholars as well as other 
stakeholders such as financiers, academics and technocrats at the bureaucracy due to 
their involvement in the process. The data that has been gathered from structural 
interviews are integrated with secondary data from academic articles, reports, and 
SABIC sukuk brochure. In addition, interpretative method as a qualitative method is 
also used to analyse the data. 
It should be noted that drawing a line between qualitative and quantitative research 
methods remains a difficult task. However, it could be maintained that generally 
speaking, qualitative methods become important in cases of exploratory, descriptive 
or evaluative research, while quantitative methods are mostly used in cases where 
explanatory research becomes involved. Having said that, the use of quantitative 
methods for descriptive and evaluative purposes should not be completely ruled out.   
Thus, a combination of the two types is often used by social scientists to improve the 
outcome of the research (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). In this respect, Kothari, 
(2004) is of the opinion that qualitative knowledge in terms of social settings could 
become useful in the understanding of patterns of quantitative data. In addition, it is 




phrases imply the transformation of data from the qualitative to the quantitative form. 
The same could be said about counting frequencies of specific behaviours in 
qualitative studies. Thus, the use of qualitative and quantitative methods could be very 
subjective depending on the course and purpose of research. 
4.5.1 Data Collection Method: Interviews  
The data acquired for conducting a research can be in the form of either primary or 
secondary data: the secondary data could be obtained from already existing literature 
sources no matter being published or otherwise (Saunders et al., 2007). As for 
primary data, they can be developed from survey, namely interviews, questionnaires, 
focus groups and observations. As explained, the use of primary data constitutes the 
main aspect of this study. 
As Churchill (1983) and Bryman (2015) states primary data would be most suitable 
for social studies where opinion, attitudes, knowledge, and intentions of participants 
become important. This rationalises as to why primary data is important for this study, 
as it seeks opinions, understandings and perception of the participants on specific 
topic, namely emergent shari’ah and legal risk issues in sukuk. 
It should be noted that numerous techniques exist for collecting primary data 
depending on the nature and objectives of the research study. In choosing a particular 
method, attempt should be made to select the most suitable instruments that deliver 
the best outcome when designing and formulating the chosen research methods (de 
Vaus, 2007). As rationalised above, this research utilises interviews as a qualitative 
research method. Therefore, by selecting the appropriate technique the researcher was 
able to obtain suitable data that render the research findings realistic, reliable and 
credible (Fisher, 1925).  
Churchill (1983) identifies two qualitative method for gathering primary data, which 
are either through communication or observation. Through communication, the 
researcher can ask questions to obtain the required data. On the other hand, the 
researcher can record behaviours, actions, facts etc. through observation of the 
participants involved without the need to communicate with them in a direct manner. 




It should be noted that the interviews have been the most useful qualitative method to 
be used for explorative studies (Silverman, 2010). As Babbie (2010) puts, interviews 
allow researchers to acquire data that would be impossible through other means 
including observation. Trull and Phares (2001) define interview in terms of interaction 
between two persons where each one plays its role in the process, whereas Busha and 
Harter (1980: 78) define interview as a “method where information could be gathered 
from persons as to provide research data in terms of their background, in relation to 
their experiences, opinions, attitudes, relation to service etc.”. 
In terms of advantages, interview method is described as the easiest way of obtaining 
people’s opinions; thus, according to Punch (2006) interviews remain the most 
effective way of understanding other people. In addition, King (1994) states that 
interviews can address direct questions related to life including personal decisions. 
Nonetheless, there are certain disadvantages with interview method such as time and 
travelling it may require. In other words, interviews are considered time consuming 
particularly when researchers have to meet a specific deadline. Thus, it is highly 
recommended that interviews should not cover areas than they really have time for to 
meet a particular deadline set for the study (King, 1994).  
This research utilises interviews in generating primary data, they are focused on 
Shari’ah and legal issues associated with SABIC sukuk. Thus, qualitative method of 
semi-structured interviews was employed to interview Shari’ah scholars, Islamic 
finance experts, judges, lawyers, academic staff and people involved in CMA in 
relation to sukuk. The main purpose of the interviews in this research was to gather 
information with regard to the emergent Shari’ah and legal risks in the case of defined 
case, SABIC sukuk.  
4.5.1.1 Types of interviews 
As indicated by Bryman, interviews could be in the form of structured, semi-
structured or even may be unstructured. In addition, interviews could be in the form of 
group of interviews (Collins, et al., 2004).  
A structured interview is basically considered as a questionnaire with a multiple 
questions to be prepared beforehand (Gratton and Jones, 2004). The answers of these 




down or to record. The interviews are also take place face to face or might be given 
indirectly without personal contact between the interviewer and interviewee. That 
gives the structured interviews the edge over others by giving the interviewer the 
chance to clarify vague questions (Gratton and Johns, 2004). Nonetheless, the fact 
that the limited answers might be a disadvantage as the interviewee might fail to 
explain his views more clearly (Miller and Salkind, 2002).  
As for unstructured interviews, they could sometimes be useful in cases, where the 
researcher fails to prepare his questions before hand and in which case such 
interviews might resemble ordinary conversation and the outcome might not be clear 
(Polit and Beck, 2004). However, in such cases the researcher has only a broad 
guideline about the subject to be discussed where the respondents take control of the 
discussion. It should be noted that such types of interviews are not suitable for this 
study due to exact guidelines that determine how the course of the investigation could 
be managed and that the interviewees are encouraged by guide questions to develop 
particular responses. Having said that the semi-structured interviews are mostly 
unstandardised but more focused than unstructured ones.  
It should be mentioned that among the reasons for choosing semi-structured 
interviews in the conduct of this research is that it gives the researcher a chance to 
explain the questions to the interviewees as to follow responses where appropriate 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2005); and also it rendered particular responses from different 
stakeholders on the same issue. 
In addition, semi-structured interviews helps to gather information to a greater depth 
as to allow a better understanding of the interviewees practice and interpret reality, by 
making the ideas, thoughts and memories of the interviewees in their own words 
(Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002); as semi-structured interview allows to 
personalise the questions when it is necessary. Furthermore, through semi-structured 
method, the interviewee is allowed to express his views in a more explicit manner to 
effect of making their own suggestions. While face-to-face interviews allows 
interviewers to persuade participants to the extent of clarifying specific points in 




In fact semi-structured interviews can either be carried out directly face-to-face or 
indirectly through communication channels for which new technologies can be rather 
effective. As Sekaran (2003) puts it, the face-to-face interviews has the advantage of 
allowing the interviewee to clarify any possible doubts associated with the interview 
through repetition to clarify vagueness. This is not to mention the fact that face-to-
face interviewers can help each side to understand non-verbal cues such as body 
language, a matter that would impossible over the phone. The down side of face-to- 
face interviews is that they are costly with no privacy or anonymity something that 
makes respondents to become discouraged to answer personal questions as they might 
feel embarrassed or even threatened in taking part in interviews on sensitive issues. 
Moreover, the interviewees might be influenced by the interviewers in terms of his 
answers (Kumar, 2005). 
As regards to this research, semi-structured face-to-face interviews were utilised due 
to the listed advantages in line with the research questions and process identified so 
far. Having the fact-to-face interviews enabled the research to fit into the development 
of semi-structured interviews with ease and also helped to developed mutual 
confidence, which increased the effectiveness of the interviewees.  
It should be mentioned that the interviews in this research should be considered also 
as elite interviews in the sense that interviewee sampled included very high profile 
Shari’ah scholars, specialists, technocrats, lawyers, finance professionals and 
academics. They are considered as reputable and respected members of the Saudi 
Arabian society.  
Lastly, due to the nature of the interview administration process, and the detailed 
discussion it involved, the interviews in this research should be considered as in-depth 
interviews. As informed in a later section, some of the interviews took as long as three 
hours, which gave an opportunity to explore the issues rather in detail. 
4.5.1.2 Designing the semi-structured interviews 
In terms of interview schedule design, the particular interview schedule used in this 
study is consisted of three parts, whereby the first part gathered personal information 
about the interviewees such as name, address, position, institutional affiliation etc., 




from interviewees about sukuk and risk management. The last section of the semi-
structured interviews focused on investigating and exploring Shari’ah and the legal 
risks in the case of SABIC sukuk.  
It should not be noted that interview design for the Shari’ah scholars involved in the 
structure and approval of the SABIC sukuk was designed in two particular parts. The 
first part aimed at investigating the nature of their work in relation to the approval of 
SABIC sukuk, while the second part focused on the prospectus of issuance of SABIC 
sukuk and the structure on which SABIC sukuk has been based on. 
Designing the first draft of questions is the first challenge for the researcher. The first 
draft might include long and general questions taking into account the fact that the 
first phase could include developed and elaborated questions. Then, the final stage 
will see the final drafts being displayed before a group of specialists and expertise 
including judges and academics to approve the final version of the interview 
questions.  
The questions have initially been designed to include a comprehensive answer to the 
research question featuring the legal and Shari’ah risks that sukuk structures might be 
exposed to and that have been issued in the Saudi market especially the study of 
SABIC sukuk and ways to deal with matters to avoid the identified risks. The 
questions were shown to the supervisor, who had taken part in the discussion of the 
questions by contributing to their development as to become more accurate to achieve 
the aims for which it has been designed for. 
However, after a suitable design had been achieved for the questions directed for the 
three groups of interviewees, the questions were examined by three of the academics 
and their comments have been taken into account. The questions had been then again 
shown for the second time to the supervisor who has taken part in the discussion of 
the proposals that had been presented and some of these proposals had been 
considered and the supervisor finally approved the interview questions.     





In order to select the suitable sample, the researcher had to seek the advice of 
specialists including those experts in finance and law, Shari’ah scholars, law and 
judges, who helped to select of the right sample. Consequently, in the sampling 
process, the target sample was identified as three groups of participants given that 
every group relates to a particular part of the research. 
The first group of participants were considered as Islamic finance and law specialists, 
for which the selection required the researcher to choose from a number of specialised 
individuals before nominating those who have some writings featuring sukuk or those 
who work in the area of sukuk taking into account those who have writings associated 
with SABIC sukuk which are the subject of this research. 
As for the second group consisting of Shari’ah board members, this study managed to 
get three such participants whose selection has been rather easy, as they have direct 
relationship with SABIC sukuk by being members of the Shari’ah board that 
approved SABIC sukuk. 
The third group has also been difficult in terms of its selection, as the most important 
selection for this group is that they must have the knowledge of the laws and systems 
in relation to the issuance of financial papers in the Saudi Arabian market and all 
systems associated with the jurisdiction and the Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes (CRSD) and the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Conflicts (ACRSC), the latter being the only legal authority that has been 
authorised to investigate cases of dispute involving sukuk. In addition, awareness of 
the work of judges of Shari’ah courts in Saudi Arabia is another criteria utilised to 
select participants for this group. 
In should be noted that experts who contributed to the selection of the sample are 
chosen of their expertise and judicial level in terms of seniority. Thus, among the 
experts were the members of SABB Shari’ah board who had approved SABIC sukuk. 
Thus, the contribution of such experts provided a good chance to reach accurate 
conclusions that might reflect the right application in Saudi courts as well as the 
CMA. Therefore, the above mentioned experts and particular areas of questions they 




(i) Five of the interviewees in this group included a Shari’ah scholar who is expert in 
sukuk, an academic who is a professor at SABIC in charge of Islamic funding 
research. In addition to a judge in a Saudi court, an expert in Islamic banking who 
showed a great interest in Islamic sukuk, and one of the law experts who is interested 
in sukuk structures in legal and Shari’ah terms.  
These expert participants were asked questions about Shari’ah boards and their 
importance with respect to sukuk, as a new product in the Saudi market, and also the 
work of the Shari’ah boards with regard to approving those products. The enquiries 
were also extended to cover cases involving Shari’ah boards as the mechanism for 
issuing fatawa and the criteria of the board members and the responsibilities of the 
members as well as their opinions on Shari’ah risks that sukuk might be exposed in 
relation to Shari’ah boards and their work in Saudi market. 
(ii) The second group included three interviewees representing the members of 
Shari’ah board for SABB Amanah Bank, who have approved the SABIC sukuk, as 
SABB Bank is considered as the issuer of SABIC sukuk. Those three Shari’ah 
scholars have been joining a great number of Shari’ah boards featuring banks and 
financial institutions in addition to AAOIFI. It is worth mentioning that two of the 
members are considered as a consultant for the King of Saudi Arabia working at the 
Royal Divan. 
The interviews with those members were mainly attempted to identify the nature of 
their work as members of the Shari’ah board that had approved the SABIC sukuk and 
their views about the AAOIFI standards in addition enquiring about the SABIC sukuk 
structures and to identify their views regarding the problems and the risks in terms of 
Shari’ah to which sukuk structures have been exposed and their presence in SABIC 
sukuk. 
(iii) Given the fact that the third part of the research deals with the issue associated 
with legal risk to which the Islamic sukuk might be exposed in general and SABIC 
sukuk in particular, three interviewees were chosen as potentially effective individuals 
who could answer questions for this section of the research. One of them represents 
the manager of appeal studies featuring the CRSD and ACRSC at the SAMA, the 




other one representing an academic law expert specialised in sukuk, and the third one 
is an employee from one of Riyadh Shari’ah courts interested in legal aspects.  
The main aim of the interview with the participants in this section was to explore the 
laws associated with financial market in Saudi Arabia regarding issuance of sukuk in 
general and SABIC sukuk in particular, in addition to making attempts to identify the 
reference law for SABIC sukuk in case of dispute between sukuk holders and the 
issuer and how the Shari’ah courts deal with sukuk featuring Shari’ah disputes and 
also the legal risks to which SABIC sukuk might be exposed in the Saudi market. 











Interviewee 2 Riyadh 07-08-2013 






Interviewee 5 Riyadh 22-08-2013 
Interviewee 6 Riyadh 25-08-2013 
Interviewee 7 Riyadh 28-08-2013 





Interviewee 10 Riyadh 13-09-2013 
Interviewee 11 Riyadh 20-09-2013 
It should be noted that this research managed to interview a total of 11 participants, in 
the form of elite and in-depth interviews representing various specialities as has 
already been mentioned; and the interview questions can be found in Appendix 1. 
Table 4.1 provides a list of interviewees, their locations, their affiliations and the date 
the interview conducted. The names and institutional affiliations have been kept 




4.5.1.4 Validity of the interview schedule and pilot study 
In order to verify the clarity and comprehensiveness of the interview questions to 
achieve the desired goals of the research, a pilot study was conducted with selected 
interviewees. This pilot study is also considered as a verification and validity process 
for the questions included in the interview schedule. 
This sample in the validity and hence pilot study included two types of sampled 
individuals. The first group consisted of three specialists in English language with 
their mother tongue being Arabic. The questions were provided for them in both 
Arabic and English languages to validate the translation for the clarity of the recipient 
and quality assurance. The second group consisted of three people being specialists in 
Islamic finance, who had been requested to review interview questions from Islamic 
finance perspective and make sure they would support the overall aim of the study by 
enabling sampled interviewees to answer the research questions in an efficient and 
comprehensive manner.  
The feedback provided by these two specialists group helped to enhance the 
questionnaires in terms of Arabic language and also in terms of Islamic finance 
related contents. After refining the questions in the interview schedule in relation to 
aims and objectives of the study, the pilot study proved the efficiency of the interview 
process, which also helped to develop an idea as to how long the interviews would 
take. Importantly, the pilot study helped to develop the questions to be formulated in a 
clearer and more comprehensive way by helping to develop the questions in an 
understandable manner by the interviewees. 
All these measures were under the supervision of the supervisor who in followed the 
process of formulating the questions to be comprehensive and clear manner which to 
determine the aims of the study. 
 
4.5.1.5 Administering the interviews 
Given that the research is associated with Shari’ah and legal aspects of sukuk in Saudi 
Arabia in general and SABIC sukuk in particular, that required approaching the 
Shari’ah board members that has approved SABIC sukuk was an essential task not to 




been approached. In addition, the interview questions have been presented to Shari’ah 
scholars and legal experts as well as to the Islamic banking experts in addition to the 
academics and the judges of Saudi courts who are closely associated with sukuk either 
through their work or otherwise through scientific writings or through their 
contribution in the scientific conferences.  
The interviews were conducted through two-field research from July 2013 to 
September 2013 in three cities, namely Riyadh, Makkah and Jeddah, which are the 
locations where the interviewees resided. The interviewees were given the option to 
choose the places for conducting the interview in order to make the interview process 
easier for them: some were interviewed at their own home, while others were 
interviewed at their offices and a third group was interviewed either at hotels or at 
cafes. 
The duration of interviews extended from one to three hours for every interview and 
that long interviews were specially conducted with the members of Shari’ah board 
members that approved SABIC sukuk for the simple reason that the questions that 
have been prepared for them have been of two parts, as described above.  
It should be noted that after identifying all the names required for interviews, a 
suitable way was explored to establish communication with the sampled names. 
Consequently, contacts were made with a number of friends in order to obtain the 
telephone numbers of the interviewees, while others have been contacted through e-
mail. Then, after all the interviewees were contacted to fix a date of the interviews, a 
time table was made for every interviewee and all paper work was prepared including 
the recording system. 
It is worth mentioning that prior to conducting the interviews the researcher had to 
establish a friendly relationship with potential participants. That idea has been 
proposed by Sekaran (2003), who suggested that the researcher has to be credible and 
that rapport can encourage interview to provide genuine answers and that could 
minimise bias, so that according to Sekaran (2003), the interviewers have to avoid 
asking biased questions during the process. In this regard, the general and easy 
questions should be gradually followed by the interviewer whenever that is possible. 




through time, which is considered as aiming at getting more reliable data (Sekaran, 
2003). 
In making respondents more focused, the researcher reassured the interviewees that 
all information would remain confidential, and interviewees should decline to answer 
any questions that they might not be interested in where the interview session might 
not last for more than one hour and that can stop the interview at any time during the 
session whenever they lose interest. The interviews were usually tape recorded to 
avoid any loss of information as well as the full transcript for all the participants were 
given a code to keep confidential.  
As part of the interview process, in the beginning, the researcher introduced himself 
to those participants who did not know him, and gave a brief explanation of the aims 
of the interview with the hope that an efficient and effective interview could be run. 
For this, one of the following approaches utilised according to the dictation of the 
situation (Punch, 2013; Seidman, 2013): 
(i) to avoid boredom and tiredness, a friendly environment and process was ensured 
by the researcher; 
(ii) The researcher assured all his interviewees that everything would remain 
confidential including the names to guarantee their free responses. 
The mechanism of the interview was designed to include a short presentation by the 
researcher on a briefing the interviewee on the idea of the research including the aim 
of the study, the subject of the study, the approach of the research and purpose of the 
interview by informing the interviewees that the interviews were only for reserach 
purposes. The interviews were conducted in Arabic and then latter were translated and 
transcribed into English. 
4.5.2 Data Analysis 
Data analysis constitutes the essence of any research study. In this sense, the accuracy 
of data analysis is a crucial matter for the credibility and accuracy of the research 
findings (Lewis-Beck, 1995). In other words, choosing the suitable techniques for 
analysing the data tends to guide the researcher to the right interpretation for the final 




implies that any errors associated with data analysis would eventually lead to the 
wrong conclusions. For that reason, researchers always need to pay attention to data 
analysis as to select the appropriate research methods to meet the research objectives.  
As mentioned above, this research mainly utilises qualitative data in the form of 
secondary data through interview schedule and documents, respectively. The methods 
of analysis in relations to these are discussed in the following sections. 
4.5.2.1 Content analysis 
As mentioned above, a number of various sources of secondary data were also utilised 
in the conduct of this research, which were sourced from various sources, such as 
government reports and other sources related to companies and financial 
organisations. For this research study, secondary data were acquired from published 
reports compiled by CMA on sukuk management in Saudi Arabia as well as reports 
from around the world featuring licensed Islamic financial institutions. Thus, in 
addition to published reports, bank magazines, the internet, professional and academic 
conference materials were also consulted and examined in order to acquire up-to-date 
information on the development and progress of the Islamic banking and finance in 
general and sukuk in particular.  
The most important document subjected to analyse in this research features the 
prospective relating to the issuance of SABIC Sukuk No 3 together with the summary 
of the prospectus of issuance approved by its Shari’ah board in addition to the 
documents attached to the prospectus of issuance not to forget mentioning the fact 
that the prospectus of issuance 1 and 2 were also reviewed and examined. 
In the analysis of the documents acquired for this research, content analysis was used. 
As part of qualitative and unobtrusive research, content analysis mainly related to 
written and published documents. The aim in such analysis within content analysis is 
to understand the participants’ categories and the way through which theu 
communicate a particular activity; in this case, constructing a sukuk structure, namely 
SABIC sukuk.  
Content analysis is defined as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and 




18). Thus, it aims at revealing the specified characteristics of messages by 
“systematically analysing and making inferences from text” (Weber, 1985: 9). In the 
case of this research, SABIC sukuk prospective is considered as the unit of analysis 
constituting the examined text along with other supporting documents and literature 
material. 
In conducting the content analysis, mainly texts, including the prospective of SABIC 
sukuk, were scrutinised carefully to develop an understanding of the process of 
generating the sukuk in question, its issuance and related Shari’ah compliance and 
financial issues. In the analysis, pre-determined or structured categories were not 
utilised, but rather documents including the prospectuses and their appendices were 
examined with an open mind to understand the communicated message, namely the 
explanations on the construct of SABIC sukuk, working mechanism and the process 
of construct including the Shari’ah scholars involved. Thus, in the coding process, 
rather than imposed or pre-determined codes, emerging codes were utilised 
(Krippendorff, 1980); and the process of recognising such emerging codes is informed 
through the knowledge developed on the subject matter through the research process. 
In examining the material and in particular the prospectus and the attached 
documents, manifest items that were physically seen in the documents helped as a 
guide to develop the interpretations or the latent contents with the recognition that 
documents including the prospectus communicate socially constructed yet objectively 
produced social artefacts, communications or structures that involves various agents 
and their negotiations, namely, in this case, sukuk structure. 
The developed material was then utilised in articulating and writing such matters in 
the formation of this thesis. Thus, content analysis method was utilised in the 
examination of literature material and importantly the SABIC sukuk brochure and the 
attached material. 
4.5.2.2 Interview data analysis 
A qualitative method is used for the analysis of the collected data through the 
interviews where the data were transcribed following each interview, as is advised by 
Sekaran (2003). However, due to the delays in the interviews and considering the size 
and length of the interview material, the transcription process was completed two 




In the analysis of the transcribed data from the interviews, thematic analysis was used, 
which provides a coherent way of reading and organising some of the interview 
material associated with specific research questions. As Banister (2011) puts it, 
thematic headings to do justice to both the research elements as well as to 
preoccupations of the interviewees. The interviews were coded according to the 
themes of the research, which allowed the researcher to respond to the particular 
aspect of the research through insider insights provided by the interviewees. 
In the thematic organisation of the material developed from interview based data and 
textual data, an interpretative method was utilised to analyse the material transcribed 
from the interviewees. This assumes, philosophically, that the interview material was 
socially constructed and they were further subjected to social constructionism through 
the understanding of the researcher. Hence, the analysis presented in this research is a 
reflection of this particular process. In addition, in rendering meaning making through 
interpretative method, in each of the empirical chapter, critical reflections were 
provided by subjecting the findings to further analysis. 
4.6 LIMITATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES 
It should be noted that many challenges and limitations have been faced through the 
period of conducting this research, which are listed as follows; 
(i) Preparing the questions and classifying them into three sections, which is also true 
for the transcribed material; 
(ii)  Searching for the sampled participants and communicating with them was a real 
challenge which required a great effort particularly the Shari’ah board members who 
approved SABIC sukuk, as two of the members are permanent advisors of the King 
making them not settled in one city, as the researcher found later that each member 
stays in a different city including Riyadh, Jeddah and Makkah. 
(iii) In order to protect anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issues, some of the 
interviewees had declined to allow the researcher to record the interview so that the 
researcher had no way but to write down the interview during the sessions; 
(iv) There were too many detailed questions for the purpose of reaching the right 




(v) The rarity of the studies in relation to sukuk with regard to legal and Shari’ah risks 
involving sukuk structure made it difficult to conceptualise the study in general and 
interview schedule in particular. 
(vi) The difficulty of interviewing high profile professionals including members of 
















Chapter 5                                                                                                             
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SHARI’AH SUPERVISORY BOARD  
  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, the developments in Islamic financial markets have witness 
many debates and arguments mainly over sukuk from Shari’ah and legal perspectives. 
For example, some contenders from Shari’ah scholars criticised sukuk structures by 
arguing that the idea of sukuk has been inconsistent with Shari’ah law. That view 
might have accounted for the decline of sukuk market in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis in 2008. However, the main debate remains is as to whether sukuk structures are 
different to conventional bonds or not. As far as the Islamic financial transactions are 
concerned, sukuk represent a new and innovative product for financial investment. 
Thus, given the complexity of the Islamic finance and the associated products 
including sukuk, it is quite natural that new products become problematic in terms of 
Shari’ah and other legal matters.  
One of the important areas raised in particular in the aftermath of the financial crisis is 
risks in Islamic finance and its management. In particular the existence of Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) overseeing the Shari’ah compliancy of any Islamic 
financial products is potentially concerned to be a source of such risks in Islamic 
finance. This is particularly true with sukuk, as the premature birth of Goldman Sach 
sukuk particularly indicated. Hence, the SBB and its member and their actions and 
credibility can be a source of major risk for the issuance and successful completion of 
sukuk.  
Being the first empirical paper of this research, this chapter aims at exploring risks 
associated with the SBSS who was in charge of approving the structure and the 
issuance of the SABIC sukuk, which is the case study in this research. 
In organising the chapter, first section discusses the importance of the Shari’ah 
supervisory board in Islamic finance in general and sukuk in particular and the risks 
associated with it. The second part presents the primary data collected through 




the significance of SSB. The third section shifts the discussion to SBSS by discussing 
the primary data collected through interview survey from the field in relation to the 
duties of SBSS in approving and structuring SABIC sukuk as well as related issues. 
The last part of this chapter aims to develop an interpretative discussion by delving 
into the identified risks which SABIC sukuk could be exposed to from the time of 
issuing till the maturity. 
5.2 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SSB: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In this section, critical issues related to SSBs are highlighted and discussed with the 
objective of providing a foundation base for the discussion through primary data 
presented in the following sections. In this regard, it is essential to identify the 
conceptual nature of the SSBs, the function of SSBs and their responsibilities with 
regard to their role of evaluating the Shari’ah risks related to sukuk structures. In 
doing so, recent criticisms with regard to fatwa and the related issues are also 
explored and underlined.  
5.2.1 The Concept of SSB 
In re-iteration, an essential aspect of any Islamic financial product is the Shari’ah 
complicacy to ensure that the Islamic financial products, instruments and services are 
structured, constructed and approved according to the Shari’ah principles. In modern 
times, this process in IBF is provided by SSBs and within that with the SBSS. 
Therefore, the existence of SSB and its approval for any product to be presented to 
investors is an important matter according to AAOIFI (2010). 
The SSB is defined according to AAOIFI (2010) as ‘an independent body of 
specialized jurist in fiqh al mua’malat (Islamic commercial jurisprudence)’. In 
addition, the decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s No 177 (3/19) also stated the 
same definition. This implies that the main duty of SSB is to support the Islamic 
financial institutions with supervision, guidance and direction (Nuhtay and Salman, 
2013). In supporting this, DeLorenzo (2006) pointed out that the purpose of having 
SSB in Islamic banks and financial institutions are to ensure that all transactions 




While the everyday experience in IBFIs indicates that in most cases as in the case of 
sukuk, the roles of SSB’ are confined to the approval of sukuk for business dealings 
(Al-Sayed, 2013), according to the AAOIFI (2010) it has been stated that SSB  
Should not limit their role to the issuance of fatwa on the permissibility of the 
structure of sukuk. All relevant contracts and documents related to the actual 
transaction must be carefully reviewed {by them}, and then they should oversee 
the actual means of implementation, and then make sure that the operation 
complies, at every stage, with Shari’ah guidelines and requirements as specified in 
the Shari’ah Standards. The investment of Sukuk proceeds and the conversion of 
the proceeds into assets, using one of the Shari’ah compliant methods of 
investments, must conform to Article (5/1/8/5)7 of the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standard 
(17).  
This AAOIFI standard, therefore, implies that it is not enough to have SSB to sign the 
approval of any structure of sukuk in the first stage, as those committees should 
follow up the application of the associated structures as well as the steps involved in 
relation to the issuance of sukuk, and in effect would decide the legality of the sukuk 
in terms of Shari’ah law. Thus, the focus of SSB in giving the legal advice (fatwa) on 
sukuk business without paying attention to the follow up of the practical application 
will constitute a great risk which should be avoidable (Faishal and Akinsomi, 2012).  
In other words, the failure of SSB in undertaking their real role regarding the follow 
up of the different stages of sukuk issuance could result in sukuk violating the 
Shari’ah principles due to the missing of due diligence (DeLorenzo, 2006). In this 
regard, AAOIFI (2010) as well as the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 177 
(3/19) suggested that Islamic finical institutions should have internal Shari’ah review, 
which is defined according to AAOIFI as; 
an examination of the extent of an IFI’s compliance in all its activities [which must 
include] the contracts, agreements, policies, products, transactions, memorandum 
and articles of association, financial statements, reports (especially internal audit 
and central bank inspection), circulars, etc.’ 
It can, therefore, be stated that the objective of such review is to make sure that all the 
transactions are according to the Shari’ah principles as the Shari’ah committee is 
responsible for expressing as well as forming a view on the extent of an IBFI’s 
compliance with the principle of Shari’ah (Nuhtay and Salman, 2013). 
In addition, it can be argued that the lack of the clarity in having SSB in the mind of 




lead to the emergence of risks associated with Shari’ah supervision (Yaacob, 2012), 
as this might lead to losing the right direction and forgetting the main duty and 
responsibility of having an SSB (Abu-Ghudah, 2003). This consequently may lead to 
Shari’ah supervision becoming imaginary and meaningless. In this respect, Alroshood 
(2013) suggested that the SSB should be more active with regard to review as well as 
examine all structures under their investigation, as their duty does not confine to 
issuing a statement of ‘permissibility’ in the sense of providing instrumental 
legitimacy as they are expected to provide moral substance to the process by also 
fulfilling the form requirement with it fullness. 
On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the level of the understanding of most 
of the SSB of the reality of the contemporary economy and its innovations, as well as 
their knowledge about banking and financing matters is not equal to the level of their 
knowledge and their expertise on Shari’ah matters (Bose and McGee, 2008; Yaacob, 
2012; Hasan, 2012). This could lead to the rejection of many models and the format 
of financing transactions, for which there might not be a substitute for it in the 
literature of Islamic jurisprudence. In this regard AAOIFI (2010) suggested that ‘the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board may include a member other than those specialized in 
fiqh mua’malat, but should be an expert in the field of Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) with the knowledge of fiqh mua’malat’.  
Moreover, the regrettable fact is that until now an a systematic and sophisticated 
system for the follow up of the application of sukuk product from its initiation to post-
issuance process in relation to Shari’ah compliance is non-existent. In addition, 
according to Ahmed (2011), the pressures that may be exercised by the banks 
managers on the board in order to pass legalization verdicts in favour of some of the 
financial transactions and activities due to their misperceptions of the knowledge level 
of SSB about the banking transactions can lead to unwanted consequences. All these 
and other implications may result in Islamic finance being exposed to risks that are 
related to Shari’ah supervision, the extent of its effectiveness and the difficulty of 
harmonizing the multiple fatawa of the banks together (Izhar, 2010).Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the lack of efficient and effective Shari’ah supervisory process as 





5.2.2 The Lack of Shari’ah Experts 
It could be noted that one of the critical issue in the area of sukuk is the scarcity of 
specialists in sukuk structures, whether those specialists are Shari’ah scholars or 
academics who combine between the Shari’ah knowledge and the other knowledge 
that could assist to have a full understanding of the complexity of sukuk structures 
(Yean, 2009). The main role of those specialists according to AAOIFI standards is to 
review the sukuk that have been issued as to whether or not they comply with 
Shari’ah principles. If not then the sukuk will be rejected as an Islamic product; in 
which case all parties involved will be affected regardless of being funders, the sukuk 
holders or the market as a whole (DeLorenzo, 2006). Nonetheless, from a legal point 
of view, the lack of specialists to monitor sukuk contracts will render those contracts 
legally flawed, which would mean vagueness in terms of rights and obligations of the 
parties involved, in which case both sukuk issuers and sukuk holders would be in risk, 
a matter which should be avoided (Aoudah, 2010).  
On the other hand, the increasing demand for Shari’ah compliant products as 
compared to the number of specialists reveals a huge deficit in the latter so that the 
need is urgent to make up for the observed deficit in terms of legal committees and 
other Shari’ah organisations involved in the examination and approval of Islamic 
financial products including sukuk. By doing so; those products will be intact in terms 
of their compliance with Shari’ah leading to the avoidance of potential risks involved 
(DeLorenzo, 2006; Al-Amine, 2008). However, it is noteworthy that the scarcity of 
Islamic sukuk specialists who combine between the knowledge of Shari’ah and the 
legal knowledge has serious impact on the studies and research associated with sukuk. 
In addition, research centres in the Islamic finance related research are effective 
enough in themselves to be able to communicate with the industry to work for 
solutions, which is in itself a setback that should be given great attention. Yet, in order 
to avoid all the above risks, or at least keep the damage to the minimum in case they 
happen, should imply a better understanding of the nature of sukuk, and the way they 
work as well as the risks involved in terms of Shari’ah and other legal and financial 
aspects as that will not be possible without establishing the appropriate and adequate 
research centres featuring specialists in Shari’ah and other legal matters who will 
study the sukuk structures from all aspects before they are finally approved for public 




argued that Islamic financial institutions need Shari’ah scholars who can understand 
finance and banking system. In this regard, considering that the top 20 scholars serve 
more than 500 boards globally which means that the number of Shari’ah experts is 
limited (Zawya, 2015). 
It can, on the other hand, be argued that due to the dearth of Shari’ah specialists in 
sukuk structures for instance, Islamic banks utilize the services of the trained 
employees of the conventional banks. That is because of the lack of variation in most 
of the operations and activities in terms of the procedural requirements and the 
activities that are carried out in the existing banks, and that of the Islamic banks 
(Najeeb and Ibrahim, 2014). However, this situation could lead to the mimicry and 
mirroring in the form of convergence towards the principles and values of the 
conventional banking. In a similar manner, the consolidation of the concepts of 
comprehensive security, such as the capital and profit guarantee by the level of the 
lowest possible risks, may result in the lack of the caring of administrative bodies of 
Islamic banks about innovation and the implementation of new models that are 
complementary to the instruments and the current models (Iqbal, 1997). Therefore, 
Islamic banks are in dire need of training elements. Such training will prepare 
qualified personnel for the ability of carrying out an economic feasibility study of 
production projects and seek the assistance of qualified experts to oversee the 
production projects in which they invest (Erol and El-Bdour, 1989). 
This challenge is usually blamed on the level of the availability of technical staff and 
specialized professionals that are trained to work on the harmonization of the 
prevailing law and the Shari’ah rulings (Hasan, 2011). Such experts will also be able 
to perform legal expertise tasks combined with the minimum level of Shari’ah 
knowledge, which will assist them on the management and implementation in a better 
way, without the violating the rules of Shari’ah (Yahya and Mahzan, 2012). 
Similarly, in the area of the actual activities, the cooperation between Islamic banks in 
the area of the provision of technical personnel and banking expertise is still in narrow 
stage and it is not regular (Izhar, 2010). Therefore, the lack of Shari’ah experts and 
hence their effectiveness in relation to sukuk is considered as one of the Shari’ah risks 




5.2.3 Multiplicity of Jurisprudence Opinions/Verdicts 
The multiple opinions/verdicts and the different fatawa that are issued by SSB, on the 
same banking activities have constituted confusion to the sukuk investors as well as to 
the people who are in-charge of the management of the banks, likewise to the 
employees (Ahmed, 2009;Yaacob, 2012). However, this might lead to the disruption 
in the implementation of some banking instruments that provide the banks with 
operational flexibility, and more active role in enabling the banks to provide the 
possible maximum banking activities (Iqbal, 1997). In this regard, the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy’s Decision No 177(3/19) stated that the SSB’s should follow all the 
decisions made by the Islamic Fiqh Academy as well as they should consider what it 
has been decided in decision no 153(2/17) with regard to the rules of issuing fatwa.  
It could be argued that the differences in jurisdiction between the various Shari’ah 
committees such as those in the GCC region and Malaysia regarding the legality of 
selling debts as one of the examples, should pose a great risk to the sukuk product in 
particular and the Islamic finance in general. As a matter of fact, that difference 
between the sources of fatwa has led to the interruption of the development of that 
product closing the door for the emergence of new methods based on the principle of 
sukuk (McMillen, 2006). In other words, the road has ended with some sukuk that 
have been approved by many Shari’ah scholars, while many other types of sukuk have 
been ignored that might have otherwise been more attractive to investors, given the 
juristic difference regarding their legality among the various fatwa sources 
(DeLorenzo, 2007). 
5.2.4 The Legal Opinion (Fatwa) and Associated Risks 
Some experts in Islamic finances believe that any Islamic product such as sukuk could 
be safe through legal advice (fatwa) as to become eligible for marketing locally or 
internationally (DeLorenzo, 2007; Lahsasna, 2014). In this regard, one of sukuk 
issued in Saudi Arabia has been approved as an Islamic product consistent with 
Shari’ah principles, based on a fatwa issued from one of the Shari’ah committee. 
However, later on, it has been discovered by other group of scholars that the fatwa has 
been legally flawed in terms of Shari’ah; questioning the consistency of the product 




that a legal opinion (fatwa) features a number of risks some of which are the 
following: 
(i) The rejection of fatwa 
Where financial transactions are concerned, disagreement between Shari’ah scholars 
always exists as unanimity becomes almost impossible (Masud, 2009). That is for the 
simple reason that such transactions are based on juristic reasoning or otherwise 
independent judgment, and both constitute major sources for Shari’ah legislation 
(Skubik, 2009). Thus, issuers of sukuk, sukuk holders as well as Shari’ah scholars 
should always bear in mind the fact that there is a possibility of rejection of fatwa 
sometime after being enforced (Shaharuddin et al.,2012). This should make those 
concerned more meticulous when giving a fatwa; a matter which should only happen 
after careful examination of the contract in question in terms of its compliance with 
Shari’ah principles, and that failure to do so will result in a flawed fatwa (Ahmed, 
2009; DeLorenzo, 2006). Eventually, that will damage the image of those who have 
issued the fatwa in front of public as well as customers will have no trust on the 
product in which case both sukuk issuers and sukuk holders are more likely to pay the 
cost (Mounira and Anas, 2009). 
(ii) Changing the fatwa 
As it has already been mentioned; the mufti (the one who makes fatwa) relies on his 
understanding of the basic Shari’ah principles regarding his approval of a particular 
financial product in relation to their compliance with Shari’ah law (Sole, 2007). For 
instance, in case of sukuk, after being structured, they will be referred to the Shari’ah 
committee which is part of the institution that issues the sukuk. The committee will 
examine the sukuk as to their compliance with Shari’ah principles, and will either 
approve them or will otherwise reject them accompanied with a report highlighting 
the areas where they violate Shari’ah law. It can be argued that the main risk is that 
the committee or one of its members might discover sometime after the product has 
been promoted that some inconsistencies with Shari’ah do exist in which case 
transactions involving such sukuk will be unlawful in terms of Shari’ah principles. 
That was exactly what had happened with two of the Shari’ah committee members of 




guarantees to sukuk holders that they would be eligible to full refund after sukuk 
expired (Merah, 2008; Almenea, 2044). The same case was repeated with Sheikh 
Usmani who stated that 85 % of the sukuk did not comply with Shari’ah principles, 
even though he had been responsible for the approval of many of those sukuk, and that 
many investors and scholars used his fatwa as a basis for their acceptance to some 
kinds of sukuk (Shaikh and Saeed, 2010). 
It should be noted that, changing of fatwa is a complex matter as it could lead to 
invalidation of the contract (Vogel and Hayes, 1998). In this respect, even Shari’ah 
scholars remain divided regarding some of the Islamic contracts and structures that 
have been based on fatwa issued by Shari’ah scholars who have later on discovered 
their fatwa to be wrong, and have retracted from it. The main point of difference is 
that whether the contract will immediately be invalidated and so will the associated 
sukuk featuring that contract, or should the sukuk continue to be valid until they 
expire. In addition, one would question the legal status of sukuk holders in terms of 
Shari’ah assuming that they had made gains from their sukuk. In other words, whether 
those gains are lawful (halal) or not, in terms of Shari’ah, given the fact that the 
original contract was legally flawed, or otherwise what they have gained is considered 
lawful as the sukuk was issued by a renowned legal committee and that the reversal of 
fatwa should not affect those gains. Moreover, how do courts deal with such risks? 
All those critical issues should be given more legal attention in terms of Shari’ah law. 
It is worth mentioning that fears of withdrawal of fatwa have had its effects featuring 
the poor subscription to those products as the risk cannot in any way be played down 
or ignored according to some experts (Qattan, 2003). 
(iii) The transparency of fatwa 
It could be argued that most of the investors in the Islamic sukuk market trust the 
sukuk product when there is an involvement of SSB. In this regard, the existence of 
the Shari’ah committee in most cases seems to be enough to win the hearts and minds 
of investors to join the sukuk market (Alkholayfi, 2003). Nonetheless, it can be said 
that the main risk is that most of the investors are not quite aware of the methods 
through which sukuk have been approved in terms of Shari’ah principles (Siswantoro, 
2013). Thus, some investors might have some reservations regarding fatwa on which 




they are own. Consequently, had the investor become aware that the structure had 
been approved based on specific fatwa or a certain school of thought he might have 
changed his mind and would have stopped transactions dealing in that sukuk. In this 
regard, AAOIFI (2010) suggested that IFIs should have ‘Audit Committee’ as the 
main purpose for it is that it plays a significant role to achieve the fundamental 
objectives of the IFIs, enhance greater transparency and disclosure in financial report 
and to gain the public’s confidence of the IFIs regarding the application of Shari’ah 
rules and principles. Thus, lack of transparency from the side of those who approve 
the sukuk poses a risk, and that the possibility that one of the sukuk holders could 
claim against the issuers for deception or ignorance should not be ruled out 
(DeLorenzo, 2006; Casper, 2012). In this regard, investors in sukuk have got the right 
to know the legal evidence for the validity of those sukuk in terms of Shari’ah law. In 
addition, investors need to know the juristic justification for such kind of sukuk prior 
to their investment on them as this is considered as a basic rights for sukuk 
holders(Van Wijnbergen and Zaheer, 2013).Therefore, issuing fatwa is an essential 
matter when it comes to the validity of the sukuk as well as the consequent risks might 
occur. In this respect, AAOIFI standards as the Islamic Fiqh Academy suggested that 
it is highly recommended to issue a written fatwa with related evidences and 
justifications as well as the distribution of the fatawa between other SSB and Islamic 
institutions will be beneficial. 
5.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SSB AND THE 
WAY FORWARD: THE PERSPECTIVE OF SPECIALISTS 
This section aims to report and discuss the position of the interviewed participants 
whether Shari’ah scholars, academics, judges or experts to explore and discover the 
significance of the Shari’ah boards in the sukuk market through their understanding, 
knowledge and experience so that the potential risk areas can better be understood and 
related. 
As mentioned before, sukuk are considered as the most recent Islamic finance 
products which implies that sukuk structures and operations are in urgent need of 
further scrutiny and examination for the extent of compliance with Shari’ah rules and 




Usmani pointed out that most of the sukuk issued in the market are not in accordance 
of the rules of Shari’ah. 
The purpose of discussing these questions through a range of important issues related 
to sukuk is to explore and examine some of the risks that may be associated with 
sukuk in the Saudi market. The discussion is developed through the analysis of the 
opinions of the selected interviewees and suggestions they deem to develop the work 
of these legal entities as well as trying to avoid or reduce the risks that sukuk might be 
exposed in the Saudi market. In doing so, the discussion is presented in a thematic 
manner in the following sections. 
5.3.1 Questioning the Importance of the Shari’ah Supervisory Boards 
In questioning the importance of the SSB, interviewee 1 pointed out that Islamic 
financial institutions’ operations are guided by the principles and values based on 
Shari’ah law which make them unique in comparison to the conventional banks. To 
ensure Shari’ah compliance on the operations of the banks and institutions, each bank 
and institution is required to establish a Shari’ah board However, as stated by the 
interviewee 1, in practice some of the Islamic banks, deliberately or otherwise, 
become involved in transactions as well as products such as sukuk that are sometimes 
inconsistent with Shari’ah law. It could be argued that such inconsistency could be 
due to a number of reasons including the role of Shari’ah board as suggested by one 
of the interviewee 2:“The failure of the SSB within those banks to live up to their 
duties regarding the supervision of the banking and financial transactions or otherwise 
failure of the bank to establish its own SSB in the first place”. 
According to Interviewee 2, the existence of SSB within Islamic banks and financial 
institutions should be considered an indispensable requirement to ensure that all 
products such as sukuk are based on Shari’ah principles. For that reason, some 
Muslim countries such as Malaysia have made the existence of SSB within Islamic 
banks as a basic condition to ensure Shari’ah compliancy, which, as argued by 
Interviewee 2, has reassured sukuk investors to do business with those banks with full 
trust. In this regard, Interviewee 2 also mentioned that since in Saudi Arabia, even 
though the state constitution refers to Qur’an and Sunnah as the main sources of 
legislation with regard to banking and financial transactions, and that all banking 




of SSB to monitor sukuk transactions is not a condition for approving any sukuk 
structure in Saudi Arabian sukuk market. That is for the simple reason as stated by the 
Interviewee 2 that ‘the policy makers in Saudi Arabian sukuk market assume that 
there is no need for such SSB as long as all banks transaction should be based on 
Shari’ah principles and operate accordingly’. 
In this respect, Interviewee 3 argued that the absence of SSB, particularly in Saudi 
Arabia could be a risk that should be accounted for. In other words, he mentioned that 
the main risk is that the absence of SSB could be a threat to sukuk investors who 
unlikely to have any background on matters related to Islamic finance particularly 
new products such as sukuk, which have become widespread in the world especially 
in Saudi Arabia. This lack of awareness should make some Muslim investors hesitant, 
worried and indecisive regarding investment in those banks and financial institutions 
in which Shari’ah boards are non-existent, as they would not be able to appreciate the 
product as to its compliancy with Shari’ah law (Interviewee, 3). Thus, the only option 
for such investors is to avoid investment in those banks which may have negative 
effect on the economy. 
Nonetheless, according to Interviewee 4: 
The absence of Shari’ah boards within banks should not be the only 
problem when we see some Islamic financial products such as sukuk are not 
Shari’ah compliant in some cases. The problem is that the lack of system 
that features those boards within banks in terms of aims, function, the 
criteria of members and the mechanism by which those board work issue 
their Shari’ah-based decision regards the products and financial processes to 
persuade investors in sukuk.  
Furthermore, according to Interviewee 5, the main risks which face Islamic banking is 
that many governments particularly in Saudi Arabia have failed, so far, to understand 
the real importance of the SSB to maintain the Shari’ah compliancy of sukuk 
structures. Interviewee 5, therefore, pointed out that the solution to maintain sukuk 
structures to be Shari’ah compliant becomes simple by ‘drafting the right legislations 
and by installing the good systems or at least activating the current practices such as 
AAOIFI standards’. In addition, he pointed out that those standards and 




an application will ensure that those organisations are operating the sukuk transactions 
according to the principles of Shari’ah. 
In further exploring the issues, Interviewee 4 asserted that the existence of the SSB 
within the banks and other Islamic financial organisations will play an essential role 
for the development of those Islamic institutions in terms of products consistent with 
Shari’ah principles by responding to the demands of investors, not to mention their 
positive impact on the sukuk market especially as a new Islamic financial product.  
5.3.2 Questioning the advantages of having SSB 
All interviewees were requested to give their perceptions and comments on specific 
issues raised by the researcher to highlight the importance of SSB towards the sukuk 
market as well as sukuk investors in Saudi Arabia. Based on their opinions, 
perceptions and understandings, the advantages of having SSB in the Islamic capital 
markets are as follows; 
(i) Guarantee 
In essentialising the importance of guarantee, Interviewee 4 argued that the existence 
of the SSB within the financial organisations dealing with sukuk will ensure that those 
organisations would not become involved in unlawful transactions such as the 
guarantee of the capital and returns in sukuk structures. In this respect, Interviewee 2 
stated that the sukuk structures should be closely scrutinised and examined in terms of 
Shari’ah as to be judged by the SSB to ensure that the product or funding process in 
question is consistent with Shari’ah principles. According to Interviewee 1,the 
existence of such SSB should reassure every investor in sukuk that the money he 
would put in the bank for investing in sukuk would be invested in accordance with 
Shari’ah principles. In this respect, all Interviewees argued that 
The existence of those SSB would be meaningless unless they undertake 
their real role as stipulated by standards of AAOIFI featuring monitoring, 
follow up, reviewing and reporting the structures of the sukuk and the 
consistency of those structures with Shari’ah principles. 
 
Therefore, it becomes clear that the establishment of Shari’ah board within every 
Islamic financial institution will have a great impact regarding the security of all 




from the Shari’ah boards in their duties with regard to structuring sukuk will have a 
negative impact on the sukuk that might become inconsistent with the rules of 
Shari’ah. 
(ii) Trust 
Interviewee 3 suggested that the Saudi society can be described as a ‘religious 
society’, which has impact on banking patronage. To give an example, Interviewee 
3stated that Alrajihi Bank is considered as the most popular bank in Saudi Arabia 
joined by many of the Shari’ah scholars as the bank has publicly announced its 
compliance with the Shari’ah principles, and that all its transactions are interest-free. 
That announcement had made the Shari’ah scholars at that time make their judgment 
in favour of the bank by encouraging people to put their moneys in that bank with an 
understanding to avoid any dealings with other banks. Therefore, the bank has taken 
advantage of that judgment to win the trust of the people and as a result of that many 
Saudi people has involved in Alrajihi Bank and it became the top ranking bank in 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in terms of Shari’ah compliant assets as well as in the Gulf 
region. It could be maintained that the existence of the SSB within the banking 
establishment tends to promote trust and reassurance among investors, as stated by the 
Interviewee 1.As strongly emphasised by Interviewee 2, ‘trust is an essential element 
as sukuk investors for instance are always looking for rules and legislation that 
prevent their money from being squandered and preserve their financial rights to the 
effect of using their money in a way consistent with Shari’ah principles’. 
Moreover, Interviewee 4 maintained that the failure to provide that guarantee 
featuring the absence of SSB tends to place the money to be invested in sukuk 
transactions at the risk of loss. According to Interviewee 5, therefore, some of the 
banks in Saudi Arabia tend to create unreal SSB to win the trust of sukuk investors. 
Interviewee 4 also emphasised that such practice is currently going on in some of the 
non-Muslim countries to open Islamic windows in their conventional banks or 
otherwise promote products mimicking Islamic products. Such practices from non-
Muslim countries, he stated, should not be taken for granted that Islamic banking 
provide the solution to save the world from its financial crisis. However, their aim, as 
Interviewee 4 stated, might be just to attract capital from Muslim countries to be 




principles or otherwise make use of the savings of the Muslim people who are in 
those countries. 
According to the above, it becomes obvious that investors in financial markets in 
general and in the Saudi market in particular are mainly concerned with the existence 
of Shari’ah boards in banks and other Islamic financial institutions. However, the 
existence of such Shari’ah boards as indicated by one of the interviewees would tend 
to enforce the trust of investors on Islamic products in general and on sukuk in 
particular. Therefore, having such committees will have a positive effect leading to 
the flourishing of sukuk market.  
(iii) Avoidance of loss of the capital 
Making profit and avoidance of loss in sukuk for instance are the main aim of 
investors in any bank or institution. In this regard, Interviewee 1 argued that risk and 
the possibility of loss should be taken into account in any potential business 
transaction, and that should differentiate Islamic transactions from other transactions, 
as according to Shari’ah principles insuring capital in any financial transaction 
renders the financial process an act of riba. Nonetheless, as Interviewee 3 asserted 
that ‘it becomes a duty for Shari’ah boards to do their best to avoid any type of risks 
involving sukuk particularly Shari’ah risks’. 
In substantiating this, Interviewee 2 referred to the fact that the real loss takes place 
when the sukuk investor discovers that he has become involved in business that does 
not comply with Shari’ah principles. According to the principal of Shari’ah in such 
case the investor has to pull out of the deal by any means no matter the consequences 
and eventually, he could end losing his capital. Interviewee 2, therefore, noted that, 
for example, after the announcement by one of the members of the Shari’ah board 
who approved the Bahrain Airport sukuk by saying that these sukuk are not Shari’ah 
compliant due to some Shari’ah issues people got confused. However, Interviewee 
4madea question based comment with regard to the Airlines Bahrain sukuk: ‘Who is 
the responsible for the loss of the capital of investors in the case of Bahrain Airport 
sukuk?’ He went on to state that investors in the above mentioned sukuk had two 
options either to sell those sukuk, which became not Shari’ah complaint, at a cost less 




which would mean becoming involved in business practice against the principles of 
Shari’ah. In addition, Interviewee 4 also pointed out that the same scenario happened 
following statement issued by Mufti Taqi Usmani labelling 85% of the sukuk as non-
Shari’ah compliant. That statement had the power of fatwa, and eventually had 
negative impact on sukuk market. However, according to Interviewee 4 the risk of 
loss could be avoided if there is; 
an establishment of Shari’ah board that would examine the sukuk structure 
in terms of its compliance with Shari’ah, and the possibility of application 
without the risk of deviation from the right destination in accordance with 
Shari’ah principles as the case with sukuk from initial issuance to the end of 
the duration as prescribed by the issuance prospectus. 
It should be noticed that any Islamic transactions including sukuk could be 
subject to profit and loss. However, the loss should not be due to the lack of 
performance of SSB’s in undertaking their duties or due to the poor 
understanding of the Shari’ah boards towards sukuk structures. If this is the 
case, then such loss which is as a result of the shortening from the SSB’s 
should not be justified and would have an impact on the Islamic financial 
reputation in general and sukuk in particular. 
(iv) Avoidance falling into sin 
Islamic financial transactions should comply with Shari’ah principles so that dealing 
and acting against Shari’ah law would mean that a Muslim has committed a sinful act 
(haram), which is prohibited that would make him/her subject to punishment by God 
in the hereafter (Interviewee, 2).In this context, Interviewee 5 argued that ‘the failure 
in sukuk structures to be complied with Shari’ah principles and dealing in riba is the 
main cause of the sukuk crises in 2008’. He further asserted that dealing with riba 
transaction is the source of financial crisis that beset the USA financial markets 
(Interviewee, 5). Having said that, riba has many forms in these days and could even 
be confusing for scholars not to mention lay people who have no background in 
Shari’ah-related matters (Interviewee, 1). In this respect, Interviewee 4 stressed the 
fact that; 
The absence of the specialised Shari’ah boards in sukuk that give advice 
to people as to distinguish between which sukuk structures are allowed 




malpractices that have made people become involved in sinful financial 
transactions. 
In ensuring the prohibition of riba, Interviewee 3 pointed out that the local banks in 
Saudi Arabia are monitored by the Capital Market Authority (CMA), which bans 
banks and other financial organisations from becoming involved in any financial 
transactions that do not comply with Shari’ah principles. According to Interviewee5, 
the problem is that investors in the Saudi sukuk market believe that all sukuk in Saudi 
Arabia are Shari’ah compliant, therefore, they do not care whether SSB and their 
decisions in relation to those sukuk are exist or not. For that reason, Interviewee 5 
made it clear that; 
The problem should not be the absence of SSB but rather raising 
people’s awareness of the main problems and risks regarding the 
application of the Islamic financial system within those Islamic financial 
institutions, and the fact that some of those banks and organisations 
operate out of the control of Shari’ah system. 
Therefore, it could be argued that any failure or negligence that could take place from 
SSB’s regarding the examining of sukuk structures could cause great embarrassment to 
investors. In other words, Muslim investors either continue sinful acts due to 
becoming involved in non-Islamic transactions or lose their capital. That should make 
SSB’s do their best while they approving any structures to avoid sinful acts that might 
be practiced by investors in case they discovered the product had been inconsistent 
with Shari’ah principles. 
(v) The invention and development of products in compliance with Shari’ah 
principles 
Interviewee 1 mentioned that in relation to managing risks involving the Islamic 
finance products in general and sukuk in particular, the dilemma is that the majority of 
the staff in Islamic banks has previous experience in relation to conventional banking. 
That experience in conventional banking has negative impact regarding devising the 
necessary tools in relation to Islamic financing and investment including sukuk, 
which, according to the Interviewee 1, to a great extent has converged towards 
conventional financial transactions. In this context, Interviewee 4 referred to this 
particular problem as the real problem of IBF by stating that; 
the dogmatic state and the underdevelopment of the Islamic banking 




operation could be due to the lack of the qualified personnel within the 
Islamic banks and organisations with the know-how in Shari’ah-related 
matters that make them capable of innovation to the effect of generating 
new products in compliance with Shari’ah principles, or otherwise 
readjusting conventional products in compliance with Shari’ah 
principles. 
In confirming this, Interviewee 2 pointed out that the existence of Shari’ah boards 
alone is not enough with regard to the invention and development of Shari’ah 
compliant products as it is obvious that despite that many banks and Islamic 
organisations have SSB, and yet Islamic banks are short of Shari’ah compliant 
products. It should be noted that the same comments were uttered also by 
Interviewee3 who maintained that ‘the majority of sukuk in the sukuk market feature 
ijarah which considered by some critics as one of contracts that should be examined 
and evaluated’.  
For that reason, Interviewee 5 is of the view that development of Shari’ah-compliant 
products should require that the Shari’ah board in each financial institution should 
accommodate law specialists, financiers, and accountants who should work side by 
side each in his own field in order to create a product in response to the needs of the 
society in ensuring Shari’ah compliancy. In the meantime, that product should be 
risk-free with regard to its compliance with Shari’ah principles. With that mechanism, 
Interviewee 5 argued that the Islamic banking system becomes capable of competing 
with the top of the range of the conventional products in international financial 
markets by presenting Islamic products. To be more precise, Interviewee 1 pointed 
out that the current financial institutions have to ‘live up to the main challenge by 
generating products and services in accordance with Shari’ah standards, and in the 
meantime should be capable of competition with other financial products as to 
achieve profits in the long run’. 
It becomes clear from the above that SSB’s have to cope with the main challenge as to 
make Islamic products attractive to investors. However, in the meantime, the 
existence of SSB’s should not be enough as to respond to the market requirements 
regarding the discovery and development of various new Islamic products in response 
to the market needs. Consequently, there is a potential necessity for financial 
specialists in general to employ their expertise in discovering new structures and 





(vi) Ensuring the achievement of Shari’ah objectives (Maqased al-Shari’ah) 
According to Interviewee 1, the aims and objectives of Shari’ah rules could be used 
as an benchmark to judge whether a specific institution is being run in accordance 
with Shari’ah principles or not. However, scholars are in full agreement of the fact 
that the preservation of wealth is one of the main objectives of Islamic Shari’ah. As a 
matter of fact, Interviewee 1 argued that Shari’ah which protects and preserves the 
social order must pay great attention to reserve wealth. It should be mentioned that, 
the following dimensions have been presented to most of the interviewees to gain 
their comments on how wealth can be preserved as follow; 
Preservation of wealth by protecting the right of ownership 
Interviewee 4 noted that Islamic law acknowledges that human being has a natural 
instinct for ownership, thus, defining clear standards to control this instinct in terms of 
usage and saving of money; and hence it does not have a particular issue and problem 
with wealth generation. In this regard, according to Interviewee 1, one of the main 
concerns of SSB is to ensure that sukuk investors enjoy that ownership in the context 
of the aims and objectives of maqased al-Shari’ah. In essentialising the importance of 
this, Interviewee 3 argued that the existence of SSB within financial organisations 
should ensure that one of Shari’ah objectives, featuring the preservation of money for 
its ownership, has been achieved as well as to ensure that money, no matter in form of 
cash or assets, or otherwise should be always available for the owner who should have 
full authority to decide on his belongings. In this respect, Interviewee 4 pointed out 
that; 
Currently, the main problem and risk that faces sukuk from Shari’ah and 
legal perspective is that, sukuk holders do not enjoy their full rights upon 
their sukuk. In other words, that ownership of their underlying assets is 
only nominal as the case with many sukuk structures. 
Moreover, Interviewee 2 argued that, from Shari’ah perspective, the complete denial 
of ownership or otherwise making that ownership incomplete must be incompatible 
with one of Shari’ah objective featuring the preservation of wealth. That fact has been 




ensuring the full transfer of sukuk assets from sukuk issuer to sukuk holders, should 
represent a genuine part of the objectives of Shari’ah’.  
In this regard, preserving the capital as much as it could when designing sukuk 
structures is one of the main Shari’ah objectives. In other words, proving the 
ownership for the sukuk holders is considered one of maqased al-Shari’ah   that 
should be considered. 
Preserving wealth from harm 
According to Interviewee 5, Shari’ah always calls for protection of wealth from any 
type of damage through two means: first, the protection of wealth from potential risks 
that could produce damage, and second, the prevention of damage by disallowing 
abuse of wealth. In this respect, Interviewee 3 suggested that the presence of SSB to 
monitor sukuk structures and put course of the sukuk from the time of issuance to time 
of expiry should an important and essential matter. Interviewee 5 also pointed out 
that; 
The abuse of money for purposes inconsistent with Shari’ah could be 
mainly due to the failure of SSB to live up to their real duties with regard 
to the continuous supervision and control of the various financial 
processes to be undertaken by the relevant financial organisations. 
In the meantime, Interviewee 4 stated that unless the risk management of a specific 
investment lives up to its duties, the outcome will be disastrous in a way that threatens 
the economy of the region or state. Therefore, it implies that risk management is a 
matter of paramount importance. 
Preserving money by preserving its value 
According to Interviewee 2, Shari’ah law, among other maqased items, aims to 
preserve wealth through preserving its value. For instance, the Holly Quran states 
what could be translated as ‘you should not underestimate other people’s things’. The 
term ‘underestimate’ refers to low evaluation, dishonesty and deception in 
measurement. In this context, Interviewee 1 referred to the fact that in Saudi Arabia, 
some of sukuk structures seem to be ‘fraudulent and deceptive’, and therefore he 
argued that they are in clear contradiction with Islamic moral principles.  Interviewee 




deception. Furthermore, he maintained that ‘sukuk structures currently could be 
deceptive as the method of evaluation of those sukuk was unclear, and without the due 
transparency’. 
According to Interviewee 3, he asserted that the real value of sukuk has not been taken 
into account from sukuk holders so that sukuk holders are not bothered whether the 
price they have paid for sukuk is fair or not, as they will sell the assets back to the 
main buyer in the nominal value and they will have their money back without any 
loss. Therefore, Interviewee 1 argued that; 
Many sukuk structures had indirectly guaranteed the capital as well as 
the return so that the sukuk holders would not bother about the evaluation 
of the sukuk assets at the time of purchase whether it was based on real 
and fair evaluation or fraudulent and deceptive evaluation. 
Nonetheless, Interviewee 2 pointed out that the real risk comes if those sukuk go 
bankrupt, in which case failure to meet the objective of preserving the fair value of 
money becomes obvious. 
In addition, Interviewee 4 maintained that understanding the maqased al-Shari’ah 
should imply that the financial institutions should be controlled according to the moral 
and legal principles of Shari’ah, which could be through defining the transactions to 
be undertaken by those institutions within the moral framework to be outlined by 
Shari’ah. For instance, Interviewee 4 stated that Shari’ah tends to preserve individual 
rights of ownership, and yet those rights are subject to specific rules and moral 
standards that have been drafted to protect social rights. Thus, Interviewee 5 noticed 
that Islamic financial institutions are not expected to operate in isolation of the 
society, as its main task is to achieve balance between the individuals and the society 
in terms of rights and duties. 
From the above discussion, it becomes obvious that observing maqased Al-shari’ah in 
Islamic financial products in general and sukuk structures particularly is one of the 
main issues when it comes to structuring sukuk. In this regard, SBSS has a duty to 
make sure that the maqased Al-shari’ah have to be taken into account during the 






(vii) Education and training of staff and exchange of knowledge and experiences 
According to Interviewee 1, it becomes obvious that the majority of the staff in 
Islamic banks and Islamic financial institutions have come from a background that 
could be linked to conventional banking, and that has indirectly affected the sukuk 
issued by Islamic banks and other financial institutions. Thus, according to 
Interviewee 2 ‘the existence of SSB should be vital for Islamic organisations in terms 
of providing the necessary training for the staff to develop the Islamic products 
particularly sukuk which is considered relatively new in the Islamic financial 
markets’. By contrast, Interviewee 4 stressed the fact that the mere existence of SSB 
is not enough unless those SSB keep close sustainable relationships with the staff in 
the relevant organisation. Those relationships could be beneficial by raising 
awareness of Shari’ah rules among the staff members through lectures and training 
sessions to be provided by the members of the Shari’ah boards in order to raise 
awareness with matters related to Islamic contracts, and the modern methods of 
financing such as sukuk as well as highlighting the risks associated with those 
methods. Moreover, Interviewee1 suggested that the task of examining the products 
for approval should not be confined to the SSB alone but the board should seek the 
advice of the relevant departments to clear legal and accounting matters and in effect 
issue clear products in compliance with Shari’ah, financial and legal matters. On the 
other hand, Interviewee5 noted that members of staff in Islamic financial institutions 
have very poor knowledge and awareness of Shari’ah, and that matter, so far, has not 
been addressed by the SSB who have failed to undertake their role in raising 
knowledge and awareness of Shari’ah-related matters among the staff. 
5.3.3 Questioning the Concept of Shari’ah Board 
In exploring the position of the participants on Shari’ah board which is essentially 
important for the success of any sukuk, Interviewee 1 mentioned that it becomes of 
paramount importance to give a comprehensive definition for SSB within financial 
institutions not matter those institutions being Islamic institutions or otherwise, as 
people and particularly the members of those boards must become aware of their 
duties and commitments when they approve any sukuk structures’. In referring to the 




consisting of members with an expertise in the field of fiqh. However, he argued that 
this definition has been cause of the problem with regard to the failure of the boards to 
undertake their duties while approving sukuk structures, as the above definition is 
inadequate falling short of highlighting the real duties of the board members. In 
identifying the importance of such a definition, Interviewee 4 stated that by giving an 
accurate definition of the SSB, the members of the board can be held to account for 
underperformance.  
As part of the conceptual definitional issues in particular in responding to the nature 
and composition of SSB, interviewee 3argued that it is not necessary that the SSB 
should incorporate expertise from other fields as the duty of those boards is confined 
to the approval of the sukuk structures or otherwise refer that structure back to the 
bank with the appropriate comments. In substantiating this, Interviewee 4 maintained 
that ‘the problems with sukuk in Saudi Arabia in terms of Shari’ah issues have been 
due to the fact that Shari’ah boards within the relevant banks lack the awareness with 
regard to the structuring of sukuk’. In addition, Interviewee 4 asserted that most SSB 
members have no idea with regard to the legal and financial complexities that might 
render sukuk inconsistent with Shari’ah principles as those boards deal with sukuk 
without the appropriate expertise in the legal and financial matters. However, 
Interviewee 1 argued that until now a comprehensive definition of SSB has yet to be 
found, and organisations such as AAOIFI and Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) have a duty to find a comprehensive definition as to allow the appointment of 
SSB according to recognised international standards as suggested. 
5.3.4 Questioning the Purpose of Shari’ah Boards 
As regards to the purpose of SSB, Interviewee 1 pointed out that defining the 
objective and aim of the SSB is a matter of paramount importance. He argued that the 
current chaos and confusion within Islamic financial institutions including banks, 
particularly with regard to the Shari’ah compliancy of sukuk, should make the aims 
and objectives in relation to SSB questionable. In this regard, Interviewee 2 pointed 
out that ‘the aim and purpose of those SSB are still vague and unclear as to whether it 
relates to just the approval of sukuk structures and their consistency with Shari’ah 
principles or the control and continuous scrutiny of the products to verify their 




According to Interviewee 4, some of the banks choose their SSB to approve their 
sukuk for the purpose of business without considering to Shari’ah and legal risks 
which might face sukuk in the future. This is what El-Gamal refers to ‘fatwa shopping 
and Shari’ah arbitrage’. In addition, Interviewee 4 noted that ‘some of the financial 
organisations do not pay much attention to the spirit of Shari’ah and its objectives 
when they invest in sukuk, but rather focus on profit making’. 
In exploring the ‘fictitious rather than the main aim’ of the SSBs, Interviewee 5 stated 
that the main aim of SSB in some of the financial institutions is to attract investors by 
deceptive means to invest in sukuk by labelling them as being Shari’ah compliant. 
Moreover, according to Interviewee 3, the concept and aim of Shari’ah board should 
be made clear through AAOIFI standards and other authentic organisations as well as 
it should be implemented accordingly. 
5.3.5 Questioning the Function of the Shari’ah Boards in Sukuk Issuance 
As regards to the function of the Shari’ah boards, all interviewees have asserted that 
SSB has a major role upon sukuk market. In this regard, Interviewee 1 stressed the 
essential nature of the Shari’ah board in articulating that ‘In Saudi Arabia, most risks 
in relation to sukuk structures in terms of Shari’ah could be due to the failure of SSB 
to undertake their duties featuring review, close examination and control of the 
structures as required from them’. However, Interviewee 4 added that in most cases 
the exact duties of the members of the Shari’ah boards are not clear as those duties 
vary from one bank to another. Interviewee 2 highlighted that in most cases, the only 
duty of the most of the members of SSB is to approve that the structure is Shari’ah 
compliant. 
Interviewee3, on the other hand, suggested that before discussing the duties to be 
undertaken by SSB, one has to make sure that those boards have access to information 
from the relevant financial institution as well as any information associated with the 
sukuk to be examined for approved. In addition, he mentioned that AAOIFI has set 
some of the procedures required to be followed by SSB in relation to the product to be 
approved such as SSB should have access to all documents, records and information 




In this regard, Interviewee 5 pointed out that easy access to the required information 
is a necessary matter for the SSB to issue their judgment on any sukuk as one of the 
Shari’ah rules states that ‘judging on something is part of its conception’. In other 
words, the Shari’ah scholar cannot issue any verdict as to whether a certain product is 
Shari’ah compliant or not before making a clear view of the nature of that product 
from all aspects (Interviewee, 5). Thus, the Interviewee 2 suggested that the member 
of SSB has the right of access to all the relevant documents, and also the SSB 
members should have an excellent communication with all parties associated with the 
product under scrutiny such as accountants, legal experts and others. However, 
Interviewee 4, in a critical manner, stated that the main risks associated with Islamic 
financial products, particularly sukuk is that, the members of SSB have no access to 
all the relevant documents. 
In this regard, Interviewee 3 suggested that SSB should have a duty to review all 
documents in relation to the sukuk in question following any potential modification to 
be made by the SSB. Thus, as identified by the Interviewee 1, the SSB has the duty to 
stop signing any product for approval before closely re-examining the contract after 
the proposed amendment to ensure that the contract is free of errors in violation of 
Shari’ah principles that might cause risks to both the investor and the financial 
organisation that has produced the product as well as the economy of the state in 
general. 
Furthermore, Interviewee 1 mentioned that the members of the SSB should be fully 
aware with the production process and the course of development of the sukuk 
structure featuring the legal, financial and managerial aspects. In substantiating this, 
Interviewee 2 stated that ‘otherwise legal and Shari’ah risks will be faced. For 
instance, in case of disputes or in case the issuer goes bankrupt how the sukuk holders 
going to prove their rights of the assets?  
In terms of consequences of a proper process, Interviewee 5 highlighted that the full 
awareness and understanding of the members of SSB of sukuk structure should favour 




5.3.6 Questioning the Rule of Fatwa 
This section discusses the rule of fatwa in the process of issuing sukuk through the 
analysis of the interviews. 
5.3.6.1 The steps of issuing the judgment on the sukuk structures (fatwa) 
As regards to the steps involved in issuing a fatwa on the sukuk structure, according to 
the Interviewee 1, the approval of sukuk by SSB should feature a number of steps to 
guarantee the validity of the product in terms of Shari’ah principles. However, 
Interviewee 2 stated that many of the prospectuses of sukuk have stopped short of 
explaining the mechanism of approval of sukuk in terms of Shari’ah. As, the 
prospectus only explains that the sukuk structure has been examined by the relevant 
SSB and has been approved in terms of Shari’ah rules without mentioning the steps 
involved in the procedure(Interviewee 2).Therefore, Interviewee 1 asked the 
existential question as to ‘whether the sukuk have been drafted, structured and 
produced in its current form by the SSB or otherwise the role of the SSB is only 
limited to the approval of the sukuk?’, which will remain an important debate in 
Islamic finance industry.  
In providing a sceptical view, Interviewee 4, therefore, argued that ‘the function of 
SSB seems to be only limited to approval the validity of the structure and has 
nothing to do with any details prior to that’. In addition, he stated that it seems that 
the sukuk have been structured without consultation with the SSB, as the role of the 
SSB is relegated to proposing the suitable readjustment of the product for Shari’ah 
compliancy. Furthermore, Interviewee 3 confirmed that in terms of Shari’ah side, 
one of the risks associated with sukuk structure is the fact that ‘the drafting and 
structuring of sukuk is made by individuals who are disqualified in Shari’ah terms, 
whose background is related to traditional products, so that the sukuk comes out 
almost identical to interest-based (riba) sukuk’, as the SSB involves in the very last 
stage of the process. 
For that reason, Interviewee 3 suggested that the banks have a duty to establish a 
special department for Shari’ah-based investigation and scrutiny as those departments 
should include specialists and scholars in the doctrine of fiqh featuring Islamic 




Shari’ah. As identified by the Interviewee 3, those departments should take part in 
‘the drafting of sukuk related contracts as well as other Shari’ah products before the 
sukuk contract is presented to the SSB. The process of sukuk issuance by such a 
department should follow a comprehensive process, which must refer to financial, 
economic and legal underlying elements of sukuk besides the elements of Shari’ah. 
Such a process will ensure that sukuk will be secured from any anti-Shari’ah 
malpractice’. 
Furthermore, Interviewee 2 suggested that there is a need to have specific and clearly 
written steps for the development of the product from its preliminary drafting to the 
end when the sukuk expire, and that those steps need to be approved by recognised 
organisations such as AAOIFI. Moreover, those arrangements should become a 
mandatory practice for Islamic financial institutions including banks in association 
with the offering of sukuk to investors (Interviewee 2).  
5.3.6.2 Shari’ah board in relation to changing their fatwa 
An important issue in the sukuk issuance process is the possibility for the SSB to 
change their fatwa. In exploring thus, Interviewee 1stated that one of the risks 
featuring sukuk in relation to SSB is reconsidering the fatwa issued for the approved 
sukuk by the SSB itself or in the case one or more than one members of the SSB 
changes his mind. In exploring such a matter, Interviewee 3pointed out that changing 
fatwa from the SSB whether one of them or more could be for a number of reasons. 
Most importantly, the member might realise that he was not aware of some facts at the 
time judgment had been made on the product (Interviewee, 3). Thus, Interviewee 5 
suggested that changing fatwa could be made by speeding up the judgment without 
taking sufficient time to examine the structure fully and comprehensively so that the 
members can make their judgment on the sukuk without the risk of making errors. 
However, Interviewee 2 mentioned that the error in fatwa can possibly happen, but it 
is incumbent on the member to issue a written statement explaining the error he has 
committed, and the right formulation of the sukuk that Shari’ah compliant. 
Interviewee2 is of the opinion that the sukuk holder even if he realises that the sukuk 
with which he is involved is not Shari’ah compliant, he can continue to invest in the 
sukuk he hold until the contract expires, as he considers the sukuk valid based on the 




get rid of the sukuk. On the other hand, Interviewee 4 stressed the point that the SSB 
should become aware of its role and live up to its responsibilities, and that any errors 
in its judgment on the product will have adverse impact on the economy in general 
and on the investors on the sukuk in particular. 
5.3.7 Questioning Specific Issues Related to the Shari’ah Board Members 
This section aims to present the analysis through the contribution of the interviewee’s 
arguments and statement in relation to the issues related to SSB members. 
5.3.7.1 Questioning the qualifications and criteria of the SSB members 
Interviewee 3 pointed out that every Islamic institution including banks sets its own 
standards and criteria for choosing its SSB members, and yet those standards and 
criteria are not known to the general public. In addition, Interviewee 3described the 
absence of criteria and standards recognised by supreme Islamic organisations as 
being unfortunate. Interviewee 1 also referred to the fact that members of the SSB in 
banks who approve sukuk structures need to be retrained to be qualified to face the 
new structures designed from those who came from conventional side. In this regard 
Interviewee 4suggested that 
The member of the SSB should not be understood as a mere sheikh 
according to his Shari’ah background (in the sales background), but rather 
as an expert in Islamic banking and finance. Nonetheless, such expert 
should have the knowledge of Shari’ah in relation to the rules of buying 
and selling, and also in economics and finances, besides successfully 
attending training sessions in the basic principles of accounting, finances 
and law.  
In further exploring, Interviewee 4 added that it is not a difficult task to recruit such 
type of people to become members of the boards, as they could be considered more 
of an expertise in IBF rather than Shari’ah scholars. This view point is supported by 
Interviewee 1 who suggested that a distinction should be made between a fatwa in 
which the error is confined to the person who asked the question and the approval of 
an Islamic product in which case any error of judgment in Shari’ah terms could have 
damaging consequences on the state of economy in general and the reputation of IBF 
as well. This point of view is further explained by the Interviewee 1, who asserted 
that in many occasions the fatwa is only related to the question of the person seeking 




Shari’ah principles implies that the member of the board should be knowledgeable in 
many fields, such as finance, economics, accounting, and law to be able to provide 
an effective and efficient opinion, otherwise that could negatively affect his 
judgment on the product. 
On the other hand, Interviewee 1stated that some famous Shari’ah scholars in the 
IBF sector of the Saudi Arabia sit on the SSB of more than one bank. That should 
indicate a shortage in expertise with regard to IBF, or otherwise the standards set by 
the various banks are so difficult that only a few persons can be qualified to become 
members of SSB. In this respect, Interviewee 4noted that ‘banks always look for 
famous sheikh no matter the level of their knowledge of Shari’ah, while others look 
for sheikh with moderate rather than conservative attitudes regarding their fatwa 
related to financial matters’. 
Interviewee 2, therefore, critically noted that most of the Islamic products in Saudi 
Arabia carry the signature of certain sheikhs, and the main reason for this is not the 
shortage of expertise in the field of IBF, but rather due to the fact that the relevant 
banks prefer not to employ other sheikhs who might not comply with the policies of 
the bank with regard to the promotion of its products such as sukuk. 
In providing a critical and macro perspectives, Interviewee 5 noted that  CMA which 
is designated for the organisation of the Saudi market has not set any standards or 
criteria in relation to the qualifications expected of the SSB members, leaving the 
whole matter to the bank administration to nominate and select the members. 
5.3.7.2 Questioning the relationship between the SSB and other related authority 
According to Interviewee 1, the main duty of SSB is to verify the product as being 
Shari’ah complaint and with these boards functioning in a proper manner, the rights 
of sukuk holders will be secured.Interviewee4pointed out that the main risk involving 
sukuk is that 
The judges of the Shari’ah courts as well as the committee members who are 
responsible for the financial securities problems in Saudi financial market 
have no commitment to take into account the fatwa approved from SSB even 




Interviewee4 further explained such a risk by stating that in case of any problem, the 
sukuk holders will eventually be referred to either Shari’ah courts or committees who 
are responsible for the financial securities problems to get their rights, but the judges 
might nullify the sukuk contract due to some inconsistencies with Shari’ah principles 
without recognising the signatures of the SSB that has approved that particular sukuk.  
In further reflecting on the rationale for the SSB, Interviewee 3 questioned the 
wisdom of establishing SSB in banks while the judgments they issue are not 
recognised by Shari’ah courts as well as CMA. Therefore, Interviewee 5 shifted the 
debate to the importance of central Shari’ah board as a government body. The main 
duty of the central boards is the approval of sukuk issued by banks, and that decision 
made by those boards should be taken into account by all parties involved, so that in 
case of any dispute, the judges of the court of law have to nullify the sukuk contract 
due to some inconsistencies with Shari’ah, as long as that sukuk has been approved by 
the central board. As identified by the Interviewee 5, such an arrangement will secure 
the rights of sukuk holders on the assets that belong to them, which favours stability of 
the Islamic financial markets. 
5.3.7.3 Questioning the application of AAOIFI standards by the SSBs 
Since AAOIFI is established to provide standards for the IF industry, it is expected 
that Islamic banks and financial institutions should also consider such standards in 
relation to sukuk issuances. Interviewee 2, therefore, noted that AAOIFI has issued 
specific standards featuring Shari’ah contracts to be as a guideline for SSB. He also 
stated that ‘those standards represent a step forward to keep the sukuk contracts within 
the framework of Shari’ah as not to resemble interest-based (riba-based) bonds’.  
In the respect, Interviewee3 stated that availability of standards such as those of 
AAOIFI should be considered a pioneer step in the field of Islamic financing, and yet 
those standards will not worthwhile and will be ineffective unless their 
implementation is made mandatory by the SSBs upon their drafting of sukuk 
structures.  
In providing a critical perspective, Interviewee 1 pointed out that among the reasons 
that make some of the members of the SSBs become adamant to implement AAOIFI 




specific standards closes the door of interpretation(ijtihad) in relation to fiqh and the 
commitment to specific standards also make the ijtihad of the members meaningless 
as long as they rely on prejudged opinions in the form of standards, and that his only 
role becomes focused on linking the already made judgment with the case in point.  
In considering potential solutions, Interviewee5 mentioned that currently, many 
people in Saudi Arabia can for implementation of a measure known as ‘the 
legalisation of Shari’ah-based judgments’. Such legalisation has the following 
advantages according to Interviewee5; first, it provides a reference for all staff 
featuring IBF not to mention investors with no Shari’ah background in relation to 
such products particularly new one such as sukuk. Secondly, Shari’ah-based 
judgments in that law will be accurate and more detailed as to become more 
worthwhile than AAOIFI standards as it seems to be generalised needing more 
detailed explanation as well as redrafting as to become clear. Thirdly, among the 
benefits of legalising Shari’ah-based judgments involving financial transactions 
according to Interviewee 5 is that such law will minimise the disagreement between 
Shari’ah scholars with regard to fatwa involving financial transactions. Furthermore, 
he stated that such law tends to have positive impact as to protect the rights of sukuk 
holders from being squandered.     
5.3.7.4 Questioning the accountability of the SSB members 
Since the Islamic financial markets and operations have been expanding in Saudi 
Arabia, Interviewee 5 pointed out that ‘the scholars who show interest in issues 
related to Islamic financing have recently become in high demand’. However, as 
discussed above, their qualifications are an issue which may lead to reputation and 
Shari’ah risks. All Interviewees, therefore, have asserted that the fatawa issued by 
any SSB need to be carefully thought to avoid any potential risk associated with the 
methods of Islamic financing. This implies that with the increased demand for and 
available opportunities for new Shari’ah scholars, not well educated and trained 
individual scholars joining the ranks may cause for the emergence of certain risks. 
Interviewee 2 stated, therefore, that the high demand could be linked to the general 
tendency of investors to set a condition that there should be a Shari’ah board. For that 
reason, many Islamic banks and other financial institutions have managed to establish 




the necessary cover in terms of Shari’ah tinge (Interviewee, 2).In substantiating this, 
Interviewee 3 mentioned that: 
The increasing demand for scholars has negative impact on the quality of 
the SSB as the Islamic banks and institutions have recruited individuals 
who are not knowledgeable enough in Shari’ah terms to deal with and 
approve new products, and in the meantime that has put more pressure on 
the scholars with good reputation in the area of IBF. 
In further exploring the risks related to sukuk and sukuk issuance, Interviewee 5 noted 
that the risks involved in structuring sukuk could be the existence of two types of 
Shari’ah scholars. The first type features those who have good reputation in terms of 
their knowledge of Shari’ah, however, the fact that those scholars are members of 
many Shari’ah boards has weakened their performance making the fatawa they make 
unreliable. The main problem is that those scholars are very busy so that they have no 
time to understand thoroughly the new products, which will eventually make them 
issue the wrong fatwa on those products. In further explaining, Interviewee 5 also 
refer to the another group of scholars who join the Shari’ah boards without having the 
necessary knowledge of Shari’ah. Their presence, Interviewee 5 argued that paves the 
way to the emergence of Shari’ah risks also, as their only legitimacy comes from the 
fact that they become a SSB member, which somehow qualifies them to examine 
Islamic financing products particularly the new products such as sukuk. This is 
considered as an essential risk and challenge in front of Islamic finance sector. 
In an attempt to find a solution, Interviewee1 suggested that ‘those risks could be 
avoided by inventing a system that would call the members of the SSB to account for 
the errors in relation to the fatawa and decisions they make’.  Nonetheless, that 
suggestion is opposed by Interviewee3 who noted that those fatawa are the product of 
personal efforts made by the members through ijtihad in which case errors should not 
be punishable as indicated by the principle of Shari’ah law. On the other hand, 
Interviewee 2 pointed out that “it is necessary that standards and specifications to be 
set for the selection of those who have the right of judgment and approval of sukuk 
structures prior to calling the members of Shari’ah boards to account for the errors 
they make”. On the other hand, Interviewee 4suggested that it is necessary to create 




financing”, in which case those who SSB without being licensed should call to 
account. 
In relation to the Saudi market, according to Interviewee1, the problem with Saudi 
Arabian market is that “no system is available for controlling and organising fatwa 
including the judgment of a product as to their Islamic orientation, as well as those 
who have the right of making such judgment”. He also stated that the SSBs to a great 
extent have been practicing fatwa in a manner that has been and still being practiced 
in Saudi Arabia. That practice features contacting the scholar in person and asking 
him direct questions to which he would provide answers on the spot without closely 
scrutinising the question from all aspects particularly question that need one to be 
careful and patient. Interviewee 1, therefore, in supporting his argument continued to 
explaining as what has been happening with the fatwa practice in Islamic banks by 
stating that “as the product is presented to the SSB, which judges the product based on 
the description provided to them rather than on scientific facts based on examination 
and analysis with the due patience and care rather than giving a hurried judgment”. 
Therefore, Interviewee4 stated that those who issue fatwa need to be well informed in 
Shari’ah matters. For instance, there must be individuals who are specialised in 
family affairs, and others in criminal affairs such as murder, theft etc. and some need 
to be specialised in matters associated with sukuk as such specialisation tends to 
enhance the position of those who make fatwa in terms of scientific knowledge 
(Interviewee, 4). Moreover, Interviewee 2 supported this suggestion by stating that 
specialisation will make it easy for the authorities to follow up their activities of the 
boards and call them to account for any potential errors. 
5.3.7.5 Exploring the source of authority to call SSB for the accountability 
Since there is a general consensus that SSB should be accountable, it is important to 
explore the source of such an authority to be charged with a function for SSB’s 
accountability. For this, most of the interviewees agreed that “it should be a proper 
law and system for arranging the judgments and fatwas in relation to issues associated 
with Islamic finance.  
This agreement should raise the question: as to who is authorised to enforce such law 
so that members of SSB who do not follow the law should call to account? In this 




control such matters unlike the case with Malaysia for instance. On the other hand, 
Interviewee 5 believed that such role should be undertaken by CMA, which is the 
legal authority for organising the financial market. Interviewee 5 also noted that the 
CMA has given up its role with regard to controlling the integrity of Islamic products 
including sukuk in terms of Shari’ah. He also stated that CMA has given up this 
sensitive role leaving it for Islamic banks and other Islamic financial organisations 
without any central regulative authority.  
 Interviewee 4 has also essentialised the importance of a supreme central authority to 
control fatwa featuring issues in relation to Islamic financing, given the great 
intention of both Islamic and commercial banks to do business involving Islamic 
financial methods.  
In addition, Interviewee5 suggested that the benefit of such independent central 
authority is that it makes members of SSB in banks and financial organisations feel 
that they are accountable for their failures regarding the implementation of the 
necessary procedures as well as their judgment on any product in terms of their 
Shari’ah compliancy. Consequently, as Interviewee 5 argued that will make them put 
the necessary efforts to study the product in question thoroughly before issuing their 
final verdict. Interviewee3also suggested that 
Members of SSB should morally call to account including suspension of their 
activities in relation to issues associated with Islamic financing provided they 
have proved to fail to abide with the guidelines in relation to the fatwa and 
judgment of the product as to its consistency with Shari’ah principles. 
Alternatively, the members of SSB should also financially call to account for 
their errors by paying fines.  
5.4 THE FUNCTION OF THE SBSS REGARDING SABIC SUKUK: INTERVIEW 
DATA ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SBSS MEMBERS 
In an attempt to provide a critical understanding of the identified issues in SABIC 
sukuk, it is essential to discuss the primary data collected through interview survey 
from the field with SBSS. In this regard, the following sections present the analysis of 
interview responses from the members of the SBSS with regard to their own function 




5.4.1 Examining the Role SBSS Played in the Process of Drafting the Structure 
of SABIC Sukuk 
This section aims to present the answers gathered from the interview question which 
aimed at examining the role of SBSS in the issuance of SABIC sukuk. In this analysis, 
whether the SBSS has been the real player behind the structuring of sukuk or 
otherwise its role has been confined only to the process of reviewing and approval of 
sukuk is also examined. 
In elaborating these issues, all members of SBSS have responded by saying that as far 
as SABIC sukuk is concerned the role of SBSS has been limited only to the process of 
reviewing and approval of sukuk structure without being involved in any way in the 
process of drafting the structure of sukuk or otherwise being engaged in any other 
arrangements that precede the drafting of sukuk. In this regard, two of the members of 
the SBSS pointed out that the structures of sukuk presented to the SBSS would 
usually need full restructuring due to inconsistency with Shari’ah principles in terms 
of similarity with riba-based bonds. Moreover, the first members of the SBSS added 
that the first issue of SABIC sukuk presented to the SBSS had greatly resembled the 
traditional bonds in structure in terms of the guarantee of the capital and profits, and 
that real and legal transformation of assets from the sukuk issuer to the sukuk holders 
in terms of Shari’ah did not exist. In addition, he said that the SBSS normally identify 
its comments pointing out the real problems from Shari’ah perspective after close 
examination of the sukuk. The sukuk was then referred back to the sukuk issuer who 
drafted the structure in response to the comments by making the necessary 
amendments in accordance with Shari’ah principles as it has been indicated by one of 
the members. 
From response of the SBSS, the following conclusions can be drawn through 
interpretative discussion; 
(i) It is clear that SABIC sukuk has been approved by SSB. Accordingly, the sukuk 
was allowed to circulate in the Saudi exchange market; 
(ii) In addition, from the above it is obvious that as far as SABIC sukuk is concerned 




terms of consistency with Shari’ah principles or otherwise referring it back to the 
sukuk issuer to be amended in accordance with the comments to be made by the SSB; 
(iii)It is important to observe that the SBSS did not make any contribution to the 
drafting of SABIC sukuk, and has never made any preliminary arrangements 
involving other committees, legal persons or accountants, and yet SABIC sukuk 
structure was presented to SBSS by persons from outside the SBSS implying that the 
structure has not been the work or invention of the SBSS; 
(iv) The forgoing account by the SBSS demonstrates that there is no clear method for 
the SBSS to work with, as the SBSS member interviewed failed to explain a specific 
approach and whether a specific method for action has been available to them to 
undertake their duties as SBSS. In other words, the analysis indicates that SSBs are 
not requested by the relevant bank or financial organisation to stick to a clear method 
and mechanism in their examination of Islamic financing products nor do they have a 
particular mechanism or structure to reach a verdict regarding the Shari’ah 
compliancy of Islamic financing contracts in the case with sukuk, which could make 
them avoiding the potential Shari’ah risks that could definitely have negative impact 
on the sukuk product such as SABIC sukuk in particular and the Islamic financing 
industry in general. It seems that this was the case with the SSB dealt with the SABIC 
structure, as arbitrariness seems to be the method of process and procedures. This 
should be considered as a source of worry in terms of working mechanism and 
decision making process of the SSBs,  
(v)  It has also become clear from the above that SABIC sukuk structure in its initial 
form had been inconsistent with the principles of Shari’ah as it has strongly 
resembled riba-based bonds in terms of the guarantee of the capital, returns, and the 
fact that there was no envisaging of real transfer of assets from the sukuk issuer to the 
sukuk holders. However, having said that by pointing out those inconsistencies, the 
SBSS has managed to modify the structure to match Shari’ah standards before 




5.4.2 Exploring the SSB’s Role and Function in Examining the Relevant 
Documents  
This section examines the responses provided by the SBSS’ members as to whether 
they reviewed all the relevant documents in relation to SABIC sukuk issuance, which 
should include commitment of purchase, sukuk ownership transfer agreement, and 
sukuk assets management agreement among others. 
The first member of the SBSS responded to this by stating that the SBSS had been 
aware of all the documents in relation to SABIC sukuk, which they had reviewed. In 
the meantime, the second member of the SBSS pointed out that the SBSS reviewed all 
the documents featuring SABIC sukuk, and yet the SBSS does not need to review 
some of the documents even though those documents have some implications for the 
SABIC sukuk, as he stated that the sukuk issuance features in documents totals to 500 
page, written in the English language and that most of the information is irrelevant 
and has nothing to do with Shari’ah but rather involved financial and legal matters 
available for everyone. In addition, according to the third member of the SBSS, he 
noted that some experts in Shari’ah and other legal matters were presented with all 
the documents featuring SABIC sukuk. Eventually, after examining and reviewing the 
documents from those experts, the sukuk structure had been presented to SBSS and 
was explained for approval according to the third member of SBSS.  
Based on the above stated account on the process of reviewing documentation related 
to SABIC sukuk, the following conclusion can be derived as findings through 
interpretative method: 
(i) Two members of SBSS reviewed the relevant documents prior to their 
examination of the structure of SABIC sukuk whereas the third one did not; 
(ii)  The SBSS members failed to point out the exact documents that they reviewed; 
It should be noted that the responses of the SBSS shows some variations. For 
instance, one of the members mentioned that the board had been aware of all 
documents featuring SABIC sukuk, while another member had pointed out that there 
is no need for reviewing all the documents involving legal and financial matters, and 




directly related to sukuk from Shari’ah perspective. In the meantime, a third member 
mentioned that all the documents were presented to experts in Shari’ah and legal 
matters in the first stage, and then they presented their decisions to the SBSS for 
approval, which could be through verbal explanation without the need for 
examination of the documents. 
As can be seen, the role and function of SBSS in actual application is not necessarily 
close to the aspirational expectation of effectiveness in full procedural process even in 
document review. 
5.4.3 Examining Pursuance of AAOIFI Standards by the SABIC Sukuk SSB 
According to the first member of the SBSS, the board takes AAOIFI standards into 
account and benefits from it, which was the case with the SABIC sukuk. However, as 
articulated by the first member the SBSS has no commitment towards AAOIFI 
standards. The second member of the board maintained that Shari’ah boards allegedly 
state that they are committed to the AAOIFI standards, while he also stated that for 
them as a SBSS, they observe some of the standards and ignore others and make their 
own efforts in the form of ijtihad to avoid risks. However, the third member argued 
that commitment towards AAOIFI standards has always been there and that the SBSS 
is also members of the organisation that has approved the AAOIFI standards. 
According to the answers given by the SBSS members in relation to the AAOIFI 
standards, the following points are concluded: 
(i) The members of SBSS are also members of AAOIFI and all of them have taken 
part in the approval of those standards; 
(ii) The analysis can identify a variation in the opinions among the members of SBSS 
with regard to the commitment to AAOIFI standards: two of the members of the 
SBSS believe that the board takes the standards into account without committing 
themselves to those standards, nonetheless, the board makes its own ijtihad in some 
cases; while the third member of the board stated that the members of the SBSS show 
commitment to the standards; 
(iii) The members of the SBSS interviewed could not explain as to which standards 




some reservation about them or the cases associated with Islamic financing and they 
have made efforts counter to AAOIFI standards as they stopped short of explaining 
that. 
The analysis shows that despite the fact that AAOIFI is an internationally recognised 
body aiming to establish standards for Islamic financing in general and sukuk in 
particular, there is not much recognition among the Shari’ah scholars in everyday 
practice of Islamic finance. 
5.4.4 Examining SSB’s Post-Sukuk Issuance Roles and Functions 
This section aims to examine the responses provided by the SBSS as to whether they 
undertake the post-sukuk issuance task of following up and controlling SABIC sukuk 
as required by AAOIFI Standards. 
In responding, the first member of the SBSS responded by arguing that SBSS uses 
formal committees for control and supervision, and those committees compile reports 
on banking activities, including sukuk. However, according to the second member of 
the board, the SBSS does not undertake the task of control, supervision and follow up, 
adding that a condition set by Shari’ah boards of late calling for the task of follow up, 
supervision and follow up to be assigned to a separate board or otherwise to the same 
board that has approved the sukuk, but having said that currently as it is happening 
now a legal advisor has to be appointed to undertake the task of supervision and 
control of the activities associated with sukuk which has yet to happen in case of 
SABIC sukuk. As for the third board member, he denied any activities of the SBSS 
associated with supervision and control after the signing of the prospectus. 
Taking the responses of the members of the SBSS into account in relation to this 
particular thematic issue, the following conclusions can be drawn; 
(i) The SBSS has nothing to do with task of supervision and control of sukuk once 
those sukuk are presented to investors until the time of maturity; 
(ii)  The role and task of the SBSS was terminated at the endorsement of the issuance 




(iii)  The activities of the SBSS is not shaped or restricted by the AAOIFI standards 
that stipulate that Shari’ah board has to undertake the task of supervision and control 
of sukuk after they are issued; 
(iv)  The responses of the SBSS have varied so that one of them mentioned that the 
SBSS formed committees to undertake the task of supervision and control, while the 
other members denied any activities of the SBSS and others associated with 
supervision and control. 
Despite the fact that the members of SBSS who make it clear that sukuk structure 
need follow up and control from the date of issuance to the maturity date. However, a 
variation of opinion exists between the members of SBSS regarding SABIC sukuk 
whether there is a real supervision and following up after the approving the issuance 
or not. That should indicate that the absence of a general understanding of the duties 
of Shari’ah boards might cause many risks particularly with sukuk product which as it 
has been already mentioned sukuk need more examining and observing.  
5.4.5 Exploring Potential Problems in the Application of AAOIFI Standards in 
SABIC Sukuk 
This sections aims at questioning as to whether some barriers and problems exist in 
the application of AAOIFI standards to SABIC sukuk. 
In exploring the problems and barriers in the application of AAOIFI standards in the 
issuance of SABIC sukuk, the second member of SBSS responded by conceding that 
some barriers exist featuring SABIC sukuk and the Saudi market in general. This is 
for the simple reason that like any other Islamic banking product the process of 
issuance of SABIC sukuk had to rely on Shari’ah standards besides the financial 
standards. In this regard, the product could be described as excellent from Shari’ah 
perspective, and yet could be inapplicable from a financial and banking perspective. 
This is where problems start to materialise and application becomes difficult. In this 
respect, the third member of the SBSS responded by denying any existence of barriers 
or problems featuring the application of AAOIFI standards to SABIC sukuk. 
According to the answers given by the members of the SBSS involved in the SABIC 




(i) Disagreement exists among the members of the SBSS regarding the existence 
of barriers in relation to the application of AAOIFI standards to SABIC sukuk; 
(ii) The members of SBSS failed to explain the reasons that stopped them short of 
application of AAOIFI standards to SABIC sukuk. 
  
Despite the fact that specific standards exist featuring sukuk such as AAOIFI 
standards, which have been approved and recognised by many SSBs, such as the 
members of SBSS. However, the difficulty of practical application remains the main 
problem. The difficulty of application could be due to the fact that those standards are 
enigmatic and seem to be generalised or otherwise the application of those standards 
might make the product become unpopular among investors. Thus, there must be 
comprehensive and detailed standards to accommodate all structures known to all 
members of SSB’s and in the meantime satisfy the requirements of investors in sukuk. 
5.4.6 Exploring the Process of Decision Making Process within the SSB 
Approved the SABIC Sukuk 
This section aims to examine the responses given by the members of the SBSS in 
relation to the decision making process within the SBSS and whether they followed 
an unanimous vote or simple majority. As the responses given by all the members of 
the SBSS interviewed indicate that normally in any structure the decision making 
process was based on simple majority. 
According to the responses of the members of the SBSS the following conclusion can 
be drawn; 
(i) SABIC sukuk was initially presented to the Shari’ah board featuring three 
members; 
(ii) The members did not indicate any differences among them with regard to the 
process of structuring SABIC sukuk or otherwise showing any objection to one of the 
articles featuring the prospectus of issuance in its final form. Consequently, all the 
members signed the prospectus of issuance indicating their approval that they have no 




5.4.7 Sukuk Issuance and Common Shari’ah Standards 
This section aims at exploring as to whether the sukuk issuance should be subject to 
common Shari’ah standards as the case with the AAOIFI standards. All members of 
the SBSS responded to this question by stating that they agree to that arrangement, 
and two of them mentioned that they have also been members of the AAOIFI. Thus, it 
can be stated through the responses of the members of the SBSS that they are in 
agreement with the AAOIFI standards to be taken as a guideline by the SSBs, as none 
of the SBSS members interviewed has shown any discontent with those standards. 
5.5 An Interpretative Discussion on the Established Findings  
The discussion presented so far aimed at exploring SSB related issues in the case of 
the SABIC sukuk in particular (but also in general relating to the IF industry) through 
the perceptions and understandings of various stake holders. In an attempt to provide 
further critical understanding of the identified issues related to the SSB in this section, 
it is essential to discuss the findings so far established through analysing the primary 
data collected through interview survey from the field with experts such as Shari’ah 
judges, SBSS members, and academic staff or researchers who are interested in IBF 
and sukuk. In subjecting the findings to further analysis, the recommendations issued 
by the AAOIFI with regard to issuing sukuk, the AAOIFI standards for investment 
sukuk and the literature review will be all considered during the discussion and 
evaluation below. 
5.5.1 Reflecting on the Importance of the SSB 
As it has been highlighted that AAOIFI asserted the importance of having SSB in any 
Islamic banks and financial institutions. In this regard, many of those who were 
interviewed have maintained that the existence of SSB is essential as it tends to avoid 
many potential risks associated with Islamic financial transactions particularly sukuk 
business as it constitute a newly invented product which has yet to be tested in terms 
of the Shari’ah and legal risks involved particularly in Saudi markets. 
In reflecting on the SABIC sukuk, it can be argued by many of the interviewees that 
what is the wisdom behind the importance of the existence of SSB and endorsed the 
prospectus of issuance, while many inconsistencies in terms of Shari’ah exist in many 




structure. Therefore, Shari’ah compliancy related inconsistencies exposed SABIC 
sukuk to many Shari’ah and legal risks putting probably the blame on the SSB which 
has a duty of securing the sukuk against any risks that involve the breach of the 
Shari’ah. For that reason, one of those who were interviewed indicated that the risk 
involving SABIC sukuk is the existence of SSB itself that has not been living up to its 
duties as it has to do.  
On the other hand, according to one of the interviewees, the Shari’ah supervisory 
cannot be judged on their performance unless there is a clarity on what their job 
should be, whether it is sharing with people involved in the drafting of the sukuk from 
the beginning until the sukuk maturity with fully monitoring and supervision nor is it 
that the duty of SSB is only to approve the structure of sukuk without looking at any 
details or related documents or any type of supervision or following. In this regard, it 
should be mentioned that the aims and objectives of the existence of SSB within 
Islamic financial and capital markets especially with sukuk markets have been 
highlighted and explored during the literature review as well as according to the 
answers and comments made by the interviewees whether SBSS or others. Therefore, 
the advantages of having SSB can be surmised as follows: 
(i) ensuring that all transactions should be based on Shari’ah standards; 
(ii) playing an essential role for the development of the Islamic institutions in terms of 
products consistent with Shari’ah principles by responding to the demands of 
investors; 
(iii) encouraging people to put and invest their money in the bank who has SSB; 
(iv) ensuring that those organisations would not become involved in unlawful 
transactions such as the guarantee of the capital and returns in sukuk structures; 
(v) it promote trust and reassurance among investors 
(vi) avoiding the loss of the capital as the losing of the capital as result of involving in 
business that does not comply with Shari’ah principles; 
(vii) avoiding to involve in riba and gharar transactions; 




(ix) giving advice to people who are involved in sukuk design so as to distinguish 
between which sukuk structures are allowed and which are forbidden 
(x) raising people’s awareness of the main problems and risks regarding the 
application of the Islamic financial products such as sukuk; 
(xi) ensuring financial engineering and development of products be Shari’ah 
compliant in developing products in response to the needs of the society; 
(xii) educating and training of staff and exchange of knowledge and experiences; 
(xiii) ensuring the achievement of Shari’ah objectives (maqased al-Shari’ah). 
From the above analysis, it becomes clear that having SSB’s is an important but in the 
same time a perfect mechanism that guide the work of SSB’s in order to achieve the 
goal of its establishment is crucial. Therefore, it could be argued that Islamic 
institutions have failed regarding issuing binding and a comprehensive standard for 
SSB’s to be followed as well as clear methods to be implemented.  
5.5.2 The Failure of Shari’ah Board to Undertake its Critical role 
According to the AAOIFI (2010) the SSB must have the authority to supervise and 
control of the contract and structures following their approval by those boards. The 
real duty of the SSB was explained by one of the interviewees by stating that 
the SSB has a duty to follow up, control and supervise the sukuk from the 
time it has been approved by Shari’ah board to the time of maturation or 
clearance as to make sure that the sukuk progresses in accordance with 
Shari’ah principles and that no violations of Shari’ah principles have been 
committed that could transform them from Islamic sukuk to riba-based 
bond. 
Despite such a comprehensive role assigned for the SSB, in the case of SABIC sukuk, 
however, it could be argued that the SBSS failed to provide a comprehensive 
supervision from the time of structuring and follow up. In this regard, one of the 
members of the SBSS pointed out that the structure of SABIC sukuk was designed 
and examined by Shari’ah experts before being presented to the SBSS as the duty of 
the SBSS is just to look at the structure and approve it after introducing some 





On the other hand, one of the members of the SBSS indicated that some committees 
emerging from SBSS undertake the task of control and supervision. Nonetheless, this 
matter was denied by the other two members of the SBSS, and that no reference exists 
to such committees in the prospectus of SABIC sukuk. However, the question that has 
been raised by many of those who were interviewed who are not among the SBSS 
with regard to SABIC sukuk related to who is the party who undertakes the task of 
following up and monitoring the SABIC sukuk process. That should imply that failure 
of the SBSS to undertake the task of following up, supervision and control will place 
SABIC sukuk at further risk with regard to Shari’ah noncompliance risks. 
However, while one of the SBSS member is of the opinion that it is needles for the 
SSB to take part in structuring the sukuk as those who undertake that job have a good 
knowledge of Shari’ah besides wide experience in those matters; therefore, there is no 
need for Shari’ah boards to involve in such work. He therefore argued that, the board 
needs to focus only on reviewing sukuk structuring by making comments and that 
should end its task. However, that viewpoint can be rebutted by the argument that 
should those involved in the process of sukuk structuring by Shari’ah experts then the 
faulty sukuk would not have been presented to the board showing great resemblance 
to riba-based bonds as could be understood from the responses of two of the board 
members as presented above. On the other hand, another member pointed out that the 
duty of the board should not be confined only to the approval and endorsement of 
products, but rather should undertake the task of following up and control, and that 
has not been happening in the case of SABIC sukuk. In this respect, the AAOIFI has 
made attempts to extend the general concept of SSB suggesting that the SSB should 
incorporate expertise from all fields particularly economists, legal experts as well as 
experts in financial matters to assist the members of the board undertake their duties 
(AAOIFI, 2010).In addition, many of those who were interviewed have pointed out 
that the main problem and risk lies with the difference in opinion and fatwa among 
the members of the board regarding the definition of task to be undertaken by the 
Shari’ah board members. In this regard, SABIC sukuk is the case in point where 
opinion has varied regarding the exact task to be undertaken by the members as it has 
been asserted by the SSB. Therefore, it could be argued that the SBSS has failed to 
undertake the real task whether participating in structuring the models of the new and 




the summary of the prospectus of SABIC sukuk is considered one of the main risks 
that should be avoided. 
As can be seen, Shari’ah scholars involved in SSB in ensuring Shari’ah compliancy 
of Islamic financial transactions, including SABIC sukuk mainly argue for passing 
their responsibility to other departments and individuals in banks and financial 
institutions by limiting their perceived task. By doing so, they accept the hegemony of 
the capitalist instinct over the essentialisation of Islamic moral expectations. This 
attitude will expose Islamic financial and banking transaction to Shari’ah non-
compliancy risk and will further liberalise the Islamic banking and financial attitude 
by embedding it into capitalist forms of economy. 
5.5.3 Failure of the SSB to Take Part in Designing the Sukuk Structure 
Among the risks which SABIC sukuk have been exposed is that the SSB has failed to 
take part in designing sukuk structure as has been indicated by the members of the 
SBSS, which is discussed above. Consequently, those who have designed SABIC 
sukuk structure seem to be less knowledge in terms of Shari’ah therefore the SBSS 
discovered that the SABIC structure has been exactly similar to the structure of riba-
based bonds as has been indicated by one of the members of SBSS. As a consequent, 
the failure of the SBSS to take part in the original design will expose SABIC sukuk to 
many risks such as overlooking some of Shari’ah inconsistencies that cannot be easily 
discovered without close investigation through taking real part in the design. That has 
really been highlighted by the confession of the one of SBSS members after the 
prospectus of SABIC sukuk was presented to him and after the deep discussion he 
held over SABIC sukuk on the ground that it contained some Shari’ah inconsistencies 
that were missed by the SBSS. Thus, it becomes a duty that the members of the SBSS 
should make a real contribution in the design of the financial structure, in the case the 
SABIC sukuk and should be aware of all stages of sukuk including the real risks in 
Shari’ah, legal and financial terms to which sukuk might be exposed and ways of 
avoiding those risks through Shari’ah means. 
In other words, by undertaking their real role the SSB’s will become effective in 
relation to developing the financial industry through new financial products that 




5.5.4 Disqualifying the People who Proposed Structuring SABIC Sukuk 
It could be argued that one of risk is the trust of the SBSS given to people who seem 
to be not qualified to structure SABIC sukuk as well as to review Shari’ah-based 
comments. 
In this regard, it should be mentioned that the SBSS has relied on SABB Amanah 
bank to structure the SABIC sukuk before being presented to the SBSS. This process 
poses a risk as most of the bank staff might came from backgrounds featuring 
conventional banking expertise involving riba-based practices as it has been 
mentioned by one of the interviewee. For that reason, it should be noted that most of 
the financial products and structures they manage to draft mimic and resemble riba-
based contracts and structures as that is for the simple reason that they have poor 
knowledge of Shari’ah. This explains as to what happened in the case of SABIC 
sukuk as it has been pointed out by one of the members of SBSS when he asserted that 
SABIC sukuk structure was initially presented to the SBSS as the same structure as 
bond structure with no difference. 
In addition, it is assumed that the SBSS has undertaken its designated role involving 
the examination of the SABIC structure sukuk, and that the SBSS pinpointed some of 
problems associated with the structure in terms of Shari’ah. Furthermore, according 
to one of the SBSS, those comments were referred back to the relevant authorities to 
take them in consideration based on Shari’ah standards. However, as yet those non-
Shari’ah compliancy issues are still exist featuring all issuances of SABIC sukuk, 
namely the first, the second and the third issuance indicating lack of follow up from 
the SBSS with regard to comments they make as has been pointed out by one of the 
interviewees who argued that the task of Shari’ah board end with referring back its 
comments to the issuer of sukuk, and yet the sukuk structure could be approved 
without the need to confirm that inconsistencies with Shari’ah compliancy are 
removed. 
It should be noted that as indicated by respondents in the interview process, some of 
the comments made by Shari’ah board were ignored by the issuer of SABIC sukuk. 
According to one of the SBSS member when the SABIC sukuk’s prospectus presented 




contents as it features inconsistencies with Shari’ah principles. That clearly indicates 
the lack of follow up by the SBSS to the comments it makes in improving the 
Shari’ah compliancy of the SABIC sukuk which might be a source of risk to SABIC 
sukuk. 
5.5.5 The Dependence of the SBSS  
An efficient corporate and good governance indicates that the members of the SBSS 
should be fully independent of the institution they are working for to avoid any 
conflict of interest in views between them and the bank or company that has issued 
the sukuk as it has been suggested by the AAOIFI (2010) as well as the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy decision No 177(3/19). However, the members of the SBSS are dependent 
on the SAAB bank as they work for it as Shari’ah consultants which might lead to the 
risk as it has been indicated by some of those who have been interviewed. Thus, the 
independence of the members of SBSS from sukuk issuers will promote assurance 
among investors whether that being with SABIC sukuk or other products in relation to 
Islamic financing. 
5.5.6 The Members of SBSS Having Various Other Tasks and Jobs 
It should be mentioned that one of those who were interviewed mentioned that many 
of the Shari’ah scholars who are well informed in matters concerning Islamic 
financing have to face a major problem due to the fact that they take part as members 
of many international and local Shari’ah committees. This might lead them to not 
have the time to provide proper fatwa, follow up and control of sukuk they have 
approved. That seems to be the case with the SABIC sukuk as the members of the 
board have been members of other boards of banks in Saudi Arabia as well as other 
countries as it has been indicated in table 5.1. 
Table  5.1: Matching Between the Members of SBSS and the Numbers of Institutions they Work for 
Members of SBSS 
The number of 
institutions they work for 
The number of sukuk 
they approved 
1 41 91 
2 81 222 
3 17 66 





In addition, they are being engaged in activities associated with the government as 
well as other charity organisations. Therefore, it could be difficult for them to find 
enough time to examine and study the SABIC sukuk structure with all the relevant 
documents and aspects as well as to undertake the task of a full supervision and 
control following the approval of SABIC sukuk. Consequently, those boards have 
entrusted the bank with the task of control and supervision or to the party that has 
issued the sukuk without any follow up from them which constitutes a risk given that 
the bank or company can be only concerned about maintaining their profits, the value 
of sukuk and the reputation of organisation no matter the sukuk being consistent with 
Shari’ah principles or not. 
In this regard, many of those who have been interviewed have suggested that 
members of the boards should have had the maximum time allowed to take part in the 
study of the SABIC sukuk structure before the final approval as well as the 
involvement in other committees should be limited. However, they are in the view 
that this should be a general practice for all the Islamic financial products. In addition, 
it has been also suggested that as long as SBSS has a duty to undertake its role in the 
follow up and control or otherwise designate that role to an independent party 
featuring experts and specialists in Shari’ah, legal and financial matters to undertake 
that role on its behalf. 
5.5.7 Failure to Review all the Documents and Information Relevant to SABIC 
Sukuk 
The judgment to be made by the Shari’ah board regarding any financial products 
cannot be relied on or accepted from Shari’ah perspective until there is full 
understanding, which should have been the case for the SABIC sukuk. In this regard, 
Ibn-Al-Qayyim (2002) stated that what has plagued this nation is the lack of 
understanding of the Shari’ah rules as well as the lack of understanding of the reality, 
most importantly, the lack of understanding of how to match one over the other, 
therefore, the understanding is a great asset in Shari’ah. Therefore, it is unconceivable 
to make a judgment on any case as to whether or not it agrees with Shari’ah principles 
unless the whole case is conceived and the relevant documents are reviewed that help 
the Shari’ah board to understand the case in question as it has been decided by the 




members of the board needed a great deal of time and effort to understand the 
structuring of SABIC sukuk especially the SABIC sukuk structure considers a new 
and complex structure since it is consisted of deferent contracts and then make a 
judgement according to their understanding. Their task normally also includes 
reviewing all the documents; and this is the case for SABIC sukuk, which featuring 
documentation such as contracts between SABIC company and its subsidiary 
companies, the purchase commitment agreement, the transfer of ownership of sukuk 
assets agreement, the agreement of management of sukuk assets etc.  However, as 
discussed above, the members of the SSB did not review all the relevant 
documentation, which indeed paves the way for a potential non-Shari’ah compliancy 
risk.  
As discussed above, the members of SBSS have been indifferent about reviewing all 
papers and documents relevant to SABIC sukuk. As one of members of the SBSS 
indicated that it has not been important to review all the documents in the presence of 
specialised committees that undertake the role of studying the structure in terms of 
Shari’ah and then the structure will be presented to Shari’ah board for approval. On 
the other hand, another member indicated that the long prospectus of issuance could 
constitute an obstacle in addition to the language barrier so that reading the full 
prospectus of issuance is not needed. Thus, the fact that the SBSS only becomes 
aware of the summary of the prospectus of issuance will expose the SABIC sukuk to 
the risk of SBSS not being aware of some inconsistencies with Shari’ah compliancy 
that have not been originally included in the summary of prospectus of issuance 
which will be discussed in details in next chapter. Thus, if the Shari’ah board 
becomes aware of any misspecification in Shari’ah compliancy, it would definitely 
not approve the structure, and yet those details are missing in the summary of the 
prospectus of issuance that has been signed by the SBSS. 
However, the question which has been raised from one of the interviewee is that, why 
the members of SBSS has failed to review all the documents relevant to SABIC sukuk 
as it has been mentioned from two members of SBSS? Is it because the documents 
featuring financial and legal matters are insignificant as to be reviewed as has been 
mentioned by one of the SBSS or otherwise, because those documents have already 




again given that those experts have been trustworthy in terms of their expertise in 
relation to Shari’ah, legal and financial matters, whereas the SBSS may be is not 
qualified in legal and financial matters or otherwise the documents are too long and 
written in the English language as has been mentioned by one of the members of 
SBSS. Regardless of the reason, the fact is that the party that made the structuring 
failed to provide the Shari’ah board easy access to the relevant documents as one of 
the interviewees pointed. It should be noted that AAOIFI has made it clear that bank 
managers and directors of financial organisations have a duty to make it easy for the 
members of SSB to access every bit of information relevant to the product under 
investigation (AAOIFI, 2010). In addition, it seems that there was no particular 
demand to see such documentation, as the members of the SBSS were engaged in a 
number of activities and panels featuring banks and financial organisations so that 
they had no time to review all the documents. Thus, the practice cannot be considered 
as a good practice in terms of relinquishing the expected tasks from the Shari’ah 
scholars. 
As the discussion above indicates, most of those who have been interviewed have also 
made it clear that the SBSS members need to meet the persons who have something to 
do with the SABIC sukuk no matter those persons being accountants, legal persons or 
any other persons for the purpose of full understanding the sukuk structure, which will 
help them to the understand and identify the assets underlying sukuk and whether the 
sukuk holders really own those assets through reviewing the accounting and financial 
records. Eventually, that will make the Shari’ah scholars to understand the procedures 
involving the transfer of assets from the sukuk issuer to sukuk holders from the legal 
perspective, which will, consequently, will help the sukuk holders to identify as to 
whether they are capable of dealing conclusively with the assets they own or 
otherwise the ownership has been just a formality. 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that some of the SBSS members seem to be 
indifferent with regard to reviewing all the documents relevant to sukuk so that failure 
of full and careful examination of the documents featuring sukuk could place the 
sukuk at the risk of not being Shari’ah complaint. 
It could also be argued that the members of the SBSS need to be fully aware of the 




it as it has been indicated by Ibn Al-Qayyim (2002). In this regard, SBSS might focus 
on the structure of sukuk only through the summary of the prospectus and find out if 
the structure is intact to verify the Islamicity or the Shari’ah compliancy for eventual 
approval. Such procedure is defective as has been pointed out by one of the 
interviewees by saying that  
Some of Shari’ah boards perceive the process of sukuk structuring which 
mostly features between one and two pages and consistent with Shari’ah 
principles. However, when it comes to the details and the main prospectus of 
issuance and the relevant documents, one might discover a different wording or 
even sometimes by comparing the structuring to the prospectus of issuance 
inconsistencies exist. The board has approved something; however, application 
is something different, as it could be argued that the mission of SSB is just to 
make the approval of the product.  
As opposed to such a simplistic approach, as discussed in detail, the role of the SSB 
should go beyond the approval of the structure but instead their task should include 
the close examination of the structure, the prospectus of issuance as well as any other 
relevant documents according to one of the Interviewee. In this regard, it should be 
mentioned that the SBSS opted for a pragmatic solution as it signed on the summary 
of the SABIC sukuk which could mean that they failed to examine and evaluate the 
main prospectus which has many of the critical Shari’ah issues which will be 
discussed in next chapter.  
Therefore, it becomes obvious that the SBSS has come short of reviewing all 
documents associated with the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk. However, the 
focus has been only on the summary prospectus of SABIC sukuk without giving more 
attention to the main prospectus of issuance which could give the real picture of the 
structure and its consistence with Shari’ah principles. Such behaviour of SBSS could 
have negative effects. As a consequence, failure of making a full conception of 
structure will definitely lead to a judgement that might be inconsistent with Shari’ah 
principles according to the rule “judgement of something should always constitute 
part of its conception”. In other words, the judgement will not be valid and consistent 
with Shari’ah principles unless the members of SSB have full conception of the 




5.5.8 Failures of Control and Follow after Sukuk Being Approved 
The AAOIFI standards stated that the Shari’ah board has to be involved in controlling 
as well as monitoring sukuk from the time of issuance until maturity. That will 
provide guarantee of the performance of the product in a way consistent with Shari’ah 
principles and it will not veer from the right track of Shari’ah through close control 
and follow up by the members of Shari’ah board. However, in case of SABIC sukuk 
some of the members have indicated that some sort of underperformance exists in this 
aspect which has made sukuk consistent with Shari’ah principles and then latter it 
veers from Shari’ah track due to lack of those who control and follow up. 
 As has been explained above, sukuk are still considered new products featuring 
Islamic financial markets and need more examining and investigation. For that reason, 
SSB’s have to put more effort in controlling and examination of sukuk performance 
from the beginning of issuance to their expiry date. However, such a task could be 
very difficult for SSB’s in general and SBSS in particular due to their involvement in 
numerous financial institutions as it has been indicated in table 5.1. Nonetheless, it 
could be said that the establishment of specialised centres to undertake such duties 
could provide a suitable solution given the shortage in the number of Shari’ah 
scholars specialised in Islamic finance. 
5.5.9 Observing and Following the AAOIFI Standards 
As discussed previously, AAOIFI is an internal standard developing body for the 
Islamic financial institutions, whose standards remain voluntary in most of the 
Muslim countries; as only a couple of countries have formally instituted the AAOIFI 
standards for their Islamic finance industry. As far as AAOIFI standard is concerned, 
it has its own standards in relation to sukuk as main purpose of those standards is to 
become a reference for IBF so as to eliminate the risk of disagreement among the 
various stake holders in terms of the fatawa they make. To reach that end, the 
AAOIFI has managed to bring together a leading Shari’ah scholars and specialists in 
Islamic financing who have managed to set those standards as a reference to Shari’ah 
boards when examining any of the products associated with Islamic financing such as 
sukuk. It is worth mentioning that all members of SBSS are also prominent members 
of the AAOIFI. Those members, however, stressed the need for such standards to 




area of sukuk in particular as the latter constitutes a new product that needs to be 
supported and developed in favour of companies seeking financing.  
Nonetheless, it could be argued that the failure of the SBSS to observe those standards 
as it has been mentioned by two of the members SBSS should expose SABIC sukuk to 
great risks as it has been indicated by the majority of those who have been 
interviewed. It should however be mentioned that the members of the SBSS had 
shown their consent to the existence of the AAOIFI standards, and yet in another 
position of the interview they mentioned that they should not commit to the AAOIFI 
standards and instead should make their own ijtihad. In this regard, it could be argued 
that the main risk associated with such positioning is that when there is an 
announcement as a fatwa from other Shari’ah scholars pointing out that there is no 
Shari’ah compliancy in the structure of SABIC sukuk, as it has been stated by Merah 
(2011), this would put the whole Islamic finance at risk by shaking the foundation of 
the industry. Therefore, the observing as well as following any standard such AAOIFI 
as a Shari’ah guideline should be a solution for such risk as it has been suggested by 
the AAOIFI regardless of the position taken by some of the interviewees, in particular 
Shari’ah scholars. 
On the other hand, a clear discrepancy exists between AAOIFI standards with regard 
to sukuk and the fatawa issued by the members who have approved the standards. The 
fact of the matter is that the three members of SBSS are also members of AAOIFI, 
and yet SABIC sukuk feature some Shari’ah issues which are against the AAOIFI 
standards (these issues will be discussed in the next chapter). However, the 
subsequent risk is the absence of reliable common standards to be observed by all 
Shari’ah boards as it has been suggested by (DeLorenzo, 2006; McMillen, 2006). In 
addition, it could be argued that there is no point of signing standards without putting 
them into practice, a matter that will definitely make customers mistrust the whole 
process of Islamic finance. 
It should be noted that all the SBSS members interviewed have agreed that they have 
not been committed to the standards in the issuance of the SABIC sukuk as stated by 
AAOIFI with regard to sukuk given that they are members of AAOIFI. Subsequently, 
examining and approving the structure of SABIC sukuk has been based on the views 




by considerable sources. Therefore, failure to be committed to those standards will 
cause confusion in fiqhi view between the various Shari’ah boards which makes the 
structures on which SABIC sukuk has been designed are consistent with Shari’ah 
standards for one Shari’ah board and inconsistent for the other (DeLorenzo, 2006; 
Alshamari, 2013), which has been asserted during the interviews as well as. 
Therefore, many demands are made by those who have been interviewed and others 
who are concerned about the Islamic economy that there must be some standards to be 
observed by all Shari’ah boards on which their judgment are made. 
5.5.10 Lack of Reference for Fatawa Associated with Sukuk 
It could be argued that there is no single provision exists in the AAOIFI standards that 
indicate that the SSB should be committed to the standards during examination of 
sukuk structures. Accordingly, the SBSS has not observed as well as organised the 
AAOIFI standards as has been already mentioned. As a matter of fact, the absence of 
standards for SSB’s to rely on regarding their examination of the products of Islamic 
financing including sukuk, can result in disagreement of fatawa. That has been 
obvious with regard to the structuring of SABIC sukuk as the members of SBSS are in 
disagreement with regard to the consistency of SABIC sukuk with Shari’ah principles 
as it has been indicated during the interview section. 
5.5.11 Issuing the Legal Decision (Fatwa) by SBSS   
According to AAOIFI (2010), the members of Shari’ah board that examines and 
approves the contracts should not be less than three members which is exactly the 
case with SBSS. Nonetheless, the question is whether the three members are sufficient 
to examine such sukuk structure which is considered as a new product that needs 
individuals who are well informed and knowledgeable of the basic principles in 
relation to legal and financial matters besides their knowledge of Shari’ah matters, so 
that through the diversity of knowledge available to them they would be capable of 
judging the product from every aspect as it has been suggested by one of the 
interviewees. Consequently, the inadequacy of the number of SBSS member is 
considered among the risks that have to be paid attention to in the next issuances. 
On the other hand, the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk indicates that SBSS 




Shari’ah compliant. However, by assuming that if one members shows objection to 
some of the articles or otherwise have some reservations to some of what has been 
mentioned in the prospectus of issuance in terms of its consistency to Shari’ah 
principles, then in this case the vote will be two against one which is not sufficient to 
judge a product with the complexity of the structure as SABIC sukuk considered. 
It should be also noticed that the summary of the prospectus of SABIC sukuk features 
the signature of the three members of SBSS indicating their approval without any 
reservation. Moreover, by interviewing the members of SBSS, it has become obvious 
that one of the SBSS had opposed to some of the articles featuring the prospectus of 
SABIC sukuk in terms of their Shari’ah principles. It could be argued that one of the 
reasons is that he might have not read the prospectus of SABIC sukuk carefully or he 
changed his mind with regard to a specific issues when he had seen some practical 
issues happening in the ground which against the Shari’ah rules. 
Therefore, the potential of changing the fatawa issued by SSB’s constitutes a major 
Shari’ah risk as it has been pointed out. In this regard, it has been suggested that 
different structures have to be designed in advance by some experts and reliable 
institutions. Such structures should not give any chance to individual SSB’s to 
approve structures which could be subject to become inconsistent with Shari’ah 
principle. 
5.5.12 The Lack of Diversity Among the SBSS in Terms of Specialisation 
The different specialisation among the SSB members is highly needed as indicated by 
interviewees. In addition, the approval of any sukuk structure has to be based on a 
comprehensive view in terms of Shari’ah, legal and financial aspects. Consequently, 
any judgment (fatwa) to be made should be consistent in terms of Shari’ah as well as 
the legal aspect as to avoid any potential Shari’ah and legal risk. It can be said that 
many of the recent sukuk structures are most likely to be considered complicated and 
do not based on real assets as the case with SABIC sukuk. Such structures need to be 
well understood both financially and legally. Thus, accordingly, the SSB’s should 
include specialists in law and finance and have a well background in Shari’ah 
contracts in order to reach the right decision as it has been suggested by AAOIFI 




5.5.13 Lack of the Necessary Law for the Accountability 
The absence of the accountability law for calling members of SSB’s to be 
questionable in case of the their failure could expose SABIC sukuk structure to the 
risk of being inconsistent with Shari’ah principles as it has been noted by Khorshid 
(2012). Accordingly, some of the interviewees believe that a law must be made to 
incriminate responsible for underperformance in some of SSB’s regarding their 
approach of approval of the products of Islamic financing. However, having such a 
law will make SSB’s doing their best before approving any sukuk structure. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
As the discussion so far indicates, a number of Shari’ah risks related to SBSS have 
been highlighted in this chapter, which are summarised in Table 5.2. The concept of 
Shari’ah supervision is still not really cleared as it has been discussed above. In 
addition, the comprehensive as well as a proper fatawa will play an essential role for 
making the sukuk structure consistent with the principles of Shari’ah. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that SABIC sukuk issuance has been exposed to different risks 
related to the real functioning of SBSS as also highlighted in Table 5.2. In other 
words, the members of SSB’s should provide a guarantee for the sukuk structures as 
to avoid resemblance riba-based bonds. This could be through taking part in all the 
steps of structuring and developing the sukuk. In this regard, the Islamic financial 
institutions and research centres have to play a major role in the studies of the needs 
of the market with regard to the development as well as standardisation.   
The next chapter will discuss and examine the SABIC sukuk structure through the 








Table  5.2: Established Risks Related to SABIC Sukuk 
No The evaluation points Risks Related to SABIC Sukuk 
1 
The clarity of duty and 
responsibility 
The SBSS members are in different opinions with regard to their 
duties and responsibilities which have to be undertaken 
2 
Participating in designing the 
structure 
Failure of SBSS to take part in designing the structure of SABIC 
sukuk in the first stage 
3 clear method and mechanism 
The lack of clear method and mechanism when the SBSS do their 
examination of SABIC sukuk structure 
4 
The contribution of all the 
members to review all the 
documents 
Not all of the members of SBSS have reviewed the relevant 
documents prior to their examination of the structure of SABIC 
sukuk. It seems that the SBSS members just read and focused on the 
summery of SABIC sukuk, which contained the SBSS’s signature, 
rather concentrating on the main prospectus. 
5 The real of supervision 
Failure of SBSS to undertake the task of  supervision and 
monitoring of the SABIC sukuk as the role and task of the SBSS 
terminates at the endorsement of the issuance prospectus 
6 
Ensure that all Shari’ah 
observations have been 
modified 
Lack of follow up from the SBSS with regard to comments and 
objections  they make after the first observation 
7 
A comprehensive examination 
and study 
Focusing on the structure itself without any consideration to the 
result and the consequences. 
8 
Consistency and harmony 
among the all documents 
The differences between the main prospectus and the summery of 
SABIC sukuk have been discovered as there are many critical issues 
have not written in the summery 
9 Observing AAOIFI standards 
A variation in opinion exists among the members of SBSS with 
regard to the commitment to AAOIFI standards 
10 Observing a reliable standards 
No standard to be Observed and followed during the examination 
and evaluation such as AAOIFI standards. 
11 Internal Shari’ah committee 
NO internal Shari’ah committees under the SBSS to undertake the 
task of supervision and control 
12 
The unification of fatwa and the 
sustainability of the legal 
decision 
The members of Shari’ah board are in disagreement with regard to 
the consistency of SABIC sukuk with Shari’ah principles 
13 
Consistency of jurisprudence  
verdicts 
Differences between the SBSS and other Shari’ah scholars with 
regard to the consistency of SABIC sukuk with Shari’ah principles 
14 
The quality of people involved 
in the structuring of sukuk 
Disqualifying the people who proposed structuring SABIC sukuk in 
the first stage as the SBSS has discovered that the structure of 
SABIC has been exactly similar to the structure of riba-based bonds 
15 
The participation of experts 
during structuring sukuk 
The failure of SBSS to make any connections with other specialists 
during the studying and approving the SABIC sukuk for the purpose 
of having full understanding the structure of SABIC sukuk 
16 
Adequacy of the number who is 
participating in examining and 
approving the structures of 
sukuk 
The members of SBSS seem to be not enough to approve a new 
product with new and complex structures such as SABIC sukuk 
17 
Specialization in the members 
of SSB 
The lack of diversity among the SBSS in terms of specialisation 
18 
The ability for evaluation and 
adequate examination 
The members of SBSS seem to be busy with many occupations 
19 Independence 
There is no independence for SBSS as the SBSS should be fully 
independent to avoid any conflict of interest in views between them 







Chapter 6                                                                                          
SHARI’AH RISKS IN SUKUK STURUCTURES 
  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is essential to know that the risk which related to the Shari’ah compliance is the 
main risk that sukuk structures are exposing to in the current financial market as it has 
been pointed out by Tariq (2004) and Kahf (2006) among others. In this regard, the 
non-Shari’ah compliance risk refers to the possibility of occurrence of circumstances 
where the financial service or product is not or will not be in compliance with 
established Shari’ah principles and standards (DeLorenzo, 2006). The importance of 
examining and evaluating the subject of Shari’ah non-compliance risks is essential as 
the Shari’ah regulations and principles are considered as the key features of Islamic 
financial institutions that the customers do emphasise, while ascertaining the extent of 
the bank’s adherence to the regulation (Iqbal et al., 1998). Mostly, what distinguishes 
Islamic financial institutions from other institutions is its commitment to the 
provisions of Shari’ah as the articulation of Islamic morality in all its dealings (El-
Hawary et al., 2007). 
It should be noted that in the previous chapter, the risks associated with SSB with 
regard to SABIC sukuk are identified and critically discussed. This chapter attempts to 
discuss the essential Shari’ah issues in relation to sukuk structures in general and 
SABIC sukuk in specific. Therefore, this chapter is divided into three parts as the first 
part discusses and explores the critical issues associated with Shari’ah non-
compliance risks; while the second part aims to report and discuss the position of the 
SBSS, particularly with regard to the issues related to the structure of SABIC sukuk 
through the opinions and perceptions of the participants in the interview schedule. 
The third section discusses and examines the structure of SABIC sukuk and the 
related documents from Shari’ah perspective as any inconsistency with Shari’ah rules 




6.2 SHARI’AH NON-COMPLIANCE RISKS: A CRITICAL LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
In order to provide a detailed discussion on Shari’ah non-compliance risks, the 
discussion is formed around a thematic method by referring to a number of issues. 
However, in order to make a better sense of such issues, this section commences with 
a sub-section, which compares sukuk and bond structures. 
6.2.1 Comparing Sukuk and Bonds Structures 
While the Islamic financial markets have been spread with many sukuk with Islamic 
description, Usmani (2007) argues that in their engineering the main aim has been to 
make sure that those sukuk can compete with the riba-based or conventional bonds 
and that most of the sukuk available in the markets carry most of the characteristics of 
conventional. He further contends that this is done with the objective of making them 
easily promoted in the Islamic financial markets. However, he pointed out that the 
characteristics associated with riba-based bonds should not be contained in Islamic 
sukuk as a direct consequence. However, the reality is that sukuk have been 
transferred from methods of investment to become methods of funding; and therefore 
those who work in sukuk have attempt to make their sukuk to acquire many of the 
characteristics associated with riba funding bonds in an indirect manner through 
finding different methods as part of their financial engineering so that they should be 
marketable. 
Almenea (2010) asserted that the main aim of issuing sukuk is to become a 
replacement for investment in bonds that are considered as riba based for borrowing. 
However, in support of Usmani (2007), he also argued that most of the issuances of 
the current sukuk have not been on the right track in terms of Shari’ah and instead 
they Islamic sukuk in their forms while in the reality they represent faked structures 
based on riba which apparently appear to be following Shari’ah. In this respect the 
decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s No 188 (3/20) stated that “Islamic bonds 
“Sukuk” must to demonstrate the fundamental differences between them and usury 
bonds in terms of structure, design, construction, and the need to reflect them on the 




It is at this point identifying the differences between Islamic sukuk and riba based 
bonds as follows (Adam and Thomas, 2004; Usmani, 2007; Tariq and Dar, 2007): 
(i) The bonds represent an amount borrowed by the issuer and have nothing to do with 
assets, while sukuk, on the other hand, represent parts of available properties 
belonging to projects or investment activities; 
(ii) The bond holder is not affected by the outcome of the company activities nor it is 
affected by its financial status, as it deserves the nominal value of the bond at specific 
date plus the required profits, while the sukuk holder is affected by the activities of the 
project as it shares profit and losses and also shares the risks involves; 
(iii) The returns on bonds are a commitment to be made by the borrower (the bond 
issuer) that should be a commitment in the form of a return of the bond that will be 
added to the capital; therefore, it becomes a riba. In addition, the relationship between 
the bond holder and the issuer becomes a ‘relationship borrower creditor’, and yet, the 
returns of sukuk have nothing to do with the issuer, as the returns are not a 
commitment to be added to the nominal value. On the contrary, the returns on sukuk 
are profits due to activities as a result of using the money (raised by sukuk) to be paid 
by sukuk holders. Moreover, the nominal value of sukuk is not guaranteed by the 
issuer so that they will not be a debt on the source; 
(iv) The bonds holder has the priority to obtain the nominal value of the bond he 
carries in addition to the other profits no matter whether the project has gained or lost. 
Thus, the issuers of bonds have a duty to return the capital besides the profits agreed 
upon to the bond holder. However, sukuk holders have no priority but rather will be 
paid some of the percentage from what have remained from the project assets after the 
payment of debts to debtors. 
These differences are presented in Table 6.1. 
Table  6.1: Comparing Sukuk and Conventional Bond 
Comparison Reference Sukuk Bonds 
Represent Assets, usufructs, services, rights Pure debt 
The holder 
Is affected by the financial status of 
the issuer 
Is affected by the activities of 
the project 
The relationship between 
the issuer and the holder 
Based on the nature of the contract 
whether musharakah mudarabah etc 
Creditor and borrower 
relationship 
The returns According to the project performance A commitment on the issuer 




It could be argued that the transformation of sukuk from investment structure to 
financing structure by trying to attach sukuk some characteristics of riba based bonds 
that have been popular among investors tend to raise issues around the legality of 
sukuk from the Shari’ah perspective. Therefore, the following Shari’ah issues are 
expected to arise in the issuance of sukuk: the ownership of sukuk holders to the 
assets, the guarantee of the assets and the returns,  the actual  transfer of assets from 
the issuer to sukuk holders, and other Shari’ah issues associated with sukuk (Merah, 
2008; Merah, 2011). It should be mentioned that these issues have been discussed by 
many Shari’ah scholars and academic researchers as well as AAOIFI and Islamic fiqh 
Academy, which therefore constitute the content of the discussion in this chapter and 
they are discussed in the following sections. 
6.2.2 The Reality of the Ownership (Legal and Beneficiary Ownership) 
The decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s No 188 (3/20) stated that “Sukuk 
contracts should fulfil all the requirements whereby ownership is legitimately and 
legally proven, resulting in the ability to act and afford insurance. Contracts should be 
free from fraud and sham and insuring that they will ultimately guarantee safety from 
the Shari’ah point of view”. 
In this regard, Usmani (2007) also asserted that sukuk have to represent the right of 
ownership no matter being ownership of properties, usufructs or services, and 
therefore sukuk should not represent a debt for profit on the issuer. This is the main 
character that differentiates sukuk from riba-based bonds. In addition, according to 
AAOIFI (2010) “Sukuk, to be tradable, must be owned by Sukuk holders, with all 
rights and obligations of ownership, in real assets, whether tangible, usufructs or 
services, capable of being owned and sold legally as well as in accordance with the 
rules of Shari'ah”.   
As it has been mentioned by AAOIFI (2010) that one of the benefits of sukuk with 
regard to investor who carries the sukuk is that sukuk holders have to enjoy the full 
rights of their ownership to sukuk assets, as sukuk represent common gains in real 
assets. In other words, the sale contract must be real by transferring the assets in terms 
of Shari’ah and by law from the balance sheet of the seller to the register of sukuk 
holders by giving them all the rights by full behaviour of the assets such as sale, rents 




According to the authentic Shari’ah position contracts that include things and 
conditions that constrict ownership would still be considered valid and viable. 
However, due to some features and conditions, certain sukuk structures can be 
considered as unreal and fictitious, as there is no real intention for sale (Merah, 2011). 
Some of such conditions include; sukuk holders have no rights to sell sukuk assets or 
do anything including selling or marketing the products of assets. In addition, sukuk 
holders have no right to introduce any amendments in relation to the conditions to do 
with the issuance or otherwise do any restrictions without the consent of the issuer 
(Almenea, 2010; Merah, 2011). 
It is quite clear that those conditions and restrictions indicate that ownership does not 
allow the owner to have all the rights to behave in full in its ownership as it has been 
stated by AAOIFI (2010) as well as the decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s No 
188 (3/20). Given the fact that the main feature of sukuk as compared to bonds is the 
availability of ownership, Ibn Taymiyyah, therefore; explained the meaning of 
ownership by saying that the full ownership; where the owner has full authority to sell 
or offer or otherwise rent or any other uses (Ibn Qasem, 1995). On the same issue, 
Alkhafeef (1996) pointed out that the ownership of anything that makes the owner has 
a full authority to claim the ownership unless that becomes not possible due to 
Shari’ah barriers that prevent that. 
In further exploring ownership issues, Hassan (2012) stated that the ownership can be 
either full (asset and usufruct) or otherwise incomplete ownership (beneficiary 
ownership). In the case of the latter, benefit incurs by using the asset for specific 
period of time, such as, the one who sells the manfa’a of the asset to be owned to 
sukuk holders for certain period of time which is known as the ‘tangible assets sukuk’. 
This also can occur in the cases where an individual buys a usufruct of asset for 
certain period of time (90 years as ijarah contract), and then manages to sell to sukuk 
holders which is known as (sukuk al manfa’a) in which case he owns the benefit but 
not the asset as he is renting the asset. Abu Zahra (1976) also has the same view that 
the ownership is divided into full ownership by the asset and usufruct, and not full 
ownership which involves the asset only or the usufruct only. 
Hassan (2011) argued that the ownership, whether it is full or not (beneficial 




fully accommodated to match its conditions and constrictions according to Shari’ah 
law, whether the ownership of the assets has been recorded by the government office 
or not. In other words, the transfer of property from the register of the seller to the 
register of buyer should not constitute a condition in Shari’ah to satisfy the right of 
the sale.  
Hassan (2012) also argued that it is not allowed under the principle of Shari’ah to 
transfer the ‘beneficiary ownership’ to the sukuk holders and in the same time holding 
the title (the real ownership) of the assets under the name of the issuer. In addition, he 
pointed out that the term ‘beneficiary ownership’ does not considered in Shari’ah law 
as it has been used for securitization of the returns of the stocks or the right of 
receiving the rentals from the lessees of an asset. Therefore, the scholars have to agree 
on the opinion that securitization of debts, rights and interests linked to assets should 
be prohibited. Furthermore, the beneficiary ownership of the assets should be 
transferred fully according to a Shari’ah complaint sale agreement as there is no need 
to register the assets legally as long as the sale reached the requirements of the 
Shari’ah law.  
According to Dusuki and Mokhtar (2010), the beneficiary ownership does not have 
the same impact as in the legal ownership for several reasons. One of these reasons is 
restrictions usually imposed on sukuk holders in the disposition of the assets owned 
by them during the period of the sukuk, because they are considered as the owners for 
just usufruct. Additionally, if any disagreement accurses, under the beneficiary 
ownership system, the sukuk holders cannot dispose of the assets by selling them, as 
they are not legally registered under their names but still under the name of the main 
seller. In this regard, the asset probably transferred to SPV, however, the SPV in most 
cases owned by the original owner. Consequently, it is still under the authority of the 
seller as the transition seems to be unreal. Accordingly, the ownership in the asset-
based sukuk structure is considered incomplete in terms of Shari’ah rules due to the 
lack of the ability of the sukuk holders to dispose their assets by selling or giving to 
others as charity etc. Hence, there is an urgent need to recognise the fact that most of 
the sukuk structures are assets-based rather assets-backed. This has a negative impact 
on the ownership of the sukuk holders whether is it according to Shari’ah rules or not 




It should be stated that the most important features that differentiate between the full 
sale and incomplete sale in terms of Shari’ah is the ability of the buyer in disposition 
of the assets purchased through sale to a third party and this in fact does not take place 
under the term of ‘beneficiary ownership technique’. In this respect, it should be 
mentioned that one of the maqasid al Shari’ah is to maintain and ensure the rights 
with the application of transparency principle in financial transactions.  
With regard to the ‘beneficiary ownership’, it should be noted that after the global 
financial crisis, it turned out for many investors that in fact, they cannot dispose of 
assets they bought in sale as they are classified as ‘beneficial owners’.  Therefore, it 
could be argued that the ‘beneficiary ownership technique’ might be chosen in the 
case of failure to prove full ownership due to the laws of the country in ownership of 
foreign investors as it has also been explained above.  
OIC and Malaysian Negara Bank resolved the controversy in the subject of 
‘beneficiary ownership’ within the terms of Shari’ah. However, it has been stressed 
that the beneficiary ownership must be transmitted with all the rights and obligations 
from the issuer to the new owner of the assets (sukuk holders). To achieve this 
condition, some Shari’ah scholars with legal experts found a practical solution in the 
common law of trust. At common law, there is so-called ‘trust system’ which is when 
the person (mostly the seller) holds and keeps the asset sold to someone under his 
name according to the ‘trust law’. The purchaser is considered as an owner of the 
usufruct of the asset in common law. The asset will be hold and kept under the name 
of another person called (the trustee). The relationship between the two will be the 
relationship between the beneficiary and trustee documented by a trust deed executed 
(often unilaterally) by the settlor.  
This relationship entitles the owners of the usufruct to a convenient access to the 
assets they own through the trustee even though it is not registered in the purchaser’ 
name. However, it is kept with the seller under the ‘trust law’. Therefore, if there is 
any dispute, the original owner, who is here called ‘beneficial owner’, due to inability 
to register his/her name is able to dispose of the owned assets according to the ‘trust 
law’. Accordingly, under the common law of trust, this former mentioned mechanism 
has enabled Shari’ah scholars as well as legal experts to expand the concept of full 




is the owner of the usufruct and the seller, who retained the asset, is considered as 
trustee on the bare. However, it can be said that this mechanism may not be a perfect 
solution due to the differing legal framework from one country to another.  
On the other hand, there is an urgent need to clarify the legal status and the type of 
ownership to investors before going into any financial transaction as this is dictated 
by the rules of Shari’ah. Additionally, there is an urgent need that selling should be 
based on the rules of Shari’ah, which will result in the protection of investors’ rights 
as well as their ability to dispose of the assets they bought upon the occurrence of any 
disagreement by liquidated and obtain liquidity.  
In this regard, some researchers and Shari’ah scholars suggest not relying on the 
mechanism of beneficiary ownership found in common law as it is originally designed 
for debt securities in the financial markets. Even if there is a reformulation of the 
mechanism of beneficiary ownership to be compatible with the Shari’ah rules, it is 
ultimately derived from the common law, which does not take Shari’ah rules into 
account and consequently the risk of none-Shari’ah compliance still exists.  
However, despite all, Hassan (2011) suggested that based on maqased al-Shari’ah, it 
is preferable that the assets registered and comply with the regulation of the land in 
order to secure the rights of the sukuk holders. In addition, he also suggested that the 
preservation of the interests of the sukuk holders from any kind of risks as well as to 
evidencing that the legal ownership is preserved can only achieved through the seller 
by issuing a ‘deed of trust and regency’ confirming that he will keep the title for the 
real owners of the assets as he has no right to act without their permission. 
The main concern, here, is not only the proving of the validity of the right of the 
contract or not in Shari’ah terms as it has already been mentioned by Hassan (2011). 
However, the matter is rather associated with the potential legal risks that might 
encounter sukuk holders in relation to affecting their capability to behave as owners 
with regard to the origin of sukuk they have already acquired whether through selling 
or rent or even being offered as it has been noted by AAOIFI as well as the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy. Ibn Taymiyyah (as stated by Merah, 2011; Almarshood, 2013) 
considers these constituting real meaning of ownership. Moreover, in proving 




official register is considered among the requirements of Shari’ah that advised by 
scholars as to avoid conflicts (Al-Sayed, 2013). This is substantiated with the 
Qur’anic verse (2:555) stating that “Oh you who believe you should write down any 
debts between you for a certain period’ in order to maintain the rights of people to 
avoid conflicts between them”.  
6.2.3 The Validity of the Underlying Sukuk Assets 
It could also be argued that one of the critical issues with regard to sukuk structure is 
the real nature of the assets underlying sukuk structures. In this regard, Dagi (2011) 
asserted that some issuances do not represent the real assets, usufruct or services or 
otherwise rights that can be financially evaluated in the market; rather the underlying 
sukuk indicates that the issuer has sold just the right of obtaining the returns which 
will be generated from the assets in future or the future profits to be distributed to the 
sukuk holders. However, it should be noticed that selling the right or selling the future 
right of getting the future financial gains is not considered as selling of the assets, 
usufruct or services but rather it is considered as selling of the returns of the assets 
and that should not be allowed in Shari’ah terms as it is considered as riba (Merah, 
2011; Almarshidi, 2014).  
It can be argued that the right, which can be sold and bought, is the right which has a 
financial value and can be assessed such as the privilege rights (Almarshood, 2013). 
Nonetheless, Merah (2011) argued that many of sukuk structures, which are based on 
rights, cannot be valued and assessed; therefore, it is not considered Shari’ah 
compliant. On the other hand, Merah (2011) believes that there exist some restrictions 
that must be considered in order to make the ‘sukuk of rights’ approved from Shari’ah 
perspective. He states that sukuk holders should have full rights of the sukuk they hold 
either through the right of asset or the right of usufruct that can be valued, sold and 
fully controlled. In addition, the contract should also be targeted itself rather than just 
for the sake of gaining future profit such as the contracts of enah sale. 
6.2.4 The Guarantee of the Returns 
Given the risks involved from a Shari’ah perspective, returns on capital investment 
cannot be guaranteed, as one of the Shari’ah principles states that ‘al ghonm bil 




Therefore, AAOIFI’s (2010) related standards state that “The prospectus must not 
include any statement to the effect that the issuer of the certificate guarantees a fixed 
percentage of profit”. In this respect, it could be argued that sukuk manager by being 
committed to pay specific profits based on the benchmark is similar to the 
commitment of riba-bond issuer to pay periodical profit on the nominal value of the 
bond based on the benchmark (Almarshood, 2013). Consequently, in the case where 
there is a guarantee of specific profit on sukuk, then it will be sukuk based on loan 
with specific profit which features riba., and that fact will not be changed whether 
given the name profit or lease as the case with ijarah sukuk, for instance. In relation to 
this, Hassan (2011) states that it is not allowed for sukuk manager to guarantee profit 
for sukuk holders or any other specific return whether that profit for a specific amount 
or any other percentage from capital or depending on a certain benchmark such as 
LIBOR. It should be mentioned that all current scholars agree on this principle with 
no exception. 
In addition, it can be said that the reason behind the prohibition of making the 
securing of the profit as a condition is that such condition terminates the partnership 
between the two partners, so that the profit will be on the commitment on one partner 
who has to pay the profit no matter the project has generated profit or loss. As can be 
seen, this will be the same as riba (Hassan, 2011). 
It can, therefore, be inferred from the above discussion that the Shari’ah has 
prohibited the predefined interest (profit) whether the interest is based on the capital 
or according to the benchmark such as LIBOR as it is considered riba. However, in 
the case of ijarah structure, what it is fixed in advance is not the profit rather the lease 
that must be visible and specific at the beginning of the contract as Shari’ah rules 
clarified that as this matter will be explained in details in 6.2.6.  
6.2.5 The Distribution of Profits Based on an benchmark 
It should be noticed that sukuk markets have based their calculation of profits for 
sukuk holders depending on the performance of a certain benchmark such as LIBOR 
and SAIBOR, as those benchmarks are linked with the prices of loan between banks 
(Shaatah, 2003). Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that those benchmarks are 




on the availability of cash in the bank and the standard of the currency in the market 
as being represented by those benchmarks (Habsh, 1998).  
As the practice in the markets indicates, the use of interest mechanism such as LIBOR 
is becoming a common feature that characterise Islamic financial instruments. 
However, Shaikh and Saeed (2010) pointed out that as the case with conventional 
bonds, the same pricing reference being used by Islamic banks as an appropriate 
reference for sukuk pricing. This can be attributed to the failure of Shari’ah scholars 
and economists, who have failed to provide an alternative for conventional interest 
rates, which could be used by Islamic banks and other financial Institutions as a 
reliable benchmark (Al-Amine, 2008). In this regard, Wilson (2008) argues that the 
use of alternative benchmark to the LIBOR in Islamic financial instruments and 
contracts becomes inevitable. However, in reflecting on alternative benchmarks, 
Wilson (2008) argue that such benchmarking could be based on macroeconomic 
benchmarks featuring real economic activities such as the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth for sovereign sukuk as well as firm performance in case of financing 
corporations. In a response, Almenea (2010) argued that the use of LIBOR as a 
benchmark is essential as a benchmark at early stages; however, the practice should 
be dispensed of following substantial developments of Islamic financial institutions. 
It could be argued that the main reason behind companies being dependent on the 
profit benchmarks is that sukuk are being considered as a substitute for conventional 
bonds that are based on benchmarks for defining the level of profits, as the 
conventional bonds do not based on productive assets as sukuk structure. Therefore, as 
long as sukuk are considered as substitute for riba-based bonds, those who are 
working on sukuk structures tend to avoid all non-Shari’ah compliant elements in the 
riba-based bonds. However, they failed to avoid using the same benchmarks which 
also used in riba-based bonds, given that sukuk do the same role of riba-based bonds 
whether investment or funding (Usmani, 2007; Almenea, 2010). It is worth 
mentioning that those who invest in sukuk they always seek to ensure the stability of 
their profits, which cannot take place without depending on a benchmark through 
which they can find out the amount of profits that they are going to get from their 
investment on sukuk (Elgari, 2011). For that reason, the industry including the 




6.2.6 Evaluation the Current Ijarah Sukuk Structure from Shari’ah Perspective 
According to Hammad (2001) and Almenea (2011), depending on conventional 
benchmarks to determine the rent which literally considered as profit associated with 
the current ijarah sukuk structure is against the rule of Shari’ah. The rent in ijarah 
structure should be determined and known for both parties at the time of issuing the 
ijarah contract otherwise the transaction will lead to gharar, which is prohibited. In 
other word, since the LIBOR as a benchmark used in ijarah is not stable as it has been 
mentioned earlier by making reference to Habsh (1998) and the rent will be 
depending on the changeable benchmark such as LIBOR then the rent will be 
unstable, which as a practice is not allowed according to the Shari’ah principals. 
However, even if gharar is allowed in such as case, since there are many other 
reasons, the transaction will be non-Shari’ah compliant according to Hammad (2001), 
Merah (2008) and Almenea (2011). Therefore, it is still considered against Shari’ah 
rules. The first reason is that, most of ijarah sukuk, which are currently available on 
the market, can be described as a type of disallowed sales in Shari’ah terms, namely 
enah sale. In addition, selling such type has more than one method; and the most 
popular method is that one sells a commodity to another for a deferred price and then 
he buys the same commodity for a current price for less than the price he has already 
sold. Another method is what is known as the reversed enah featuring one person who 
sells a certain commodity to another person for a current price and then buys the same 
commodity for a postponed price at the higher price than the first. 
However, the similarity between the reversed enah and ijarah sukuk structure, which 
is currently widespread, can be described by the fact that sukuk issuer sells an asset 
for a current price and then latter renowned it back from the buyer for a deferred price 
to be paid by instalment to sukuk holders for more than the current price, while the 
second sale will be conditioned on the sukuk so that asset in between will make no 
difference. Furthermore, another method is that the sukuk issuer sells certain sukuk 
assets for a current price and then hires them from sukuk holders for a specific 
duration during which it gives sukuk holders the profits against the rent for sukuk and 
at the end of ijarah period the sukuk issuer will manage to buy the assets for a 
nominal price (Merah, 2011; Almarshood, 2013). However, in this regard, Ibn 
Taymiyyah pointed out that the scholars have agreed on disallowing selling enah 




has to set a condition for the buyer to sell him the commodity that he bought from him 
for the second time (Ibn Qasem, 1995). It should be noted that enah sale is becoming 
disallowed as it has become an excuse for the use of riba, as the asset or the 
commodity is not a target in itself but rather the money itself is the main target so that 
the whole process becomes ‘money against money’ with an untargeted commodity in 
itself but what is targeted is having a loan with interest (Alroshood, 2013). However, 
Alshobaili (2011) argued that generally speaking targeting money in any transaction 
is allowed, as the aim of the business is to gain money unless the transaction is not 
according to the principle of Shari’ah. 
The second prevailing reason is that the most of ijarah sukuk structures are currently 
used are based on ‘wafaa sale’ which is prohibited in Shari’ah (Almenea, 2010). In 
addition, the meaning of the wafaa sale is that when there is an agreement between 
two persons for a certain assets for instance that the buyer has to pay a certain amount 
to the seller so that the seller from his part has to offer the buyer an asset to make use 
of it until the seller returns the money with him to the buyer in order to return the real 
estate that he has already sold it (Barodei, 2012). 
It should be mentioned that the reason for this label as ‘wafaa sale’ as the buyer has to 
become committed for selling the assets again to the seller. In this regard, ijarah 
sukuk, which are similar to wafaa sale features the fact that the sukuk issuer will sell 
his asset or the usufruct of the asset to sukuk holders and then lease again the asset 
from sukuk holders for a certain period of time so that at the end of that period of 
lease, the sukuk issuer will buy the assets for the second time from sukuk holders for 
the nominal price (Alammar, 2003). 
It could be said that the majority of scholars from Malikis, Hanbalis and Shafis are on 
the believe that wafaa sale is disallowed, as that sale mainly targets making riba 
rather than assets and in fact it is really a loan that makes a benefit which is not 
allowed (Barodei, 2012). In addition, it has also been stated, by the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy’s Decision No 66 (4/7), that  bay' al-wafaa (debt guarantee sale) is “the sale 
of money on condition that when the seller returns the price, the purchaser returns to 
him the amount purchased, this sale is in fact a loan which has generated a profit. It is 
therefore a fraudulent practice of Riba, and is considered unsound by the majority of 




Ibn Taymiyyah stated that “if the sale is targeting the seller to take the money while 
the buyer takes the asset to benefit from its rent as long as the money remains with the 
seller unless he returns the money to buyer then the buyer will returns the asset to the 
seller then that will be disallowed as it represents a sale of money for the same money 
in addition to the rent which goes to the one who makes the loan who is actually the 
buyer” (Ibn Qasem, 1995;198). Such sale is also known as ‘amanah sale’ (trust sale), 
as the asset remains in the trust with the buyer so that he can benefit from its rent until 
the seller returns its asset. Therefore, Ibn Taymiyyah (as cited by Ibn Qasem, 1995) 
pointed out that the sale of trust (amanah) is also invalid by the agreement of scholars. 
Moreover, it has been argued that wafaa sale or amanah sale might be valid by the 
argument that even though it is inconsistent with Shari’ah rules, such sale is approved 
given that people need it to avoid riba; so that it is originally disallowed but it has 
been approved given the need of people for it (Elgari, 2010). Nonetheless, it has been 
argued that it will be incorrect to say that the need of people for such kind of 
transaction should make that sale allowed in terms of Shari’ah. Therefore, the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 177(3/19) asserted that fatawa issued by SSB’s should 
follow the Shari’ah rules and apply that rules rather than depending on transaction 
with no Shari’ah evidence or support but rather it is just tricks and fraud (heal).  
Furthermore, it should also be stated that among the reasons that make such type of 
ijarah sukuk disallowed is that the above mentioned structure (the selling of sukuk by 
the issuer some of certain assets for a current price and then lease them from sukuk 
holders for certain period of time and during that period he gives sukuk holders the 
lease of assets as returns for sukuk, and then at the end of the period of lease, the 
sukuk issuer will buy the assets again for the nominal value) is considered multiple 
structured by including many contracts and promises, which seems to be unreal, and 
the transaction is considered as a ribawi (Almenea, 2010; Alroshood, 2013).  
However, the sukuk issuer who is the owner of the usufruct when he sells the usufruct 
to sukuk holders and afterwards rent them from sukuk holders by promising to buy the 
sukuk from sukuk holders at a certain time, and that during the lease time the issuer 
(who is currently the renter) will manage to pay the rent in form of returns to sukuk 
holders. Such a mechanism will make the ijarah sukuk unreal and not a target itself 




that becomes consistent with function to be done by the riba-based bonds. In other 
words, sukuk holders have given a loan to sukuk issuer in the form of money in return 
for periodical returns (which represents the price of rent) as to be paid by the issuer to 
sukuk holders on that loan. However, Hammad (2001) believes that in the case of 
collective multiple contracts, even though they might be perfect and valid, when they 
agree on a disallowed idea or end in something not allowed, then such type of wafaa 
sale will become invalid and disallowed. Consequently, in the above mentioned 
structure case, it features a valid sale contract with a valid ijarah contract and so the 
two come together aiming at targeting a loan for profit as it has been mentioned 
above. 
In contrast, Abu-Goudah (2003) and Hassan (2041) approved dependence on the 
LIBOR benchmark to determine the profits associated with ijarah sukuk, as the sukuk 
issuer in the ijarah contract is considered as seller for the asset itself or the usufruct of 
the asset to the sukuk holders, and then the issuer becomes a hirer so that he leases 
what he already sold it or hired it to sukuk holders for a lease based on the profit price 
(the benchmark) and the sukuk issuer will commit itself to buy sukuk at the end of the 
ijarah period.  
In this respect, among others Hassan (2003) argue that there is no similarity with the 
prohibited sale such as enah and wafaa with the current ijarah sukuk structure as the 
origin in the contracts and the conditions is allowance based on Shari’ah principles. In 
addition, ijarah sukuk represents collective contracts (sale contract and ijarah 
contract) and those contracts should fulfil the conditions and they come together in a 
different mode from that of the loan which is based on interest. Abu-Goudah (1999) 
and Hassan (2003) explained further that the sale and then the lease and then the sale, 
in one contract, are in fact do not represent a loan based on interest as there is a huge 
difference between the loan and ijarah with regard to conditions and requirements. 
Moreover, Abu-Goudah (1999) and Hassan (2003) believe that in the case of ijarah 
sukuk the lease of the property that will be hired will be known and the rent will be 
most likely either based on the original price of the asset and making a certain 
percentage from it so that percentage becomes a price for rent, or otherwise making a 
certain amount to be agreed upon between the one who rents and the owner. 




dependence on the benchmark as long as the rent is known and the profits are fixed 
when the contract has been signed. However, the reason for dependence on any 
benchmark with regard to ijarah sukuk is for fixing the incentive that will go for 
sukuk manager who receives all that in excess of profit on the benchmark. It should be 
noted that the AAOIFI has approved fixing rent based on a specific benchmark given 
that it should be fixed in the first stage with a certain numbers and that there is a 
minimum and maximum limit of the benchmark (Hassan, 2003). In this regard, the 
decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s No 188 (3/20) stated under the section of 
‘Leasing an Asset to the Seller’ that “An asset may not be sold at a cash price with the 
condition that the seller leases this asset as a lease coupled with a promise of 
ownership at a total of lease and price exceeding the cash price whether this condition 
is explicit or implicit as this type of sale is considered as enah sale which is prohibited 
by Shari’ah. It is therefore not permissible to issue Sukuk on the basis of such a 
mode”. 
6.2.7 The Dependence of Investment Sukuk (Musharakah, Mudarabah and 
Wakalah agency) on a Financial Benchmark from Shari’ah Perspective 
Usmani (2013), in general, disallowed using a benchmark without distinctions 
between Shari’ah structures. In addition, Hassan (2003) believes that fixing profit 
should not be allowed no matter depending on the benchmark or depending on 
specific percentage of the nominal price and any other specific amount. In this regard, 
hence, there is an agreement among Shari’ah scholars on the prohibition of using and 
depending on a financial benchmark or benchmark with regard to contracts mentioned 
earlier. This is due to the fact that the holders of investment sukuk have to obtain the 
actual profit to be expected from investment of sukuk assets they own no matter that 
profit being more or less, and in case no profit has been made of the project then 
sukuk holders will not claim any profits as they will be subject to the business risks 
(Toufahah, 2014). 
On the other hand, the reason of depending on the LIBOR benchmark can merely be 
for a mechanical or technical matter in the sense that the sukuk holders will obtain a 
stable return. If this is the case, then what has been in excess of the specific 
percentage, it will go to sukuk holders and will be kept in the reserve account to face 




the benchmark or the benchmark. However, in case sukuk have been sold then 
whatever goes to reserve account will go to the agent as an incentive, which should be 
made as a condition that has to be agreed upon by sukuk holder (Elgari, 2010). 
Nonetheless, regarding the claim of companies that it is being necessary to have a 
benchmark for companies who issue sukuk to depend on with the objective of 
assuring investors with regard to profits and capital from the project manager as that 
has already been mentioned above. It could be said that the manager is originally a 
trustee no matter being a mudarib or an agent, thus, the previous CV of sukuk 
manager will tend to encourage investors rather that by giving a guarantee for profit in 
a way that reverse the reality of contract. In addition, the nature of the project and the 
studies that have been made will fix the amount of expected profit without the need to 
a benchmark or benchmark that has been originally made to indicate the price of riba 
profit (Almenea, 2010; Alroshood, 2013).  
Moreover, there is nothing wrong in Shari’ah term to allow the establishment of 
specialised economic institutions with high financial solvency as an independent 
entity from the issuer so that they undertake the economic stability for the projects 
and estimation of profits expected based on accurate standards and monitoring the real 
profits. By doing so, those institutions will undertake the function to be undertaken by 
the institutions of international credits (Alroshood, 2013). 
According to Usmani (2007), he indicated that in case when the distribution of 
investment profits to sukuk holders is based on those benchmarks rather being based 
on the real profit or otherwise the profits have not been linked to the investment 
activities but rather the percentage of profit is linked to the paid capital for sukuk that 
has been bought, then that will reverse the nature of the contract to riba loan contract 
similar to conventional bonds. In this regard, as it has been mentioned, AAOIFI 
(2010) stipulated that “the prospectus must not include any statement to the effect that 
the issuer of the certificate guarantees a fixed percentage of profit”. On the other 
hand, Almenea (2010) suggested that the periodic distribution of profits should be 
linked to the actual profit to be produced by the investment activity without paying 




6.2.8 Guarantee of the Capital 
 Elgari (2009) pointed out that many economists believe that sukuk that are not being 
rated cannot be circulated in the financial market, as the ‘credit rating’ is the one 
issued by international rating agencies. Such agencies rate financial performance 
including sukuk according to the credit risks which is considered as the ability of 
sukuk issuer to return the capital to sukuk holders and its ability also to secure the 
specific profits in the prospectus issuance. Elgari (2009) also argued that there is no 
way of rating the ability of sukuk issuer to return the capital money and its security to 
provide periodic profits to sukuk holders, unless the capital is being guaranteed in the 
form of a loan on sukuk issuer’s balance sheet. However, in case sukuk is based on 
real assets, usufruct or rights, then sukuk issuer will develop certain ruse such as 
making the capital as a loan on himself in his balance sheet. In addition, they will 
issue a binding promise agreement to buy those assets, usufruct or rights from sukuk 
holders at its current selling price. Consequently, his promise to return the money 
capital is considered as a commitment on himself subject to credit rating as it is 
considered as loan. Therefore, depending on the high classification of the issuer, the 
investor will be encouraged for investing in sukuk (Elgari, 2009).  
On the other hand, it could be argued that most sukuk contracts issued nowadays 
indirectly feature guarantees given to sukuk holders as managers make an undertaking 
to buy assets upon sukuk maturity for a given value regardless of their current value at 
the time of maturation (Usmani, 2007). This arrangement could be resemble to 
conventional as the manager will either be a loser in case of losses or a winner in case 
of gains, in which case sukuk holders will only be entitled to their principal amount. 
In such a case, that practice is considered as inconsistent with Shari’ah principles 
which prohibit any guarantees given to investors (Almarshidi, 2014). According to 
Shari’ah principles, at the end of the sukuk period or when there is intention for sale, 
sukuk holders should be entitled to the current market value of the asset involved 
(Tariq, 2004). In this regard, Usmani (2007) pointed out that the manager could 
become a speculator (mudarib), partner (shareek) or otherwise an investment agent 
(wakel) of potential investors depending on the situation. 
The AAOIFI (2010) standards in relation to investment sukuk provide that “The 




accepts the liability to compensate the owner of the certificate up to the nominal value 
of the certificate in situations other than torts and negligence”. In addition, it has been 
stated by the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Resolution No 178(4/19) concerning the sukuk 
and its current application, “the sukuk manager is a trustee that should not guarantee 
the capital except if there is a negligence or dereliction of his duty or otherwise 
inconsistency with the condition of musharakah, mudarabah or wakalah agency with 
respect to investment”. Accordingly, if the prospectus issuance included a statement 
of the condition featuring the commitment of the issuer or the sukuk manager to buy 
the underlying sukuk assets on its nominal value at a specific date, or otherwise the 
prospectus of issuance refers to the fact that sukuk holders should commit to sell their 
sukuk. This, then, will be considered as giving a guarantee of the capital that is not 
allowed in terms of Shari’ah (Merah, 2011). In addition, the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s 
Decision No 188 (3/20) states that “No mudarib, partner, or agent shall commit to 
buying Sukuk or Sukuk assets at their nominal value or with a predetermined value 
leading to capital guarantee or to current cash for deferred cash, save in cases 
pertaining to abuse and negligence, which require the guarantee of the rights of Sukuk 
holders”. Consequently, it should be mentioned that the guarantee of capital will 
transfer the process to riba transaction due to the fact that sukuk holder will receive a 
profit. However, he will not be considered as guarantor based on the Shari’ah rule of 
‘al ghonm bil gorm’ and that guarantorship will not be allowed by the Shari’ah 
scholars (Abu-Goudah, 1999).  
 However, in case the prospectus of issuance stated that a commitment of the issuer 
exists by buying the assets at its market value or a fair value, the in such a case, a 
different judgment can be made depending on the type of sukuk (Alroshood, 2013). 
Therefore, in case of tradable sukuk, such as musharakah, mudarabah or wakalah 
agency, the sukuk issuer can make a commitment in the prospectus of issuance of 
sukuk to buy whatever given to him by the sukuk holders after the process of issuance 
completed at the market value. As it is stated by AAOIFI (2010) that;  
It is not permissible for the Mudarib (investment manager), sharik (partner), or 
wakil (agent) to undertake (now) to re-purchase the assets from Sukuk holders or 
from one who holds them, for its nominal value, when the Sukuk are 
extinguished, at the end of its maturity. It is, however, permissible to undertake 
the purchase on the basis of the net value of assets, its market value, fair value 




Moreover, the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 178(4/19) regarding sukuk and 
its current application states that sukuk should not be returned back at its nominal 
value but rather should be at its market value or otherwise at the value to be agreed 
upon at the time of mature. In addition, the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 
30(3/4) stated that it is not allowed that the prospectus of issuance to feature a 
statement that make a commitment for sale, but otherwise it will be allowed the sukuk 
include promise for sale in which case the sale should only be completed with a new 
contracted at the estimated value to be made by the experts to the satisfaction of the 
parties involved.  
In this regard, it can be said that in case of partnership between the manager and 
potential sukuk holders, the former is not allowed according to Shari’ah rules due to 
the fact that giving guarantees to the sukuk holders on capital returns tend to disrupt 
the profit sharing agreement between the two parties (Almenea, 2010). In the 
meantime, as a partner, the manager should not give binding promises to investors to 
purchase assets at face value. In this respect, Usmani (2007) asserted that allowing 
managers of Islamic banks to return depositors’ investment tends to eliminate the 
distinction between sukuk and conventional deposit accounts. 
In addition, in cases where agency (wakel) becomes involved any guarantee given by 
the manager to investors is considered an unlawful practice as it has been stated by 
the AAOIFI. This should be so for the simple reason that agency or wakel features a 
contract of trust where no guarantees should be given by the investment agent except 
in cases of negligence (Usmani, 2007). However, this ruling stems from the fact that 
any guarantees given by the investment agent will render the enterprise into an 
interest-based loan in the sense of involving riba in violation of Shari’ah as it has 
been pointed out by the AAOIFI as well as the Islamic Fiqh Academy.  
Therefore, it becomes obvious from the above discussion that managers are not 
allowed to repurchase assets from sukuk holders at their face value at sukuk maturity. 
However, managers can repurchase assets at the current market value or otherwise at 
an agreed value at the time of purchase. Yet, guarantees on capital returns could only 
be valid in case of negligence on the part of sukuk manager by ignoring investors’ 
conditions as it has been issued by AAOIFI (2010) as well as the Islamic Fiqh 




As regards to the salam sukuk, AAOIFI (2010) states that “it is not permissible to 
trade in salam certificates’, as they represent loan and yet in case of the istisnaa 
sukuk. Their circulation is allowed in case the money became assets owned by sukuk 
holders during the time of production as AAOIFI (2010) stated that “It is 
permissible to trade in or redeem Istisnaa certificates if the funds have been 
converted, within the period of the Istisnaa, into assets owned by certificate 
holders”.   
On the other hand, it could be argued that there is a difference between guaranteeing 
the capital by sukuk manager and between the promises to buy sukuk assets at 
nominal value (Hassan, 2003). In this respect, Hassan (2003) noted that the 
guarantee that came from the sukuk manager include a promise to buy the assets 
from sukuk holders at the nominal value no matter those assets remain as original or 
have been damaged and so that guarantee with such commitment is not allowed in 
Shari’ah term. However, the allowed promising to buy at the nominal value by the 
sukuk manager is the promise which is based on the fact that buying at the nominal 
value will not take place unless the assets remain as original as in the first time of 
purchase without any change or damage. 
In contrast, Alkailani (2011) and Almarshidi (2014) argue that the value of the assets 
could be dropped without any change or damage on those assets depending on the 
market performance. Hence, despite the fact that the value of the assets has dropped, 
the sukuk manager has a duty to buy with the capital based on the promise given by 
him to buy at the nominal value. It means that there is no point for the differentiating 
between the assets being as original or not. 
In addition, it could be also noted that among the differences between the guarantee 
and the promise to buy is that the guarantee of the capital to buy the assets at the 
nominal value of sukuk should require sukuk holders have to sell their sukuk even if 
they do not like to sell, while the promise to buy should be a commitment to sukuk 
manager to buy but is not a commitment for the sukuk holders to sell (Hassan, 2003). 
However, that difference can be rejected by the fact that sukuk holders are forced 
indirectly to sell their sukuk at the specific time (five years normally) by sukuk 
manager so that the nominal value of their sukuk does not drop after five years. Thus, 




the sukuk holder to sell after five years because of the fear of losing the capital 
(Merah, 2011). Therefore, it can be argued that no difference exists between the 
guarantee and promise to buy at the nominal value according to the argument 
discussed early based on the current implications of sukuk. In addition, according 
AAOIFI (2010), Alroshood (2013) as well as the Islamic Fiqh Academy Decision No 
178(4/19) and 188(3/20), it can be concluded that it is permissible for sukuk manager 
to promise to buy the sukuk at the following conditions; 
(i)  The promise should feature the tradable sukuk; 
(ii) The promise should be given by sukuk issuer by buying what even on offer of 
sukuk by sukuk holders and that no promise should be given or commitment on 
sukuk holders to sell sukuk to the sukuk issuer; 
(iii) The purchase of sukuk should be based on the market value or what they agree 
upon at the time of selling; 
(iv) The purchase should take place after completing the process of issuance; 
(v) The promise to buy by the issuer should not include any commitment of sukuk 
holder to sell for sukuk issuer whether that is directly or indirectly such as promise to 
buy when it is linked to a specific date (such as making the issuer to say that he will 
buy the sukuk at a certain time). Thus, in case that is associated with a fixed date that 
will make one to understand that sukuk holders will be committed to sell their sukuk 
to the issuer at that date. In such a case, the failure to sell sukuk will make the value of 
sukuk drop, which will create an advantage to sukuk holders to sell their sukuk at the 
time to be fixed by sukuk issuer. In other words, linking the promise of purchase to a 
specific date will cause sukuk holders to initiate his proposal for selling before that 
date and that will lead to the same result regarding setting a condition for the sukuk 
holder to sell his sukuk. In this regard, Al-Qarafi (2003) stated that ‘ al-wasa’el laha 
ahkam al-maqasedt’ which implies that the methods will take the same rules as the 
aims so that if the aim is to commit the sukuk holder to sell, then the method that leads 
to that aim by fixing the date of buying will include the same rule which 
disallowance. In this respect, the Islamic Fiqh Academy Decision No 188(3/20) stated 
that “contracts should be free from fraud and sham (heal) and insuring that they will 
ultimately guarantee safety from the Shari’ah point of view”. 
In addition, it could be argued that another reason behind the prohibition of the 




by fixing a specific date is that such a contract is considered as two sales in one which 
is prohibited based on Shari’ah rules (Hammad, 2003). In this regard, Prophet 
Muhammad (may peace be upon Him) disallowed to make two sales in one sale. In 
addition, it has been stated that if two people made two sales in one sale contract, then 
both the sales are invalid as it is based on the intention that ‘I sell you as well as you 
sell me’ as a condition (Alroshood, 2013). This is due to the fact that making the sale 
transaction depends on the condition that ‘I sell you in a condition you sell me’ will 
make the ownership unstable as in the case the buyer did not fulfil his promise what 
will happen to the first sale. In other words, the real ownership does not exist unless 
the buyer sells what he has promised. Similarly, when there is a promise from the 
sukuk issuer to buy at the face value (after five years as the most of prospectuses 
stipulate) that will force the sukuk holders indirect way to sell their sukuk as the 
transaction will based on the arrangement that ‘I will sell you now and you should sell 
me after five years’. However, the transaction made through the way of promise to 
avoid the prohibition of making two sales in one will not change the reality as the 
sukuk holders will sell their sukuk because they want to obtain their capital back 
(Merah, 2011; Alroshood, 2013). Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that it is 
possible to avoid the promise of the issuer or the manager of sukuk to buy the assets at 
the nominal value through many legal ways in order to protect the assets against risks, 
as discussed below; 
(i)  Guarantee from the third party 
It could be argued that among the methods of protection of capital is commitment to 
be made by a third party to provide guarantee to the capital or the profit in favour of 
sukuk holders (Elgari, 2003; Lahsasna and Lin, 2012). That guarantee, however, can 
be expected from government officials in case the sukuk have been issued in favour of 
projects to benefit the public (Mshaal, 2012). In addition, it has been indicated by the 
AAOIFI (2010) that “it is permitted to an independent third party to provide a 
guarantee free of charge”. 
Moreover, Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 30(5/4) in relation to mudarabah 
and investment bonds states that “there is nothing wrong in terms of Shari’ah to 
provide in prospectus issuance a promise of a third party which is separate in terms of 




service without pay to cover any lose in any specific project, however, the 
commitment should be independent from the contract so that in case the third party 
fails to its commitment the contract will not be affected”. 
According to the forgoing, it could be concluded that for the third party to give a 
guarantee, a number of conditions are needed as follows: 
(a) The third party should be independent from sukuk issuer as well as sukuk holders 
according to the decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 30(4/5) and 
decision No 188(3/20). In addition, the independence of the third party should be 
financially ensured and neither the third party is owned by the issuer in full or by the 
majority of shares according to the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 30 (4/5) 
(Mshaal, 2012). In this regard, Merah (2011) asserted that the third party should not 
be as SPV, which has been established by the issuer or that the third party represents 
one of the companies of the issuer or otherwise the third party represents the state 
which will guarantee one of the issuances of its ministries or its government 
departments otherwise the guarantee becomes invalid;   
(b) In addition, the guarantee should be for free. In this respect, Alshobaili (2011) 
states that the guarantee with fees should be considered as a form of commercial 
insurance as the third party will be committed to pay any loss return for the pay that 
will be paid to him by the manager or sukuk holders and this process is not Shari’ah 
compliant according to Islamic Fiqh Academy as it constitutes part of prohibited 
commercial insurance. In contrast, Elgari (2010) argue that it is difficult to apply 
those conditions above in the financial transactions that aim for profit and that is what 
has been indicated by the decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy No 118(3/20), which 
has not been applied due to the strict conditions included in the decision. 
(ii) The reserve profits 
Among the methods to protect capital is the allocation of reserve from sukuk returns 
so as to cover the future potential losses (Ahmed, 2011). It should be noted that 
AAOIFI (2010) identified the reserve as being a certain amount taken out from profits 
to achieve specific aims. In addition, Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 188(3/20) 
in relation to sukuk states that “hedging measures may be taken against Sukuk capital 




governed by the rules of the Shari’ah”. Furthermore, it has been stated by AAOIFI 
(2010) regarding investment sukuk that; 
It is permissible for the issuer or the certificate holders to adopt permissible 
methods of managing risk, of mitigating fluctuation of distributable profits (profit 
equalization reserve), such as establishing an Islamic insurance fund with 
contributions of certificate holders, or by participating in Insurance (Takaful) by 
payment of premiums from the income of the shares of Sukuk holders or through 
donations (tabarru’at) made by the Sukuk holders. 
On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the establishment of reserve accounts 
constitutes one of the methods to be used to deal with all risks associated with sukuk 
aiming at keeping a certain level of sukuk returns (Duaabah, 2010). It is most likely 
that the issuance prospectus of sukuk includes statements indicating that some amount 
will be cut in excess of certain percentage of profits to be kept in a reserve account in 
favour to face keeping the level of profits indicated by the issuance prospectus 
(Toufahah, 2014). 
Nonetheless, the decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy has failed to explain where 
those reserves should go at the end of the sukuk period. According to Alanazi (2011), 
given that those reserves have been deducted against the shares of sukuk holders so 
that share should go back to them when sukuk expires. However, in case sukuk 
holders have sold their underlying sukuk assets before their sukuk expire, then 
whatever their shares they have in the reserve account either they give it up optionally 
in favour of other sukuk holders based on what it called in fiqh as ibra’a. The meaning 
of ibra’a is that the investors who sold their sukuk should give up their rights of their 
profits in the reserve account to others, or otherwise those reserves should go to 
charity organisations under the control of Shari’ah committee members of the bank 
and that after taking consent sukuk holders who are the owners of those reserves 
(Dagi, 2011). By contrast, Alanazi (2011) argues that it is preferable that the money 
should go back to the owners, which according to an accounting point of view will not 
be difficult given the methods of modern technology. 
6.2.9 The Deduction of Reserves from Shari’ah Perspective 
It could be argued that one of the critical issues that can be taken against the reserves 
is deducting reserve amounts for more than is really required. In this regard, it has 




profits is measured by the amount thought by the management as necessary”. 
Therefore, the estimation of the reserve amount is a matter for the management 
department to decide and yet one of the setbacks of the management is that it 
approves amounts not based on real studies as those reserves will go to the 
management as a bonus (Alanazi, 2011).  
In this regard, Alanazi (2011) pointed out that the condition associated with the 
incentive has most likely come from sukuk manager and that amount of reserves to be 
charged against profits will also be decided by sukuk manager. Therefore, it could be 
argued that there will be a conflict of interest as there is nothing that disallow sukuk 
manager to fix a huge amount of reserves to face risks and there might be some sort of 
believe that such risks might not take place and yet given that at the end of the period 
he makes use of those reserves as a bonus, the sukuk manager, then, manages to 
increase the amount of those reserves to get benefit of them. In other words, the sukuk 
manager or issuer is the one who decides the amount of reserves and hence he will be 
the one who benefits from those reserves as a bonus. For this reason, the scholars 
have disallowed the agent to buy the goods that have been given to them to sell them 
on behalf of the seller. 
6.2.10 The Condition set by the Sukuk Issuer to Benefit of the Reserve Account   
Observation and examination would show that a number of issuance prospectus stated 
that the sukuk manager has got the right to benefit from amounts available in the 
reserve account with the guarantee given. However, this cannot be allowed, as it is 
considered as a loan from sukuk holders to sukuk manager. In addition, this will 
constitute a combination of sale and loan in one contract, which is not Shari’ah 
compliant, as Prophet Muhammad (pease be upon Him) prohibited the transaction of 
combining sale with loan (Alshobaili, 2011). However, Alanazi (2011) suggested that 
instead of giving loan, the sukuk issuer or manager should invest whatever is available 
in the reserve account in favour of sukuk holders and through a mudarabah contract 
the two sides will agree on a percentage of profit between them. In addition, 
Alshobaili (2011) also suggested that the reserves should go to Islamic accounts 




6.2.11 The Condition of a Loan When the Profit Becomes Less than a Specific 
Percentage 
Sukuk manager will be normally committed to offer a loan without interest to sukuk 
holders in order to guarantee a distribution of a specific return to sukuk holders at 
fixed dates. In this, loan is made when no profit is made from the project or that the 
profits comes less than amount as stated in the prospectus issuance. 
In this regard, Almarshidi (2014) pointed out that in case the loan given by sukuk 
manager will be paid back then that action will be allowed, as the manager will be 
paid back his loan of the profits he got from coming periods, and if there is no profits 
he will get that back from sukuk assets when sukuk expire. However, in case the loan 
is not paid then that will be not Shari’ah compliant, as such a practice is not allowed 
by the consensus of the Shari’ah scholars due to the fact that this provides a guarantee 
for profit. However, since the profit at the time of contract is not available, they 
cannot guarantee something unavailable (profit) and cannot be given (Alshobaili, 
2011). In addition, according to Usmani (2007), providing loan without any condition 
to get it back is not allowed, as it brings together selling and giving loan. 
On the other hand, when profits turn out to be lesser than the fixed percentage, the 
promise from the manager for giving loan to the sukuk holders will most likely be in 
return for sukuk holders for giving up their profits if they exceed the fixed percentage 
in favour of the manager and the issuer (Merah, 2011). Consequently, according to 
Shari’ah rules, such a practice is not allowed, as it has got loan and sale that comes 
together in one contract, which is prohibited due to having a combination of sale and 
loan in one contract, and every loan that makes a profit is considered as a riba. 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No  
178(4/19) in relation to sukuk states that “it is not allowed for sukuk manager to 
promise to lend sukuk holders or give free donation to make up for the real profit 
which is less than expected profit”. Furthermore, the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s 
Decision No 188(3/20) also stated that “lending to Sukuk holders when the real return 
on Sukuk falls below the projected return thus leading to borrowing and selling or 





By contrast, according to Almarshidi (2014), some believe that the disallowance of 
promise is related to do with investment sukuk (musharakah, mudarabah and 
wakalah). In such sukuk cases, it is not allowed for sukuk manager (being a mudarib, 
shareek or wakeel) to commit to give a loan to sukuk holders in case insufficient 
sukuk assets returns compared to the fixed return as indicated by the prospectus of 
issuance. Such a case can lead to a combination contract bringing sale and loan 
together in one contract which is disallowed as being similar to riba. Nonetheless, for 
funding sukuk, such as sukuk al-manfa’a or sukuk al-hughog (rights’ sukuk), it is 
allowed for sukuk manager to give a loan to sukuk holders in case the returns comes 
out to be less. This is due to the fact that sukuk manager is considered as an 
independent third party, but on condition that promise remains independent and is not 
associated with condition in the contract. In addition, as has been stated by AAOIFI 
(2010), “It is not permissible for the Manager of Sukuk, whether the manager acts as 
Mudarib (investment manager), or Shareek (partner), or Wakeel (agent) for 
investment, to undertake to offer loans to Sukuk holders, when actual earnings fall 
short of expected earnings”. 
On the other hand, in case the loan given by sukuk manager to guarantee a distribution 
of a specific return to sukuk holders at fixed dates that will not be paid back as it is 
considered as a donation from the manager of sukuk to sukuk holder then that 
transaction will be prohibited as it is considered as a guarantee for the return 
(Alshobaili, 2011). In this regard, Almarshidi (2014) also argued that it is not allowed 
to provide a non-refundable loan to sukuk holders as the issuer is considered as a 
trustee and the trustee cannot be guarantor unless if there is any negligence from the 
issuer. 
6.2.12 The Condition of Incentive for the Sukuk Manager 
It should be mentioned that the incentive is the condition to be paid to the manager of 
sukuk for his good performance in addition to what is given for him as indicated by 
the prospectus of issuance (Alshobaili, 2011). In addition, in most sukuk issuances, 
the condition is normally set by the issuer that in case he discovers an excess of the 
reserve account at the end of the sukuk period amounts more than the expected rate to 




has the right to take whatever is excess into the reserve account as bonus for his good 
performance (Almenea, 2010). 
However, according to Alzuohaili (2000) and Almasrei (2000), such a condition 
invalid for a number of reasons. The first reason is that such a condition will lead to 
the termination of profit sharing between the sukuk manager and sukuk holders. In 
addition, the amount of profit in excess of the fixed percentage as referred to by 
issuance prospectus is unknown. Furthermore, the incentive is considered from 
Shari’ah perspective as an ujrah (wage) so that the condition of ujrah should be 
known. Moreover, it could be argued that such condition will make the contract not 
real, as the profits are usually based on the conventional benchmark. As a 
consequence, in case the manager takes whatever becomes excess of the expected of 
the profits, then the process will converge towards conventional bonds. This is due to 
the fact that bonds holders have only a certain percentage as fixed in the bond and 
anything in excess of the benchmark from the profit should go to the bonds manager. 
Furthermore, among the reasons that make such a situation to be disallowed is that 
musharakah and mudarabah sukuk make both two parties share the profit and loss.  
Such a condition for bonus should not be consistent with contract given that no 
sharing will be on profit, as the profit will go to the sukuk issuer or sukuk manager and 
the condition, as a result, will be invalid. 
By contrast, Aldareer (1993) and Alshobaili (2011) believe that the sukuk manager 
will be allowed to set such condition according to Ibn Abbas, as Ibn Abbas stated that 
“it has allowed for somebody to ask another to sell a shirt on behalf of him for a 
specific price and yet what is in excess of that it is for the seller as an incentive”. In 
addition, it could be argued that from Shari’ah principles, whatever has been said by 
the Sahabah will be considered as a judgment unless there has been a proof based on 
Shari’ah to argue against that; hence, this maxim is valid for Ibn Abbas’ statement 
(Alshobaili, 2011). Moreover, the bonus does not terminate the share of profits as the 
manager will share the profits with sukuk holders to a certain limit and then will take 
what comes as excess. This evidences that there will be an initial share, which does 
not make that contract invalid, as long there is a share. In addition, the validity is also 
provided by Shari’ah, as there is nothing in Qur’an or the Sunnah making the 




states that “Oh you who believe you should not try to take other people’s money 
without good reason unless it is a trade agreed between you”. Therefore, Almighty 
Allah puts the agreement as a condition in case of trade. Thus, when an agreement 
takes place and nothing else in Shari’ah that indicates invalidity then the contract will 
be valid, and also an hadith states that “the Muslims are upon their conditions” 
(Alshobaili, 2011). 
However, according to Usmani (2007), there are some details in the condition of the 
incentive: if there is any kind of fixation of the ujrah for the sukuk manager and that 
any excess will be a bonus for the manager that will be allowed by the most of 
scholars as there is no denial of wages and whatever comes in excess of the wage will 
go as a bonus for the manager of sukuk for his good performance. This is supported 
by AAOIFI’s (2010) in Mudarabah Standard No. 13 states that  
If one of the parties stipulates that he should receive a lump sum of money, the 
Mudarabah contract shall be void. This rule does not apply to a situation where the 
parties agree that if the profit is over a particular ceiling then one of the parties will 
take the additional profit and if the profit is below or equal to the amount of the 
ceiling the distribution of profit will be in accordance with their agreement. 
On the other hand, Usmani (2007) believes in the invalidity of the current applications 
of the sukuk structures with regard to the fixation of the distribution of profits and the 
way they work out the incentive for sukuk manager. In this regard, he referred to the 
fact that according to many scholars who approved that the manager of sukuk has to 
take whatever comes in excess of a specific percentage of the profits as a bonus to 
him for his good performance. This is due to the fact that they are allowed the excess 
based on the fact that the incentive will be based on the expected profits of the project 
that are based on real studies of the project and not to fix the bonus based on profit 
benchmarks of riba as is being made now in many sukuk structures. For that reason, 
Usmani (2007) and Almenea (2010) believes that the bonus featuring current sukuk 
structures is not a real bonus but rather is a result of making sukuk mimicking riba 
bonds to fix a certain amount of profits for sukuk holders according to an benchmark 
or benchmark and not based on the real profits of the project and what comes as an 
excess of profits goes to sukuk manager.   
Accordingly, Almenea (2010) argued that the sukuk manager has no right to take 




addition, the sukuk manager has the right to take a reasonable percentage of the profits 
by the consent of sukuk holders, as the sukuk manager takes a share that has been 
fixed for him by the prospectus of issuance. Therefore, he has no right in the profits of 
the excess expected percentage, which should go to the sukuk holders. According to 
Merah (2008), the incentive agreement made between the sukuk manager and sukuk 
holder was not based on an agreement from the sukuk holders but it was set as a 
precondition for sukuk holders that the bonus should be owned by the sukuk manager 
and that sukuk holders have no option to reject that condition. 
In addition, Elgari (2011) asserted that the sukuk manager has no right to set a 
condition for sukuk holders featuring prospectus issuance as to give up the right in 
relation to the amount of money available in the reserve account at the end of the 
sukuk period. However, in case sukuk holders have received whatever amount in the 
reserve account and they have the ability and full control of the amount in the reserve 
account, then there is nothing wrong according to Shari’ah to allow them to give what 
they have received to the sukuk manager as an incentive. 
On the other hand, it should be noted from the maqased al-Shari’ah point of view, the 
incentive system with regard to sukuk structures that are widespread today has not 
been in favour of the high moral code aiming at the distribution of wealth among 
investors based on fair system. This is partly due to the fact that sukuk structures 
which are available that are based on the bonus system has made the profit based on 
the interest rate not on the real profit of the project and so that makes one party take 
advantage of the other (Usmani, 2007). In this regard, the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s 
Decision No 188(3/20) stated that “Islamic sukuk should achieve the maqased al-
Shari’ah in terms of developing and supporting real activities and the administration 




The discussion in the preceding section is summarised in a systematic manner by 
presenting the results of the evaluation points in examining sukuk structures based on 




(i) The validity of the structure: the structure should not be like enah or wafaa 
structure or other structure, which resembles to bonds structures; 
(ii) The real nature of the ownership: sukuk have to represent the right of ownership 
no matter being ownership of properties, usufructs or services etc.; 
(iii) The validity of the underlying sukuk assets: Some issuances do not represent the 
real assets, usufruct or services or otherwise rights that can be financially assessed and 
evaluated in the market; 
(iv) The guarantee of the returns: The prospectus must not include any statement to 
the effect that the issuer guarantees a fixed percentage of profit; 
(v) The distribution of profits based on the benchmark: The periodic distribution of 
profits should be linked to the actual profit to be produced by the investment activity;   
(vi) The guarantee of the capital: The prospectus must not include any statement to 
the effect that the issuer of the certificate accepts the liability to compensate the owner 
of the certificate up to the nominal value of the certificate in situations other than torts 
and negligence; 
(vii) The promise of purchase: Sukuk managers are not allowed to repurchase assets 
from sukuk holders for their face value at sukuk maturity. However, managers can 
repurchase assets at the current market value or otherwise at an agreed value at the 
time of purchase; 
(viii) The guarantee from the third party: The third party should be separate in terms 
of identity and financial independence from the two parties of the contract and the 
guarantee should be also for free; 
(ix) The reserves profits: Reserves should go at the end of the sukuk period to sukuk 
holders as they are the owners; 
(x) The deducting of reserves: Sukuk should be based on real study and evaluation; 
(xi) The condition set by sukuk issuer to benefit from the reserve account: All the 




(xii) The condition of a loan when the profit becomes less than a specific percentage: 
It is not permissible for the manager of sukuk, whether the manager acts as mudarib 
(investment manager), or shareek (partner), or wakeel (agent) for investment, to 
undertake to offer loans to sukuk holders, when actual earnings fall short of expected 
earnings. 
6.3 PERSPECTIVES OF THE SBSS MEMBERS ON THE STRUCTURE OF 
SABIC SUKUK: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
This section aims to present and discuss the position, opinions and understandings of 
the members of the Shari’ah board of SABIC sukuk (SBSS) with regard to the issues 
related to the structure of SABIC sukuk, as SABIC is the empirical case in this study. 
Each section in the following discussion relates to a particular issue, in which the 
opinions and understandings of the interviewed Shari’ah scholars as part of SBSS are 
reported.  
6.3.1 The Structure of SABIC Sukuk 
This section presents a discussion based on the opinions and understandings of the 
interviews in relation to SABIC sukuk structure.  
6.3.1.1 Questioning the nature of the SABIC sukuk contract 
According to the Interviewee 6 (first member of the SBSS), SABIC Company has 
issued three types of sukuk all of which have the same structure known as manfa’ah 
sukuk (usufructs sukuk). Interviewee 6 identified the term manfa’ah or usufruct as the 
benefit of the sale, as SABIC undertakes the marketing of the products of subsidiary 
companies. However, SABIC undertakes the marketing of the products of those 
companies, and in return takes fees and commission for the service. Thus, SABIC has 
opted to sell that privilege, featuring the right of marketing the products of subsidiary 
companies to sukuk holders. For that reason, SABIC sukuk are given the name 
‘manfa’ah sukuk’ or usufruct sukuk. In addition, it has been asserted by Interviewee 6 
that it is imperative that the name of the contract should be mentioned in the issuance 
prospectus.   
On the other hand, he pointed out that the initial structure that has been presented to 
the SBSS has been inconsistent with Shari’ah principles and in fact the structure from 




bonds to sukuk. Moreover, he argued that the initial structure can be described as riba-
based structure rather than Shari’ah-based sukuk structure. Eventually, SBSS has 
discovered the trick and SBSS have managed to introduce the necessary amendments 
so that all issuances of SABIC sukuk (one, two and three) have become Shari’ah 
compliant according to the Interviewee 6. 
According to the Interviewee 7 (second member of the SBSS), the SABIC Company 
has the right of marketing the products of its subsidiary companies, as he maintained 
that right by virtue of its competitiveness even though it has no shares in some of 
those companies. However, SABIC sold those rights of marketing to sukuk holders. 
Accordingly, SABIC sukuk could be given the name the ‘sukuk of rights’ or ‘rights of 
privilege’ (concession).   
In addition, Interviewee 7 confirmed that it is essential to mention the name of the 
contract between SABIC and sukuk holders pointing out that mentioning the subject 
of the contract is even more important. He also suggested that where sukuk is 
involved, there is always something to be sold to sukuk holders. However, in case of 
SABIC sukuk what is to be sold is the right of marketing known as the ‘privilege 
right’, which labels SABIC sukuk as ‘marketing rights sukuk’. 
However, according to the Interviewee 8 (third member of SBSS), SABIC sukuk has 
something to do with leasing rather than selling of manfa’ah (usufruct). As a matter of 
fact, contracts featuring the selling of usufructs are non-existent in Shari’ah but rather 
leasing contracts, as the selling of usufruct is known as leasing. In other words, in 
Shari’ah, the term ‘sale’ defines the selling of assets, while the term ‘ijarah’ defines 
the selling of usufruct. Accordingly, those who perceive SABIC company as having 
sold a manfa’ah are wrong and their understanding of Islamic contracts should be 
questionable. In addition, those who believe what has been sold to sukuk holders are 
privilege of rights is also wrong, and that SABIC sukuk has to be labelled as a 
‘marketing sukuk’. In fact, SABIC has not sold anything but has leased its right for 
marketing the products of its subsidiary companies to sukuk holders. Therefore, 
contrary to the belief of those who do not understand the idea of sukuk, SABIC has 
leased rather than sold the rights and obligations of the marketing contracts to sukuk 




the SBSS with regard to the idea that it is fundamental that the name of the contract 
should be mentioned in the issuance prospectus.  
In reflecting on the discussion of interviewee analysis, the following conclusions can 
be drawn: 
(i) SABIC has made three issuances of sukuk; 
(ii) The members of SBSS are divided with regard to the description of SABIC sukuk 
structure;   
(iii) Regarding the first issuance, it became obvious to the SBSS that those who had 
been involved in the structuring process had intended to mislead the SBSS through 
structuring SABIC sukuk in a manner that made it look very similar to the structure of 
riba-based bonds, and by doing so, they meant to cheat customers by changing names 
from bonds to sukuk.   
(iv) All the members of SBSS have agreed that it is important the name of the contract 
should feature in the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk. 
6.3.1.2 The differences between SABIC sukuk and SABIC bonds 
In responding to the differences between SABIC sukuk and SABIC bonds, 
Interviewee 6 argued that SABIC bonds that had been issued prior to the sukuk should 
not have been allowed as they were based on ribawi transaction, and the amounts paid 
by investors to SABIC should, in reality, be considered as debts. Consequently, the 
relationship should be described as a borrower-lender relationship, according to which 
SABIC should pay periodic riba on those debts. This implies that the bond holder will 
return his capital back when the expiry date is due. By contrast, with regard to sukuk 
holders, they are different to bond holders as in the case of sukuk, the investor 
purchases assets or usufructs, so that the relationship between SABIC company and 
sukuk holders can be described as a buyer-seller relationship. It follows that sukuk 
holders have the right of selling their sukuk with a profit of 10% for instance, to a 
third party as they are considered the owners of the usufructs. However, selling the 





On the other hand, Interviewee 7 pointed out that those who are not aware of the 
nature of sukuk could be in a state of confusion. In this regard, he mentioned that 
some might deem sukuk as being similar to bonds regarding the profit generated to 
holders of either of them, as bond holders are given a specific percentage of the value 
of their bonds. So is the case with SABIC sukuk holders, as they are being paid fixed 
periodic returns, and that makes them similar to riba-based bonds. He, however, 
stated that in case of sukuk, the returns are the outcome a commercial process, and 
that the stability of sukuk returns is a matter that has to do with the organisation made 
by the companies involved to keep good control of liquidity.   
In addition to the above argument, interviewee 8 added that one of the most important 
differences between SABIC sukuk and SABIC bonds is that, the latter are guaranteed 
by the issuer as bond holders will surely be paid back their capital when the expiry 
date of the bond is due, while no guarantee is given to sukuk holders, instead, profit 
and loss will be existed and sukuk holders will bear the risk of loss.  
Reflecting on the above discussed responses of Shari’ah board members to the above 
questions, the following conclusion can be drawn; 
(i) There is an agreement from all members of the SBSS that the main differences 
between SABIC bonds and SABIC sukuk are; 
(a) In the case of sukuk, the relationship between SABIC company and sukuk 
holders can be described as a buyer-seller relationship whereas in bonds, the 
relationship should be described as a borrower-lender relationship; 
(b) In SABIC sukuk, there is no guarantee to the capital, while in SABIC 
bonds the capital that were paid from bonds holders to SABIC is guaranteed 
when it is due. In other words, bonds holders will not bear any risks as their 
money will be back in the time of expiry contract. By contract, sukuk holders 
will share the loss and profit; 
(c) In SABIC sukuk, the returns of the sukuk are not guaranteed as it depends 
on the performing of the assets underling sukuk, whereas in SABIC bonds 




(ii)  In response to those who argue that SABIC sukuk is similar to riba-based bonds; 
one of the members of Shari’ah board has made a distinction between the regular 
constant returns given to sukuk holders and those given to bond holders. 
6.3.1.3 The financial commitments between SABIC and its subsidiaries 
This section focused on exploring the views of the Shari’ah scholars on the separation 
and isolation in the financial commitments (financial disclosure), between SABIC and 
its subsidiaries; and whether that should become a requirement or not. In this regard, 
Interviewee 6 made it clear that such a distinction between the financial commitment 
of SABIC company and its subsidiaries is imperative. However, according to 
Interviewee 6, what is written in the financial records of SABIC company considering 
the underlying of SABIC sukuk as debts should be considered as a mistake made by 
SABIC company which has nothing to do with sukuk that have already been sold to 
sukuk holders. In his view, SABIC has a duty to write off the value of sukuk that have 
been sold from its financial records. Moreover, sukuk holders have nothing to do with 
SABIC malpractices regarding its financial records. That is for the simple reason that 
sukuk holders are the only beneficiaries from the marketing of the products of SABIC 
subsidiary companies as dictated by the sukuk contracts they hold. 
As for Interviewee 7, he argued that a distinction of financial commitments between 
SABIC and its subsidiary companies actually exists due to the fact that even though 
those companies could be partially affiliated to SABIC, and yet SABIC could have 
owned some shares in those companies. Therefore, as long as those companies are not 
fully owned by SABIC, that should imply a distinction between SABIC and its 
subsidiary companies in terms of accounting and annual budgets. However, the fact 
that whether SABIC refers to sukuk in its financial records as debts or they keep the 
assets in the financial records as their assets should not affect the ownership of sukuk 
holders to their assets.   
However, Interviewee 8 suggested that the real practice should be the main concern 
rather than what would be written in the books and financial records. In other words, 
the fact that SABIC refers to sukuk value in its financial records as debts should be 
deemed as an accounting error, given that the accountants have no experience in 
Shari’ah matters. However, in case that happens, it will not be a problem as the real 




In critically reflecting on the responses delivered by the members of SBSS in this 
section, the following conclusions can be developed: 
(i) It is important to determine matters in relation to financial commitments between 
SABIC and its subsidiary companies and that every company should have its financial 
statements records; 
(ii)  The members of SBSS have been divided as to whether SABIC has the right to 
include the sukuk in its financial records as debts. Some believe that it is a wrong 
procedure and that SABIC has no right to do that, while others argue that such 
procedure does not affect the validity of SABIC sukuk as well as should not be 
associated with any risks in Shari’ah or legal terms. 
6.3.1.4 The real sharing of profits and losses between sukuk holders and sukuk 
issuer (SABIC) 
In examining the share of profits and losses between sukuk holders and sukuk issuer, 
namely SABIC, both the Interviewee 6 and Interviewee 8 argued that profits and 
losses should be shared between sukuk holders and SABIC, which would constitute 
the basis for Islamic transactions in line with Shari’ah principles. In this regard, 
Interviewee 6 asserted that, failure of the two parties to share profits and losses tends 
to render the commercial practice involved as being Shari’ah non-compliant. 
Interviewee 7, on the other hand, argued that it is the type of sukuk contract that 
makes the difference. Therefore, taking this viewpoint into account implies that 
sharing of profits and losses should only feature musharakah contracts rather than 
ijarah contracts. The same could be said about murabahah and mudarabah contracts, 
which are common these days, as in case of murabahah, there should be no sharing of 
profit or loss. 
Furthermore, on discussing the nature of the SABIC sukuk, all the interviewees, 
namely Interviewee 6, 7 and 8, asserted that there is a sharing of profits and losses 
between SABIC company as (wakeel) not as an issuer and sukuk holders. In this 
regard, the sukuk holders will bear risks as there is no guarantee for the capital. 





(i) Two of the members of SBSS explained that sharing the profit and loss is one of 
the basic rules of business transactions for Shari’ah compliancy, while the 
Interviewee 8 adds that the process of sharing profit or loss varies from one contract 
to another. 
(ii) Two of the members of SBSS argued that SABIC sukuk feature the sharing of 
gain and loss between SABIC as agent and sukuk holders whereas Interviewee 8 has 
argued that sharing profit or loss depends on the type of contract. Yet, in case of 
SABIC sukuk the type of contract has not been explained. 
6.3.2 The Assets of SABIC Sukuk 
This section aims to report and discuss the position of the sampled SBSS members 
with regard to the issues related to the nature of the assets of SABIC sukuk. 
6.3.2.1 The nature of the assets of SABIC sukuk 
In exploring the issues regarding the nature of the assets of SABIC sukuk, Interviewee 
6 (first member of the interviewed SBSS) mentioned that the assets of SABIC sukuk 
represented the commission offered to SABIC in return for the efforts made by 
SABIC regarding the marketing of the products of its subsidiary companies. In the 
construct, that commission was considered to have the sole ownership of SABIC, and 
that SABIC preferred to sell it to investors. In other words, the assets of SABIC sukuk 
represented the benefit of the concession given to SABIC for marketing the products 
of its subsidiary companies, and that benefit will be the assets of SABIC sukuk. 
However, the Interviewee 6 noted that the assets of SABIC sukuk are the marketing 
contracts signed between SABIC and its subsidiary companies. The Interviewee 8 on 
the other hand defined the assets of SABIC sukuk as being the right of marketing of 
the products of SABIC subsidiary companies, and that right had been hired to sukuk 
holders.  
From the responses of the members of the board in relation to the nature of the assets 
of the SABIC sukuk, the following inferences can be drawn: 
(i) The members of the SBSS are divided over the nature of assets in relation to 
SABIC sukuk, which is part and parcel of the previous differences, which has already 




focused on the label of Shari’ah-based contract featuring SABIC sukuk, while the 
current difference is over the assets of SABIC sukuk that will be sold to sukuk holders 
which determines the profits to be given to sukuk holders;  
(ii)  The members of the SBSS are of different opinion in relation to the nature of 
assets as some believe that the assets of SABIC sukuk represent ‘the benefit generated 
by selling the product of SABIC subsidiary companies’, and as has previously been 
mentioned benefits represents a percentage of profits as a function of interest rate as a 
benchmark. However, other believe that SABIC sukuk represent ‘the marketing 
contracts between SABIC and its subsidiary companies’, while Interviewee 8 argued 
that the underlying SABIC sukuk asset is ‘the right of marketing the products of 
SABIC subsidiary companies or what is known as privilege right’. 
6.3.2.2 The real transfer of the assets   
Interviewee 6 has made it certain that a full transfer of sukuk assets to sukuk holders 
have taken place in the arrangement of SABIC sukuk, so that no other party will have 
the right of ownership of those assets, as they will become the sole ownership of 
sukuk holders. In other words, he stated that sukuk holders were considered to be the 
only party that will have the authority to dispose of the sukuk assets. In addition, the 
process of sukuk transfer will be legally documented.  
As for the Interviewee 7, he assumed that it will be incumbent on SABIC that have 
the privilege of marketing, to transfer the marketing contracts with its subsidiary 
companies to sukuk holders. The Interviewee 8, on the other hand, agreed with the 
rest that, the sukuk assets in the case of SABIC sukuk, have been transferred to sukuk 
holders. Yet, further argued that the transfer process should not be affected by the fact 
that those assets have been referred to in SABIC financial records as debts. In his 
view, the realities and facts should make all the difference rather than what is being 
written in the accounting records.   
In addition, according to the Interviewee 6, he pointed out that the structure of SABIC 
sukuk had been initially presented to the SBSS. However, the board had made some 
comments on the structure including the fact that the transfer of sukuk assets was not 
real. Thus, taking that point into account, the SBSS have managed to make the 




From the responses of the members of the board to the transfer of SABIC sukuk 
assets, the following inferences can be drawn: 
(i) The members of SBSS agree that a real transfer of sukuk assets from the issuer 
(SABIC) to sukuk holders has taken place; 
(ii)  One of the members of the SBSS has asserted that the transfer of sukuk has been 
legally documented; 
(iii)  One of the members has made it clear that it is not necessary that as a condition 
for the transfer of sukuk should not feature on the financial records of the issuer, and 
the fact that those assets feature on SABIC financial records (the issuer) as debts 
should affect the transfer of ownership as what counts is facts on the ground rather 
than what feature in the accounting records; 
(iv)  According to the other member of the SBSS, the real transfer of assets gives the 
sukuk holders the full freedom to have control over their underlying sukuk without 
being restricted by the issuer. 
6.3.2.3 The periodical profits given to sukuk holders  
It should be mentioned that there is an argument regarding the returns on sukuk as to 
whether the returns are consistent with the sukuk assets and according to the 
performance of the assets of SABIC sukuk or that is only determined by the market 
interest rates rather than the nature of sukuk assets according to some interviewees 
who are not from SBSS. 
The Interviewee 6 pointed out that SABIC sukuk returns are the function of the 
marketing process, i.e. the higher the marketing the higher the returns. On the other 
hand, SABIC as a representative (wakeel) of sukuk holders in the marketing process 
together with sukuk holders have agreed on a fixed return based on a percentage rate 
to be consistent with SIBOR or LIBOR benchmark for instance, to be given to sukuk 
holders so that any excess money should go to the reserve account in favour of sukuk 
holders. The main reason for fixing the rate based on a certain benchmark is to 
overcome any accounting difficulties regarding the distribution of profits generated 
from sukuk assets as those assets vary from one month to another. However, having 




holders and will be used to compensate for any deficits in the periodic profits to be 
distributed among sukuk holders, and that in case of liquidation any sums that remain 
in the reserve account will be given to sukuk holders. 
Interviewee 7 (a second member of Shari’ah board) has also made it certain that the 
profits and periodic returns should be linked to sukuk assets rather than the 
benchmark. However, linking the returns to the index should be for the sake of 
stability of returns. To explain this matter, he noted that some companies such as 
insurance companies prefer low risk investments with stable returns such as sukuk. By 
contrast, insurance companies avoid investment in shares where the risks are high and 
returns are high compared to sukuk though those returns are not stable. However, 
some group of investors prefer to opt for sukuk by arguing that they do not mind to go 
for low returns as long as those returns are stable. They believe that such returns will 
enable them repay their financial commitments to other companies. Thus, the stability 
of returns on the issuance is an important requirement for the issuance to succeed. For 
that reason, the purpose of the reserve account is to achieve stability; thus, the 
argument that the profits are generated by the company that sells sukuk (SABIC) 
rather than sukuk assets is not true. 
From responses of the SBSS members, the following conclusion can be drawn: 
(i) There is an agreement among the members of the SBSS that the return from 
sukuk is a function of sukuk assets and that SABIC as a seller has nothing to do with 
sukuk returns; 
(ii) The members of the SABIC SBSS pointed out that an agreement between SABIC 
and sukuk holders exist regarding the determination of profit percentage and linking 
that percentage with the interest rate benchmark as it becomes difficult to work out 
monthly profits given the variable nature of profits not to mention the fact that linking 
profits with the benchmark is useful in terms of stability of returns. 
(iii) One of the members has stressed that whatever goes to the reserve account 




6.3.2.4 The source of the sukuk returns 
On the issue of the sukuk returns, some of the non-SBSS member interviewees argued 
that the profits given to sukuk holders are linked to the financial solvency of the sukuk 
issuer (SABIC) rather than the performance of the assets of sukuk itself. For that 
reason, they believe that there is an indication of the fact that the existence of sukuk 
assets in the current application of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is a formality, which should 
be considered as an important revelation. 
According to the Interviewee 6, a member of the SABIC sukuk SBSS, only those who 
deal in traditional bonds will be concerned about the financial solvency of the issuer; 
however, this should not be a worry for sukuk holders. This, however, should 
distinguish the difference between sukuk and traditional bonds, as the latter give 
profits based on the financial solvency of the issuer, not to mention the fact that bonds 
do not feature any assets but rather bond price, which is considered to be a debt to be 
owed by the issuer to the bond holders with no commitment of buying and selling. By 
contrast, the idea of sukuk structures is different as sukuk feature assets to be owned 
by sukuk holders so that the returns should be a function of the value of the assets 
irrespective of the financial solvency of the sukuk issuer. Thus, any decrease in the 
value of the assets will mean a decrease in the returns of sukuk as the returns are a 
function of sukuk assets and have nothing to do with the financial solvency of the 
issuer as the case with riba-based bonds. 
From responses of the SBSS members on the issue of sukuk assets and its link with 
the return, the following can be concluded: 
(i) the members of SBSS have made it certain that the financial solvency of SABIC 
company as a seller has nothing to do with the determination of returns, and that the 
return is usually a function of the size of marketing of the products of the companies 
by SABIC; 
(ii) One of the interviewees explained that depending on the financial solvency of the 





6.3.2.5 The value of sukuk after circulation in the secondary markets 
On the issue of the value of the sukuk after circulation in the secondary markets, some 
interviewees who were not from SABIC sukuk SBSS mentioned that the value of 
sukuk after circulation in the secondary markets are not affected by the value of sukuk 
assets, but rather affected by the periodical batches of sukuk as well as the market 
interest rates. In another words, there is no real link between the value of sukuk and 
the underlying assets of sukuk. Thus, there is an indication of the fact that the 
existence of sukuk assets is a formality. 
It should be noted that there seems to be wide debate among the non-SBSS member 
interviewees that have taken place involving many of the critics of sukuk who argue 
that in practice the increase or decrease of the value of assets in the financial market 
does not affect the value of sukuk as the case with traditional bonds. However, those 
critics believe that it has been observable in the sukuk market that the value of sukuk 
assets may increase or decrease, while the value of sukuk remains almost the same. In 
other words, no real relationship exists between sukuk value and the value of the 
underlying assets, pointing out that the former is really affected by the periodic 
payments of sukuk by increasing or decreasing as well as the interest rates. 
According to the Interviewee 6, a member of the SABIC sukuk SBSS, with regard to 
riba-based bonds, the above mentioned observation should be true, however, not with 
regard to sukuk.  In his view that should distinguish between sukuk and bonds, as the 
latter is linked to the index and the value of the bond will be determined accordingly. 
However, since there are no assets to be owned by bond holders, the bonds become a 
debt to be owed to the holders by the issuer with no purchases or sales taking place. In 
case of sukuk, the situation is different as there are assets to be owned by sukuk 
holders, and that those assets generate profits as has already been mentioned.  
On the other hand, the Interviewee 7 seems to be unsure as to whether following 
circulation in the secondary markets, the value of sukuk will not be affected by the 
changing value of the underlying assets, but rather affected by the periodic payments 
of sukuk as well as the prevailing interest rates. However, the Interviewee 7 made 
some correction to admit that there could be some link between sukuk value and the 




be affected by one another.  He went on to argue that investors featuring the financial 
markets are well aware that all financial activities will be affected by the interest rates 
even though a direct link might not exist. For that reason, a link might be suggested 
bearing in mind the fact that the return from sukuk would be linked to LIBOR, which 
would definitely be affected. In this regard, according to the Interviewee 8, it should 
be assumed that the value of sukuk should be affected by the underlying assets rather 
than the periodic payments and the index by increasing or decreasing their value. 
From response of the SABIC sukuk SBSS members interviewed, it can be pointed out 
that: 
(i) The members of the SBSS explained that they are not aware of the element that 
makes SABIC sukuk a real attraction to investors: is it sukuk assets and the profits 
they generate or the name and reputation of SABIC Company in the market and its 
financial solvency? 
(ii) As far as sukuk is concerned the increase or decrease in returns should be 
proportional to the increase or decrease in the value of assets irrespective of the 
benchmark as the returns are usually a function of sukuk assets rather than the 
financial solvency of the issuer as the case with riba-based bonds; 
(iii) Two of the interviewees made it clear that after circulation in the secondary 
market, sukuk value becomes affected by value of sukuk assets increasing or 
decreasing and that the periodic payments of sukuk or market interest rates has 
nothing to do the matter, while the Interviewee 8 pointed out that a relationship could 
be there but with no effects. 
6.3.2.6 The multiplicity of duties and responsibilities of the issuer (SABIC) 
On the issue of the multiplicity of duties and responsibilities of the SABIC in the case 
of SABIC sukuk, a number of interviewees who are not among the SBSS members 
argued that the sukuk assets are controlled by the sukuk issuer (SABIC), and also the 
SPV is a company affiliated to the issuer (SABIC) as well as the marketing agent is 
SABIC, which indicate the formality of sukuk structure as the sukuk holders have no 
real assets that could be considered in case of insolvency of the issuer or otherwise its 




The Interviewee 6 pointed out that all sukuk should be like that, and to make things 
clear SABIC should be the basic company with specific duties, while the SPV, being 
one of the SABIC subsidiary companies, should also have specific duties. For that 
reason, it could be maintained that the fact that both SABIC or one of its subsidiary 
companies is multifunctional should not affect the validity of sukuk in terms of 
Shari’ah perspective. Consistency with Shari’ah, given that in some of the sukuk that 
have been issued recently the issuer, the SPV and the marketing agent are the 
different entities. On the other hand, Interviewees 7 and 8 also mentioned that even if 
SABIC has multiple duties it does not mean that the SABIC sukuk are formality. 
From response of the interviewees it can be concluded that all of the interviewees 
stressed that as long as SABIC company is considered as the issuer of SABIC sukuk 
and also the SPV of the SABIC sukuk assets as well as the marketing agent, this 
multiple functions of SABIC company does not implies the formality of sukuk 
structure. 
6.3.2.7 The nature of the assets of sukuk in the case of insolvency or failure of 
SABIC 
In case of insolvency or failure of SABIC to meet its financial commitments towards 
sukuk holders, what are the assets of SABIC sukuk (marketing contracts) that could be 
considered and claimed by the sukuk holders? 
In responding to this question, Interviewee 6 stressed the point that the contracts must 
refer to the legal action to be taken in case of bankruptcy or failure of SABIC 
company to live up to its duties regarding the sukuk holders. In his view, there must 
be certain measure to be taken to deal with the problem, as the assets on which sukuk 
holders rely would be a manfa’ah contract rather than tangible assets. 
Nonetheless, the Interviewee 7 argued that in case of SABIC company going 
bankrupt, the sukuk holders will look for another company to undertake the marketing 
of products of SABIC subsidiary companies, in which case sukuk holders would 
resemble shareholders, and should have a general assembly that would make decision 
in case of crisis as would be indicated in the issuance prospectus. 
From response of the interviewed SABIC sukuk SBSS members, the following 




(i) Differences in opinion exist among the members of SBSS with regard to the 
disposition of SABIC assets by sukuk holders in case SABIC goes bankrupt, and what 
sukuk holders should do. 
(ii) Two of the members of the board mentioned that the issue of bankruptcy is being 
dealt with in the prospectus of issuance, and that sukuk holders have the right of 
appointing another marketer in case SABIC goes bankrupt. 
6.3.2.8 The Contracts Between SABIC and its Subsidiary Companies 
A debate emerged among those who are not from the SBSS whether SABIC 
continuously sign marketing contracts with its subsidiary companies or does it do that 
only when the need arises to create assets to issue sukuk (formality of assets). 
In responding to this, Interviewee 6 confirmed that the marketing contracts 
representing the assets of SABIC sukuk would have already existed, and that those 
contracts would not have been created for the sake of sukuk assets as some would 
think. The Interviewee 7 also agreed with Interviewee 6 that the marketing contracts 
should have already been there and would not have been created for the sake of the 
sukuk assets, and also there should not be interference between SABIC contracts. In 
other words, those contracts have been used more than once by SABIC to issue sukuk 
as some believe and that the SBSS has reviewed all the documents. Nonetheless, he 
further stated that from Shari’ah perspective there will be nothing wrong with the 
contracts between SABIC and its subsidiary companies to create assets for sukuk 
provided that those contracts are real and valid.  
From the responses of the members of SBSS to the above question, it can be 
concluded that the members of the board have agreed that the existing marketing 
contracts are already existed and the issuer has not created the marketing contracts 
just for the purpose of issuing sukuk.    
6.3.3 Guarantee of the Capital and Returns 
This section aims to present and discuss the material gathered from the interviewees 
on assurance of capital and returns in the contractual design of SABIC sukuk by 




6.3.3.1 The undertaking of the sukuk issuer to purchase the sukuk 
On the issue of undertaking of the sukuk issuer to purchase the sukuk, Interviewee 1 
pointed out that sukuk holders do not have to sell to SABIC, but as yet SABIC has 
made a commitment by promising to buy the marketing contracts from sukuk holders 
which have initially been sold to them by the company. However, it remains up to 
sukuk holders to sell their sukuk to SABIC or otherwise retain them, as they have no 
commitment towards SABIC. In other words, SABIC would be happy to buy the 
sukuk if the holders decide to sell them for the par value and the company has to live 
up to that promise. In other words, what has been given is a mere promise rather than 
a guarantee.  
Furthermore, the argument that SABIC preserves the right to consider the sukuk as a 
financial commitment under to the bond section in the balance sheet, which should 
mean the SABIC is committed to pay the par value to sukuk holders after five years 
even though it has sold to them. Thus, what has been raised as criticism is considered 
as an accounting error, which could be a potential error to be made by the accountants 
who are not knowledgeable of Shari’ah matters so that they consider sukuk as a 
formal substitute for the bonds. However, the Interviewee 7 believes that this 
constitutes a main problem for sukuk issuance in general as such financial assurances 
by the issuer are unavoidable. He also highlighted the fact that matter has been 
allowed by a number of Shari’ah boards without objection to such kind of assurance, 
as currently most sukuk require such promise. 
Thus, in this section the following generalisations can be drawn: 
(i) Differences among the SBSS with regard to the question ‘whether or not SABIC 
provides a guarantee to buy sukuk assets at the nominal value from sukuk holders’ 
remains an issue; 
(ii) Among the members of the SBSS, some made a distinction between the guarantee 
and the binding promise, and what has been given by SABIC is an obligation or 
binding promise rather than a guarantee to buy the assets at the nominal value but that 




(iii) One of the members has made the point that sukuk cannot be issued without a 
guarantee and that scholars have been divided over that argument, while some have 
backed the argument, others have called for redrafting the structure of sukuk as to 
replace the guarantee by a binding promise by the issuer. 
6.3.3.2 The AAOIFI standards with regard to the guarantee of the capital  
On the issue of AAOIFI standards with regard to the guarantee of the capital, SABIC 
gives the right to sukuk holders to recover their sukuk every five years at the face 
value not at the market value (90% from the capital plus 10% as a return which means 
100% will be guaranteed), which is inconsistent with AAOIFI standards. 
According to the Interviewee 6 of SBSS, the assets of SABIC sukuk is the sole 
ownership of sukuk holders and that an initial arrangement has been made between 
SABIC and sukuk holders that has allowed SABIC to buy the sukuk for their par 
value. That arrangement has been based on a previous promise from SABIC to buy 
the sukuk for the par value, though that should not affect the validity of the contract. 
However, Interviewee 6 referred to what has been mentioned in the prospectus of 
issuance regarding SABIC commitment to purchase for the par value, which should 
be, in his evaluation, inconsistent with AAOIFI standards, so that he will consider 
reviewing the matter regarding commitment with the members of SBSS. The 
Interviewee 7, being the second member of the SBSS also agreed with what has been 
mentioned by the Interviewee 6 that such a commitment will be inconsistent with the 
AAOIFI standards. However, he mentioned that this has become a necessity. In 
relation to this, the Interviewee 8 argued that such type of assurance should be 
allowed and should not be in contradiction with AAOIFI standards as in fact the 
matter should be considered an agreement in advance rather than an assurance. That 
could be so as SABIC had managed to hire its right of marketing the products of its 
subsidiary companies to sukuk holders, and in the meantime had made an agreement 
with sukuk holders that it would retrieve that right from sukuk holders at the rate of 
90% from the capital plus 10% return at the end of the first five years depending on 
the desire of sukuk holders a matter that would be allowed by Shari’ah. This, as an 
issue, was cleared by the Interviewee 8 who maintained that any arguments referring 




the end of the five years would have nothing to do with the capital but would 
represent interests and profits to be paid from the reserve account. 
From the responses of the members of SBSS to the above question, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
(i) One of the SBSS changed his mind during the interview by denying that what 
was given by SABIC was a commitment, and instead considered that as a guarantee 
and that he would discuss it with SBSS; 
(ii) Two of the board members are of the opinion that SABIC sukuk feature a 
guarantee which might have been dictated by necessity; 
(iii) One of the members has made the point that what has happened between SABIC 
and sukuk holders has been an agreement in advance rather than a guarantee and that 
should be consistent with the AAOIFI standards. 
6.3.3.3 The guarantee of the capital and the returns from an independent third 
party 
It has been argued that why the issuer have no right to guarantee the capital and the 
returns, while an independent third party has the right of capital assurance in favour of 
sukuk holders. 
In responding to this issue, Interviewee 6 considered SABIC as an independent party 
as the sukuk have been sold to the sukuk holders. Therefore, after that deal had been 
completed, SABIC would have nothing to do with sukuk so that the relationship 
would be between sukuk holders and SABIC subsidiary companies. In such a case, 
from a Shari’ah perspective, SABIC would be allowed to give capital assurance to 
sukuk holders. The Interviewee 7 also explain that there would be nothing wrong with 
the capital assurance to be given to sukuk holders provided that assurance would be 
given by a third party independent of both the issuer and sukuk holders as dictated the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy for that practice to be allowed. However, theoretically 
speaking, that assurance could be provided voluntarily by an independent party; as yet 




From the responses provided by the interviewed members of SBSS to the above 
question, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
(i) SABIC is allowed to give guarantee with regard to the capital and returns as 
SABIC is considered an independent party after selling the sukuk bringing its 
relationship with sukuk assets to an end; 
(ii) The grantor must be an independent party from both the issuer and sukuk holders; 
(iii) Bringing a third party, as a grantor, will be theoretically possible but will be 
inapplicable in practice. 
6.3.3.4 The commitment of SABIC to pay the sukuk holders profits 
It could be argued that SABIC considers its delay of fulfilling its financial 
commitments to sukuk holders as a sign of fail as it has been mentioned in the 
prospectus, and accordingly, sukuk holders have the right to claim the full recovery of 
sukuk from SABIC at the face value. 
In exploring such an issue, Interviewee 6 is of the opinion that such structure should 
not affect the sukuk in terms of Shari’ah, as it is Shari’ah compliant. As such a 
structure implies that sukuk holders would own the assets which the issuer had 
promised to purchase when sukuk expired or otherwise in case of failure of payment 
of the periodic returns to sukuk holders. 
On the other hand, the Interviewee 7 referred to the fact that the failure as stated by 
the prospectus of issuance should be related to SABIC as an agent representing sukuk 
holders rather than as the first owner of sukuk assets (SABIC Company). To be more 
precise, SABIC has two entities: first; as the company that has sold sukuk assets to 
sukuk holders, and second as an agent representing sukuk holders in marketing the 
products of its subsidiary companies. However, SABIC (as a representative of sukuk 
holders) could manage to market the products, and eventually could collect the 
revenues but for one reason or another could stop short of paying sukuk holders which 
would be considered as a failure case. Thus, in this case, the failure will be related to 
SABIC as a representative of sukuk holders rather than a company. Consequently, the 




sukuk holders for the par value in case of his failure to distribute the sums generated 
from the marketing process. 
On the other hand, Interviewee 7 explained further that SABIC issuance has been 
among the first sukuk issuances in Saudi Arabia, and so there must have been some 
commentary on it, and accordingly some improvements to sukuk structure have been 
made since then. However, it is worth mentioning that had the SABIC sukuk 
presented to other Shari’ah boards, they would not have approved particularly the 
issue relating to the commitment of the issuer to buy the sukuk. However, the current 
sukuk structure does not include the commitment of the issuer to buy for the par value, 
and SABIC sukuk have been issued prior to the statement of the AAOIFI.   
From the response of the interviewed SABIC sukuk SBSS, the following can be 
developed: 
(i) Commitment by SABIC to buy the assets at the nominal value provided they have 
failed to do the periodic payments should be consistent with Shari’ah principles; 
(ii) SABIC has given the guarantee to buy the assets at the nominal value by virtue of 
its capacity as a representative of sukuk holders rather than the issuer, so that in terms 
of Shari’ah it will not be allowed for the issuer to provide guarantee for the capital. 
6.3.4 The Reserve Account of Profit  
The reserve account of profit has emerged another contentious issue; and this section 
therefore aims to report and discuss the position of the interviewed SABIC sukuk 
SBSS, particularly with regard to the issues related to the reserve account of profit. 
6.3.4.1 The control of profit reserve by the sukuk administrator (sukuk issuer) 
In exploring the control of profit reserve by the sukuk administrator (sukuk issuer), 
Interviewee 6 explained that establishing a reserve account will have a positive impact 
as it tends to keep the balance right for investors with regard to their return earnings. 
He argued that such account will reassure sukuk holders that they will receive the 
right amounts of the periodic profits as that account will compensate for any potential 
deficits. Eventually, that will make life easy for sukuk holders who will most likely be 




companies in relation to financial commitments, so that those companies will not face 
any difficulties regarding the undertaking of any financial commitments. 
The Interviewee 7 has also confirmed that the reserve account could be described as 
the ‘safety valve’ for investors, as investors always seek for stable returns. However, 
some critics of sukuk have a wrong perception that sukuk returns are always fixed, and 
that distinction should be made between fixed returns and stable returns. In terms of 
Shari’ah, any fixed return is disallowed (haram) as it relates to riba. On the other 
hand, the stable return is different as those returns might decrease or increase depends 
on the performance of the business and the reserve account will readjust those returns. 
In reflecting on the responses provided, according to the response of the members of 
the SBSS it can be pointed out that the members of SBSS have commended the idea 
of a virtual reserve account as that account tends to set the balance right for investors 
regarding the returns they earn. 
6.3.4.2 Explaining the rate of periodic profits and reserve profits 
Sukuk holders have the right to know all the details related to the periodic profits of 
sukuk as well as the sums to be kept in the reserve account. It could be argued that 
whether that right really exists and whether SABIC, as the sukuk administrator, 
explains the real sukuk profits to sukuk holders, or whether sukuk holders have no idea 
about the real profits, and they only know about the profit to be initially determined 
by the sukuk administrator based on LIBOR index. These are the issues explored with 
the interviewees as the members of the SABIC Sukuk SBSS, which are discussed as 
follows:  
The Interviewee 6 has responded by presuming that SABIC has a duty to provide an 
elaborate explanation of the periodic profits as well as the sums to be kept in the 
reserve account in favour of sukuk holders. However, Interviewee 6 added that it is 
the duty of the company auditor and accountant to explain the annual profits and the 
sums to be kept in the reserve account in the annual report featuring the total revenues 
and whatever sums are available in the reserve account. Nonetheless, that report 
should not prevent the SBSS from undertaking its role in following up the flow of 
money into the company and the distribution of the sums that have been collected and 




principles. In other words, it becomes an essential matter that the reserve account 
should be monitored by the SBSS to avoid riba-related transactions. Thus, the matter 
should not be left to SABIC company alone without the close follow up and control of 
SBSS. 
From the responses of Shari’ah board members to the above question it can be 
concluded that; 
(i) There is an agreement among the members of SBSS that the sukuk holders have 
the right to know all the details related to the periodic profits as well as the sums to be 
kept in the reserve account; 
(ii) One of the members has explained that the accounts in relation to the profit 
reserve have nothing to do with the board, while another member has maintained that 
the prospectus of issuance provides every detail with regard to the reserve. 
6.3.4.3 Authority of the assets manager (SABIC) in relation to the sums to be 
kept in the reserve account 
As stated by the issuance prospectus of SABIC sukuk, the sukuk manager (SABIC 
Company) has the right of investing all sums of money to be kept in the reserve 
account to his advantage so that the returns will be his own right. However, in case, 
the sukuk manager lives up to his commitments in paying the periodic sums to sukuk 
holders according to schedule, then any remaining sums when sukuk expire will go to 
the sukuk manager as a motivation. 
In this regard, the Interviewee 6 referred to the fact that the above authorisation has 
been forbidden by the SBSS. The board has issued a verdict signed by the members 
referring to sums featuring the reserve account as the ownership of sukuk holders 
alone. That verdict by the board should apply to every case where sukuk is involved 
otherwise one should question the difference between sukuk and bonds. In fact, there 
will be no difference as long as the returns to sukuk holders have been predetermined 
so that they have no right on the remaining sums. Such procedure should not be 
permitted, and that the sukuk manager should not be eligible for more than the 
percentage originally allocated for him unless sukuk holders voluntarily give up their 




manager will be allowed to invest the sums in the reserve account to his advantage as 
well as pocketing the remaining sums as a motivation when sukuk expire. 
The Interviewee 7, on the other hand, argued that the process of dealing with the 
reserve account could vary from one issuance prospectus to another. For instance, in 
some issuance prospectus, sukuk holders tend to allow the issuer to use the sums 
available in the reserve account to his advantage as the case with SABIC sukuk, where 
at the end of the period the remaining sums featuring the reserve account will go to 
the sukuk manager. It should be noted that in some issuance prospectus make it 
incumbent on the sukuk manager to invest the sums available in the reserve account in 
favour of sukuk holders.  However, in the first case, there is nothing wrong with the 
procedure in terms of Shari’ah as long as the sukuk manager has been authorised by 
the sukuk holders and the manager of the assets will be as a guarantor (damin) due to 
the investment of the assets for his interest. However, at the end, when sukuk expire 
the sums featuring the reserve account will go to the issuer as long as the sukuk 
holders have voluntarily given up their right on the remaining sums in his favour, and 
nothing wrong with that from Shari’ah perspective as well. 
As for the Interviewee 8, he argued that from Shari’ah perspective, it is allowed for 
investing the sums in the reserve account in favour of the sukuk manager, as the sukuk 
manager has to make some profits and those gains should feature the sums to be kept 
in the reserve account.  
Based on the discussion presented in this section, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
(i) There is an agreement between the members of SBSS that the issuer of the 
manager of assets has the right to collect whatever remains of the reserve account as a 
bonus when sukuk expires provided that sukuk holders agree to give up their right on 
that money; 
(ii) The manager of assets has got the right to dispose of the reserve account in his 




6.3.4.4 Method of determining the share of the new sukuk holders from the 
reserve profits 
As a matter of fact sukuk circulate in secondary markets, and that should raise the 
question as to how the share of the new sukuk holders from the reserve profits could 
be determined? In other words, after selling sukuk from one holder to another should 
raise the question as to whether the money available in the reserve account will be 
taken by seller according to his share or will automatically be owned and transferred 
to the new buyer and how could that be determined? 
The Interviewee 6 has referred to the fact that whatever money is related to profits, no 
matter the size of it, should go to sukuk holders, and yet profit calculation is not 
among the duties of the SBSS. While the Interviewee 7 argued that all matters in 
relation to profit calculation have to be included in the issuance prospectus and that 
prospectus has to be accessible to all sukuk holders. The Interviewee 8, however, is of 
the view that the final sukuk structure has to be presented to the Shari’ah board for 
close examination leaving other aspects and cases to specialists who have the ability 
to deal with matters in more detail. 
From the responses of SBSS to the above question, it can be concluded that the 
justification of the method used by SABIC to sukuk holders either is not a duty of 
SBSS or it can be seen in the SABIC sukuk issuance. 
6.3.5 Questioning Gharar Issues in SABIC Sukuk 
Since gharar constitutes one of the main Shari’ah compliancy issues in Islamic 
finance, this section aims to report and discuss the position of the SBSS members of 
the SABIC Sukuk on various aspects of the (non) presence of gharar in their sukuk. 
6.3.5.1 The evaluation of the SABIC Sukuk assets 
According to the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk, the sukuk assets have been 
evaluated at SR 5,000,000,000 and that will raise the question as to how those assets 
have been evaluated.  
The Interviewee 6 being the member of the SBSS explained that SABIC Company 
has nothing to do with the evaluation, and there is an external party who has to do the 




essential that the Shari’ah board reviews the evaluation in detail as the board is not 
concerned with those details. In addition, the Shari’ah board should be presented with 
a general rather than a detailed report. In the meantime, Interviewee 7 referred to the 
fact that the method of evaluation of sukuk assets has to be included in the prospectus 
of issuance so that nothing is being hidden from sukuk holders. 
6.3.5.2 Difference between the nominal value and the market value of Sukuk 
assets 
An important controversial issue is the difference between the nominal and market 
value of sukuk assets. This sections aims to examine this particular issue with the 
contribution of the sampled interviewees. 
One of the non- SBSS member interviewees highlighted the fact that the market value 
of the assets of many sukuk is not equal to the actual amount to be paid by sukuk 
holders for obtaining those assets. In this regard, Interviewee 6 referred to sukuk 
evaluation as being fair and accurate as it is being undertaken by specialised parties. 
Nonetheless, he argued that in case of a significant variation between the market and 
the nominal values, and then sukuk holders have to refer to the issuer (SABIC 
Company) for the final decision. However, in case the issuer concedes a significant 
difference and an error in evaluation exists, then sukuk holders preserve the right of 
consulting a neutral third party for arbitration. By contrast, Interviewee 7 is of the 
opinion that it is not essential what has ever been paid by sukuk holders for the assets 
are actually equal to the market value of those assets. In other words, the validity of 
sukuk should not be affected by the market value of sukuk assets. However, in case of 
an unfair evaluation of sukuk assets that should be a matter for Shari’ah courts. 
Nonetheless, those matters are not being stated in the issuance prospectus, as they do 
not originally feature as problematic during the evaluation process. 
6.3.5.3 The extent to which sukuk holders are aware of the nature of Sukuk 
assets they purchase 
Sukuk structures have always been the focus of enquiry by many critics as to whether 
sukuk holders are aware of the actual (market) value of sukuk assets, the potential 
returns from those assets, and the nature of the contracts between SABIC and its 




involved in the marketing contracts as well as whether the contracts between SABIC 
and its subsidiary companies are available to be reviewed by sukuk holders. 
According to the Interviewee 6, the answers to the above questions should feature in 
the issuance prospectus, and as long as the prospectus of SABIC sukuk has all the 
details and answers for all those questions above, then there is no gharar involved in 
SABIC sukuk. As for the Interviewee 7, he mentioned that all information concerning 
sukuk is supposed to be available for investors either electronically via the company’s 
website or alternatively in the prospectus of issuance. Nonetheless, the problem lies 
with the investors themselves as they never search those sources for the right 
information. Yet, as long as that information is available for sukuk holders then 
SABIC sukuk can be described as being safe. 
From the responses of the interviewed SABIC Sukuk SBSS members to the above two 
questions with regard to gharar the following conclusions can be drawn; 
(i) The prospectus of issuance has explained the method of evaluation of SABIC 
sukuk; 
(ii) As it has been pointed out by one of the members, the members of the SBSS will 
not be aware of the details of the evaluation; 
(iii)The evaluation of SABIC sukuk has been consistent with the market value; 
(iv) The validity of the contract will not be affected by the inconsistency between the 
market value and the nominal value; 
(v) The matter has to be referred to a neutral third party or Shari’ah courts for 
evaluation should there be a big difference between the market value and the nominal 
value; 
(vi) The details featuring the prospectus of issuance should deny any potential risks 
pertaining to SABIC sukuk. 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
The discussion so far included a critical examination of the available body of 




are explored further by specially and directly focusing on the SABIC sukuk through 
the perceptions, understandings and opinions of those SABIC sukuk SBSS members 
as well as non-SBSS members. This section aims to provide a critical and integrated 
analysis through an interpretative discussion on the issues presented and discussed in 
the previous sections.  
Recalling that SABIC company issued three issuances of sukuk in the years 2006, 
2007 and 2008, and that a review of the prospectus of issuance of the three types had 
approved by SBSS that the three issuances were very similar in terms of structure. 
Given that the third and the last issuance is the subject of this study, the ‘prospectuses 
of SABIC sukuk’ with the relevant documents to SABIC sukuk such as the ‘purchase 
commitment agreement’, the ‘transfer of ownership of sukuk assets agreement’, the 
‘agreement of management of sukuk assets’ also have been closely evaluated and 
examined in this section based on the sukuk recommendations issued by AAOIFI 
(2008), AAOIFI Standards (2010) with regard to sukuk, the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s 
decisions and also those who have been interviewed whether SBSS or those who have 
been interested in the subject of sukuk. Hence, an integrated interpretative discussion 
is provided in the following sections by referring to the emergent issues in the 
preceding sections. 
6.4.1 The importance of defining the mode of the SABIC sukuk contract  
It could be argued that the prospectus of SABIC sukuk has not clearly stipulated the 
name of the contract that SABIC sukuk structure based on, which is essential 
according to AAOIFI (2010) as well as the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 
178(4/19). Instead, the Prospectus Issuance of SABIC Sukuk (PISS) only stipulates 
that “Some of the assets of SABIC sukuk have been put on sale for investors” (PISS, 
2008). In another place of the prospectus of issuance, it has been stipulated that 
“SABIC will transfer sukuk assets to the custodian (SPV) of SABIC” (PISS, 2008). In 
addition, the prospectus of issuance also states that “The Shari’ah board has reviewed 
the third issuance of marketing investment sukuk (istithmar sukuk)” (PISS, 2008). 
It should be noted that by reviewing SABIC sukuk 1, 2 and 3 it has been discovered 
that the prospectus of issuance has failed to label, in Shari’ah and legal terms, the 
contract that constitutes the basis for SABIC sukuk. However, under the term 




many types of sukuk as follow “These sukuk include sukuk of ownership of leased 
assets, ownership of usufructs, ownership of services, Murabahah, Salam, Istisna’a, 
Mudarabah, Musharakah, investment agency and sharecropping, irrigation and 
agricultural partnerships” (AAOIFI, 2010). 
Eventually, as a result of failure to label the contract clearly, the members of SBSS 
have been divided on that issue as to whether SABIC sukuk could be labelled as a 
contract featuring the sale of usufruct (sukuk al-manfa’ah) or whether it features the 
sale of marketing rights or could be labelled as selling privilege rights or alternatively 
the contract could be an ijarah contract and that no assets have been sold so that the 
process has involved the renting of the marketing right of the products by SABIC to 
sukuk holders. 
In addition, it could be argued that the differences between the members of SBSS 
regarding the labelling of the contract and failure to label the contract clearly in the 
prospectus of issuance should make an impact legally as well as in Shari’ah terms on 
the contract per se and the parties involved in the contract as well. Thus, according to 
the Shari’ah principles for a contract to become valid in Shari’ah terms, the first 
requirement is labelling the contract or referring to any mode that indicates the name 
of the contract or otherwise the nature of relationship between the two parties 
involved in the contract as it has been stated by the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision 
No 178(4/19). Consequently, every party knows the intentions of the other party being 
sale, rent (ijarah), partnership (musharakah) or any other form of Shari’ah contracts 
(Merah, 2008). For that reason however, the validity of the contract depends on a 
‘mode’ that expresses the will of the contractors in terms of the purpose of 
establishing that contract, as it has been asserted by the SBSS through the interview 
analyses presented in the preceding section and summarised in Table 6.1. In this 
regard, AAOIFI (2010) stipulates that; “Any sukuk should be issued on Shari’ah 
based contract”. 
Table  6.2: The Opinions of the Interviewees on the Nature of SABIC Sukuk Structure 
 Interviewee 6 Interviewee 7 Interviewee 8 
Name of the 
contract 
‘sukuk al- manfa’ah 
‘rights sukuk’  
 or  





Nature of the 
transaction 
SABIC sold the 
manfa’ah of marketing 
the products to sukuk 
holders 
SABIC sold the 
‘marketing contracts’ 
or 
SABIC sold the rights of 
marketing the products to 
sukuk holders 
SABIC leased its 
right of marketing 
the products to sukuk 
holders 
Having said that, every contract is different with regard to the rights and commitments 
both in legal and Shari’ah terms, which should be observed by all parties involved in 
the contracts. Thus, from Shari’ah and legal perspective, failure of the prospectus of 
issuance to label the contract or otherwise bring something that refers to that matter 
could lead to Shari’ah and legal risks. Those risks could involve the validity of the 
contract or could put sukuk holders at risk with regard to claiming their rights on the 
assets associated with sukuk that have been bought from SABIC in case of conflict. 
From the forgoing discussion it could be stated that in case the SBSS is unaware of 
the name of the contract as well as the consequences of that and if differences might 
emerge among the members over that matter, then the differences even more probable 
among sukuk holders. In other words, given the differences among the members of 
SBSS on the nature of the contract and the failure of the prospectus of issuance to 
clarify that, it seems that the subject of the contract remains unclear for both the 
members of the SBSS as well as for sukuk holders. This is an essential concern 
causing Shari’ah as well as legal risks, which undermine the entire process and trust 
to the process. This can have adverse implications on the development of Islamic 
capital markets in Saudi Arabia and also globally. 
 
6.4.2 Reflecting on the Assets of SABIC Sukuk 
This section renders a critical discussion based on the literature and the above-
presented interview analysis on the aspects and dimensions of assets of SABIC sukuk. 
6.4.2.1 The nature of the SABIC sukuk assets 
One of the basic rules of dealing with others in business such as buying and selling is 
awareness of the item to be sold which is one of the elements that validates the selling 
process as has been explained by Shari’ah scholars; otherwise, it would not be 




renders the contract legally invalid in Shari’ah terms as it has been noted by Ibn 
Qudamah (2003). However, according to the prospectus of SABIC sukuk, it has been 
stated that sukuk assets represent: “the rights for twenty years span featuring specific 
commitments as indicated by the marketing contracts between SABIC and its 
subsidiary companies” (PISS, 2008). 
From this stipulation, it could be argued that there is some sort of ignorance exists 
with regard to what it has been sold with SABIC sukuk. Since the item to be sold 
features rights and commitments, it seems that SABIC sukuk documents and process 
did not clarify by the prospectus of issuance as to the nature of those rights and 
commitments which makes it impossible for one to become involved in a contract that 
stops short of explaining the exact subject of the deal. On the other hand, with regard 
to the argument that the assets of SABIC sukuk represent the marketing contracts 
between SABIC and its subsidiary companies, which have not been attached to the 
prospectus of issuance not to mention the fact that SBSS as well as sukuk holders 
have not reviewed; or otherwise, it could be argued that sukuk holders have no right to 
review those contracts as being provided by the prospectus of issuance, which states 
that “Sukuk holders have no right to request the issuer to reveal information regarding 
the activities of the other party” (PISS, 2008). In another place of the prospectus, 
however, it is stated that; “The sukuk holder has no right to examine the marketing 
contracts between SABIC and the subsidiary companies” (PISS, 2008). Accordingly, 
the rights of sukuk holders as well as the assets of SABIC sukuk are not specified, 
since there is no right for sukuk holders to look at and review the contracts between 
SABIC company and its subsidiaries according to the statements mentioned early 
from the PISS. 
Thus, the question is how could sukuk holders be able to buy sukuk assets that they 
have not been aware of and has not been described in a way that eliminates their 
ignorance with the item being sold as well as the nature of the contract so that 
knowing the real value of those assets and potential revenues to be generated by the 
assets etc. will be unknown to sukuk holders. More importantly, as the discussion 
identified, the SBSS also failed to review the ‘marketing contracts’ between SABIC 
and its subsidiary companies, as it has been pointed out in the interview. Having said 




associated rights and commitments which are considered as assets of SABIC sukuk, 
and that SABIC is not given permission to put them on sale, lease them or otherwise 
transfer their ownership to other parties under any circumstances as being provided by 
the prospectus of issuance, as stated by the prospectus: “Sukuk holders have no right 
to sell sukuk assets or dispose of them in any way but according to purchase contract” 
(PISS, 2008). In another part of the prospectus it has been stated that; “the transfer of 
ownership of sukuk assets from the issuer to sukuk holders does not give sukuk 
holders the mandate or the right of marketing or selling of any of products of the other 
party or the examination of any of those products” (PISS, 2008). 
In addition, those contracts represent temporary agreements between SABIC and its 
subsidiary companies, as they have the legal right whether SABIC or any of the 
subsidiary companies to opt out of the agreement and sever the contract by providing 
an initial notice to the other party. In the words of the prospectus, hence, “no 
assurance can be given that any of the Marketing Agreements will remain in force for 
the duration of the Sukuk” (PISS, 2008). This might represent a great risk to sukuk 
holders through losing the assets, which are the profits generated from the marketing 
contracts between SABIC and its subsidiary companies.  
Moreover, for those who argue that the assets of SABIC sukuk represent privilege 
rights as has been already mentioned, it could be maintained that from a legal point of 
view, SABIC sukuk cannot be labelled as privilege, which is further be discussed at 
the next chapter in discussing the legal aspects of SABIC sukuk. 
The other view that considers sukuk assets as the usufruct (manfa’ah) featuring the 
marketing of the products of SABIC subsidiary companies can be refuted by the fact 
that any usufruct should be linked to a source, as it has been indicated by Usmani 
(2007). Therefore, in case of SABIC sukuk, what is the source that generates the profit 
as the contracts between SABIC and the subsidiary companies being unproductive of 
the profits per se’ cannot represent the source.   
According to the above discussion, it becomes clear that the assets of SABIC sukuk 
could neither be described as an a tangible assets, as it has been noted by one of the 
SBSS, or usufructs, nor could be described as a rights that could be sold, but instead it 




marketing services provided by SABIC to its subsidiary companies as would be 
explained by the prospectus of issuance. This kind of structure, however, has been 
discussed by Merah (2011). In this respect, the prospectus of issuance of SABIC 
sukuk has stipulated that SABIC sukuk represent the cash revenues to be generated 
from the marketing services: “SABIC has issued sukuk 1 and sukuk 7 worth SR 3 
billion and SR 8 billion respectively), whereby 77.06 of the total marketing revues 
gathered by SABIC has been transferred to SPV in favour of sukuk holders” (PISS, 
2008).  
Therefore, the assets of SABIC sukuk are either the money itself to be collected in the 
future from SABIC subsidiary companies or the right of obtaining the money to be 
gathered in the future from SABIC subsidiary companies which are in both cases the 
transaction is not Shari’ah compliant as it has been argued by Dagi (2011), Merah 
(2011), Alroshood (2013).     
6.4.2.2 The real transfer of the assets 
According to the AAOIFI Standards (2010), there must be a real transfer of ownership 
from the issuer to sukuk holders so that those assets disappear legally from the 
financial records of the issuer to be transferred to the financial records of the holders, 
as sukuk holders have to retain the full legal right to dispose of their assets. It should 
be mentioned that this matter has been confirmed by one of the members of the 
SABIC Sukuk SBSS who maintains that according to Shari’ah rules sukuk holders 
should have the full freedom to dispose of sukuk assets with no restrictions by the 
issuer. 
However, as discussed above, all the members of SBSS are in an agreement regarding 
the full transfer of SABIC sukuk from the issuer to sukuk holders. In addition, SBSS 
has previously noticed that when SABIC sukuk has been presented to them for the 
first time they have noticed that a legal transfer of sukuk in Shari’ah terms from the 
issuer to sukuk holders has been non-existent, and that the SBSS has introduced some 
amendments to the structure to feature a real transfer of sukuk assets. Nonetheless, by 
reviewing the financial records of SABIC sukuk, it has been noticed that the 
underlying assets of SABIC sukuk still appear on those records of the issuer and being 
referred to them as debts owed by SABIC, which indicates that no real transfer of 




to SABIC sukuk, but rather refers to financial deposits paid by sukuk holders into 
SABIC bank account only to be paid regular profits in return.  
However, as discussed above, one of the members of SBSS stated that what is written 
on the records is insignificant and ineffective, and he pointed out that what is 
important is the fact on the ground. In addition, this view cannot be entertained and 
should be considered as erroneous and inaccurate, which has been objected by many 
Shari’ah scholars and legal experts that the confirmation of rights with regard to 
financial transactions is an important matter, so as to avoid any Shari’ah and legal 
conflict between the parties involved in the contract, and documents provide an 
important evidence for the court in case of disputes as it has been asserted by 
(Usmani, 2007; Ayub, 2009; Al-sayed, 2013; Islamic Fiqh Academy’s decision No 
188 (3/20); Usmani, 2013).  
As for those who believe that sukuk holders have voluntarily given up their rights to 
dispose of their sukuk by giving the full right to SABIC, that argument can simply be 
refuted by the fact that sukuk holders have actually given up their rights and that 
decision has been irreversible, which has been a precondition set by SABIC to 
complete the contract and not an option given to sukuk holders as dictated by the 
prospectus of issuance in the following statement: “Under no circumstance should 
sukuk holders retain the right to dispose of sukuk assets including selling and 
marketing” (PISS, 2008). In another place, however, the prospectus states that 
“Amendment to the decisions to be made by the meeting of sukuk holders or addition 
of proposals can only be made with the consent of the issuer (SABIC)” (PISS, 2008). 
Consequently, from the forgoing, it could be understood that sukuk holders have been 
deprived of the legal right of absolute disposal of the sukuk they own in return for the 
guarantees given by SABIC with regard to the capital and profits. This makes 
needless for sukuk holders to claim their right of full disposal of the assets they own, 
or otherwise they are indifferent about a real transfer of assets as long as those assets 
are guaranteed by SABIC, as this view has been supported according to one of the 
interviewee. 
Thus, from the above it becomes obvious that what is going on in relation to SABIC 




Shari’ah and legal perspective, which is considered as a risk to be avoided. In reality, 
hence, what has happened could be as a sum of money that has been deposited into 
SABIC account by sukuk holders in return for profits on that sum which is considered 
as a bond based transaction.          
6.4.2.3 The source of returns in SABIC sukuk 
It has already been pointed out that the main differences between riba-based bonds 
and Islamic sukuk is that the return on bonds is linked to the capital, in the sense that 
the profits represent a percentage of the capital given to the bond holders as the 
relationship between the issuer and bondholders is like the relationship between a 
creditor and a borrower. By contrast, the returns on sukuk should be a function of 
sukuk assets, and that whatever profits are generated from sukuk should go to sukuk 
holders bearing in mind the fact that those profits are neither fixed nor are they 
predetermined as the case with bonds, but rather increase or decrease depending on 
the market performance and other factors, and yet those profits can be estimated 
(Almenea, 5444; Usmani, 5443). However, a critical review of SABIC sukuk reveals 
that the prospectus of issuance states that sukuk holders are to be given a certain 
percentage of the capital as profits irrespective of the expected returns of sukuk assets 
and that specific percentage should be linked with the expected profits, which means 
SABIC only takes into account the nominal value of sukuk and determines a specific 
percentage of profits. While SABIC links the returns to the LIBOR to bring the 
stability to returns, as it has been pointed out by one of the members of SBSS, 
however, SABIC has failed to give in the prospectus an estimate of the expected 
revenue of sukuk assets which is a basic right of sukuk holders, which indicates that 
SABIC company rather than the sukuk assets is the actual source of the returns. 
 
6.4.2.4 Determining the percentage of returns 
An examination of the SABIC sukuk prospectus demonstrates that the prospectus of 
issuance stipulates that “Sukuk holders are eligible for a certain percentage of profits 
based on their capital” (PISS, 2008). However, as discussed above, according to one 
of the SBSS member interviewed, the determining of such a percentage is due to the 




the sake of stabilising the return in favour of sukuk holders. Having stated this, it 
should be noted that the argument that the periodic determination of profits is difficult 
for SABIC company seems to be inaccurate particularly in relation to SABIC 
company with all the capabilities and the expertise in financial matters including 
accounting and other aspects which requires giving particular attention to the profit so 
that such excuse becomes unacceptable. 
The issues, however, relates to as to whether the profits have been determined as a 
function of the capital, and whether that determination is based on a comprehensive 
investigation and well study of the prospective profits from the assets of SABIC sukuk 
or otherwise as a function of interest rates and the financial solvency of the issuer as 
the case with riba-based bonds as it has been discussed above. It could be argued that 
sukuk issuers perceive conventional bonds as potential competitors and that the 
returns on bonds are normally linked with the interest rates; and it seems that sukuk 
issuers seems to consider that they have to take the current market interest rates into 
account as it has been mentioned by one of the interviewee. For instance, 5% interest 
rates for riba-based bonds implies that sukuk must be issued at a similar price or less 
in order to be economically feasible as to compete with the bonds for the issuer to 
avoid loss. However, according to Merah (2011), a brief financial study featuring 
SABIC sukuk shown that SABIC has gained more profits than sukuk holders by three 
fold in only five years given that sukuk holders are the actual owners of the assets, and 
by definition sukuk holders should have the larger share of the profits rather than 
SABIC. This should indicate that determining the percentage of profits given to sukuk 
holders has not been subject to a close investigation and examination of the real 
profits of SABIC sukuk which could be generated, as it has been suggested by Usmani 
(2007) and Almenea (2010). However, it seems to be based on the financial solvency 
of SABIC Company as well as the indictor of interest rates as it has been noticed by 
Merah (2011). 
However, as discussed above, one of the interviewed SBSS member stated that 
linking the returns to be earned by SABIC sukuk holders with a market benchmark, 
such as LIBOR, is based on an agreement between SABIC and sukuk holders for the 
adjustment of a stable return seems is considered as an inaccurate justification. 




due to the fact that no real assets exist for SABIC sukuk, and that sukuk holders in 
reality does not own real assets; otherwise the determination of returns should have 
been linked to the real returns of the assets, so that the revenues to be generated from 
sukuk should go to sukuk holders, as they are the true owners of the assets in which 
case linking with a specific benchmark will be unjustifiable, and that the returns, no 
matter more or less, should go to sukuk holders as this suggestion has been supported 
by Almenea (2010).  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the determining the rate of returns in SABIC sukuk 
is considered not Shari’ah complaint due to the fact that there is no real justification 
for that determination in the issuance of SABIC sukuk as well as it has been 
discovered that the percentage adjusted by sukuk manager was in favour of SABIC 
rather sukuk holders. In addition, the differences between what sukuk holders received 
as profits and what SABIC gained a mater which is questionable and that could make 
no difference between sukuk and bonds as both of them seem to be depending on the 
market interest rates. 
6.4.2.5 The link between sukuk holders and the financial solvency of the issuer 
As the discussion in the previous sections indicate, the denial of SBSS members that 
no relationship exists between sukuk issuer (SABIC) and sukuk holders, and the sukuk 
assets have been sold by SABIC to sukuk holders severing any financial relationship 
with sukuk holders reducing the role of SABIC as a marketing agent representing 
sukuk holders, contradicts the prospectus of issuance which stipulates that “SABIC is 
committed to paying the periodic payments to sukuk holders as well as to buying the 
sukuk at the nominal value” (PISS, 2008). 
Therefore, as far as sukuk holders are concerned, to become a grantor, it is very 
important for SABIC to be financially solvent as well as have a good financial 
classification and reputation in the market as it has been pointed out by one of the 
interviewee. In this regard, it should be noted that sukuk holders will take into account 
the issue of financial solvency of SABIC, and will greatly focus on that matter in 
which case their capital and their periodic returns will be guaranteed from a company 
with a strong financial solvency such as SABIC Company. In other words, it could be 
argued that the sukuk holders might completely ignore the underlying assets of the 




reasons that make sukuk holders focus on the financial solvency of the issuer is that if 
SABIC financial solvency has not been strong then the risk will be high. 
Consequently, the profits will be high to set the balance right between the high risk 
and the high profit. A case in point is the sukuk featuring Dar Al-Arkan, where a high 
percentage of profit were given to compensate for the poor solvency of the Dar Al-
Arkan company comparing to SABIC, which puts the capital at risk so that sukuk 
holders have to bear the burden of any potential losses of the capital. Therefore, in 
case of SABIC, the sukuk holders have accepted the small percentage of profits based 
on the guarantee given to them by SABIC in relation to the capital and the returns, 
and sukuk holders most likely go for low risk investment with a fixed return in order 
to avoid the loss of capital. Thus, for sukuk holders to guarantee their capital would 
imply that the grantor, which SABIC Company should be in a high financial solvency 
level as has been previously mentioned. 
6.4.3 The Guarantee of Capital 
After closely examining the responses of the members of SBSS regarding the 
guarantee given by SABIC to buy the sukuk at the nominal value; the following 
critical reflections can be made.  
First; as can be seen in Table 6.2, there have been significant differences among the 
members of SBSS with regard to whether SABIC has really given the guarantee to 
buy at nominal value from sukuk holders. One of the members of SBSS responded 
positively by confirming that there is a guarantee given by SABIC to buy sukuk assets 
at the nominal value as he stated that such guarantee is against the principle of 
Shari’ah and he promised to discuss that matter being non-Shari’ah compliant with 
other members of SBSS. On the other hand, another member stressed that a guarantee 
has been given out of necessity as it will be impossible to issue sukuk without given a 
guarantee to buy at the nominal value. This clearly explains the reason for 
inconsistency with AAOIFI standards with regard to the guarantee of capital as 
SABIC sukuk have been issued in advance of the emergence of AAOIFI standards. 
Another member believe that no guarantee has been given by SABIC to buy at the 
nominal value, however, the fact of the matter is that SABIC has given a binding 
promise that it will buy at the nominal value from sukuk holders, and that promise is 




them to a third party other than SABIC when the expiry date is due. It should be 
noticed that some of the members have added by stating that SABIC has not given a 
guarantee but an agreement has been made in advance between SABIC and sukuk 
holders to buy at the nominal value. 
Table  6.3:  The Opinions of the Interviewees on the Guarantee of Capital 
 Interviewee 6 Interviewee 7 Interviewee 8 
Guarantee of the 
Capital 
There is a guarantee in 
SABIC sukuk 
There is a guarantee in 
SABIC sukuk 
There is no guarantee 
in SABIC sukuk 
Justification 
The guarantee given was 
mistake as he will 
discuss this issue with 
the SBSS 
There is a necessity and 
SABIC sukuk have been 
issued before the 
issuance of AAOIFI 
standards 
There is a binding 
promise (Wa’ad) rather 
than a guarantee 
Second; it seems that the members of SBSS are not steadfast their opinion, as some of 
the members are of the view that no guarantee has been given by SABIC featuring the 
prospectus of issuance, then they have recanted in another question by maintaining 
that SABIC has really given guarantee of the capital which is inconsistent with 
Shari’ah principle. On the other hand, another member believes that SABIC has not 
given guarantee, and that SABIC has made a commitment and that a distinction 
should be made between a commitment (promise) and a guarantee, then they have 
recanted that view in another question by saying that SABIC has given a guarantee 
but the guarantee given by SABIC for the capital has been out of necessity. 
Hence, after examining the prospectus of issuance, it could be argued that SABIC has 
given a guarantee to purchase sukuk assets at the nominal value as stipulated by the 
prospectus of issuance in many places that SABIC has made a commitment to buy 
sukuk from sukuk holders at their request after five years, and that SABIC will make a 
payment of 90% of the nominal value to sukuk holders and the remaining 10% of the 
nominal value will be paid from the reserve account, which means the holder will be 
paid back 100% of what he has paid for his sukuk. In those places, the prospectus of 
issuance provides that: “Five-year duration of sukuk has been determined at the point 
where the investor regains 100 % of the value of his investment at the maximum” 
(PISS, 2008). This confirm the view that a guarantee of the capital has been given by 





(i) Reflecting on the position that what has been made by SABIC is a commitment 
(promise) or agreement rather than a guarantee: 
In responding to this, it could be argued that the ‘promise’ given by SABIC to buy the 
assets for the capital or otherwise the ‘agreement’ between SABIC and sukuk holders 
to buy for the capital is quite similar to the term ‘guarantee’, as the final outcome will 
be the same in the sense that SABIC has become committed to buy at the nominal 
value regardless of the term being used either ‘commitment’, ‘agreement’ or 
‘guarantee’, the legal consequence will be the same and the difference will be only in 
the term. However, the meaning and the final result will be the same as it has been 
discussed above.  
In addition to support what it has been mentioned is that the statement made by one of 
the members of SBSS after the prospectus of issuance has been presented to him 
featuring the wording and expressions that indicate guarantee, by maintaining that a 
real guarantee has been given as featured in the prospectus of issuance which amounts 
to an inconsistency with Shari’ah principles, which should be presented to the SBSS 
again for correction of error. In addition, there are many conditions that have to be 
applied with regard to the promises given by the sukuk manager to be Shari’ah 
compliant as it has been indicated by AAOIFI (2008), AAOIFI (2010) and 
Almarshood (2013) as well as the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 178(4/19) 
and Decision No 188 (3/20).  
With regard to what has been mentioned by two of the members of the SBSS that only 
the issuer should make a commitment to buy sukuk for the capital, while sukuk 
holders have to be given the option either to sell for the capital or keep their sukuk for 
twenty years before they expire. In response to that view, it could be argued that it 
will not be in the favour of sukuk holders to keep their sukuk after five years have 
passed as the nominal value will start to decrease. Thus, selling sukuk at the end of the 
fifth year will be in their favour as they will be able to claim back their capital from 
the issuer. That is exactly the case with SABIC, 1, 2 and 3 sukuk, as all sukuk holders 
have sold their sukuk to SABIC at the end of the fifth year for the capital. In addition, 
it has been stated by the prospectus of issuance that the duration of sukuk is five years 




by five-year duration and at that point the investors will be paid back 100 % of the 
value of his investment at the maximum limit” (PISS, 2008). 
This indicates both the issuer and the holders have already been aware that the capital 
has been guaranteed through selling at the end of the fifth year which is the year that 
the issuer has promised to buy the assets at 90% of the capital plus 10% additional 
profits from the reserve account which amounts to the nominal value of sukuk. 
Moreover, in response to the argument that sukuk holders should make no 
commitment to sell after five years, it could maintained that, by not forcing sukuk 
holders to make a commitment to sell has been to stop objection in terms of Shari’ah 
based on the argument that it will question their full ownership of the sukuk as long as 
they are committed to sell after five years. However, by assuming that there is no 
commitment coming from the sukuk manager to buy at the nominal value, then it 
could be argued that the ownership of sukuk holders to the assets is unreal as has been 
explained before. For this reason, sukuk holders are given the option to sell at the end 
of the fifth year or keep their assets, and that option will definitely not take place as 
the sukuk holders will sell otherwise they will lose the chance to get their capital back. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there was a hidden guarantee has been given by 
the issuer to sukuk holders to buy at the nominal value. 
(ii) The argument that the guarantee given by SABIC is out of necessity: 
In response to the position that SABIC had to give guarantee out of necessity, it could 
be argued that Shari’ah rules are being flexible based on the rule that ‘necessities 
render the prohibited permissible’ (Mohamad el al., 2013). Therefore, in case of 
SABIC sukuk, what is the necessity that motivates the judgment to allow the 
guarantee of capital is not clear given the other Shari’ah rule that states; ‘Necessities 
is to be assessed and treated proportionally’ (Mohamad et  al., 2013). 
However, one of the members of SBSS interviewed for this study provided an excuse 
that the Islamic financing industry is still at the infant stage and that there is need for 
comprising some issues of fiqh for the industry to continue and compete with the riba-
based traditional system. That excuse, however, seems to be unacceptable in the view 
of one of non-SBSS member interviewees. He argued that Islamic financing industry 




traditional system. Therefore, Shari’ah scholars and other groups involved in the 
industry are capable of creating new products based on different theories and 
paradigm compared to the current conventional system that is based on giving 
guarantee for the capital and profits. 
(iii) The argument that SABIC is considered as a third party which allow it to give 
guarantee for the capital: 
As has been indicated by the prospectus of issuance, SABIC has many functions. 
First; it is the issuer of sukuk, secondly; as wakeel for sukuk holders, and thirdly; it is 
considered as the manager for the assets. This multiple roles would be confirmed by 
two of the board members of SBSS by pointing out that the guarantee that has 
featured in the prospectus of issuance has been given by SABIC by virtue of its 
capacity as an agent rather than an issuer.  
However, after examining and reviewing the prospectus of issuance, it has been 
realised that the guarantee given by SABIC in the prospectus of issuance has been 
given by SABIC as an issuer and not as an agent. In this respect, the prospectus of 
issuance provides that SABIC has made a commitment to buy for the capital, and yet 
the prospectus stops short of explaining in more detail as to whether SABIC has made 
that commitment as an issuer or as an agent. Moreover, with reference to the financial 
records of SABIC company, it becomes obvious that SABIC has made a commitment 
to pay back the value of sukuk based on the capital, as sukuk are being referred in the 
financial records as debts owed by SABIC which makes SABIC a grantor as an issuer 
and not as an agent.  
Furthermore, by assuming that SABIC represents a third party, what benefit does the 
company generates from being a guarantor? As a matter of fact, guarantors are always 
available in return for a price, and that should not be allowed, as some of the members 
of Shari’ah board argued and as AAOIFI standards stated. 
Therefore, as it has been mentioned that the guarantee from the third party should be 
accepted for many conditions as those conditions have not appeared with regard to 




Table  6.4: Positions on SABIC being as a Third-Party on the Guarantee of Capital 
Conditions SABIC sukuk structure 
The third party should be independent 
from the issuer and not owned by the 
issuer 
The third party is one of the companies 
owned by SABIC 
The financial record of the third party 
should be fully isolated. 
SABIC sukuk assets documented and 
written in the balance sheet of SABIC 
company  
 
The guarantee should be for free 
SABIC gave a guarantee for free but with a 
condition that SABIC will use all the 




(iv) The argument that the issuance of SABIC sukuk has preceded the approval of 
AAOIFI standards 
As discussed, one of the board members of SBSS has expressed his unease with the 
anti-Shari’ah malpractices with regard to SABIC sukuk, which he considered could be 
attributed to the fact that the issuance of SABIC sukuk has preceded the approval of 
AAOIFI standards. Nonetheless, by referring to the dates, it has been discovered that 
AAOIFI sukuk standards were issued on 1
st
 January 2003 indicating that sukuk 
standards have already been there before SABIC sukuk structure was approved by the 
concerned SBSS. However, it could be the case that the interviewee’s reference could 
be related to the recommendations for sukuk which were issued by AAOIFI in 2008 in 
response to concern raised from many Shari’ah scholars on the standards.  
Furthermore, one of the members of SBSS during the interview pointed out that they 
are not committed to AAOIFI standards which renders the claim that no standards 
have been available for the Shari’ah board members to refer seems to be inaccurate. 
6.4.4 The Guarantee of Returns 
In exploring the guarantee of returns with SABIC sukuk based on the debate presented 
above, It should be noted that in no circumstance should sukuk issuer, the agent of 




no matter that profit being a specific sum or a percentage of the capital or based on a 
certain benchmark such as such as LIBOR or otherwise based on the financial 
solvency of the issuer as it has been pointed out by AAOIFI (2010) as well as the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy. Nonetheless, according to the SABIC sukuk’s prospectus of 
issuance, it has become obvious that a clear guarantee has been given by SABIC for 
the periodic returns from many aspects as follows: 
(i) According to the prospectus of issuance, SABIC is committed to buying sukuk at 
the nominal value in case the company fails to distribute the periodic profits among 
sukuk holders, and that should mean the periodic profits have been granted no matter 
there have been profits generated by sukuk assets or not. The evidence for this is that, 
SABIC managed to buy the assets at the nominal price as a guarantee in case it fails to 
pay the specific profits to sukuk holders. In addition, it has been stated in the 
prospectus of issuance that among the failures that requires SABIC to buy sukuk from 
sukuk holders at the nominal value as stated in the following statement from the 
prospectus: “In case the sum to be distributed among sukuk holders by SABIC at the 
approved dates has been less than the sum that has been defined by the prospectus of 
issuance, as according to the ‘purchase agreement’ the issuer should be committed to 
buy the sukuk at the nominal value” (PISS, 2008). This should mean that SABIC has 
been committed to sukuk holders to pay them a specific percentage of the profits 
based on the capital no matter the project has been profitable or not, and in case of 
failure to do that SABIC has given them a guarantee to buy sukuk at the nominal 
value. As it has been mentioned that should be a guarantee for the returns. Eventually, 
any deal involving returns will be riba-based which is not allowed in Shari’ah terms, 
and that eliminates the difference between sukuk and riba-based bonds, as the 
bondholder would buy his bonds with guaranteed definite returns to be paid by the 
issuer as it has been noted by Alroshood (2013). In this respect, the same happens 
with SABIC sukuk as the sukuk holders bought his sukuk to be paid definite and 
guaranteed returns by the issuer, and in case of failure of the issuer, the sukuk holder 
preserves the right to claim back his capital by forcing the issuer to buy the sukuk at 
the nominal value as prescribed by the ‘purchase agreement’ between the two parties. 
(ii) As discussed previously, SABIC gives promises and makes commitments to 




commits to buy at the nominal value. However, that should mean that SABIC has 
made a commitment to pay the returns no matter it has made a profit from sukuk 
assets or not. In addition, it has already been explained that the assets of SABIC sukuk 
are not based on usufructs or rights that can be assessed as many sukuk structures 
issued. Consequently, the revenues that has been generated by SABIC sukuk has not 
come from sukuk assets as those assets are in fact non-existent, rather the revenues 
have come from SABIC company due the commitment it has made, and that the 
returns have been determined based on the benchmark and the financial solvency of 
SABIC. 
However, given the fact that the returns are to be originally generated by the assets, 
the question that needs to be raised at this point as to why SABIC is accused of failure 
in case the periodic payments to be distributed among sukuk holders is less than the 
sum to be defined in prospectus of issuance. As result of that, SABIC will be 
committed to buy from sukuk holders at the nominal value at the request of the 
holders. It should be noted that in the first place SABIC should have nothing to do 
with sukuk assets whether or not they generate profit, as the assets have been sold to 
be owned by sukuk holders; and secondly, why should sukuk holders refer to SABIC 
company when there is less sum of money available for periodic distribution as that 
would be like doing business which is subject to gain and loss, and in the end SABIC 
becomes a guarantor for the periodic returns. 
6.4.5 Critical Reflections on the Findings Relating to Reserve Account 
6.4.5.1 The idea of the reserve account 
As mentioned previously in sections 2.7.7, 2.7.8, 6.2.7 and 6.2.8, the deduction of part 
of the profits to be kept in the reserve account aims at the following: 
(i) to cope with any potential loss or otherwise decrease in profits during periods 
when profits become less or vanish; 
(ii) to achieve the required balance in future periodic distributions so that differences 
between periodic distributions from time to time are kept to the minimum possible. 
It should be mentioned that the above two reasons should justify the significance of 




through their responses to the questions related to the reserve account. However, as 
indicated by AAOIFI (2010) and Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 188 (3/20), in 
Shari’ah terms, the deduction of part of the profit to go to a reserve account is 
permissible, as the owners of those sums are sukuk holders who have donated the 
money to be kept in a reserve account, given that in Shari’ah terms they preserve the 
right to do so. Furthermore, the condition set by the prospectus of issuance or 
otherwise by the Shari’ah contract for this account to be established should not offend 
the requirement of the contract, as the permissibility has been stressed by most of the 
contemporary scholars, including Almenea (2010), Abu-Goudah (2010), Alshobaili 
(2011) and others, based on the decision made by the Islamic Fiqh Academy as well 
as AAOIFI. It has been argued that such action should be allowable as long as it has 
been stated by the prospectus of issuance that a specific percentage has to be deducted 
from the profits or otherwise that deduction of profit has to go to a reserve account as 
an insurance of the capital against potential risks (Alshamari, 2012). Nonetheless, the 
decisions of the Islamic Fiqh Academy No 178(4/19) and No 188(3/20), and the 
decision of Albarakah Group 8th Symposium for Islamic Economy (2002) stopped 
short of defining the fate of the money in the reserve account as the purpose comes to 
end with the expiry of sukuk for instance; or otherwise it has not been used for the 
purpose it has been allocated for; and who will be the owner of those sums of money 
when sukuk expires or has been resold to the issuer (Alanazi, 2012). 
6.4.5.2 Deducting more reserve than needed 
In relation to reserve account, the AAOIFI standards (2010) states that “The reserves 
should be established following the decision of the bank management (with the 
consent of the holders of the investment accounts) to establish a reserve account” 
(PISS, 2008). 
The standard, hence, stipulates that the consent of sukuk holders is indispensable, as 
the bank deduce those reserves from their share of the profits. However, the question 
is who decides the percentage of deductions of reserves from the profits. In this 
regard, the AAOIFI (2008) provides the following; “The reserve of the profit rates is 
estimated in accordance with the amount the management deems essential, taking into 




Thus, according to the AAOIFI standards of reserves, the estimation of the percentage 
of deductions for the reserves is a matter for the management department to decide 
on. However, what if the management deduced more money from the profits of 
investors than what was needed as a reserve. As a matter of fact, the accounting 
systems would allow this and the responsible manager would encourage that as well 
by giving credit to the management department for being cautious with regard to its 
investment, as mentioned above. This argument would be acceptable on the ground 
that the reserve sums would go back to sukuk holders. However, the condition set by 
the manager or issuer that whatever remains in the reserve account should be given to 
him/her as a bonus, in which case sukuk holders will be deprived from a considerable 
percentage of their profits due to the excessive caution. Moreover, this results in a 
conflict of interest between the issuer and the sukuk holders, as any increases in 
reserve account will be in favour of the issuer or the manager of assets as an interest-
free loan, in which case he/she will be accused of increasing the reserve sums to make 
the maximum benefit of the reserve sums to his favour. 
By examining SABIC sukuk, it has been realised that the percentage imposed by the 
manager of assets has been very high so that the sums to be saved from the reserve 
exceed that to be distributed among sukuk holders by many folds over. In evidencing 
this Merah (2011) concludes that SABIC has managed to save a total sum of SR 
3,937,000,000 in the reserve account, which is equivalent to three folds of the money 
distributed to sukuk holders as profits after five years of sukuk duration have passed. 
This indicates that sukuk holders have been deprived of their true profits many folds 
over than what they have received. In addition, it indicates that the percentage that 
have been defined by the manager of assets or otherwise the issuer featuring the 
potential risks has not been real based on the market condition, which is rather, based 
on LIBOR as has been already explained (Hassan, 2011).  
As a conclusion, it follows that giving the management department or the issuer a free 
hand to define the percentages of reserves is a matter that needs to have the consent of 
sukuk holders in advance not to mention the fact that a real study of the market with 
regard to the risks involved is also needed, and that all those procedures must feature 




6.4.5.3 Investing the reserve sums disfavouring sukuk holders 
As regards to the condition set by the sukuk manager (SABIC company) to invest the 
reserve sums disfavouring sukuk holders, this should be consistent with the condition 
of a loan, a matter that has been confirmed by a group of scholars of Islamic banking 
as it has been pointed out by Alshobaili (2010). They concluded that such condition 
should not be allowed due to a number of reasons that have already been discussed by 
Alomrani (2012). It is already concluded that whatever has been available in the 
reserve account has to go to sukuk holders, so that the profits to be generated by 
investing that sum should go to the owner of the money, i.e. sukuk holders as has been 
indicated by AAOIFI standards (2010) regarding investment bonds that “The reserves 
are to be deducted from the profit”. Therefore, if the profits go to sukuk holders; then 
whatever to be deducted from those profits must also go to sukuk holders when sukuk 
expire (Alanazi, 2011). 
 As discussed above, from the answers of the members of SBSS, it has become 
obvious that there is an agreement among them that the issuer or the manager of 
assets has got the right to dispose of the money available in the reserve account to 
his/her advantage. It seems that the consent of sukuk holders has been obtained by 
some of the SBSS members as well as some scholar as a condition for that. However, 
with respect to the sums in excess of the periodic distributions, the prospectus of 
issuance has stipulated that; “The manager of sukuk assets has got the right of using 
and investing the reserve sums in his favour so that the returns to be generated by 
using and investing those sums will be the property of the manager alone” (PISS, 
2008). This implies that sukuk holders have got no option other than accepting that 
condition that has been documented in the prospectus of issuance featuring the use of 
the sums in excess of the periodic distributions in favour of the manager of assets and 
that condition has become a compulsory condition.  
However, in fact the prospectus of issuance has failed to provide for a separate 
agreement involving the promise to buy or the agreement of the management of assets 
explaining that sukuk holders have given their consent to the issuer or otherwise the 
manager of assets to use the reserve sums and invest them in his favour. This should 
indicate the fact that the manager of sukuk has initially imposed that condition in the 




no option but give their consent to that condition. Nonetheless, the fact that sukuk 
holders have given their consent to that condition should mean that the capital and the 
periodic returns have been granted to them, as it is inconceivable that sukuk holders 
will give up their rights with regard to the reserves and the profits to be generated 
from investing those reserves and accept to receive a small percentage of the profits 
without being given something in return. In this case, thus, in return, the sukuk holders 
have been given the guarantee of the capital and profits to given by the issuer as has 
been explained above. 
The condition set by SABIC sukuk issuer or the manager of assets to use the reserve 
account in his favour as has been stipulated by the prospectus of issuance should 
mean that he takes whatever is available in the reserve account as an interest-free loan 
so that sum will be granted by sukuk issuer a matter to be disallowed in terms of 
Shari’ah principles (Alshobaili, 2010). In another word, sukuk holders have chosen 
the issuer (SABIC) as their agent to manage the assets at a price, and in the meantime 
SABIC has got the right to take whatever is available in the reserve account as a free 
loan. As has already been explained such practice is disallowed according to the 
Prophet Muhammad’s tradition, who prohibited the act of ‘combing between selling 
and borrowing in one contract’ (Alanazi, 2011; Alshobaili, 2011). 
Thus, in Shari’ah terms the option, according to Dagi (2011), will be either the 
reserve should be put in a current account in one of the Islamic banks favouring sukuk 
holders rather than the issuer, or to be invested by the issuer or the manager of the 
assets in favour of sukuk holders. In the case of opting for investment, such an 
investment should feature a mudarabah contract in which the two parties agree on a 
specific percentage of the profits, which should be stipulated by the prospectus of 
issuance as that should be permissible in Shari’ah terms as sukuk holders will request 
the manager of assets or the issuer in addition to his/her duties as a manger of sukuk to 
undertake another task featuring the investment of the reserve sums instead of leaving 
them inactive. It can be argued that this should be the better option than leaving sukuk 
issuer to take up all the profit in case he/she takes hold of the reserve as an interest-




6.4.6 The incentive given to the manager of assets 
It has already been explained above, there is a disagreement between Shari’ah 
scholars regarding the practicality of the condition set with regard to the incentive 
given to the manager of assets or the agent, which will be allowed according to 
AAOIFI standards (Alshamari, 2013). While a number of Islamic banking scholars 
believe that such practice should be disallowed due to the fact that the issuer or the 
manager of assets has already been paid for the job, and due to the conflict of interest 
involved based on evidence from Shari’ah as has already been explained (Alanazi, 
2011; Alshobaili, 2011). In addition, it has been pointed out that due to the fact that 
the money featuring the reserve account is being deducted from the profits to be 
generated by investing the money paid by sukuk holders and subsequently, whatever 
money is available in the reserve account should be possessed by sukuk holders alone 
and should be invested in their favour and that when sukuk expires whatever is in the 
reserve account must go to sukuk holders as that money is generated by sukuk owned 
by them as stated by the decisions of Albaraka Group Symposium (2002) that 
“Nothing wrong with deducting part of the profits and postponing its distribution to a 
later date”. This implies that the sums available in the reserve account have been 
linked to sukuk duration so that the sums automatically go to sukuk holders when 
sukuk expires. 
It could be argued that reforming the practice with sukuk as to be Islamic sukuk in 
terms of honesty and justice requires getting rid of the condition that anything in 
excess of a specific percentage of the net profit must go to the manager. In this regard, 
the net profit is the right of sukuk holders and the manager has no right in it, apart 
from a reasonable amount such as part of the net profits as a bonus for his good 
performance of his duties. This point is significant regarding the proof of good 
performance of the manager, as this justifies as to why he deserves the bonus. 
Moreover, the bonus should be given with the good intention of sukuk holders, and 
any conditions set with regard to the bonus tend to mimic the traditional banking 
system by fixing the return, and relating that practice to the Islamic investment 
products should not be allowed (Alshobaili ,2010;Almenea, 2010; Alomrani, 2012). 
It should be noted that a critical review of the of SABIC sukuk issuance prospectus 




reserve deposit as an incentive, when sukuk expires, as the prospectus states that; 
“When sukuk has been cleared the remaining sums of the reserve deposit should go to 
the manager of sukuk assets (SABIC) as a bonus for his good management no matter 
the clearance has been before or after sukuk expires” (PISS, 2008). 
However, some of the conditions and restrictions that have been introduced by some 
of the scholars in Islamic banking to lessen the resemblance of sukuk to riba-based 
bonds have not been mentioned in the prospectus of issuance. For instance, Almenea 
(2010) recommended the condition that the issuer of sukuk or manager of assets has to 
be given a reasonable percentage of the sums left over in the reserve account; Alanazi 
(2011) suggested that there has to be a mudarabah contract between the two parties 
for sharing the profits; or Merah (2011) stated that there has to be a clear word from 
sukuk holders to donate the assets voluntarily rather than by dictation. Despite all 
these various positions, the prospectus of the SABIC sukuk has not stipulated such 
conditions, as mentioned earlier. 
According to Elgari (2011), nothing wrong with the idea of a reserve account and 
keeping the returns in excess of the periodic distribution to bring about stability. This, 
however, should not be made a condition for sukuk holders to give it up at the expense 
of their right even if the amount accumulating in the account equals their original 
capital that they will give it up to the issuer. However, it could be possible that sukuk 
holders might give up whatever is available in the reserve account when they possess 
the excess money and preserve the right to dispose of it willingly without being 
dictated by any one. 
6.4.6.1 Explaining the periodic profits to sukuk holders 
With regards to explaining the period profits to sukuk holders, knowing the amount of 
periodic profits of sukuk is among the rights of sukuk holders. Thus, the manager of 
assets has a duty to explain matters pertaining to the earned periodic returns during 
the various periods featuring statements and financial reports to be presented to sukuk 
holders. 
However, as discussed above, two members of the SABIC sukuk SBSS have 
maintained that SABIC is supposed to give an explanation in relation to the rate of 




that the return from sukuk, which is the percentage of the total sales for every 
marketing contract, is non-standardised, as prospectus of issuance provides the 
following (PISS, 2008); 
SABIC is eligible for marketing fees in accordance with the marketing 
agreement, depending on the quantity of products that have been sold, 
and that the marketing fees in general is worked out as a percentage 
from the selling price, given that the rate of marketing percentage 
differ from one agreement to another.  
From the forgoing, it becomes obvious that the rate or the percentage of the profit is 
unknown, which implies that sukuk holders are unaware of what is going on with 
regard to the profits as long as there is no explanation of the percentage of the profit 
as it can be considered against the Shari’ah rule, as it has been discussed above. In 
addition, this matter has not been discussed in any of the relevant documents and 
contracts, as all the agreements and contracts between SABIC and its subsidiary 
companies responsible for the assets of SABIC sukuk indicates that sukuk holders 
have no right of access, as has been discussed. 
6.4.6.2 Explaining the excess sums to be deposited in the reserve account 
In relation to depositing the excess sum in the reserve account, knowing what has 
been deducted from the periodic returns of sukuk in the reserve account is also one of 
the rights of sukuk holders, as the manager of assets has a duty to explain those 
reserves during various periods in the form of statements and financial reports to be 
presented to sukuk holders. 
However, two of the board members of SABIC sukuk SBSS interviewed for this study 
have made the point that whatever is being deposited in the reserve account of the 
excess sums will be known to sukuk holders. However, according to the prospectus of 
issuance it becomes obvious that sukuk holders have nothing to do with the reserve 
sums, as those sums will in the end go to the manager of assets as incentive. In other 
words, sukuk holders will not be much concerned about what is available in the 
reserve account as long as the capital and the periodic returns are guaranteed. 
However, in case sukuk holders sell their sukuk before it expire, then the fate of the 
excess sums that have been deposited for them in the reserve account to cope up with 




mentioned that the prospectus of issuance and the attached documents do not make 
any provision that the sums to be deposited in the reserve account have been given up 
in advance by the owners in case they have sold their sukuk. Consequently, those 
sums should go to the manager of sukuk assets at the time when sukuk expire as it has 
been suggested by Alanazi (2011). 
From the forgoing, it implies that the manager of sukuk assets has a duty to list the 
names of investors among sukuk holders from whom the profit deductions have been 
taken for the reserve so that those deductions can be paid back to them when things 
come to an end in terms of purpose and need, in case sukuk expire or has been sold by 
the holders as those investors are the owners of the profits or otherwise taking the 
consent of sukuk holders to give up the profits being kept for them in the reserve 
account in favour of the others who have bought the sukuk from them in what is 
known in fiqh as ‘ibra’a meaning investors give up their rights of ownership of the 
reserve account in favour of the reserve account as a donation (Alanazi,2011). 
 However, there has been controversy among Shari’ah scholars with regard to the 
permissibility of ‘ibra’a, where it has been stressed that in Shari’ah terms it is dutiful 
that the reserve money goes back to the owners whenever it becomes possible to list 
the names or otherwise donate the money on their behalf to charity organisations 
rather than leaving the money for the manager of assets as being dictated by Maliki 
School. 
6.4.7 Reflecting on the Findings Relating to Gharar in SABIC Sukuk 
According to the prospectus of SABIC sukuk, the assets of SABIC sukuk were 
established at SR 5,000,000,000, and sukuk have been purchased by the investors 
based on this evaluation. Nonetheless, based on the findings from the interviews 
conducted, it can be said that many of the critics of sukuk structures have raised 
questions with regard to the current situation in relation to the method of evaluation of 
the assets of many sukuk structures as SABIC sukuk is one of them. However, among 
the questions as to who has evaluated SABIC sukuk is rather urgent, as whether it is 
SABIC Company, who has done the evaluation or another independent specialised 




In addition, whether sukuk holders have been aware of the method of evaluation of the 
assets of SABIC sukuk given that in the end they will become the real owners of those 
assets, which imply that they must be aware of its real market value in order to avoid 
gross losses in the value when sukuk circulate in the secondary market. Moreover, 
among the questions as to whether sukuk holders are fully aware of the potential 
returns of those assets as well as the feasibility study featuring the determination of 
the periodic returns that will be distributed among sukuk holders is also rather 
important. In addition, what is the nature of the contracts (in relation to sukuk assets) 
that have been signed between SABIC and its subsidiary companies, and what are 
those subsidiary companies that have signed the marketing contracts with SABIC, and 
whether sukuk holders should be aware of those contracts to be signed between 
SABIC and the subsidiary companies are among other essential issues. It should be 
stated that all the above questions were presented to persons specialised in sukuk 
business as well as to the members of SBSS. 
From the interviews with the members of SBSS it is understood that they sustain their 
position that the answers to the above queries feature in the prospectus of issuance 
and that no gharar is associated with SABIC sukuk.  
However, after examining the prospectus of SABIC issuance, the prospectus of 
issuance fails to answer the above questions and the consequences. As a consequence, 
sukuk holders seem to be alienated with regard to the assets they possess as well as 
being unaware in terms of the nature of those assets and their market value not to 
mention the potential returns from sukuk assets.  
Moreover, according to the prospectus of issuance, sukuk holders should not be 
allowed to look at the sukuk assets that have been sold to them featuring the 
agreements between SABIC and its subsidiary companies, and also sukuk holders 
have no right to make a request for a copy of those agreements or contracts or any 
information from the issuer regarding the activities of the parties involved in the 
marketing of the products of SABIC subsidiary companies.  
Furthermore, the prospectus of issuance has been ambiguous in relation to the returns 





“SABIC becomes eligible for marketing fees following every 
marketing agreement of the amount of products it manages to sell, 
and that generally speaking the marketing fees are worked out as a 
percentage of the selling price so that the rate varies from one 
agreement to another”.  
Thus, the rate or percentage is unknown and it is not defined in all documents 
featuring sukuk and the associated contracts, and that the percentage of profits varies 
from one agreement to another, a matter that the prospectus of issuance has fell short 
of explaining. 
From the forgoing, it could be argued that SABIC has evaluated sukuk assets that 
have been sold to sukuk holders due to its need for specific money that SABIC needs 
for funding. However, as SABIC needs a specific amount of money for funding 
accordingly, it seems that SABIC has evaluated the assets that it intends to sell to 
sukuk holders to generate that amount, a fact that has been confirmed by some of the 
interviewees. 
On the other hand, as it has been mentioned previously, sukuk holders could have not 
been concerned to know about the nature of assets they are going to possess, their 
market value or even the real returns of the assets of the sukuk they have bought. 
In this regard, it could be argued that no matter whether or not sukuk holders have 
bought the assets of the sukuk for the price which is equivalent to the market value; 
their capital will be returned to them, so that knowing the real price of the sukuk they 
have is not an important matter to them, not to mention the fact that the amounts 
featuring the periodic distributions are granted and fixed and that is what investors in 
the financial markets are interested in as it has been pointed out by Elgari (2011). 
Thus, it seems that SABIC sukuk holders will not be interested to find answers to the 
above questions. However, not having answers to these questions could lead to 
gharar, which can have important consequences, as the contract will be invalidated as 








The analysis and discussion in this chapter is summarised in Table 6.4, which displays 
the main findings. 
Table  6.5: Summarising the Main Findings 
No 
Evaluation and examination 
points 
Findings Relating to SABIC Sukuk 
1 
The type of the structure of 
SABIC sukuk 
It seems that the prospectus failed to identify as to which type of contract the 
SABIC sukuk was based on; 
2 The validity of the SABIC sukuk   SABIC sukuk seems to be enah or wafaa structure;  
3 
The real nature of the ownership  The ownership of the assets did not meet all the Shari’ah rules, as there is no 
control over the assets and there is no real transfer of the assets; 
4 
The validity of the underlying 
sukuk assets  
SABIC sukuk do not represent the real assets, usufruct or services or otherwise 
rights that can be financially assessed and evaluated in the market rather it 
represents future generated money or the right of collecting the future money; 
5 The guarantee of the returns  Sukuk manager (SABIC) has guaranteed the returns for the sukuk holders; 
6 
The source of the returns Returns come through marketing the products of SABIC sukuk subsidiaries, as 
there are contracts that SABIC has a duty to market those products. However, 
those contracts represent temporary agreements between SABIC and its 
subsidiary companies, as they have the legal right whether SABIC or any of the 
subsidiary companies to opt out of the agreement and sever the contract providing 
an initial notice that has been given to the other party; 
7 
The distribution of profits based 
on the benchmark  
The periodic distribution of profits was based on the LIBOR rather than the real 
function of the underlying SABIC sukuk assets; 
8 
The guarantee of the capital by 
promising to repurchase the assets 
at the nominal value  
SABIC company (sukuk manager) has made a promise to repurchase SABIC 
sukuk assets from sukuk holders for their face value; 
9 
The guarantee from the third 
party  
SABIC company is not considered as a third party, because it should be separate 
in terms of identity and financial independence from the two parties of the 
contract and the guarantee should also be free; 
10 
The reserves profits  All the profits in the reserve account went to the sukuk manager (SABIC 
company), which was supposed to go to the sukuk holders as they are the owner 
of the reserves; 
11 
The deducting of reserves  The sukuk manager has deducted more money from the returns than what was 
needed for facing any expected risks, as there is no real study has been 
conducted for the estimation of profits; 
12 
The condition set by sukuk issuer 
to benefit from the reserve 
account 
Sukuk manager (SABIC Company) received benefit from what is in the reserve 
account while it should be for the favour of the sukuk holders 
13 
The condition of a loan when the 
profit becomes less than a specific 
percentage   
In SABIC sukuk prospectus, there is no indication that there is any condition of 
loan in the case of the profit becoming less than a specific percentage   
14 
The real sharing of profits and 
losses between sukuk holders 
and sukuk issuers 
There is no PLS between sukuk manager and sukuk holders, as the sukuk 
manager (SABIC Company) will bear all the risks against less profit with using 
all the money in the reserve account as well as taking all the remaining money 
in the reserve account at the maturity of the sukuk. 
15 
The value of the underlying 
sukuk  assets  and how ‘SABIC 
sukuk rights’ have been 
assessed and evaluated 
The issuance of the SABIC prospectus did not indicate how the ‘rights’ have 
been evaluated. This implies that gharar is involved. However, it seems that 




Chapter 7                                                                               
LEGAL RISKS IN SUKUK STRUCTURES 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
Islamic financial transactions, especially Islamic financing models such as sukuk are 
surrounded by financial and legal risks. In this regard, a great deal of academic and 
professional efforts is needed through academic researchers or legal professionals 
identifying the legal risks associated with sukuk structures.  
It has been mentioned previously that the systems and regulations that govern the 
activities of IFIs have been entirely designed to serve conventional financial 
institutions (Iqbal and Lewis, 2009). Thus, it is quite natural for the IFIs to encounter 
legal difficulties while trying to cope with regulations and legal frames that do not 
take the specificities and the nature of Islamic financing into account. In addition to 
the salient nature of Islamic financing related legal risks, the legal risk potential would 
vary from one financial institution to another depending on the country in which it 
operates and the prevailing financial and legal regulations that governs the banking 
activities in that particular country (Abdullah et al., 2011). 
The legal risks are associated with failure to execute financial contracts or otherwise 
those related to the statute and legislations that govern obligations featuring contracts 
and business deals (Ahmed and Khan, 2007; Jobst, 2007). These risks could be 
internal risk relevant to the management of the financial institution and its employees, 
which could reduce the assets of the institution or increase its obligations in a sudden 
manner, either for reasons of inaccuracy or non-compliance or for lack of sufficient 
legal backing or otherwise for engaging in new types of transactions that are yet to 
become legally provided for or external in nature such as regulations that might affect 
certain kind of business transactions (Hanafy, 2000). 
In exploring legal risk related issues in relation to sukuk, this chapter will be divided 
into three sections; section one explores and discusses the legal risks that sukuk 




risks related to the sukuk holders, sales of assets, default, contracts and 
documentations, legal infrastructure of sukuk in various jurisdictions, the conflict 
between Western law and Shari'ah law, legal risks involving bankruptcy, SPV, 
standardisation of sukuk and the lack of application of IF between countries will be 
highlighted and identified. In providing empirical substance to the provided frame and 
debate, the perspectives of the interview survey based participants on structure and 
prospectus of SABIC sukuk in relation to legal issues is analysed and presented. The 
third part of this chapter attempts in meaning making in relation to the legal risks 
related to SABIC sukuk through the analysis of the interviews and the available body 
of knowledge as presented in the beginning of the chapter. In this critical discussion, 
the prospectus of SABIC sukuk is also considered through deconstruction method. 
7.2 LEGAL RISKS IN SUKUK STRUCTURES: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sukuk being the major Islamic capital market instrument has gained popularity in 
expanding the Islamic financial operations. However, similar to any other financial 
instruments, Islamic or conventional, sukuk have potential areas of risks; therefore 
previous the empirical chapters focused on Shari’ah compliancy and Shari’ah risk in 
the case of SABIC sukuk from Saudi Arabia. This chapter, in its focus on risk 
exposures related to sukuk structures focuses on legal risks and the following sections 
provides a literature survey on aspects of legal risks in sukuk structuring by beginning 
with legal risks associated with sukuk holders. 
7.2.1 Legal Risks Associated with Sukuk Holders 
Sukuk holders are the first participants in the sukuk market who are exposed to the risk 
of losing their investment. In this regard, it should be noted that sukuk certificates are 
supposed to prove the ownership of an asset which will generate a periodical return 
depending on the agreement. However, the availability of a tangible asset is central to 
the idea of sukuk, so that sukuk holders must have interest in the asset to be financed 
by the money collected from selling sukuk (Adam and Thomas, 2004). In this regard, 
AAOIFI rules that investors on sukuk should have the full ownership of the associated 
assets provided that those assets are legally bought from the original owner (AAOIFI, 
2044). In this case according to Shari’ah law the risks and returns associated with 
dealing in sukuk should be linked to the assets. Hence, even in case of insolvency the 




On the other hand, according to AAOIFI (2010) “The Manager issuing Sukuk must 
certify the transfer of ownership of such assets in its (Sukuk) books, and must not keep 
them as his own assets’. In other words, the issuer of sukuk has a duty to transfer the 
assets involved in the books to the ownership of the holders of sukuk rather than 
keeping them as his own property. To reach that end, an agreement should be made 
featuring the originator and sukuk holders as evidence of sale transaction. Such 
agreement should be given every legal consideration to be enforced.  
The AAOIFI ruling should suggest that the design of sukuk certificates should reflect 
the true ownership of the asset involved. In addition The Islamic Fiqh Academy’s 
Decision No 188 (3/20) stated that sukuk contracts should fulfil all the requirements 
whereby ownership is legitimately and legally proven, resulting in the ability to act and afford 
insurance. Contracts should be free from fraud and sham and insuring that they will ultimately 
guarantee safety from the Shari’ah point of view. 
It could be argued that the lack of relevant laws and regulations regarding the transfer 
of assets from the issuer to the sukuk holders are the main causes of risks, which may 
lead to the uncertainty and the lack of transparency (McMillen, 2006). 
7.2.2 Legal Risks in Relation to the Sale of Assets 
The legal risks involved in the sale of underlying sukuk assets become a controversial 
matter, which relates to the type of sale from the issuer to the SPV whether real or not 
(Alsayyed, 2014). In case the sale is real, the sukuk holders preserve the right of 
ownership of the asset involved. On the other hand, in case the sale is unreal, the 
sukuk holders will have no right of ownership of the asset (Yean, 2009; Khnifer, 
2010). It should be mentioned that losing the right over the asset for being the owner 
of assets is a great risk that sukuk holders may face. In other words, sukuk holders and 
creditors will legally be in the same status in the event of any loss or default and 
therefore will not be sukuk feature on conventional bonds (Khnifer, 2010). 
It is noteworthy that from a legal point of view, the registration of the property or 
asset should be in the name of the new owner, and that arrangement should be 
considered in case of legal disputes (Howladar, 2009). That should mean in case of 
sale, the ownership of the underlying asset should be transferred from the balance-




obligor declares bankruptcy, investors have recourse to the asset and preserve the 
upper-hand over unsecured creditors (Ahmed, 2015). In this regard, AAOIFI, (2008) 
highlighted the fact that sale of assets to sukuk holders should reflect all legal rights 
and obligations with regard to ownership. 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the discontinuous relationship between SPV and 
the issuer indicates that a real transfer of assets has taken place by mentioning the fact 
that some numerous conditions should be available in order that the sale becomes 
legally real (Usmani, 2007; Usmani, 2013; Alshamari, 2013): 
(i) The majority of SPV shares are owned by investors independent of the issuer; 
(ii) The management of SPV is made by a person independent of the issuer; 
(iii) SPV must subject to all risks as to gain all the characteristics associated with 
ownership of the assets. 
In addition, Giddi (2000) pointed out that there are some standards that can 
distinguish between the real sale and what is known as the guaranteed loan, so as long 
as a relationship exists that makes one understand that SPV has the right to refer to the 
seller of the underlying assets in case of bankruptcy by the issuer that should make 
one to understand that the sale becomes unreal. Moreover, in case that the sukuk 
manager has the right in the excess gains that has not been agreed upon from sukuk 
returns, the sale will not be real but rather it will be considered as a guaranteed loan 
given by the issuer to sukuk holders(Amer, 2013; Alsayyed, 2014).  
In addition, the gains should not be mixed with the money of the issuer or sukuk 
manager so that if the issuer represents the agent of sukuk holders in which case the 
income should be kept in an independent account separate from the issuer account 
until its returned to SPV account otherwise that should indicate that no real sale has 
taken place (Alshobaili, 2011; Alanazi, 2011). 
It could be argued that the full meaning of real ownership has been currently missing 
in many sukuk structures as that have been referred to by many Shari’ah scholars and 
experts in relation to real ownership, including Usmani (2007), Almenea (2010), 




that the ownership of the assets should become a risk from both law and Shari’ah 
aspects. 
7.2.3 Legal Risks Related to the Keeping the Assets on the Issuer Balance Sheet 
One of the risks that can be noticed on sukuk structures is the failure of transfer of 
assets from the issuer balance sheet to the records of sukuk holders or their 
representative SPV as it has been discussed above. However, Elgari (2009) states that 
in case the company has any intention to buy again the assets that it has sold to sukuk 
holders, there is no need to transfer those assets from the issuer records to SPV, as in 
such case that will have unfavourable effects on the issuer. 
In contrast, among others Almuslih (2011), Dagi (2011) and Alshamari (2013) argued 
that in case if there is a ‘purchase commitment contract’ from the issuer to buy again 
the assets that have been sold to sukuk holders, in which case the issuer has no right to 
make the assets remaining within its records given that it will be returned to him 
according to the ‘purchase commitment contract’ at the end of the period as the 
transaction will be inconsistent with selling contract featuring the transfer of 
ownership. 
In this respect, it can be argued that the condition of keeping the assets on the issuer 
balance sheet should feature a number of legal risks. First, it could be argued that the 
legal risks as the prevailing laws do not recognise the ownership of individuals unless 
it is registered officially under their names. This is due to the fact that AAOIFI (2010) 
makes a condition that ownership of the assets of sukuk has to be in the name of sukuk 
holders as well as the transfer of assets should be made possible by law. 
In addition, the remaining of sukuk in the balance sheet of the issuer will be returned 
to him in accordance to the ‘purchase commitment contract ’that could make the 
selling process a nominal process and that an intention is being made on the fact that 
the contract will be just a nominal (fictitious) to reach the loan with profit (Usmani, 
2013). 
Furthermore, it could also be argued that in case the assets remain with no transfer 
from the issuer to sukuk holders, there will be no major differences between bonds 




represent assets or usufructs while bonds represent loans and finical commitments 
which can be seen in sukuk without transferring the assets (Dagi, 2011). 
Nonetheless, Elgari (2009) argued that what it has been said is not accurate, as the 
balance sheet to be issued by the company, which include the underlying sukuk assets 
does not reflect and indicate Shari’ah rules that prove or not the validity of selling. 
Additionally, the balance sheet is not considered as a part of the selling contract so 
that any in-correction of the balance sheet will make the contract invalid. In other 
words, the perfection of balance sheet is not made as condition of the validity of the 
selling contract in which case leaving the assets as part of the balance sheet of sukuk 
indicates that the sale is nominal and not real.  
Nonetheless, leaving such assets register as part of the balance sheet of the issuer is an 
benchmark that the selling, which might be nominal, can be rejected by arguing that 
nothing will be considered unless the case goes to court in case of bankruptcy or 
insolvency. However, in case the judges look at the balance sheet of issuer and has 
discovered that the asset still remain in the issuer balance sheet, in which case the 
court will become confused as to what they will depend on, as to whether the assets 
which are part of the balance sheet is still owned by the issuer and has not been 
transferred or that the documents and what is being indicated by the contract as 
referring to a sale and that the assets are owned by sukuk holders (Elgari, 2011). 
On the other hand, it could be argued that no many precedent cases are available in 
Saudi Arabian courts that can provide a basis for judges so that it could be possible 
that the courts will depend on what is available in the documents and contracts to 
provide a guide to prove the transfer of ownership rather than pay attention to the 
balance sheet that has been suspected of unreal sale (Elgari, 2011).  
AAOIFI (2008), however, made it clear that;  
Sukuk, to be tradable, must be owned by Sukuk holders, with all rights 
and obligations of ownership, in real assets, whether tangible usufructs or 
services, capable of being owned and sold legally as well as in 
accordance with the rules of Shari'ah, in accordance with Articles (2)1 
and (5/1/2)2 of the AAOIFI Shari'ah Standard (17) on Investment Sukuk. 
The Manager issuing Sukuk must certify the transfer of ownership of such 




According to Hassan (2015), on the other hand, the sukuk issuer has a duty to separate 
those assets from its balance sheet so that it does not remain as part of the assets but 
out of it, as they have already sold those assets by receiving the payment as he should 
transfer its ownership. In addition, it should be mentioned that if the assets being 
available among the assets of issuer it could mean that the sale is not real and that the 
price he has received from sukuk holders represents a loan and that sukuk returns are 
considered as the ‘profit of loan’ even though it named as ujrah (wages) in the case of 
ijarah contract. Moreover, some of the Islamic banks have insisted keeping the rent 
assets that has been sold to sukuk holders as part of its lists of assets (on balance 
sheet) but instead it has to be ‘off balance sheet’ (Hassan, 2012). 
Hence, the following question can be raised: what is the reason of leaving the assets 
remaining as part of the issuer balance sheet, while in fact the sukuk have really been 
sold to sukuk holders. In this regard, Elgari (2011) pointed out that due to the fact that 
the issuer will retrieve its assets that has been sold or otherwise has rented them to 
sukuk holders so that claiming out those assets from the balance sheet and then their 
retrieval will incur taxes to the issuer, which will of course increase the cost of issuing 
sukuk and as a result sukuk holders will be affected. Therefore, by leaving the assets 
within the balance sheet will make one avoid the tax in a way consistent with the law. 
Moreover, he argued that separating these assets from the issuer balance sheet has 
negative effects on the company shares on the financial market, and also the process 
of selling the assets could face some disagreements from shareholders in relation to 
company. However, in case of government assets, their move out of the balance sheet 
might become complicated and might need a new law so that sukuk issuers could 
insist on keeping assets as part of the issuer balance sheet. On the other hand, Elgari 
(2011) also argued that ownership could be proved even without any transfer of assets 
from the register of the issuer to the record of sukuk holders as they are many ways to 
be used by accountants such as the ‘comments’ made by the accountant advisor of the 
balance sheet making the points that the ownership of assets has been changed or 
otherwise has been mortgaged. 
It could also be pointed out that many legal criticisms have referred to the structures 
of current sukuk given to the possible legal conflicts between sukuk issuer and sukuk 




of the assets that have bought and also the possibility of their legal capability of 
proving their right of ownership so that many legal specialists in sukuk would see that 
it is essential to transfer the assets from the balance sheet of the issuer to the register 
of sukuk holders which is consistent with what has been provided by AAOIFI 
(2008),AAOIFI (2010) and the Islamic Fiqh Council in its decision no 188(3/20)  as it 
has already been explained above.  
By contrast, as it has been mentioned in Chapter 6 that some believe that it would be 
enough to transfer just the ‘beneficiary ownership’ while the title of the assets still 
remains with the seller as there is no harm for the assets to be remained in the balance 
sheet of the issuer (the seller). An example could be when the issuer keeps the 
ownership of the hired assets in his balance sheet and transfers the right of collecting 
the rent to the sukuk holders (Afshar, 2013; Hidayat, 2013).  
Nonetheless, many of sukuk specialists believe that laws differ from one country to 
another with regard to the law of transferring the ‘beneficiary ownership’. Therefore, 
one should avoid any dispute which may be caused by the misunderstanding as a 
result of the differences of the laws and regulations in each country. For example, 
transferring the ‘beneficiary ownership’ is considered valid and real sale in one 
Jurisdiction while it could be against the law in another judicial authority as the case 
in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, sukuk holders will be exposed to one of the legal risks 
as becoming incapable of proving their legal rights because of the invalidity of the 
law of transferring the ‘beneficiary ownership’(Duaabah, 2009). 
7.2.4 The Impossibility of Transmission Assets from the Issuer to the Sukuk 
Holder 
It should also be noticed that among the critical issues relating to sukuk structures 
regarding the real ownership is that, the possibility of transferring the ownership of 
the assets from the issuer to sukuk holders, in case such assets represents reigns assets 
that are not expected to be sold as its ownership belong to main companies such the 
management buildings of the companies or that those assets belong to governments 
such as airports and other public domain or that the law of the state will not allow 




In this respect, Elgari (2011) asserted that despite those who think that the 
governments and big companies are not expected to sell or otherwise rent their 
sovereign assets, the current realities have proved that many governments has either 
sold or rent their sovereign assets. For instance, what has been managed by the UK 
government by selling Belfast airport to a private company; Austria having sold 47 
percent of Vienna airport to the private sector; Switzerland by selling 50 percent of 
Zurich airport to the private sector, and also Australia following suit by renting 17 of 
the most important airport for 50 years to the private sector. Therefore, the statement 
that it is impossible for governments to sell or rent some of its properties is not an 
accurate statement. Hence, in case the assets have really been transferred to the buyer 
(sukuk holders) will prove that the sell is real rather than nominal.  
However, it can be argued that a number of criticisms in relation to sukuk structures 
have been raised, such as the case for the ownership on the sovereign assets. Due to so 
many conditions on the ownership on the sovereign assets, one may conclude that 
there is a doubt as well as uncertainty as the sale is not real rather than only the 
impossibility of selling the sovereign assets (Merah, 2011). Moreover, the associated 
conditions as well as suspicions will support one another so that in the end they 
become real that there is no true sale as a result of impossibility of selling an 
important asset. In another words, re-renting the governments and companies to the 
assets they have already sold by keeping them in their records and balance sheet, and 
also the conditions made by those companies and governments as to become agents 
for sukuk holders indicates the impossibility of transmission assets from the issuer to 
the sukuk holder. In addition, it could be also said that sukuk holders have less 
experience and knowledge to deal with investment areas such as airports and public 
roads or the other public domain. In such conditions, they become forced to accept 
any conditions set by the sukuk issuer including restricting their authority as well as 
fully controlled upon their assets and that will indicate that the ownership is not in full 
as has been pointed out by AAOIFI (2008) along with the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s 
Decision no 188(3/20). 
However, regarding the difficulty and impossibility to register the ownership under 
the name of sukuk holder, if possible amending the state law to allow the sale or 




by contrast, the register and transfer of the ownership to foreign investors will not be 
allowed under that law. In which case if the bank and other funding institutions (sukuk 
holders) are foreigners, therefore, in this case, the issuer has to issue a ‘bond against’ 
the deed of trust and regency, and need to make a decision that it will keep the 
ownership (as title) for the sukuk holders by the real owners of the assets and that it 
has no right to transact on those assets without their consent (Elgari, 2009; Almenea, 
2010). 
7.2.5 Assets Backed vs. Assets Based Sukuk 
Among the critical legal issues in relation to the ownership of the sukuk structures, it 
is a contentious issue that sukuk should be asset backed rather than assets based 
(Tariq, 2004). In this regard, it could be argued that the concept of true sale from 
Shari’ah and legal perspective is the key difference between asset-backed sukuk and 
asset-based sukuk (Khnifer, 2010). In addition, there exist two types of sukuk: the first 
one is known as assets backed sukuk in which case the ownership of assets is 
transferred to sukuk holders in real terms, which means that they got the right to 
access to sukuk assets and sell them in case of bankruptcy of the issuer. Nonetheless, 
the main problem emerges in relation to assets based sukuk, as in such cases no real 
transfer takes place for the assets from the seller to sukuk holders (Al-Amine, 2008; 
Abdul Aziz et al., 2009). 
A quick survey of the sukuk databases would show that asset based sukuk represent 
the majority of the current issuances, which imply that sukuk holders in case of 
bankruptcy will not be able to claim their assets as there is no ownership on them, as 
they are not transferred to the SPV in Shari’ah and legal terms as it has been 
discussed before (Godlewski et al., 2010). 
According to Usmani (2007), McMillen (2007), Al-Amine (2008) and Khnifer 
(2010), the differences between asset backed sukuk and assets based sukuk can be 
surmised as follows; 
(i) In case of asset backed sukuk, the sukuk holders are exposed to risks in relation to 
devaluation of the sukuk assets in question; for example, risks associated with assets, 
while in case of asset based sukuk, the risks are associated with the issuer and its 




(ii) In asset backed sukuk, the assets will be sold to sukuk holders by the issuer as a 
real sale from legal perspective, which becomes nominal in case of asset based sukuk; 
(iii) In case of assets backed sukuk, the legal risks of bankruptcy of the issuer can be 
separated from sukuk holders, as the assets are kept in an independent separate entity 
(SPV) while in case of asset based sukuk, the risks cannot be separated as the assets 
are still kept in the balance sheet of the issuer; 
(iv) In case of bankruptcy or insolvency, the holder of asset based sukuk have no legal 
right on the assets, however, they have a legal right to go back to the issuer to claim 
their capital as the relationship is debtor and creditor relationship. As for asset backed 
sukuk, the holders do not have any right to refer to the issuer as there will be no 
relationship between the issuer and sukuk holders as there is a real sale exists after 
which the relationship has severed. 
(v) Consequently, in cases where asset-backed sukuk are involved, sukuk holders will 
be able to recover their money through liquidating the asset in the event of default. 
Again that will not be the case with asset-based sukuk as investors’ rights on the asset 
are restricted (Khnifer, 2010). 
Therefore, from the forgoing, it could be argued that the structure of assets backed 
sukuk is consistent in and fulfil Shari’ah terms. Thus, from legal and Shari’ah 
perspective, assets backed sukuk represent ‘sukuk ownership’ associated with assets. 
On the contrary, the structuring of assets based sukuk represents a funding process 
that in reality is not different from the ribawi bonds that are not allowed in Shari’ah 
terms; and hence, it causes an objection in Shari’ah terms (Cox, 2007; Agha, 2009). 
However, according to the recommendations made by AAOIFI (2008), it is stated that 
in the event of insolvency of originator, investors should have recourse over the asset. 
Such arrangement will definitely favour investors in the long run. However, as far as 
the rules of asset-backed sukuk are concerned, they are compatible with Shari’ah in 
terms of asset ownership (Yean, 2009). Therefore, the originator needs to make a sale 
in such a way as to ensure a legal distinction between that sale and the state of 
bankruptcy of the seller. It is also noteworthy to stress that asset-based sukuk is 
gaining popularity in the sukuk market despite the Shari’ah concerns raised (Jabeen 




out of 560 or 2% of sukuk issued met the requirements of asset-backed sukuk as 
prescribed by Shari’ah principles with regard to asset sale to potential investors. In 
this regard, there is no difference between asset-based sukuk and conventional 
unsecured bonds in terms of recourse to asset (Hassan and Kholid, 2010). Such 
preference for asset-based sukuk is partially due to the fact that the instrument is rated 
on the basis of the obligor’s credit worthiness (Howladar, 2009) rather than the 
relationship of the sukuk to the underlying assets. 
While the debate on the legal nature of the asset backed and asset based sukuk is an 
important one in relation to the underlying assets, the reality of what is happening on 
the ground has alerted practical and professional perspectives on the issue in 
particular with the finical crisis in 2008. It could be argued that the sukuk holders have 
become aware after a number of default occurred during and aftermath of 2008 
financial crisis and hence the debate is further essentialised through financial, 
Shari’ah as well as legal positioning. 
In relation to the debate, the conventional bonds that are not allowed by Shari’ah can 
be mentioned, which are known as the asset backed securities. However, in legal 
terms, there is a difference between asset backed securities and the asset backed sukuk 
as follows; the assets backed sukuk is a financial paper that represents assets, while 
asset backed securities represent financial papers as loan on the issuer and that loan is 
guaranteed by the mortgage made by the assets (Merah, 2011). Thus, the right of 
sukuk holder is limited to the assets that represented by the sukuk only, while in the 
asset backed securities the right of sukuk holder of such type has to do with the issuer 
and that the assets are a mere guarantee and a mortgage in case the issuer fails to pay 
the nominal value and the gains (Godlewski et al., 2010). 
7.2.6 Legal Risks of Default 
While Islamic banking and finance claims ‘resilience’ in the face of global financial 
crisis in 2008, there have been a number of defaults associated with sukuk since 2008 
(Van Wijnbergen and Zaheer, 2013). In fact, every sukuk certificate prescribes the 
legal remedies to be implemented in the event of dissolution, and that those remedies 
vary from one type of sukuk contract to another depending on the issuer. However, it 
is not usually true that sukuk holders have the right of ownership of the relevant asset, 




in payment, or otherwise will be able to force the issuer to buy back the asset as 
initially being agreed upon in the sukuk contract (Usmani, 2007). It could be argued 
that the uncertainty of the law in terms of the process and the procedures that sukuk 
holders should go through after any default would lead to the legal risk. In other 
words, the legal statue of sukuk holders over their assets would be unclear (Salah, 
2010; Jobst, 2007). 
7.2.7 Legal Risks Involving Bankruptcy 
It should be mentioned that the importance of the bankruptcy law arises from the fact 
that it preserves investors’ rights to receive payments in case of issuers’ insolvency or 
otherwise absolute bankruptcy (McMillen, 2012; Alsayyed, 2014). Unfortunately, 
such laws are yet to be issued in some countries particularly in the Middle Eastern 
countries (Marinescu, 2012). However, as far as the GCC region is concerned, the 
laws of each jurisdiction in the region does not render a specific definition of the term 
‘bankruptcy’, and instead defines an insolvent trader as being a bankrupt (Hassan and 
Kholid, 2010; Jan and Marimuthu, 2015).The legal uncertainties featured in Nakheel 
sukuk case in the UAE, as sukuk holders’ right to take procession of the assets in the 
event of originators’ bankruptcy, has not been preserved. That should raise the alarm 
that asset-based sukuk are treated by courts the same as loans (Nazar, 2015), which 
was the case with Nakheel sukuk. 
One of the risks in relation to sukuk structures emerges in the case sukuk becomes 
bankrupt is where sukuk holders are not in any position proving their rights in the 
assets they own and that have been transferred in unreal manner from the issuer to 
SPV (Van Wijnbergen and Zaheer, 2013).According to Amer (2013), it has been a 
common tradition that the transfer of ownership of assets from the issuer to the SPV 
in order to separate between sukuk assets and the risk associated with the issuer. Thus, 
in such a case the sukuk holders will make sure that their assets are separated and kept 
separate from the assets of the company (issuer) and that they might not be affected in 
case of bankruptcy of the issuer. 
7.2.8 Legal Risks Associated with SPV 
In sukuk contracts the SPV plays the role of a trustee through which assets are 




2013). In this regard, trust law needs to be incorporated into both common law and 
civil law as to govern the SPV establishment, a move which has already been made by 
Dubai and Bahrain (Nazar, 2015).  
The trust law tends to protect the right of the beneficiaries against any offensive acts. 
In case of common law, however, the legal rights of trustees are bounded to the legal 
rights of beneficiaries (Thomas, 2007; Khan et al., 2015). By contrast, in terms of 
civil law, beneficiaries have no control over the assets to be managed by trustees, 
which becomes problematic to the sukuk contracts to be issued in countries under the 
jurisdiction of civil law. In such countries, sukuk holders’ right to have recourse to the 
assets is restricted by law and will be classified as asset-based sukuk (Hansmann and 
Mattei, 1998; Dewi, 2010; Ismail, 2015). 
It should be mentioned that since the Saudi system does not have trust law; the legal 
statues of the SPV is considered as a private company controlled by the Capital 
Market Law. 
It could be argued that in some of the cases involving sukuk; the issuer and the SPV 
may be based in different countries so that a common law that governs the two parties 
does not exist. This is exactly the case with Tamweel sukuk where the SPV is based 
on the remote Cayman Islands while the originator is based in Dubai (Radzi, 2011). 
The problem could be arising from the lack of a common law that governs the two 
parties is even becomes more complex by the laxity of the Island’s authorities on 
enforcing the law in response to the needs of the parties involved. Thus, no matter the 
origin of the court order in the remote Cayman Islands, the UK or anywhere else in 
the world, the problem will exist as to the enforceability of the court orders due to 
lack of bilateral treaties between the countries involved (Frankell, 1998; Dewi, 2010; 
Khan et al., 2015). 
In this regard, Ayub (2009) raised the point that lack of transparency of 
documentation as well as unclear relationship between parties in terms of obligations 
and rights could become issues of potential concern regarding sukuk. Therefore, it is 
highly recommended that sukuk prospectus should clearly define legal issues 
particularly those related to rights and obligations of the parties involved in the 




7.2.9 Legal Risks Related to the Standardisation of Sukuk 
Some financial organisations involved in regulating sukuk structures such as the 
AAOIFI and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), put forward appreciable 
efforts by putting the standards and measures for the issuance of sukuk. Those 
measures have led to the promotion of sukuk product and development of Islamic 
capital market. Nonetheless, those measures stop short of covering all kinds of sukuk 
structures, a matter which deepens the differences between the various Shari’ah 
organisations concerned with the process of sukuk approval, and thus increasing the 
legal risks involved in terms of Shari'ah law (Tariq and Dar, 2007;Khan et al., 2015 ). 
It could be argued that the uncertainties associated with transactions involving sukuk 
necessitates the standardisation and streamlining of sukuk contracts in terms of legal 
documentations and Shari’ah principles (Ahmed and Khan, 2007). In this regard, 
AAOIFI (2010) has already managed to standardise sukuk contracts, even though the 
standard contract is not binding to other key players in the Islamic financial industry. 
Yet, legally speaking, the enforcement of a standard Shari’ah compliant sukuk 
contract becomes critical for sukuk market. Furthermore, laws and procedures to deal 
with legal issues need to be uniform with regard to the issuance of sukuk (Khan and 
Feddad, 2004).With such arrangements conflicts in case of default or bankruptcy can 
easily be resolved as the uniform and standardised legislation will put things under 
control by eliminating the uncertainties and doubts associated with sukuk market as it 
has been suggested by the decision of the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s No 188 (3/20) and 
Vinnicombe (2012). 
7.2.10 The Inconsistency of Islamic Contracts  
As far as Islamic banks are concerned one of the risks involved is that Islamic 
financial contracts are different to conventional contracts in terms of contents and 
purpose. In this regard, the main setback and failure of Islamic contracts is that the 
rules are incompatible regarding judicial cases related to customer implementation of 
contracts. This is not to mention the lack of a unified format between the Islamic 
contracts themselves, and the different nature of Islamic financial contracts as 
compared to its conventional counterparts. That should lead to variations of judicial 
rulings with regard to the implementation of those contracts. The fact that every single 




(Siddiqui, 2008).Therefore, the legal format of any kind of organisation could be a 
major role to play an increasing or decreasing the level of risk involved (Al-Amine, 
2008). 
7.2.11 Risks Associated with the Legal Infrastructure of Sukuk in Various 
Jurisdictions 
As far as Islamic finance is concerned, sukuk contracts vary from one country to 
another in terms of legal development as a main determinant of success. The fact of 
the matter is that, the rules and regulations of traditional banking still dominate the 
banking business in some countries (Dar and Presley, 2000). Eventually, that does not 
provide a suitable environment for the proper development of sukuk contracts in those 
countries. For instance, in Indonesia, Asset Securitisation Law does not help the 
development of sukuk contracts as the law provides that asset securitisation can only 
be structured through debt in contradiction with Shari’ah law (Djojosujito, 2007). 
According to the British Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) of 2000, the 
sukuk market can be classified under a Collective Investment Scheme (CIS), in which 
case sukuk issuers would be subject to wide control measures with very restricted 
authority. However, such measures tend to limit the base of asset investment, which 
favours conventional debt securities over sukuk contracts (Nazar, 2015). Therefore, 
the lack of the legal infrastructure of sukuk in various jurisdictions is considered as 
one of the legal risk facing sukuk structure. 
7.2.12 Legal Risks Associated with Contracts and Documentations 
It has been noted that Islamic banks have been developing new Shari’ah-based modes 
of financing include murabahah, musharakah, mudarabah etc. contracts so that they 
can meet the financing needs of their clients. Some of those modes could be used for 
financing sellers, while others could be used for financing buyers. Moreover, some 
modes could only be used for transferring usufruct/or benefit, while others are used 
for transferring ownership of real property and benefit as well. Another type is sharing 
between two parties, for which all of them provide capital and labour and will share 
profit and loss (Kahf and Khan, 1992). However, the current models feature a number 
of setbacks, most importantly the differences among Islamic banks in terms of 
formats of contracts, forms, procedures, legal documents and mechanisms of 




another (Tariq, 2004; Ahmed, 2006; Lahsasna, 2014).It can be argued that the legal 
risks as well as the complexity of sukuk documentation could be eliminated by 
examining the terms and conditions of a typical sukuk contract (McMillen, 2006). In 
this regard, investors can only insure a smooth and applicable litigation process in 
case of a clear unambiguous contract.  
7.2.13 The Lack of Application of IF Between Countries 
The operations of IFBs from one country to another are neither harmonious nor 
consistent, nor are proper legal frameworks to deal with sukuk established in most 
countries (McMillen, 2006). This underlines the legal barrier to reduce the risk of 
diversity and uncertainty, which also reflects the lack of assurance of Islamic financial 
contracts. Even between orgnisations such as the International Islamic Fiqh Academy 
(ISFA) and AAOIFI, there are conflicts of interest (NuHtay and Salman, 2013). For 
instance, the SAC of the Securities Commission in Malaysia recognises some Islamic 
financial principles, which are not acceptable in countries such as those of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and Pakistan. For example, bai al-dayn (date trading) is an 
acceptable principle for sukuk issuance in Malaysia, whereas it prohibited transaction 
in the GCC (Rosly and Sanusi, 1999). 
7.2.14 The Applicability of Shari’ah in Non-Islamic Jurisdictions 
Islamic financial institutions related disputes are still dealt either with the English law 
or continental civil law.  However, in order to minimise legal risks, those who are 
working on sukuk structures should take into account the laws and the judiciary 
system the country that apply non-Islamic commercial laws (Ahmed, 2010). 
According to McMillen (2007), the idea of sukuk could make great progress in the 
presence of ratings, which are so far not available due to failure to secure satisfactory 
legal opinions regarding the applicability of Shari’ah in non-Islamic jurisdictions. 
Such legal barriers could be made less effective by standardising Shari’ah-based 
transactions as it has been discussed. Such measures could possibly alleviate risks 
featuring transactions through enforcing Shari’ah in a more consistent, predictable 
and transparent manner to the effect of facilitating integration of Islamic financial 




In the view of Jobst et al. (2008) sukuk structures must be made flexible as to 
accommodate both Shari’ah law as well as commercial law, as to overcome 
inconsistencies in non-Muslim countries. They further argue that the legal status of 
investors could become affected by lack of recognised standards with regard to 
Shari’ah, which could result in legal complications where sukuk are being involved. 
Nonetheless, adaptation of sukuk, which is Shari’ah-compliant, to a secular 
environment could be a difficult task to undertake. Therefore, as far as Islamic finance 
is concerned, combination between Shari’ah principals and Law always remains the 
main concern (Alamine, 2008). It is noteworthy that currently many transactions 
involving sukuk are governed by the English law while the associated assets remain 
under a different jurisdiction. This may lead to legal disputes in case of default. For 
instance, a court order in a foreign country might be ignored by the local authorities 
where the assets are based in case the transaction is rejected as being incompatible 
with Shari’ah law. Therefore, the diversity of laws covering the same contract would 
increase the potential of possible legal disputes between the various legislations 
involved. In fact, defaults which have already taken place in sukuk market have made 
the parties involved ending up at courts of law. A case in point is the default featuring 
East Cameron sukuk in 2008 (Khnifer, 2010). 
In this regard, Eltiby (2010) suggested that Islamic regulatory authorities such as 
AAOIFI and IFSB should provide guidelines for tuning with international standards 
for the sake of credibility of sukuk in the international arena, which can be argued for 
facilitating the enforceability sukuk contracts in different legal frameworks. 
Another legal risk regarding the inconsistency of law is that, sukuk contracts have to 
satisfy the legal requirements of the national law as well as shari'ah law, which has 
made them subject to frequent scrutiny (Tariq and Dar, 2007). However, the main risk 
and problem is that foreign courts such as the case in the UK do not recognise 
Shari’ah law and that no compromise can be reached in that matter (Ercanbrack, 
2014). It could be also argued that the lack of clarity in the enforceability of sukuk in 
different jurisdictions especially with regard to sukuk holders’ rights over their assets 
as well as the conflict between the basses of shari'ah and the local law would lead to 




states nor any country in the world has invented a legal system that combines both 
shari'ah law and the local law (Abdel-Khaleq and Christopher, 2006).  
Another risk pertaining to sukuk contracts is the possibility of sudden changes in the 
law before the sukuk expire, and that such change could happen at any time even 
before the contract comes into force, so that potential sukuk holders will be stuck in 
any dispute that might happen (Wedderburn, 2010). In this case however, the only 
way out for sukuk holders is the rescheduling of the debt to protect the investment, 
which is not a palatable option. Thus, in order to minimise the legal risks, investors 
have to make a careful scrutiny of the appropriate laws in a way that eliminates 
ambiguities as to minimise disputes (Tariq, 2004). From their part, lawyers have to 
work diligently in favour of sukuk holders featuring any potential disputes with 
issuers to the effect of giving them priority over other creditors in the event of issuers’ 
bankruptcy. 
7.2.15 The Conflict Between Western Law and Shari'ah Law and the Associated 
Risks 
It could be argued that legal risks always occur when Shari’ah law becomes involved 
with traditional laws such as the British common law or civil law (Ahmed, 2006). 
Thus, in cases of disputes, the latter dominates so that contracts are interpreted as they 
are without taking the Shari’ah dimension into account. A case in point is ‘Shamil 
Islamic Bank of Bahrain vs. Pharmaceutical Company’, in which case, the company 
failed to pay the bank as a financier, and the court judgment was issued based on the 
British law instead of Shari’ah law. Yet, in his presentence report, the judge ruled out 
the idea of the same contract being governed by more than one system of law, so that 
he opted for the British law which was based on the Roman conventions (Potter 
2004). 
However, problems associated with civil law have featured in the recent case 
involving Nakheel sukuk. Following default of Nakheel sukuk confusion occurred as 
to the appropriate law to be implemented as the company’s regulations were based on 
the British law, while the sukuk transactions took place in a civil law jurisdiction. That 
inconsistency nonetheless, has caused confusion in Dubai’s civil courts where the 
case has been seen. The alternative for investors to sue the company was the British 




seizure of the company’s assets would be unlawful (Kasolowsky and Abocar, 2009). 
Thus, in contradiction with the original contracts, investors’ rights had been restricted 
due to the conflict of laws. 
From a legal point of view, however, it could be maintained that with respect to sukuk 
contracts, Shari’ah law is more or less straight forward with the due flexibility to 
accommodate the local law (Abdel-Khaleq and Richardson, 2006). However, 
problems might occur with regard to law enforcement when it comes to cross-border 
transactions. That is particularly so with regard to assets sales between originators and 
investors via SPV as well as matters involving bankruptcy, where confusion occurs in 
the system of law to be enforced in relation to sukuk contracts (McMillen, 2007).The 
inconsistency and poor coordination between laws governing sukuk contracts may 
have direct effects on the rights of sukuk holders. Therefore, as far as sukuk contracts 
are concerned, the enforceability of a court order mainly depends on whether that 
order is based on the law of the country where that court is located (Howladar, 2006). 
7.3 PERSPECTIVES OF THE PARTICIPANTS ON THE STRUCTURE 
AND   PROSPECTUS OF SABIC SUKUK: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
In an attempt to provide a critical understanding of the identified issues in the SABIC 
sukuk, it is essential to have a data collected through interview survey from the field 
with those who are specialised in the legal side of Islamic finance especially sukuk 
such as lawyers, judges of Shari’ah courts, researchers and academic staff. As 
mentioned in the research methodology chapter, a number of interviews were 
conducted and the material presented in this chapter is the outcome of a thematic and 
textual analysis of the data collected from those interviews. It should be mentioned 
that each of the following sections based on questions that were presented to three 
legal specialists of sukuk with regard to particular legal issues in SABIC structures 
and prospectus, which are based on the above identified risk areas. 
7.3.1 Perceptions on the Need for a Law or Special Legislation Relating to 
SABIC and other Sukuk in the CMA 
Interviewees 9, 10 and 11have maintained that all rules and regulations that have been 
issued by CMA including the Offers of Securities Regulations, Listing Rules etc. do 
not feature systems or laws especially targeting sukuk; however, instead all that exist 




the Interviewees, it seems that no difference is made between sukuk and bonds in the 
rules and regulations that have been issued by the CMA so that the two systems are 
mixed up. In this regard, the Interviewee 9 has confirmed that as far as the CMA is 
concerned sukuk are no longer appreciated by the system as an independent product; 
however, instead SABIC sukuk are considered as securities similar to shares and 
bonds. In addition, he argued that this implies that sukuk for CMA is only the hybrid 
product of the capital markets. In the meantime, the Interviewee 10 pointed out that 
all companies that have issued sukuk including SABIC have legally relied on the laws 
and regulations that regulate the issuance of shares and bonds, while the Interviewee 
11 stressed the fact that the lack of special legislation for sukuk featuring the CMA 
has not prevented the companies that show interest in sukuk such as SABIC to issue 
their own sukuk by relying on laws and regulations that do not include sukuk systems. 
From the responses identified above the following can be concluded: 
(i) ‘Sukuk term’ has not featured in any special legislation issued by the CMA. In 
other words, all systems and laws issued by CMA have stopped short of referring to 
sukuk; 
(ii) The companies that have been involved with sukuk included SABIC company 
have relied on the already existing legislations issued by CMA featuring securities. 
7.3.2 Questioning the Legal Authority Dealing with Disputes and Insolvency in 
Relation to Sukuk 
In the second stage, all the interviewees were requested to express their opinions on 
the legal authority that deals with disputes and insolvency in relation to sukuk. Indeed, 
the question relates to the fact that whether such an institution exists or not. 
All those who have been interviewed responded by pointing out that the prospectus of 
issuance of all sukuk including SABIC sukuk provide that the Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) and the Appeal Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Conflicts (ACRSC) are the only legal authority to investigate 
and solve cases involving investors within the rules of the CMA as well as its 
executive regulations and the associated rules, including, for instance, the potential 
dispute between sukuk holders and the issuer. However, according to the Interviewee 




and yet in Saudi Arabia some disputes have been excluded to be dealt with by special 
panels which some consider as administrative, as the members of those panels do not 
have enough knowledge with Shari’ah rules, while some consider then as semi-
judiciary panels due to similarities between them and Shari’ah courts with regard to 
commitment to the rules and imposition of punishment. In this respect, the 
Interviewee 10 stressed the fact that apart from being linked to Shari’ah or not, the 
activity of the CRSD and ACRSC are purely legal, and that the real undeclared aim 
behind the establishment of the two committees is to investigate matters in relation to 
potential disputes featuring the financial securities market. However, securities 
market in some aspects involve riba-based transactions, in which case Shari’ah courts 
most likely decline judgment featuring contract based on riba in which case the 
contract is considered invalid from the beginning. As for that reason, a royal decree 
issued for establishment of two committees to deal with matters involving disputes 
instead of Shari’ah courts where the judges of those courts investigate the nature of 
the contracts. If investigations prove that riba is involved, they render the contract 
invalid keeping a blind eye on any disputes involving the contract. As for the 
Interviewee 11, he believes that the disputes involving sukuk should be a matter for 
specialised Shari’ah courts, and yet the main reason behind the CRSD and ACRSC is 
the absence of specialised commercial courts in Saudi Arabia. 
From the responses shown above the following conclusions can be drawn: 
(i) The CRSD and ACRSC are considered as a legal judiciary authority with regard 
to SABIC sukuk; 
(ii)  The above two committees are excluded from being under the authority of 
Shari’ah courts; 
(iii)  Disagreement exists as to the reasons behind the establishment of those 
committees. 
7.3.3 Perceptions on the Consistency of Fatwa Validating SABIC Sukuk and its 
Non-Binding Nature for CSRD and ACRSC 
In this section, the interviewees were requested to express their views from a legal 
point of view as to how they see the fatwa that approved SABIC sukuk while it is 




The Interviewee 9 responded by saying that the prospectus of issuance of SABIC 
sukuk provides that Shari’ah courts as well as CRSD and ACRSC show no 
commitment to the decisions made by the SBSS. However, that matter is considered 
among the legal risks that face sukuk holders in case of bankruptcy or insolvency of 
the issuer. As for the Interviewee 10, he pointed out that SABIC sukuk holders could 
be aware of the fact that the fatwa made by SBSS in relation to SABIC sukuk had 
been inapplicable, and that Shari’ah courts as well as the CRSD and ACRS would 
show no commitment to those fatawa. However, as yet sukuk holders might have been 
unaware of the potential legal risks resulting from failure to show commitment to the 
fatawa to be made by SBSS. The Interviewee 11, on the other hand, made it certain 
that the court system in Saudi Arabia and the semi-judiciary panels such as CRSD and 
ACRSC are independent, and that it is impossible for SBSS or any form of securities 
activity to make them committed to their decision regarding cases to be investigated 
by Shari’ah courts or the CRSD and ACRSC, given that failure to make the semi-
judiciary panels that investigate such sukuk cases to follow the fatawa issued by the 
SSB might lead to conflict between two legislative authorities. In other words, the 
SBSS will be meaningless during the fact the fatawa they issued could be not 
recognised by the Shari’ah courts or otherwise by the members of CRSD and ACRSC 
as being inconsistent with Shari’ah principles. 
From the responses discussed above the following inferences can be made: 
(i) Having neither Shari’ah courts nor the CRSD and ACRSC show commitment to 
the fatwa on which sukuk is based in terms of Shari’ah is considered among the legal 
risks that might render sukuk invalid; 
(ii) In order to enhance legal status of SBSS, the fatawa issued by them should be 
binding and obligatory. 
7.3.4 Perceptions on the Legal Status of CRSD and ACRSC 
The participants were asked for their opinion as to whether the CRSD and ACRSC are 
similar to Shari’ah courts in terms of the legal power, and considered independent in 
their judgments. In other words, they were asked to express their opinion on the legal 




The Interviewee 9 has made it certain that the CRSD and ACRSC -that have been 
authorised to investigate cases involving securities in the Saudi capital market 
including SABIC sukuk - are two independent panels practicing their activities as a 
judiciary entity featuring securities disputes with the due neutrality and honesty, and 
that nobody whatever his status can influence the course of the cases where the two 
panels are involved, and that the two committees are not in any way subject to the 
influence of the CMA. In this regard, some decisions made by CRSD and ACRSC 
against deferent cases which CMA supported that indicates the degree of 
independence and neutrality of those committees. While the Interviewee 10 
mentioned that the places where justice can be upheld are so numerous that 
sometimes causes confusion to lawyers and specialists. In other words, places where 
justice can be exercised are so diversified that it includes numerous government and 
judiciary institutions making the system of Saudi Arabia different comparing to other 
countries. The authorities concerned with disputes fall under three main categories 
which are either the public judiciary courts, the administrative courts (Board of 
Grievances), or the administrative panels (Boards) of judiciary nature which are in 
excess of 70 panels or board, where every panel has its own discipline in terms of its 
specialisation and rules featuring a royal decree in relation to sorting out disputes 
resulting from the implementation of the rules of that discipline as an exceptional case 
from the public judiciary and administrative courts. 
Despite the fact that a previous Royal Decree had been issued in 2007 ordering the 
review of those panels to pave the way for integrating them with the public judiciary 
courts or with the administrative courts or otherwise some might continue as an 
exceptional case. However, in practice those panels have yet to change in terms of 
reality and functioning particularly following the approval of the new judiciary 
system in Saudi Arabia. 
The Interviewee 10 also highlighted the importance of the origin of the judiciary 
independence, which is a genuine principle in terms of Shari’ah not to mention the 
fact that it features in most constitutions in the world. In this respect, that principle 
featured in Article 46 of the Constitution of the Kingdom clearly provides that the 
judiciary is an independent authority, and that the judges of the courts are only 




judiciary authority should keep its independence from the legislative power and the 
government so that those powers should be kept away from interfering with the 
judiciary or otherwise have control on their activities by any means. 
There have, however, a lot of controversy over the status of those administrative 
committees and the extent to which it offends the principle of the judiciary 
independence, particularly those panels whose decisions are considered final and 
obligatory before the administrative courts such the CRSD and ACRSC those have 
been approved by the regulation of the CMA featuring the Royal Decree No. (M/30) 
on July 1
st 
2001 in terms of its formation, definition of its powers and function. As 
they considered the authority to investigate cases of disputes involving sukuk 
including SABIC sukuk. 
Furthermore, Interviewee 10 argued that the issue of exception of a number of 
functions from public and administrative courts in favour of administrative panels 
(CRSD and ACRSC) which are formed from government staff rather than Shari’ah 
judges to issue decisions to sort out disputes with the power of the judiciary rulings. 
He also identified that they have the same authority as the public courts, which 
remains a controversial matter particularly with regard to the inconsistency of the 
matter with the principle of the independence of the judiciary power and the Saudi 
constitution which is inspired by the principles of Shari’ah. The main problem is that 
the members of CRSD and ACRSC are not Shari’ah judges so that it becomes 
questionable that they become entrusted with the job of sorting disputes between 
parties and impose punishment on the perpetrators. In addition, among the 
inconsistencies is the formation of the money exchange dispute relating arbitration 
panel particularly the inconsistency of Article 25 of the financial market regulation 
with the constitution which stipulates that the CRSD and ACRSC will be established 
by the CMA to be entrusted with cases involving disputes that fall within the 
jurisdiction of this discipline and its executive regulations as well as the regulations of 
the authority and the market and their rules and directives including public and private 
matters. The CRSD and ACRSC have all the necessary powers with regard to 
investigating and sorting out of cases, including the power to call witnesses, make 




etc. The members of the CRSD and ACRSC will be appointed by a decision to be 
made by the council i.e. the council of the CMA for three years subject to renewal. 
The inconsistency with the constitution in this case as the Interviewee 10 mentioned is 
that the appointment of the members of the two committees is a matter for the CMA 
council, and in the meantime the CMA per se is entrusted according to the 
constitution to make cases against those who offend public order and the associated 
executive regulations. For instance, it is not reasonable that the CMA makes a case 
involving public right featuring SABIC sukuk, for example, which is the case in point, 
for offending the CMA system to be investigated by CRSD and ACRSC whose 
members are appointed by the same authority that has made the case. In other words, 
how can the CMA become a plaintiff and a judge at the same time in case of failure of 
sukuk issuer to live up to its promises? That represents a conflict of interest and makes 
the principle of dependence questionable. In addition, that will raise doubts and 
accusations that the decision to be made by the CRSD and ACRSC will most likely be 
in favour of the CMA, as it has appointed the members of the panel. That becomes 
clear given the fact that Article 13 of the CMA regulation stipulates that the financial 
resources of the CMA feature a number of sources including fines and financial 
punishments to be imposed by CRSD and ACRSC on the offenders of the rules of the 
CMA so that by making cases involving public right, the CMA will benefit directly 
from cases where offenders are to be found guilty as it is the direct beneficiary of the 
money to be paid by those offenders that might reach tens of millions of SR for a 
single offender. In this regard Article 59 of the CMA regulation refers to the 
following penalties that “In case the CMA realizes that any person has taken part; will 
take part or about to become involved in activities or practices in offence of any of the 
jurisdiction of this discipline or the rules and regulations to be issued by the authority 
or the regulations of the market, then in that case the CMA preserves the right to 
make a case against him before the CRSD and ACRSC seeking a decision to impose 
the suitable penalty as the potential penalties include the following: compensation for 
those suffering from the damage inflicted on them as a result of the offence being 
committed, or otherwise forcing the offender to payback the material benefits he has 




Interviewee 10 also noted that the legislator stipulated in the Article 13 of the CMA 
regulation that those who suffer from damage as a result of the offences should either 
receive compensation or otherwise the offender should be forced to pay back the 
financial rewards has achieved from committing the offence in favour of the CMA. 
However, despite the fact it is technically possible to consider all those who have 
suffered from damage due to the offences made by the guilty person as well as 
estimating the damage inflicted of every one of them, and yet by reviewing all the 
cases made by the CMA before the CRSD and ACRSC in relation to the public right 
will discover that the CRSD and ACRSC have been focused only on its demands of 
the offender to be forced to pay back the benefits in favour of the CMA. However, 
according to the published decisions of the CRSD and ACRSC, there is no precedent 
that the panel has demanded the compensation of individuals who has suffered from 
damage that has been caused by committed offenses. That indicates beyond doubt the 
direct convenience in favour of the CMA by making cases involving public right. 
That result should definitely put the CRSD and ACRSC at risk in terms of 
independence and neutrality as its members are appointed through selection by the 
council of the CMA, and decision to continue or otherwise terminate that membership 
made by the same council. For that reason, given that situation it is impossible to 
assume the independence of the CRSD and ACRSC. 
In further reflecting on the independence of CRSD and ACRSC, Interviewee 10 
continued to argue that independence of any organization is a matter of definite 
constitutional stipulations rather than a matter of statements and assumptions to be 
made by government officials. It is impossible to believe that independence being 
appointed by a government body that benefits directly from the decisions to be made 
by those panels. Moreover, the fact the panel headquarters is based within the 
premises of the CMA not to mention the fact that its members receive monthly 
bonuses in return for their membership at the expense of the budget of the authority 
should put the independence of those panels in doubt. For that reason, it becomes 
obvious that Article 25 of the Financial Markets appear to be inconsistent with the 
principle of independence of the judiciary authority provided for by Article 46 of the 
Constitution. Thus, in case such provision exists in any of the constitutions in the 
world, it becomes legally feasible for those affected to challenge that stipulation 




the satiation in Saudi Arabia still remains ambiguous. Is it possible to challenge 
Article 25 of the CMA regulation as being unconstitutional and call for its repeal or 
otherwise its amendment before any court? 
In his criticism, Interviewee 10 also reflected that no constitutional court exists in 
Saudi Arabia similar to courts in other countries in terms of legal practice. However, 
according to the judiciary regulation and administrative courts, namely the Diwan al-
Mathalim or Board of Grievances, regulation issued in 2008 for the establishment of a 
high court and administrative court featuring the public judiciary and administrative 
judiciary respectively. However, those courts stop short of the description of the 
constitutional court as either of them is a high appeal court that reviews the decisions 
be made by the appeal courts in terms of application of Shari’ah law and the decrees 
to be issued by the King. Therefore, as stated by the Interviewee 10, as long as neither 
the supreme court nor the high administrative court is concerned with investigating 
cases in relation to the constitutionality of any article featuring regulations to be 
issued by royal decree, then in such a case, we have to consider the following 
questions: what if one of those affected makes a case against the decision made by the 
CRSD and ACRSC by challenging the constitutionality of its formation, i.e. the 
violation of Article 25 of the CMA regulations to the constitution, and whether the 
administrative court will accept to investigate the case?  The answer will be negative 
as the administrative courts has nothing to do with cases associated with that panel as 
an exceptional case based on the regulation issued by a royal decree featuring the 
CMA regulation and that issuance is related to the sovereign power of the state which 
cannot be overruled by the power of the administrative courts according to the rules of 
the Board of Grievances. 
Therefore, the only reasonable legal solution available is the amendment of Article 25 
of the CMA regulation so that the members of the CRSD will be appointed by a 
decision made by the Council of Ministers in a manner similar to the formation of the 
ACRSC whose members are being appointed by a decision made by the Council of 
Ministers as being provided for by paragraph Z of that article. 
Finally, in case the method of executing the judiciary system and the Board of 
Grievances has stipulated the exception of the panels of the CMA from the umbrellas 




include the exception of that panel from the principle of the judiciary independence 
by the continuation of interference of the CMA (the executive body) in the 
appointment of the members of the panel (the judiciary body). This implies that the 
judiciary independence is a constitutional principle which becomes meaningless 
unless it has been practiced. 
Finally, Interviewee 11 pointed out that the CRSD and ACRSC have direct 
independence with regard to practicing its duties, and that the CMA regulation has 
stipulated in Article 25. Accordingly, it is expected that special bodies should be 
entrusted with cases involving securities disputes in court, and those should have full 
independence in making decisions and issuing rules that it deems consistent with the 
nature of the appropriate systems and regulations to be issued. In addition, according 
to the constitution it has become the body to investigate cases involving disputing 
parties including investors, financial mediation companies as well as the organising 
and executive bodies of the CMA. 
From the above presented analysis of the responses provided by the interviewees, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
(i) The interviewees seem to be in disagreement regarding whether or not the 
decisions to be made by the CRSD and ACRSC should be independent from the 
CMA; 
(ii) The fact that numerous bodies exist to investigate cases might lead to legal 
problems as well as risks; 
(iii)The CRSD and ACRSC are the legal entity to investigate cases involving 
disputing parties as being stipulated by the constitution; 
(iv) The dependence of the panel becomes a requirement in terms of the law and 
Shari’ah; 
(v) Differences in opinion exist among the interviewees with regard to the nature of 
the panel as being administrative with legal powers or being a judiciary panel; 
(vi) Some call for the real independence of the CRSD with regard to the body to be 




(vii) Some call that the CRSD should be affiliated to the judiciary so that cases of 
disputes should be a matter for Shari’ah-related commercial courts. 
7.3.5 Perceptions on the CRSD and ACRSC’s Power for their Decision to be 
Abiding and Executable 
The interviews were asked to comment on the as to whether the CRSD and ACRSC 
have the power for their decision to be abiding and executable; and their opinions are 
analysed as follows: 
The Interviewee 9 responded by referring to the fact that both the CRSD and ACRSC 
are concerned with investigating cases of disputes that take place within the context of 
the jurisdiction of rules of the CMA and its regulations as well as the regulations of 
the authority and the market and their rules and directives regarding the public and 
private rights including any dispute that takes place between sukuk issuers and sukuk 
holders as the case with SABIC for instance.  However, he argued that, the decision of 
the CRSD and ACRSC are enforceable and be abiding to all parties involved in the 
dispute given those who show dissatisfaction with the decision of the CRSD have the 
right of appeal as to the review the verdict against him. That could be done by 
complaining against the decision to the ACRSC which is higher than the CRSD and 
can overrule the decisions made by the CRSD, confirming those decisions or 
otherwise review or reconsider the case as appropriate based on the information 
provided by the CRSD and makes the right decision in the case. However, the 
decisions to be made by the ACRSC are irreversible and abiding. 
The Interviewee 10 reflecting on the issue through a different perspective stated that 
apart from legality of the case involved, the activities of the panel should purely legal 
in nature. However, while the state constitution provides that it should be Islamic 
inspired by Qur’an and Sunnah involving jurisdiction in accordance with Shari’ah, 
and yet that raises the question as to how some cases of securities involving riba-
based transactions that offend Shari’ah principles should be investigated by the 
CRSD and ACRSC? Is it for the only reason that it has been approved by the regime 
featuring systems and regulations? So it could be said that those panels are approved 
by the CMA rules rather by Shari’ah law, therefore it is supposed that the constitution 
should not stipulate to make the CRSD and ACRSC investigate cases of dispute by 




and ACRSC will become a legal entity similar to Shari’ah court. Interviewee 10 
further argued on the idea that the judiciary must be linked to Shari’ah by stating that 
these two committees are not being linked to Shari’ah law as its members are law-
trained rather than Shari’ah-trained judges. Bearing those facts in mind, the main duty 
of the CRSD and ACRSC should be to bring together the disputing parties for 
compromise; otherwise, the case should be referred to the appropriate court for 
investigation. In other words, failure of the panels to reach a compromise to the 
satisfaction of the disputing parties should mean the case should be referred to the 
relevant court for investigation. 
In contrast, the Interviewee 11 stressed that the CRSD and ACRSC and other relevant 
committees established due to the lack of specialized legal commercial court, and the 
lack of specialized commercial courts is one of the risks that threaten the sukuk 
market as well SABIC sukuk in the Saudi market. He then added that these 
committees are not Shari’ah based and not legitimate judges, they do not derive 
provisions of Shari’ah, but applied in the Western courts of law and this violates 
stipulated in the prospectus and in the instruments of SABIC that ‘SABIC sukuk are 
subject to the regulations in force in Saudi Arabia, according to Islamic law’. 
As for the Interviewee 11, he has also explained that the CRSD and ACRSC might 
have been a necessity for the state in the past. He, however, stated that now in the 
aftermath of the development and promotion of the markets of Islamic finance there 
will be no need for them to continue; as he argued that its time for those panels whose 
jurisdiction is neither final nor binding to be replaced by Shari’ah courts specialised 
in cases involving securities including sukuk and the judges should highly trained on 
legal, financial, and Shari’ah-related matters. 
From the responses of the interviewees the following conclusions can be drawn: 
(i)  The cases involving securities including sukuk feature two levels; first reporting 
the case to the CRSD and second; making the appeal to the ACRSC in case of 
dissatisfaction with the decision; 
(ii)  The decisions made by the CRSD are not binding and challengeable before the 




(iii) Differences exist among the interviewees regarding validity of the panel in 
Shari’ah terms as it does not include Shari’ah-trained members.  
7.3.6 Perspectives on the New Judiciary System Responsible for Cases of 
Securities Disputes including SABIC Sukuk 
The interviewees were asked to comment on the new judiciary system in terms of 
defining the body that is responsible for cases of securities disputes including SABIC 
sukuk. 
All those who were interviewed are of the opinion that the new judiciary system in 
Saud Arabia that has been established in accordance with the Royal Decree No. 87/M 
dated 1429 H, has excluded the CRSD and ACRSC as well as other panels to keep 
administrative panels with judiciary powers away from the umbrella of the public and 
administrative judiciary system. In other words, they pointed out that the new 
judiciary system has made those two panels independent of the judiciary.  
In this regard, the Interviewee 9 argued that the new judiciary system made the CRSD 
and ACRSC as two bodies to be referred to in cases of disputes involving securities 
including sukuk. However, having said that it would have been more appropriate for 
those two panels to become part of the specialised commercial panels as the case with 
other semi-judiciary commercial panels that have been transferred to remain under the 
authority of the public and administrative judiciary. However, such transfer will 
secure the enforcement of decision to be made by those semi-judiciary panels besides 
making the link between those panels and judiciary even closer. 
The Interviewee 10 has made the point that the judiciary system in Saudi Arabia 
needs to be reviewed, as it seems to be inconsistent with the general rules that 
organise the judiciary so that it offends the unity of the judiciary. Ideally, it is 
preferable that the judiciary should belong to one body featuring the Ministry of 
Justice without being disputed by the Ministry of Commerce or the financial market 
authority, and the claim that those panels are judiciary organisations but rather more 
of administrative panels are not true. The fact that they have power to impose fine and 
detention should falsify those claims, and that the latter is a unique power of the 
judiciary. Moreover, the cases to be investigated by those panels are extremely 




Thus, the Interviewee 10 argued that the existence of panels and authorities to be 
entrusted with the investigation of cases associated with securities disputes as 
independent entities of Shari’ah courts should be the main reason for the poor 
enforcement of decisions made by those panels. He argued that this should be for the 
simple reason that some perceive those panels as non-judiciary bodies, but rather 
administrative bodies whose decision are not binding. On the other hand, the 
ramification of procedures associated with those panels also has negative effects on 
the enforcement of decisions. 
The Interviewee 11 argued that the new judiciary system has yet to have control 
overall legal conflicts and disputes in Saudi Arabia, as many cases of disputes still 
remain out of the authority of Shari’ah courts indicating that some legal conflicts 
remain excepted from the jurisdiction of Shari’ah law. In particular, cases of conflicts 
and disputes associated with securities are considered beyond the remit of the 
Shari’ah law, as in such cases, the members of the panels involved are not Shari’ah-
trained, even though its activities are purely legal with no consideration to the case as 
being consistent or not with Shari’ah principles as there is no sign for that in the law 
and regulations of CMA. However, the body to investigate cases involving securities 
including SABIC sukuk is supposed to be Shari’ah-linked commercial courts with 
judges to be trained in both Shari’ah law and civil law.  
Based on the above presented interpretation of the interview material, the following 
can be concluded: 
(i) The CRSD and ACRSC are still excluded by the new judiciary system in Saudi 
Arabia from being integrated in the system; 
(ii) The dependence of the CRSD and ACRSC tends to make their decisions less 
forcible; 
(iii) The establishment of Shari’ah-based commercial courts becomes a necessity; 
(iv) From a legal perspective what is the legal impacts of the different fatawa made 




7.3.7 Perception on the Effect of the Differences in Fatawa between the 
Shari’ah Committee of SABIC Sukuk and the Members of CRSD and 
ACRSC on Various Matters 
From legal point of view, the interviewees were invited to comment on the effect of 
the presence of the differences in fatawa between the Shari’ah committee of SABIC 
sukuk and the members of CRSD and ACRSC on various matters.  
The Interviewee 9 responded by pointing out that the CRSD and ACRSC, which are 
the relevant legal body in case of disputes involving SABIC sukuk, make their 
judgments in accordance with the Saudi legal system and the principles of Islamic 
Shari’ah. This implies that the Saudi legal system and Shari’ah principles should 
provide a reference framework for the CRSD and ACRSC so that the members of the 
panels have no chance to deviate from that.  
The Interviewee 10 on the other hand stressed the fact that lack of awareness between 
the members of the CRSD and ACRSC of the various approved fatawa on financial 
transactions could be among the risks facing SABIC sukuk.  In general, certain well 
known differences in relation to financial transactions do exist among Shari’ah 
scholars since the old times. Having said that, the Shari’ah board of SABIC sukuk 
could be of an opinion that could contradict the opinion held by the CRSD and 
ACRSC which would eventually affect the sukuk in legal as well as Shari’ah terms. In 
other words, the sukuk could be legally valid in accordance with the regulations issued 
by the CMA, and yet it could be in disagreement with Shari’ah principles, indicating 
inconsistency between the legal and Shari’ah aspects. 
The Interviewee 11 made it clear that among the legal risks associated with the 
securities in the CMA including SABIC sukuk, is the possibility that sukuk might not 
be subject to execution by Shari’ah courts and the judiciary panels. This could be for 
the simple reason that the Shari’ah-based structure of SABIC sukuk is not binding for 
CRSD and ACRSC in case of conflict between the issuer and sukuk holders. That 
should mean that the differences in opinion between SBSS and the members of the 
CRSD and ACRSC in Shari’ah terms might lead to the invalidation of sukuk in legal 




From the interviews analysis provided in this section, the following conclusions can 
be inferred: 
(i)  The Shari’ah-based differences among the members of CRSD and ACRSC as 
well as SBSS in Shari’ah terms is considered among the risks that threatens the 
legality of SABIC sukuk and the application of the relevant contract; 
(ii)  Failure to make Shari’ah-based fatwa made by SBSS binding tends to render 
SABIC sukuk an unpopular financial paper in Shari’ah terms. 
7.3.8 Perception on the Legal Risks that SABIC Sukuk might be Exposed  
This section focuses on the legal risks SABIC sukuk might be exposed taking into 
account a number of issues and aspects discussed below in relation to the opinions 
conveyed by the interviews; 
7.3.8.1 The prospectus of issuance 
Interviewee 9 responded by arguing that the prospectus of issuance is considered 
among the most important documents that should be taken into account whether by 
the CMA which is the official body that controls the issuance of sukuk and the 
circulation of the money exchange including SABIC sukuk, or by the issuer and sukuk 
holders that represent the contracting parties so that any legal or Shari’ah-linked 
problem might render sukuk invalid, and might lead to the squandering of rights only 
for the parties involved to indulge in conflict and dispute. For that reason, the 
prospectus of issuance must include an accurate description of the contracting 
relationship between the parties involved by naming the Shari’ah-based contract 
featuring the issuer and sukuk holders, and also the rights and duties undertaken by 
the various parties. The Interviewee 9 also made the point that in case of SABIC 
sukuk the relationship between the issuer of SABIC sukuk and sukuk holders was not 
clear beyond doubt, but instead a generalised rather than detailed description is given 
by the prospectus of issuance. 
The Interviewee 10 agreed on the argument made by the Interviewee 9 with regard to 
mentioning the name of the contract and defining the parties involved in the contract. 
In addition, he added that the prospectus of issuance must clarify the nature of the 




satisfy all conditions legally as well as in Shari’ah terms as provided by the judiciary 
systems in Saudi Arabia with regard to legal documentation featuring the transfer of 
assets from the register of the issuer to go to the register of the holders. Nonetheless, 
in most cases involving sukuk, confusion is being made between assets-based sukuk 
and assets-backed sukuk given that a big difference between the two in legal terms. 
Interviewee 10 adds that by reviewing the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk, it 
seems that the contractual relationship between the issuer and the holders is unclear, 
and whether the sukuk to be sold to sukuk holders have legal base that makes the 
selling process and transfer of sukuk from the issuer to the holders a possible matter. 
In addition, he mentioned that the prospectus of issuance has stopped short of 
explaining the method of evaluation of the assets that have been sold. 
In a functional manner, Interviewee 11 agreed that the prospectus of issuance had to 
feature all the rights, duties and the rules that had to be applied as well as the potential 
legal and Shari’ah-related risks involving sukuk, and that matter had been, to a great 
extent, missing in relation to SABIC sukuk. 
From the above analysis based on the answers provided by the interviewees, the 
following can be drawn:  
(i) It becomes a necessary matter that the prospectus of issuance should feature all 
information needed by CMA and any other parties involved such as sukuk issuers and 
sukuk holders; 
(ii) CMA is supposed to be the body responsible of any improprieties featuring the 
prospectus of issuance regarding failure to implement the financial systems of the 
market or otherwise failure to cope with Shari’ah principles; 
(iii)  The faulty and incomprehensive information available in the prospectus of 
issuance considered one of the legal risk not to mention failure to refer to legal and 
Shari’ah-related risks might any sukuk issuance be exposed and the impacts that 
follow is also considered as a risk. 
7.3.8.2 The relevant documents and papers 
In relation to the relevant documents and papers creating legal risks, Interviewee 9 




issuance is an important matter, so that the CMA has to make sure it is legal and safe 
in terms of organization. Otherwise, sukuk might be rendered invalid in terms of 
consistency with CMA systems. The Interviewee 10, on the other hand, confirmed 
that those documents and papers should be accessible to everyone and that sukuk 
holders should be exposed to documents and information in relation to sukuk they 
intend to buy, or otherwise it might not be safe for sukuk holders to make legal claims 
due to lack of information that is available to them. The Interviewee 11 made it clear 
that the CMA most likely considers the documents and papers in terms of 
organisation and consistency with the systems and regulations of the CMA apart from 
its validity from Shari’ah perspective. Eventually, that could make sukuk and the 
associated documents safe in terms of CMA regulations, which could be associated 
with some problems in Shari’ah terms exposing sukuk to some legal problems such as 
being less effective. Therefore, sukuk should be considered from both the legal aspect 
as well as Shari’ah-related aspect. 
From the analysis of the interviews presented in this section, the following can be 
concluded: 
(i)  Given that it is necessary for CMA to focus and review the prospectus of issuance, 
the authority is also required to review all the relevant documents and papers as to 
make sure that those documents are easily accessible to sukuk holders; 
(iii) CMA also has a duty to make sure of the validity of the prospectus issuance as 
well all the documents and papers in terms of compliance with CMA rules, which 
should imply the accurate examination of those documents as dictated by Shari’ah as 
to avoid any differences and inconsistencies between those documents and the 
opinion of the he members of CRSD and ACRSC in Shari’ah terms. 
7.3.8.3 Sukuk holders 
As regards to the legal risks exposed in relation to sukuk holders, Interviewee 1 
responded that sukuk holders are more exposed to the legal risks associated with 
sukuk than any other of the parties involved. In other words, rendering the sukuk 
legally invalid should mean the loss of right and probably the assets owned by sukuk 
holders. For that reason, sukuk holders have a duty to make sure that their legal rights 




those assets have been transferred to them in real and have been moved from the 
register of the issuer to the register of sukuk holders. 
Interviewee 10 on the other hand pointed out that the legal risks to which sukuk 
holders might be exposed feature the vagueness of their legal attitude in relation to the 
judiciary bodies. The question is as to whether sukuk holders will be considered by 
the CRSD and ACRSC as real owners of the assets they have bought from the issuer 
or whether they be treated as debtors? That should mean that they would be treated 
similar to bond holders, for the simple reason that the legal status of sukuk holders is 
unclear for a number of reasons including the fact that special law featuring sukuk is 
non-existent in Saudi Arabia to help to differentiate between sukuk holders and bond 
holders in terms of legal status, not to mention the fact that no precedents exist with 
regard to the cases that have been investigated by CRSD and ACRSC to provide a 
hint on the way to deal with sukuk holders in their capacity as real owners of the 
assets they have bought or otherwise to be treated as creditors similar to bond holders. 
In addition, Interviewee 11 noted that most of the investors in sukuk in the Saudi 
market belong to major companies that have sufficient staff of specialists in legal 
matters to look into securing the legal rights for those companies. They becoming 
involved in buying sukuk provide proof that they feel safe to become involved in such 
securities investment. However, the source of safety could be due to their access to 
legal documents through which they can prove the warrantee given to them by the 
issuer for their capital as well as the profit to be made apart from any other issues that 
could be considered in the opinion of those major companies as minor and not worth 
attention. 
From the analysis of the interviews provided above, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
(i) Sukuk holders are the most vulnerable of the parties involved to any potential 
legal risks; 
(ii) In the real sale and the transfer of assets from the issuer to sukuk holders, the 
procedures should be made consistent with the judiciary system and Shari’ah 




(iii)  The fact a special law featuring sukuk is non-existent in Saudi Arabia might have 
led to some ambiguities in the legal status of sukuk holders; 
(iv)  A major controversy exists among legal experts regarding the legal status of 
sukuk holders as to whether they are considered real owners of the assets that they 
have bought or otherwise the relationship between them and the issuer is that between 
a creditor and a borrower similar to that between the issuer and the holder in case of 
the traditional bonds. 
7.3.8.4 SPV 
In relation to the legal risks originating from SPV in sukuk structure, Interviewee 9 
has responded by arguing that private companies mainly aim at keeping the assets to 
be sold by the issuer to sukuk holders within a legal entity that is completely 
independent from the issuer that keeps the rights of sukuk holders away from the 
issuer. However, the system of establishing commercial companies in Saudi Arabia is 
still associated with many complexities and challenges that could consume time as 
well as money, and that would make the process of issuing sukuk highly costly 
compared to the traditional bonds which do not need such SPV to become involved. 
Consequently, the companies that seek funding would prefer the traditional bonds 
over sukuk for reasons of low costs of issuance. Issuing sukuk need the establishment 
of SPV which is costly as the issuer has to which have to meet all the . The same 
could be said about investors in securities who go for the traditional bonds rather 
sukuk as the former would generate high returns given the inverse relationship 
between the costs of issuance and the returns on securities. In addition, Interviewee 10 
makes it certain that due to the fact that a law featuring sukuk is non-existent in Saudi 
Arabia, which implies that the process of establishing private companies has to cope 
with the special systems with regard to establishing shared companies whose systems 
are complex and cost prohibitive for the issuer as has been pointed out by the 
Interviewee 9. 
However, Interviewee 11 has agreed to the above opinions, and yet he has argued that 
the SPVs have not satisfied the legal aims with regard to their establishment in 
relation to keeping the assets to be sold by the issuer to sukuk holders. In other words, 
those SPVs should constitute part of the issuer assets and in most cases should be 




from the issuer to SPV even though the condition might have not been fully satisfied 
with regard to such transfer. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the interview data 
presented in this section:  
(i)  A special law for establishing private companies (SPV) is non-existent in Saudi 
Arabia particularly in relation to matters associated with the issuance of sukuk; 
(ii) The private companies (SPV) have failed to keep the assets away from the issuer 
in favour of sukuk holders. 
7.3.8.5 Bankruptcy law 
Regarding the bankruptcy law leading to legal risks for sukuk, Interviewee 9 
explained that in case SABIC company going bankrupt or insolvent for instance, then 
the legal status of sukuk holders will be clear as being provided by the prospectus of 
issuance, given that they are owners of the assets and should not be affected by the 
state of bankruptcy. In other words, in case of bankruptcy, the assets owned by sukuk 
holders should not be included in the loss to be assessed and distributed among 
shareholders. In this regard, a distinction should be made between share and bond 
holders on the one hand and sukuk holders on the other hand as clearly indicated by 
the prospectus of issuance. By contrast, Interviewee 10 argued that the potential legal 
risks facing sukuk holders will be the controversy over their legal status in case 
SABIC company goes bankrupt or insolvent. It could be argued that whether sukuk 
holders will be considered by the CRSD and ACRSC as real owners or otherwise be 
treated as creditors. He also added that the law of bankruptcy in Saudi Arabia is very 
obvious regarding the treatment of shareholders and owners of securities including the 
traditional bonds. However, as yet the ambiguity associated with sukuk and the way 
sukuk holders should be dealt with, and as to whether sukuk holders will be able to 
prove themselves as true owners of their assets or that ownership is just nominal is 
still unclear. 
Interviewee 11 made it clear that sukuk holders might face legal risks in the efforts to 
prove their rights as owners of the assets they have bought, as according to the 




considered a debt on SABIC and as a result in case SABIC goes bankrupt or 
insolvent; sukuk holders will facing a legal dilemma as they will be considered as 
creditors similar to the holders of traditional bonds to claim back the money they have 
credited to the issuer account through the private company. 
The following conclusion can be inferred from the analysis of the interviews provided 
in this section: 
(i)  Differences exist among the interviewees regarding the legal status of sukuk 
holders in case of bankruptcy or insolvency of the issuer, and whether the assets will 
be included in the loss as a result of bankruptcy so that bond holders and shareholders 
will have their share on those assets or otherwise the sukuk assets that have been sold 
to sukuk holders will be kept away from the assets owned by the company that will be 
distributed among shareholders and bond holders; 
(ii)  Given the fact that no cases of insolvency or bankruptcy has taken place in 
relation to sukuk in the Saudi market meaning that since no precedent has existed so 
far; that makes the legal status of sukuk holders unclear. 
7.3.9 CONCLUSION 
From the preceding analysis, the following conclusions are developed in terms of 
legal risks facing sukuk issuances in Saudi Arabia: 
(i) ‘Sukuk  term’ has not featured in any special legislation issued by the CMA; 
(ii)  All the exits regulations and laws in Saudi capital market are related to stocks and 
debt instruments; 
(iii) No difference is made between sukuk and bonds regarding the rules and 
regulations that have been issued by the CMA; 
(iv) All companies that have issued sukuk including SABIC company have legally 
relied on the laws and regulations that regulate the issuance of shares and bonds; 
(v) The CRSD and ACRSC are considered as a legal judiciary authority with regard to 




(vi) The fatawa issued by SBSS is non-binding and obligatory upon Shari’ah courts 
nor the CRSD and ACRSC; 
(vii) The doubt of full independence of CRSD and ACRSC from CMA; 
(viii) The existence of numerous legal bodies to investigate cases might lead to legal 
risks; 
(ix) Differences in opinion exist among the interviewees with regard to the nature of 
the CRSD and ACRSC as being administrative with legal powers or being a judiciary 
panel; 
(x) The validity of the CRSD and ACRSC in Shari’ah terms is questioned, as it does 
not include Shari’ah scholars or members (judges); 
(xi) The CRSD and ACRSC are still excluded by the new Saudi judiciary system 
which will make their decisions less forcible; 
(xii) The legal impacts of the different fatawa made by Shari’ah scholars in various 
matters in relation to SABIC sukuk; 
(xiii) The Shari’ah-based differences among the members of CRSD and ACRSC as 
well as SBSS  in Shari’ah terms is considered among the risks that threatens the 
legality of SABIC sukuk and the application of the relevant contract; 
(xiv) The faulty and incomprehensive with regard to the information that must be 
available in the prospectus of issuance; 
(xv) Failure to refer to the legal risks in the prospectus issuance of SABIC sukuk; 
(xvi) The failure of CMA to focus and review the prospectus of issuance and all the 
legal relevant documents can lead to legal risks; 
(xvii) The fake sale and the impossibility of transferring the assets from the issuer to 
sukuk holders as well as the inconsistency with the judiciary system and Shari’ah 
principles leads to legal risks; 
(xviii) The uncertainty of the underlying assets in the prospectus of the issuance of 




(xix) The uncertainty of the legal status of sukuk holders (owners – debtors); 
(xx) The non-existence of a special law with regard to SPV; 
(xxi) The failure of keeping the assets away from the issuer in favour of sukuk holders 
in case of bankruptcy or insolvency. 
7.4 AN INTERPRETATIVE DISCUSSION        
This section provides an interpretative discussion around the analysis of the interview 
responses from specialised individuals in the field of Islamic finance in general and 
sukuk in particular presented in the preceding sections in relation to the structure and 
prospectus of SABIC sukuk. Thus, each section presents an analysis of each of the 
questions raised in the structured interviewing sessions. After presenting a brief 
analysis of the interview material through interpretative method, then an attempt is 
given to provide critical analysis with the objective of giving further meaning to the 
analysis. 
7.4.1 The Law of Sukuk in the Saudi Financial Market 
The Saudi financial market had officially start in the 1950s; however, the 
establishment of the basic systems of the market by the government was not until 
1980s (Al-Muharrami, 2009). According to the Financial Market Regulations 
featuring the Royal Decree No. (M / 30) on 44/45/5441, the CMA was established as 
it is considered as a government authority which is independent in terms of 
administration and finance, and directly linked with the Prime Minister. In addition, 
the CMA is in charge of the control, development, and organisation of the financial 
market, as well as issuance of regulations and the appropriate rules and directives for 
the application of the financial market system aiming at creating the proper 
environment for market investment besides boosting the trust on the market by 
ensuring transparency for companies associated with the market, and protecting 
clients and investors in money exchange from potential malpractices in the market 
(CMA website).  
It should be noted that in comparison to financial markets of other countries, it could 
be maintained that the CMA has been far lagging behind by opening a secondary 




establishment of a secondary market has been good news for financial expansion, 
financial inclusion, and all the relevant stakeholders including investors in sukuk, the 
general desire has been the exclusion of riba-based bonds from all market 
transactions, and accordingly the market has been given the name ‘sukuk and bonds 
market’.  
The Saudi financial market has focused on introducing regulations and laws that 
organise the financial market, while they always addressed the securities in general by 
stopping short of differentiating between all the type of securities in terms of laws and 
regulations (Al Elsheikh and Tanega, 2011). Given that, according to Interviewee 9, 
every form of securities has its own legal nature and its basic structure in addition to 
the legal rights and bindings associated with every form of securities not to mention 
the legal implications associated with every transaction linked with any form of 
securities in case of failure to abide with the terms and conditions associated with 
appropriate form of securities no matter being bonds, sukuk, shares or others. That has 
been confirmed by the CMA’s regulation for defining terminology featuring all 
regulations issued by the Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 44/45/5441 that the term 
securities should mean; 
(1)Shares; (2)Debt instruments; (3)Warrants; (4)Certificates; (5)Units; (6)Options; 
(7)Futures; (8)Contracts for differences; (9)Long term insurance contracts; and Any 
right to or interest in anything which is specified by any of the paragraphs (1) 
through (9) above . 
From the above, it becomes obvious that sukuk could be classified as a debt 
instruments (No 2),while no reference to the term ‘sukuk’ is made indicating that most 
likely no differentiation is being made between sukuk and other riba-based debt 
instruments. In the conduct of this study, the regulations regarding the promotion of 
securities has also been reviewed, therefore, it has become obvious that the 
regulations have always generally referred to the securities featuring all the laws and 
regulations and has not made any special reference to the term sukuk. This implies as 
if sukuk are being considered a sort of securities similar to riba-based bonds, and that 
all regulative and legal procedures applied to riba-based bonds could also be applied 
to sukuk including SABIC sukuk with no difference. This is a view which is supported 
by all those who have been interviewed indicating a major fault in the regulations 




differentiate between sukuk and other form of securities in terms of legal nature. In 
addition, it should be noted that what is being referred to as the ‘rules of registration 
for securities in the Saudi market’ has also been reviewed, whereby the rules have not 
included any special arrangements for sukuk, but instead those rules have mentioned 
the conditions for registration and listing of shares and debt instruments again 
indicating that sukuk are being treated similar to riba-based bonds featuring all 
procedures. Therefore, it could be argued that there is no obvious reason as to the 
failure to introduce laws and systems to be specially designed for sukuk as most of the 
interviewees have pointed out. The further substantiate to this, it should be noted that 
the CMA does not actually make a legal distinction between sukuk and bonds, which 
explains its failure to introduce laws specially designed for sukuk. 
With regard to the law to be enforced, it should be mentioned that the prospectus of 
issuance of SABIC sukuk provides that; “SABIC sukuk should be subject to the 
prevailing laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia according to the jurisdiction of 
Shari’ah law as practiced in Saudi Arabia, and should be interpreted accordingly” 
(PISS, 2008). However, it could be argued that the prevailing laws and regulations in 
Saudi Arabia could constitute a major risk that might face SABIC sukuk as well as 
other sukuk that have been issued so far in Saudi Arabia. Having said that, the 
prevailing laws and regulations in the Saudi financial market that feature in the 
prospectus of issuance do not make a distinction between sukuk and bonds indicating 
that sukuk are being treated similar to riba-based bonds. That has been stressed by one 
of the interviewees by pointing out that the issuer of SABIC sukuk has taken into 
account the laws and regulations of securities that do not make a distinction between 
sukuk and bonds. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the bond and sukuk market in Saudi Arabia has not 
witnessed so far any precedent of bankruptcy or insolvency featuring the companies 
involved in sukuk business, and that makes things more complicated as Interviewee 
10 has pointed out. It has been argued that the legal nature of sukuk including SABIC 
sukuk as well as the legal status of sukuk holders, seem to be both unclear. That is for 
the simple reason that first; a special law for sukuk in Saudi Arabia is non-existent and 
taking into account the legal differences between Islamic contracts as all that would 




its early stages of development so that the number of issuances compared to other 
countries such as Malaysia is considered humble, and as it has already been 
mentioned that has made the Saudi market safer as it has not suffered so far from 
bankruptcy or insolvency featuring any of the companies involved in sukuk business. 
However, should that happen, it could be possible to identify the potential risks 
provided that a special law for sukuk exists. That line of thought is being supported by 
the following stipulation featuring the prospectus issuance of SABIC sukuk that; 
Prospective Holders should note that to the best of SABIC's knowledge, no 
securities of a similar nature to the sukuk have previously been the subject of 
adjudicatory interpretation or enforcement in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, it is 
uncertain exactly how and to what extent the sukuk, the conditions and/or the sukuk 
documents would be enforced by a Saudi Arabian court or the Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Disputes and the Appeal Panel (PISS, 2008). 
Thus, it could be argued that the legal situation with regard to SABIC sukuk is vague 
and blurry due to the absence of a special law featuring sukuk. This view is also 
supported by Al Elsheikh and Tanega (2011) as well as all the interviewees.  
Consequently, it could be maintained that the absence of Saudi special law for sukuk 
could be the first potential risk that SABIC sukuk might encounter as to settle disputes 
and conflicts that might take place between sukuk holders and SABIC company in 
case the latter suffers from insolvency or bankruptcy. 
7.4.2 The Legal Body Entrusted with Cases of Disputes and Conflicts involving 
SABIC Sukuk 
The SABIC sukuk prospectus stipulates that;  
The Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes and the Appeal 
Panel (the "Committee") shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any suit, action or proceedings, and to settle any disputes, which 
may arise out of or in connection with the sukuk or the sukuk documents and, 
for such purposes, all relevant parties ‘including the Issuer and the Holders’ 
irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of the Committee. No suit, action or 
proceedings which may arise out of or in connection with the sukuk or the 
sukuk documents may be filed or brought outside Saudi Arabia and no court 
or any judicial authority outside Saudi Arabia shall have jurisdiction to hear 
any such claim (PISS, 2008).  
This point has been stressed by all interviewees that in the current situation in Saudi 




with the investigation of cases of disputes involving investors in securities within the 
jurisdiction of the financial market system and its executive regulations, as well as the 
regulations, rules and directives of the market authority with regard to the public and 
private rights, and that the CRSD and ACRSC are the body of judiciary power and 
authority to investigate cases of dispute and conflict involving sukuk including 
SABIC sukuk.  
Having said that, the Saudi market regulations have stipulated the two panels in terms 
of formation, authority and limitation of power in accordance with the royal decree 
No. (M/30) dated 01-08-2003. However, as pointed out by interviewee 9 that since the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that governs the country is inspired by 
Shari’ah principles, Shari’ah courts, by definition, should represent the body to be 
entrusted with the investigation and conflicts involving SABIC sukuk as those courts 
should be controlled by Shari’ah-trained judges and their decision should only be 
overruled by the power of Shari’ah. However, the fact that Shari’ah courts in Saudi 
Arabia need more organisation and specialisation such as the establishment of 
specialised commercial courts to be controlled by highly trained, highly qualified, and 
highly experienced judges on issues related to Islamic financing. It should be noted 
that as the analysis of the interviews in the preceding sections indicate, these issues 
were all raised by all the interviewees. It could, therefore, be argued that those 
institutions were established as to make up for any malfunction associated with 
Shari’ah courts as it has been mentioned by interviewee. 
In contrast, in the CMA regulations there is a condition that the members of the 
CRSD and ACRSC should necessarily be legal experts as well as knowledgeable in 
jurisprudence of transactions or fiqh al-mua’malat. In this regard, it should be stated 
that all the members of the CRSD and ACRSC do not have Shari’ah background, as 
their education and experience are not related to the fiqh al-mua’malat according to 
their CVs. This could constitute a major risk for sukuk including SABIC sukuk in case 
of potential disputes, as the members of the panels may not be qualified to investigate 
such disputes as has been pointed out by Interviewee 10. 
It is worth mentioning that as far as Shari’ah courts are concerned, judges most likely 
reject any case involving riba-based contract as invalid. That is exactly what has been 




reasons based on one of Shari’ah rules that states ‘whatever is based on incorrect 
reasoning will be incorrect’ meaning that sukuk that has been structured in a way 
inconsistent with Shari’ah should not be valid in Shari’ah terms. That line of thought 
is consistent with the idea from Interviewee 10 that the main aim behind the 
establishment of those institutions could be to investigate cases of dispute and 
conflicts featuring securities where in most cases riba-transaction cannot be ruled out. 
Thus, it could be argued that the absence of specialised commercial courts from 
matters involving such issues should be considered among the legal risks that SABIC 
sukuk has to cope with not to mention the lack of restrictions in relation to the 
nomination of the members of those panels that could be described as being linked 
with Shari’ah due to practicing the same role to be undertaken of the judges of 
Shari’ah courts. 
7.4.3 The Legal Implication of Failure to Abide with the Decisions Fatawa 
Issued by Shari’ah Committees 
In relation to the failure to abide with fatawa issued by the Shari’ah committees, the 
prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk stipulated that (PISS, 2008): 
Prospective holders should note that different Shari’ah advisers, and Saudi courts and 
judicial committees, may form different opinions on identical issues and therefore 
prospective holders may wish to consult their own legal and Shari’ah advisers to receive 
an opinion if they so desire. Prospective holders should also note that although the 
SABB Amanah Shari’ah supervisory committee has issued a pronouncement confirming 
that the sukuk as described in the detailed pronouncement are in compliance with 
Shari’ah principles, such a pronouncement would not bind a Saudi Arabian court or 
judicial committee, including in the context of any insolvency or bankruptcy 
proceedings relating to the Issuer, and any Saudi Arabian court or judicial committee 
will have the discretion to make its own determination about whether the sukuk, the 
sukuk documents and the related structure (or any part thereof) complies with Saudi law 
and Shari’ah principles and therefore is enforceable or otherwise. Accordingly, no 
person (including, without limitation, the Issuer) makes any representation that the 
sukuk, the conditions and any other sukuk documents comply with Shari’ah principles, 
except for the detailed pronouncement of the SABB Amanah Shari’ah supervisory 
committee. 
From the forgoing, it is obvious that the decisions to be made by SBSS should neither 
be binding Shari’ah courts nor should it be binding the CRSD and ACRSC, as the 
prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk clearly indicates that the fatwa to be issued by 




laws and regulations that control the Saudi financial market in terms of structure and 
other documents.  
Furthermore, the SBSS does not provide guarantee that such fatwa should be 
consistent with the ideas to be maintained by the CRSD and ACRSC in terms of 
Shari’ah principles. Consequently, the potential risk that SABIC sukuk has to cope 
with features in the failure of the members of the CRSD and ACRSC to recognise the 
fatwa that has approved SABIC sukuk and the subsequent legal implications. Such 
implications include the possibility of nullification of the contract rendering sukuk 
holders being incapable of proving their rights, which as a point has been confirmed 
by one of the interviewees. On the other hand, in order to make sure that guarantee is 
given to all parties particularly the holders of SABIC sukuk; it becomes necessary that 
the fatawa to be made by SBSS should be final and irreversible by presenting those 
fatawa to the appropriate committees of the CMA for approval before being presented 
to investors as it has been suggested by one of the interviewees. Alternatively, an 
independent body can be established for the approval of fatawa to be made by SBSS 
featuring banks and companies so that those fatawa become final after approval in 
case of being presented to any judiciary authority in the Kingdom. With that system, a 
legal guarantee will be given that those fatawa will not be overruled in case of 
insolvency or bankruptcy of SABIC company, so the fatawa made by Shari’ah boards 
become subject to being enforced. 
Furthermore, from the section of the prospectus depicted above it is obvious that a 
possibility exists that the rules and conditions agreed upon between SABIC and sukuk 
holders might not observed due to the fact that no guarantee is given by a reliable 
body whose decisions are final and binding by confirming that sukuk structure is 
consistent with Shari’ah principles and the laws being introduced by the Saudi 
market. In other words, no independent body exist in legal and Shari’ah terms to 
approve sukuk structures and other financing contracts as being Shari’ah compliant as 
the case with central bank in Malaysia for instance. However, this made the SABIC 
company to identify in the prospectus of issuance that the company will not be 
responsible for SABIC sukuk structure whether the structure is Shari’ah compliant or 




conditions is not being guaranteed recognised in Shari’ah and legal terms by the 
CRSD and ACRSC.  
For this reason, among the legal risks that might encounter SABIC sukuk could be 
that the conditions and decisions made by Shari’ah courts and other legal panels 
could not be subject to execution. This is due to the fact that Shari’ah-based 
structured SABIC sukuk could not be binding to the CRSD and ACRSC in case of 
dispute or conflict involving securities between the issuer and sukuk holders. In other 
words, the differences in opinion in Shari’ah terms between SBSS and the members 
of the CRSD and ACRSC might lead to invalidation of sukuk in legal terms and the 
subsequent failure to enforce its provisions. 
Consequently, it could be argued that among the risks that might face SABIC sukuk 
and other forms of securities as Interviewee 9 and 10 pointed out is being unaware of 
the approved opinion in Shari’ah terms regarding the financial transactions as being 
maintained by the CRSD and ACRSC. Since well-known fiqh-related old differences 
exist among Shari’ah scholars in many issues associated with financial transactions, 
SBSS might rely on a specific fiqh-related opinion as basis for sukuk structure, and 
that opinion might offend the approved opinion as to be practiced by the CRSD and 
ACRSC which tends to make a significant impact on the sukuk both legally and in 
Shari’ah terms. In other words, the sukuk might be satisfying the conditions in legal 
terms provided by the regulations to be issued by the CMA. However, in Shari’ah 
terms the sukuk might be inconsistent with Shari’ah principles and this is where 
Shari’ah and the law become at loggerhead. For that reason, some of those who have 
been interviewed suggested that recognisable Shari’ah-based standards such as 
AAOIFI standards should be adapted. However, those standards become binding to 
Shari’ah boards to be entrusted with the task of sukuk structuring as well as the bodies 
to be entrusted with investigating and decision-making on matter associated with 
sukuk. Consequently, the risk of the differences of the school of thoughts among the 
members of the CRSD and ACRSC, on the one hand, and Shari’ah boards, on the 
other hand, can be eliminated, as with the AAOIFI standards being adapted, there is 
only one reference which gives guarantee that the sukuk will not be invalidated in 
Shari’ah terms by the CRSD and ACRSC. Thus, should it not have been for such 




faced by SABIC sukuk holders include organizational and Shari’ah-related 
inconsistencies featuring the structure of the sukuk they hold as well as the prospectus 
of issuance and the documents to be attached to it, which might legally render sukuk 
holders incapable of proving their rights in case of insolvency or bankruptcy of the 
issuer company.     
7.4.4 The Legal Nature of the CRSD and ACRSC and the Degree of Its 
Independence 
The legal nature of the CRSD and ACRSC that have been stipulated by the financial 
market regulation in terms of formation and authority provided by the Royal Decree 
No. M/30 dated 44/45/5441, remains among the controversial issues as well as the 
degree of independence of those panels have also been controversial. However, 
Article 25 of the CMA stipulates that; 
A panel under the name ‘the Committee of the Resolution of Securities 
Disputes (CRSD)’ will be established by the Saudi market authority (SAM), 
and that panel will be entrusted with the investigation of disputes that take place 
within the jurisdiction of that system and its executive regulations as well as the 
regulations of the authority and the market, their rules and directives with 
regard to the public and private rights. The panel preserves all the necessary 
authorities for investigating and making decision on the cases to be presented to 
them, including the authority to call witnesses, making decisions, imposing 
punishments, and ordering the presentation of evidence, documents …etc.  The 
members of the panel will be appointed following a decision to be made by the 
council i.e. the CMA council, for three years subject to renewal. 
It should be mentioned that Interviewee 9 and 10 pointed out that the market system 
has secured for those panels the right of jurisdiction and decision-making regarding 
cases of disputes and conflict involving securities including SABIC sukuk. In 
addition, it has given those two panels the full independence to practice their activities 
as a judiciary body in relation to cases of disputes involving securities with the due 
neutrality and honesty, therefore that no one regardless his status should have 
influence or control of the cases to be investigated by those panels. Moreover, the two 
relevant panels also should not be subject to the influence of the CMA, and the fact 
that in many cases its decision has not been in favour of the CMA testifies to that. 
It could be argued that to a great extent the full independence of CRSD and ACRSC 
to practice their activities as a judiciary body will provide a great certainty and 




Nonetheless, that view point has not been taken for guaranteed by Interviewee 11 due 
to some benchmarks that those two panels might deviate from the principle of 
neutrality in cases against companies and other clients featuring securities such as 
sukuk, for instance in favour of the CMA given that the members of the CRSD and 
ACRSC are being appointed by the CMA not to mention the fact that they are being 
paid by the CMA. Moreover, the headquarters of the two panels is located within the 
building of the CMA which raises doubts making investors in SABIC sukuk less 
reassured of the possibility of those panels to take sides in their decision favouring the 
CMA in case the latter becomes involved in a case against SABIC sukuk for instance, 
and is considered among the legal risks SABIC sukuk has to cope with. 
It is noteworthy that the principle of the judiciary independence in Saudi Arabia, 
which is considered among the well-established principles in Islamic Shari’ah, is also 
ensured by the Constitution of Saudi Arabia in Paragraph 1 of Article 46 under the 
Title 2 that “Judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they shall be 
subject to no authority other than the provisions of Shari’ah and laws in force. No one 
may interfere with the Judiciary”.  
Thus, the independence of the judiciary authority does mean its independence from 
the government as well the parliament (the legislative authority) so that the two 
authorities should not have control over the judiciary activities in any way. 
However, the issue of exception of certain powers of the public and administrative 
courts to be given to administrative panels (CRSD and ACRSC) to be controlled by 
ordinary government staff rather than professional judges to make decision on 
specific cases of disputes with the power of judiciary courts remains a controversial 
matter in relation to principle of independence of the judiciary. This also runs against 
the independence principle ensured by the Saudi constitution which is shaped by 
Shari’ah. According to Interviewee 11, the inconsistency is that the members of the 
CRSD and ACRSC are not professional judges to be entrusted with making decision 
on matters involving disputes and imposing punishment on the offending side. 
Moreover, the formation of the CRSD is considered among the inconsistencies, and to 
be more precise, the inconsistency of Article 25 of the CMA system with the 
Constitution stipulating that: “The members of the panel will be appointed in 




authority, for three years subject to renewal”. In reflecting on this, Interviewee 11 
argued that the inconsistency with the Constitution is due to the members of the 
CRSD are being appointed according to a decision made by the council of the CMA, 
and that will eventually constitute a risk to clients of SABIC sukuk. It is, hence, 
inconceivable that the CMA becomes in one hand part of the case as against SABIC 
Company, and in the meantime becomes a judge who investigates the case, which, 
hence, represents a conflict of interests and lack of independence. This cast doubts 
that the decision to be made by the panel might favour the CMA, as it has appointed 
the members of the panel. 
It should be noted that among the legal risks that might be exposed to the investors on 
SABIC sukuk and other types of securities which have to cope with is that numerous 
bodies in Saudi Arabia exist to investigate cases of dispute including the public 
judiciary, the administrative judiciary, and also the panels (the administrative 
authorities) of judiciary nature. According to Interviewee 11 that could lead to 
problems and legal risks including failure to enforce decisions as well inconsistency 
of opinion in Shari’ah terms. However, these problems have not been clearly defined 
due to the fact that no case involving bankruptcy or insolvency relating to Saudi 
market has been reported to be investigated by the two panels so far nor there are any 
cases under investigation to the CRSD and ACRSC with regard to sukuk. This makes 
it difficult to predict the potential legal risks that might encounter SABIC sukuk so 
that they can be avoided as has been stipulated by the prospectus of issuance. 
Finally, given that the system of the judiciary have excluded the CRSD and ACRSC 
from the umbrella of the public and administrative judiciary in terms of their 
executive methods, it is necessary the exemption should not be extended to include 
the exemption of that panel from the principle of independence of the judiciary 
through the sustaining intervention of the council of the CMA (the executive body) 
regarding the appointment of the members of the panel (the judiciary body). As the 
principle of the judiciary independence is a constitutional matter that must be 




7.4.5 The Binding and Enforceable Nature of the Decisions of the CRSD and 
ACRSC 
After the examination and evaluation of the Constitution of the Saudi Arabian Market 
Authority (SAMA), it becomes obvious that the system has been keen to establish the 
CRSD as to become capable of undertaking its duties regarding disputes featuring 
securities. In this regard, the SAM stipulated by Article 25, Paragraph A, that it has 
been given the CRSD through CMA all the necessary powers for investigating and 
decision-making with regard to the cases involving calling witnesses, making 
decisions, imposing punishments, and ordering the presentation of evidence and 
documents. The CRSD also preserves the right to make decision to pay compensation 
as to order the condition to be restored as before. Alternatively, the CRSD can make 
the appropriate decision to preserve the right of the party that suffers from the 
damage. However, the CMA system in order to preserve the right of the disputing 
parties has established another panel, namely ACRSC, giving extra guarantee for 
preserving the rights of the parties involved insecurities related disputes, including 
SABIC sukuk, in obtaining rights such as the right to go to court at two stages so that 
any of the parties can go to the appeal panel ACRSC (second stage) should he have 
not been satisfied with the decision made by CRSD (the first stage). Article 25 
Paragraphs Z and Y stipulates the formation of the ACRSC panel entrusted with the 
investigation of appeal applications against the decisions to be made by the CRSD to 
be presented within 30 days from date the decision have been made by the CRSD. 
Having said that, the powers of ACRSC are defined by Article 25, Paragraph Z of the 
financial market regulation regarding the handling of the appeal applications against 
the decisions to be made by the CRSD as follows: 
(a) Refuse to review CRSD decisions; 
(b) Affirm CRSD decisions; 
(c) Undertake a de novo review of the complaint or suit based on the record at the 
hearing before CRSD and to issue the appropriate decision.  
(d) Nature of Decisions: The decisions of ACRSC are considered final and cannot be 
appealed. 
On the other hand, the objection made by some of the interviewees regarding offering 
the CMA the right of making the decisions normally to be made by the CRSD and 




this panel a jurisdiction panel. This implies that its decisions should be binding as to 
investigate cases involving disputes between two parties, in which case according to 
the financial market regulation those two panels would have been the same as the law 
and Shari’ah courts in nature. However, since according to the Constitution the 
judiciary in Saudi Arabia has to be based on Shari’ah, this panel could be described as 
invalid in Shari’ah terms as its members are not Shari’ah-trained judges, but rather 
have experience in law. The invalidity of the panel can be argued on ground that panel 
might also make its decisions based on sources other than Shari’ah. 
In addition, it could be argued that the duty of the CRSD and ACRSC should be to 
settle the differences between the two disputing parties so that in case of failure to 
reach a compromise the case should be referred to the appropriate court for making 
the final decision. In other words, the panel has to reach a compromise to the 
satisfaction of the two parties, or otherwise the case has to be referred to the relevant 
Shari’ah court. 
7.4.6 Determining the Body to Investigate Cases Involving Securities Disputes 
including SABIC Sukuk under the New Judiciary Arrangement in Saudi 
Market 
In 1426 H, a Royal Decree has been issued regarding the organisation of the judiciary 
systems and sorting out disputes in Saudi courts. The executive methods of the 
judiciary and the Grievance Board system was also issued in 1428 H with the inherent 
recommendation for the formation of more than 70 panel or authority to reviewing all 
panels of judiciary nature. Each of these panels would be expected to rely on special 
regulations regarding their powers and jurisdiction in accordance with a Royal Decree 
to sort out disputes originating from the application of those rules, as an exemption of 
the duties of the public and administrative courts. Article 9 of the new judiciary 
system stipulates the rearrangement and reorganisaton of the courts as to be classified 
into five types, according to which the commercial courts are classified as specialised 
courts. 
It should be noted that a great hope and ambition of those concerned with sukuk 
whether in legal terms or Shari’ah terms is the establishment of specialised courts 
under the label of commercial courts to include all the semi-judiciary panels. In 




should be entrusted with those panels instead of the judiciary or semi-judiciary panels 
or administrative panels, which should identify the legal identity of those panels as it 
has been suggested by one of interviewee 11. However, following the approval of 
those commercial courts featuring the new judiciary organisation, many of those 
panels including the CRSD and ACRSC, which are the two panels entrusted with 
cases involving SABIC sukuk, are still exempted in terms of their duties from the 
public and administrative judiciary, a matter that makes the courts in Saudi Arabia 
still multiple and complex which tends to render the decision to be made by those 
panels less powerful. 
In this regard, it has been suggested that the two panels have to be affiliated to the 
specialised commercial courts following the example of the semi-judiciary 
commercial panels that have been affiliated to the umbrella of public and 
administrative courts. Such an affiliation, however, will secure the enforceability of 
the decisions to be made by those semi-judiciary panels, and tends to make those 
panels to look more judiciary in nature. It should be noted that the isolation of those 
panels from the specialised courts offends the unity of the judiciary, and it is 
preferable that the judiciary should be affiliated to the same body namely the Ministry 
of Justice without being disputed by the Ministry of Commerce or the CMA as the 
situation currently stands. 
Furthermore, the isolation of those panels from the judiciary would be considered as 
one of the most significant risks facing SABIC sukuk, which can be a reason behind 
poor execution of the decisions made by those panels. This is because of the fact that 
some people perceive those panels as not being judiciary bodies but rather 
administrative bodies whose decisions have no binding power, on the one hand; and 
the diversification of the decisions to be made by those panels tends to make them 
less powerful and might delay the execution process, on the other hand. Again, as it 
has been asserted by Al Elsheikh and Tanega (2011) that the lack of clarity of the 
enforceability of any law or any decision of a judicial authority could be one of the 




7.4.7 The Legal Implications of Potential Jurisprudential Differences between 
the Members of the CRSD, ACRSC and SBSS  
As discussed previously, the prospectus of issuance is considered among the most 
important documents and papers that need more legal attention whether by CMA, 
which represents the organising body that controls the issuance and circulation of 
securities including SABIC sukuk, or by the issuer and sukuk holders who represent 
the parties of the contracting relationship. However, one of the interviewees made it 
clear that failure to pay the due attention to prospectus of issuance in legal terms tends 
to lead to risks as well as problems in Shari’ah and legal terms including the possible 
nullification of sukuk and the subsequent loss of the rights and the potential dispute 
and conflict between the issuer and sukuk holders. 
For that reason, it could be argued that the prospectus of issuance has to feature an 
accurate description of the contracting relationship between the relevant parties by 
mentioning the name of the Shari’ah-based contract indicating the contracting 
relationship between the issuer and sukuk holders, as well as an accurate description 
of all the rights and duties of every party as it has been suggested by AAOIFI (2010). 
However, after examining and analyzing the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk 
in legal terms, it has become obvious that the contracting relationship between the 
issuer (SABIC Company), and sukuk holders has not been clear to the point of 
clarifying the legal relationship that has taken place between the two parties as the 
prospectus of issuance stipulates that; 
SABIC Company issues sukuk each of which represents a common part of 
sukuk assets to be presented to investors. From their part the investors and those 
interested in buying will fill an application for underwriting according to which 
they give their consent for Saudi Arabia HSBC Bank Company Ltd (SABB) to 
become their representative and appointing SABIC Company as a trustee of 
sukuk assets on their behalf. They also have to determine on the application the 
number of sukuk they wish to purchase. After the completion of the applications 
SABIC Company has to transfer sukuk assets to the trustee of sukuk assets and 
issues sukuk to investors, and hence the representative of sukuk holders will 
issue an order for transferring the value of sukuk to SABIC Company (PISS, 
2008).  
From the above, it could be concluded that, as far as the prospectus of issuance is 
concerned, things are being generalised rather than being explained in detail. That 




structured as well as the definition of the parties that will continue in the contracting 
relationship until SABIC sukuk expires. That makes the reader of the prospectus of 
issuance perhaps become confused, which is due to the fact that SABIC as seller has 
set a condition that it stays as a marketer for sukuk, and that questions the real legal 
status of SABIC company, and whether it has sold or hired sukuk or otherwise 
whether another relationship exists. As can be seen, the observed vagueness in 
relationship has disclosed a varying disagreement between the members of SBSS as 
has already been explained. 
In addition, among the legal comments that have been made regarding the prospectus 
of issuance, and comments have also been made by some of the interviewees is that 
the prospectus of issuance has failed to define clearly the assets to be sold by the 
issuer to sukuk holders. It is worth mentioning that by reviewing the balance sheet of 
SABIC company, the assets that had been sold to sukuk holders did not exist in the 
company records; and also no legal evidence existed that would make one believe that 
those assets had been assessed and could be sold and transferred from the issuer to 
sukuk holders.  
Moreover, the prospectus of issuance failed to identify the method of the assessment 
of the underlying SABIC sukuk and the mechanism through which those assets will be 
sold and transferred to sukuk holders, as whether that mechanism satisfies all 
conditions in Shari’ah and legal terms in accordance with the provisions relating to 
the judiciary systems in Saudi Arabia in relation to legal documentation by 
transferring sukuk from the issuer balance sheet to the records of the sukuk holders. 
It should be noted that there have been differences among the members of SBSS with 
regard to the assets of SABIC sukuk as has already been explained. Such differences 
are also emerged in relation to whether the underlying of SABIC sukuk assets 
considered as marketing contract or privilege rights or otherwise the assets represent 
the rights of marketing the products that have been hired by sukuk holders given that 
the prospectus of issuance has provided that the assets that will be transferred sums of 
money that will be collected following the marketing of products of the SABIC 
subsidiary companies. Nonetheless, it should be noticed that what has been presented 




mention is made to the fact that the assets will be in the form of sums of money 
according to one of the SBSS. 
Hence, it could be stated that the summary of the prospectus of issuance that has been 
approved by SBSS is vague and incomprehensive, while the details depicted in the 
original prospectus, as one of the members of the SBSS described, as being long and 
written in the English language which makes it futile and needless to be reviewed. 
In reflecting on these comments, he legal comments that have been raised above have 
to be  included in the prospectus of issuance as well as the summary of the prospectus 
of issuance which should clearly explain the name of the contract that clarifies the 
relationship between the issuer and sukuk holders in legal terms as well as in Shari’ah 
term. In addition, the nature of the assets to be sold to investors and the method used 
for the assessment of those assets should be calcified in the issuance of SABIC sukuk. 
Moreover, the two prospectuses must include all potential Shari’ah-related and legal 
risks that might encounter sukuk and the possible ways of dealing with those risks or 
minimising the damage, which to a great extent is non-existent in SABIC sukuk. In 
addition, the documents and papers in relation to SABIC sukuk should be accessible 
to everyone and that any information or documents related to sukuk should not be held 
back from sukuk holders which they are going to buy. That will be among the simplest 
legal rights given by the system to sukuk holders or otherwise it becomes doubtful that 
some sort of ignorance exists that makes sukuk holders eligible to claim compensation 
for any potential damage that might have been caused due to poor information or the 
difficulty to acquire that information. 
It becomes clear by reviewing the prospectus of SABIC sukuk that the sukuk holders 
do not preserve the right to have access to all documents in relation to SABIC sukuk 
that they are going to subscribe. In addition, sukuk holders have signed an agreement 
that they have no right to access some of the documents and papers or order a copy of 
them which is legally wrong according to the provisions of AAOIFI standards as it 
has been stated. 
Among the legal risks that might encounter SABIC sukuk is that the CMA most likely 
considers the organisation of all documents and papers and the extent to which those 




validity in Shari’ah terms. For that reason, the regulations of the CMA have stopped 
short of providing for the existence of Shari’ah-trained consultants for companies that 
issue sukuk as a condition, while it stipulates the existence of legal consultants. This 
could result in sukuk and the associated documents to be valid in terms of organisation 
but subject to risks as well as problems in Shari’ah terms that could expose sukuk to 
some sort of legal risks such as being unenforceable. As a consequent, sukuk and the 
associated documents has to be considered both legally and in Shari’ah terms to 
prevent any potential legal and Shari’ah risks. 
7.4.8 Sukuk Holders 
There is no doubt that sukuk holders are considered the most vulnerable of the parties 
with regard to the potential legal risks in sukuk, as the legal invalidation of sukuk 
structure will subsequently result in the loss of their rights and probably the assets 
they own as it has been noted by all the Interviewees. For that reason, sukuk holders 
have a duty to make sure that their legal rights are well preserved and guaranteed with 
regard to the ownership of the assets that have been bought and they have been 
actually transferred from the records of the issuer to the records of sukuk holders.   
Among the legal risks that might potentially encounter sukuk holders include the 
vagueness associated with their legal status in relation to the CRSD and ACRSC. The 
question is as to whether sukuk holders will be considered real owners of the assets 
they have bought from SABIC sukuk company so that they become legally capable of 
proving their rights of ownership of the assets to prevent them from being counted 
among the assets of bankruptcy to be shared by shareholders and creditors in case the 
issuer goes bankrupt. As otherwise, their relationship with the issuer will be that 
between a creditor and a borrower, which is similar to that between the issuer of the 
traditional bond and the holder of the bond. That vagueness can be due to the fact that 
the legal status of sukuk holders is not clear for many reasons. For example, a special 
law featuring sukuk is non-existent in Saudi Arabia as has already been mentioned, 
which is essential to make a distinction between sukuk holders and bond holders 
implying that all investors will have the same legal status with respect to securities. 
However, the financial market system has so far failed to make a clear distinction 
between sukuk and bonds by considering both of them as a type of securities of the 




have been investigated by the CRSD and ACRSC as to use the decision made by 
those panels as a guide to decide whether sukuk holders should be treated as real 
owners of the assets which they have bought or creditors such as the case with bond 
holders. 
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that most investors in sukuk in the Saudi 
market belong to major companies, and those companies employ a number of law 
specialists as to secure the legal rights of those investors in relation to proving their 
rights, and that their purchase of sukuk is a clear indication that they are somewhat 
reassured to invest in such type of securities. However, that reassurance might have 
been due to the fact that they are sure that their capital as well as their potential return 
has been guaranteed.  
According to one of the interviewee he pointed out that it is clear that sukuk holders 
might encounter legal barriers with regard to proving their right as real owners of the 
assets that they have bought due to the fact that the financial reports issued by SABIC 
Company provide evidence that the value of sukuk is to be owed by SABIC as a debt, 
so that in case of insolvency or bankruptcy, SABIC sukuk holders will face a legal 
barrier. As in such a case they will be considered as creditors in which case they will 
be among the holders of traditional bonds with the same legal status with regard to 
claiming back the sums they have paid into the issuer’s account through the private 
company. Nonetheless, it can be argued that this situation does not prevent a clear 
legal status to become available for sukuk holders not to mention the fact that the risk 
potential still exists given that the issuer might lose everything in which case any 
guarantees given by the issuer featuring the capital and returns for those companies 
might not be worthwhile. Consequently, the clarity of the legal status of sukuk holders 
for real ownership of the assets representing sukuk must be ensured, which should 
make sure of the transfer of those assets to investors in legal terms.  
7.4.9 SPV             
The main purpose of the SPV is to keep the assets to be sold by the issuer to sukuk 
holders in a special legal entity fully independent from the issuer to maintain the 
rights of sukuk holders away from the issuer as it has been noted by one of the 
interviewee. In addition, the system involving the establishment of commercial 




as well as time consuming for the issuer. This makes the sukuk cost-prohibitive as 
compared to traditional bonds that do not need the services of those companies with 
special purpose.  
In this respect, according to Fitch Ratings the main factor that is likely to slow down 
or limit the growth of sukuk market is the high initial costs of issuing sukuk compared 
with other types of debt instruments (aleqtisadiah, 2014). It is worth mentioning that 
the issuing of sukuk is more expensive than bonds perhaps due to the complicity of 
the sukuk structures as well as the need of the structure to be approved by a Shari’ah 
committee which is costly. Additionally, the establishment of the SPV will cost more, 
as it is treated as private company when it comes to the establishment according to 
CML. It should be also mentioned that the establishment of SPV in countries other 
than Saudi Arabia is almost free of charge compared to the cost under the CML as 
there is no law and system for trust companies (SPV) in the CMA. Consequently, the 
companies that seek finance will be in favour of traditional bonds rather than sukuk 
due to the low cost of issuance (Jobst et al., 2008). Investors also in securities will go 
for traditional bonds rather than sukuk for their potential returns due to the low cost of 
issuance so that tends to offer good returns to match the low costs of issuance. 
As the analyses of the interviews indicate, there is an agreement among interviewees 
that not having a law for sukuk in the Saudi financial market has made it difficult to 
achieve the aim for which the special purpose companies have been established, 
which is to keep the assets of SABIC sukuk to be sold by the SABIC to sukuk holders 
in a SPV. In other words, the SPV in SABIC sukuk issuance is considered part of the 
issuer’s properties (SABIC company) and it carries the same name as the issuer 
company, which indicates that the transfer of assets from the issuer to SPV might 
have been nominal and unreal a matter that renders sukuk holders incapable of 
proving the assets they have bought in legal terms. 
It could, therefore, be argued that it becomes necessary to invent a special system for 
companies with special purpose different from the system involving commercial 
companies in the Saudi system that features many complexities and challenges that 
might be costive for the issuer in terms of money and time, and that point has been 




7.4.10 SABIC Sukuk Assets and the Possibility of Bankruptcy 
The most important difference between conventional bonds and Islamic sukuk is that 
the latter is normally linked with assets (Usmani, 2007). Therefore, Interviewee 6 (the 
first member of SBSS) has mentioned that SABIC sukuk have no tangible assets to be 
referred to by sukuk holders in case of bankruptcy of the issuer, but rather represent 
marketing contracts, usufructs or rights. However, the prospectus of SABIC sukuk 
deals with the issue of bankruptcy of the issuer as well as the legal rights of sukuk 
holders. While two of the members of the SBSS in the interview mentioned the right 
of sukuk holders to appoint another marketer in case SABIC goes bankrupt, they 
differ in their opinion with regard to disposal of sukuk assets and whether it would be 
possible legally to transfer the rights and benefits from the issuer to sukuk holders. 
It should be stated that after the examination of the prospectus of SABIC with regard 
to the underlying assets of SABIC sukuk, it could be concluded that; 
(i) It has become obvious that as regards to the assets of SABIC sukuk whether being 
rights, usufructs or marketing contracts, there are differences among the SBSS 
members regarding the nature of those assets, as the assets cannot be referred to in 
case of bankruptcy of SABIC, because they do not represent material assets to be 
transferred, owned or even separated legally from SABIC. This is due to the fact that 
they lack real separate value, but rather is valued in relation to SABIC. Having said 
that, however, in case SABIC goes bankrupt, the contracts will be invalid as they are 
linked to SABIC and its subsidiary companies. In another words, the usufructs and 
rights based on the marketing contracts between SABIC and its subsidiary companies 
will be financially worthless. Even if it was financially valuable and could be 
separated and owned by sukuk holders, SABIC would then have no right of selling it 
or otherwise relinquishing it to other parties as it has been stated in the prospectus. In 
addition, according to the SABIC sukuk prospectus, it has been noted that SABIC has 
set a condition that sukuk holders have no right of obtaining or otherwise of 
transferring or selling the assets even though they belong to sukuk holders. 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that SABIC has obtained the majority of the 




contracts in order to produce assets, through which it can issue sukuk to help generate 
funding as it has been mentioned by one of the interviewee. 
(ii) In fact, the issuance prospectus has discussed the issue of bankruptcy of the issuer 
through giving the right to sukuk holders to claim back their capital from the issuer. 
However, as has already been mentioned, the prospectus of issuance has stopped short 
of suggesting the method to be used by sukuk holders to claim the assets they own and 
how they dispose of those assets in a market such as Saudi market authority CMA 
where there is no proper law for sukuk. However, with regard to what has been 
mentioned by one of the members of SBSS that in case of bankruptcy of the issuer 
sukuk holders preserve the right of appointing another marketer; that argument 
disagrees with what has been stipulated by the prospectus of issuance that; “SABIC 
company has been appointed as the manager of assets to provide the marketing 
services and that decision will be irreversible” (PISS, 2008). Accordingly, sukuk 
holders cannot, under any circumstances, overrule that decision and that even in case 
of failure of SABIC to continue the job due to bankruptcy; the marketing contracts 
will neither be transferred to another marketer nor will they be disposed of by sukuk 
holders as has been provided by the prospectus of issuance. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
After the discussion in the preceding section, it can be said that SABIC sukuk have 
been exposed to many deferent types of legal risks, which can be summarised as 
follows: 
(i) There is no a special law and legislations for sukuk in Saudi capital market; 
(ii) All the parties involved in SABIC sukuk have to consider all laws and legislations 
related to the stock and debt instruments; 
(iii) CMA has failed to refer to the term ‘sukuk’ in all his laws and legislations which 
means that SABIC sukuk and other sukuk are similar to conventional bonds in the 
measurement of the Saudi capital market; 
(iv) SABIC company has legally relied during issuing its sukuk on the laws and 




(v) All the parties involved in SABIC sukuk have to deal with the CRSD and ACRSC 
which are not under the authority of Shari’ah courts; 
(vi) The fatwa issued by SBSS is non-binding and obligatory upon Shari’ah courts 
nor the CRSD and ACRSC; 
(vii) The full independence of CRSD and ACRSC from CMA is still questionable and 
unclear; 
(viii) The existence of numerous legal bodies to investigate SABIC sukuk in the case 
of any dispute; 
(ix) The uncertainty and the lack of transparency in the nature of the CRSD and 
ACRSC as being administrative with legal powers or being a judiciary panel; 
(x) The validity of the CRSD and ACRSC in Shari’ah terms as it does not include 
Shari’ah scholars or members (judges); 
(ix) The legal impacts of the different fatawa made by SBSS in relation to SABIC 
sukuk whether SABIC sukuk structure is consistent with Shari’ah or not; 
(xii) The faulty and incomprehensive information that must be provided in the 
prospectus SABIC sukuk; 
(xiii) The issuance of the prospectus of SABIC sukuk has failed to refer to the legal 
risks that SABIC sukuk might be exposed to; 
(xiv) There is no real sale has been take place with SABIC sukuk; 
(xv) The uncertainty of the underlying assets of SABIC sukuk; 
(xvi) The uncertainty of the legal status of SABIC sukuk holders in the case of and 
dispute (owners-debtors); 
(xvii) There is no special law with regard to SPV in the Saudi capital market as the 




(xviii) The SPV is considered as one of the SABIC company subsidiaries which 
means that the assets of SABIC sukuk are still under the authority of SABIC 





























Chapter 8                                                                                
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In responding to the research questions identified in Chapter 1, this research studied 
the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk and the attached supplementary 
documents carefully from Shari’ah and legal perspective. In addition, it also reviewed 
and discussed all the answers to the interviews that were rendered by the interviewees 
as the members of Shari’ah board as approving body of compliancy, lawyers, 
Shari’ah judges, academic staff or people who are involved in the CRSD and the 
ACRSC, which are the legal authority to investigate and solve any cases in sukuk in 
Saudi market. In addition, the AAOIFI’s recommendations related to sukuk issued in 
2008 and the stipulations of AAOIFI standards for sukuk in 2010 were considered in 
evaluating the SABIC sukuk for shari’ah, legal and SSB originated risks. In addition, 
the important decisions issued by the Islamic Fiqh Academy were also considered.  
By critically analysing and comparing all the above mentioned primary data, the 
structure of SABIC sukuk, and the terms and conditions provided by the SABIC sukuk 
prospectus, this study concluded that SABIC sukuk have been exposed to a 
considerable Shari’ah and legal risks. These are briefly discussed below. 
8.2 ANALYTICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH 
SBSS 
One of the major findings of this study is the failure of SBSS to undertake their 
duties, as it is expected that SBSS have to play an active role in relation to the 
protection of SABIC sukuk against any sorts of risks in terms of Shari’ah and legal 
frames so that the sukuk can be considered consistent with Shari’ah principals. It can 
be argued, according to the findings established in the previous chapters, that SBSS 
have fell short of their expected role, duties and responsibilities according to the 
AAOIFI standards as well as the decisions issued by the Islamic Fiqh Academy. This 
should be considered as a major concern. 
The second issue that emerged from the findings is that AAOIFI standards as well as 




of three members, and yet from the interviews featuring a number of specialists it 
become clear that three members might not be enough to approve any product as to be 
consistent with Shari’ah principals especially with regard to a new product such as 
sukuk. Therefore, it is considered as a source of risk as the voting is based on the 
majority so that the product will be become consistent with Shari’ah principals if two 
of the three members are in favour of the product. Moreover, the two members are 
considered inadequate not to mention the fact that sukuk should be subject to detailed 
evaluation and investigation to avoid criticism as has been explained by most of the 
interviewees. Consequently, the inadequacy of the number of SBSS is considered 
among the risks that have to be paid attention to in further issuances. 
The findings presented in the earlier chapters also indicate that the lack of diversity 
among the SBSS in terms of specialisation, while the nature of sukuk indicates that 
different specialisation among SSB is highly needed as indicated by interviewees so 
that the approval of any sukuk structure should be based on a comprehensive view in 
terms of Shari’ah, legal and financial aspect so that any judgment (fatwa) to be made 
should be consistent in terms of Shari’ah as well as the legal aspect in order to avoid 
difficulties in the application of such transfer of assets as it has been suggested by the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision no 188(3/20). Having said that, as the findings 
indicate SABIC sukuk structure has been approved by three members who are mainly 
specialised in Shari’ah and yet it seems no one of the members has any experience in 
structure of the conventional products such as the legal and accounting experts. This 
is considered a potential risk area in terms of efficiency in structuring but also in 
terms of ensuring every aspect of sukuk being fully covered through Shari’ah and 
other requirements. 
Similar to some other studies, this research also found that the members of SBSS 
seem to be busy with many occupations and they do not have enough time to focus on 
the structure in front of them. Therefore, some of the risks to which SABIC sukuk 
might be exposed is the fact that the members who approved the structure of SABIC 
sukuk do not have enough time to closely and carefully study and examine the sukuk 
structure, as the members have been busy with memberships of other boards not to 
mention their own private businesses and other occupations. As a result, they may 




attention to the setbacks in Shari’ah terms as has already been pointed out in the 
discussion in the previous chapters. For that reason, many of those who have been 
interviewed have suggested that members of the boards should have the maximum 
time allowed to take part in the study of the structure before the final approval as well 
as the involvement in other committees should be limited. 
The findings in this study also shown the dependence of the SBSS upon the banks 
they are working with as a source of SBSS related risk. However, the member of 
SSBs should be fully independent to avoid any conflict of interest between them and 
the bank or corporations that have issued the sukuk. As the findings in this study 
shows that the members of SBSS are dependent on the SAAB bank as they work for it 
as a Shari’ah consultant which might lead to certain risks as it has been indicated by 
AAOIFI, Islamic Fiqh Academy as well as some of those who have been interviewed. 
Thus, the independence of the members of SSB from sukuk issuers will promote 
assurance among investors whether that being with SABIC sukuk or other products in 
relation to Islamic financing. 
The analysis in this research also evidenced, through participants’ observation, the 
failure of SBSS in taking part in designing the structure. Among the risks which 
SABIC sukuk have been exposed is that the SBSS has failed to take part in designing 
sukuk structure in the first stage as it has been indicated by the members of SBSS.  
Consequently, those who have designed SABIC sukuk structure seem to be less 
knowledgeable in terms of Shari’ah, therefore the SBSS has discovered that the 
SABIC structure is exactly similar to the structure of riba-based bonds as has been 
indicated by one of the members of SBSS. Consequently, the failure of SBSS to take 
part in the original design will expose SABIC sukuk to many risks such as 
overlooking some of Shari’ah non-compliancy that cannot be easily discovered 
without close investigation through taking real part in the design. That has really been 
highlighted by the statements of the one of the SBSS members after the prospectus of 
SABIC sukuk has been presented to him; as after a detailed discussion he mentioned 
that SABIC sukuk has been containing some Shari’ah inconsistencies that has been 
missed by the SBSS. Thus, it becomes a duty that the members of SSB should make a 
real contribution in the design of the structure of sukuk and should be aware of all 




sukuk might be exposed and ways of avoiding those risks through Shari’ah and legal 
means. 
As this study evidences in the empirical chapters, lack of clear method for the work of 
SBSS is found to be another risk issue to be considered. Neither AAOIFI standards 
nor the Islamic finance institutions, which SSB belong, have been subject to the 
method through which the fatwa can be issued. In other words, the uncertainty of the 
mechanism of approving SABIC sukuk is considered as one of the main concerns, 
which might lead to certain risks. 
A major risk area is located by this research is the non-existence of a particular law 
for accountability. Failure to call members of Shari’ah boards to account in case of 
underperformance from their side, regarding their approval of structure of the 
products of Islamic finance, might expose SABIC sukuk structure to the risk of being 
inconsistent with Shari’ah principles. Accordingly, some of the interviewees believe 
that law and regulations must be made to incriminate those responsible for 
underperformance in some of Shari’ah boards regarding their approach of and 
shortcomings in the approval of the products of Islamic financing. However, having 
such a law in place will make SSB the best they could to follow reliable standards and 
procedures to approve the products such as sukuk. However, this suggestion will not 
be implemented, since there is no agreement between Islamic organisations in which 
rules and standards should be observed and followed with regard to sukuk structure 
and whether these rules and standards are binding or not. This is a macro-
environmental issue that goes beyond one individual bank or financial institution or 
SSB; as the authorities as part of public policy should now consider developing the 
necessary legal and regulative environment for the efficiency of the market by also 
identifying the procedures for accountability.  
Failure to observe AAOIFI standards in structuring sukuk is found to be another 
important issue leading to Shari’ah risk. As the discussion in the empirical chapters 
indicate, all SBSS members interviewed for this study have agreed that they were not 
fully committed to the standards as stated by AAOIFI with regard to sukuk given that 
they are members of AAOIFI. Subsequently, developing judgement on the structure 
of SABIC sukuk has based on the views and efforts of the members of SBSS rather 




be committed to those standards will cause confusion in fiqh perspective between the 
various Shari’ah boards, which makes the structures on which SABIC sukuk has been 
designed are consistent with Shari’ah standards for one Shari’ah board and non-
Shari’ah compliant for the other, as that has been asserted during the discussion in the 
previous chapter. Therefore, many demands are made by those who have been 
interviewed and others who are concerned about the Islamic finance that there must 
be some standards to be observed by all Shari’ah boards on which their judgment are 
made. 
The empirical analysis presented in this research also evidences the concerns related 
to the failures of control and follow after sukuk have been approved. It should be 
noted that AAOIFI standards and the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Resolutions mentioned 
above have asserted that the Shari’ah board has to be involved in controlling as well 
as monitoring sukuk from the time of issuance until maturity, which is expected to 
provide guarantee of the performance of the product in a way consistent with Shari’ah 
principles and it will not veer from the right track of Shari’ah through close control 
and follow up by the members of Shari’ah board. However, in case of SABIC sukuk 
some of the members have indicated that they failed to follow up and monitor SABIC 
sukuk after it has been approved. Therefore, this indicates the existence of 
complacency, which has made sukuk to being consistent with Shari’ah principles and 
then latter it veers from Shari’ah track due to lack of those who control and follow up. 
The risks associated with fatwa issued by the members of Shari’ah board need more 
concern, as this study established concerns over changing fatwa by one of the 
members of the board. When Shaikh Usmani stated that most of sukuk structures are 
inconsistent with Shari’ah principles, it seems there is no considerable efforts have 
been made by those concerned with issues in relation to Islamic finance and that the 
situation is still the same regarding Shari’ah boards that approving sukuk structures in 
terms of Shari’ah is left for Shari’ah boards without introducing a Shari’ah standards 
to be committed and binding for approval of sukuk. However, changing mind on 
fatwa or one of the members might change his views regarding the structure of a 
specific sukuk, constitutes a major Shari’ah risk to which SABIC sukuk might be 
exposed. Therefore, there is a possibility that one of the members of Shari’ah board 




which has actually happened with one of the members who believe that there are 
some non-Shari’ah compliancy issues in the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk. 
However, some of others who were interviewed for this study suggested that some of 
the structures should be designed in advance by some experts which should be 
approved by AAOIFI or by other reliable sources so that all Shari’ah boards become 
committed to those structures and that should not give any chance to individual efforts 
by some Shari’ah boards that design a structure leading to Shari’ah non-compliance 
in real terms. 
One of the effects resulting from lack of standards to be observed by Shari’ah boards 
is the confusion and differences in issuing fatawa by Shari’ah boards concerned with 
approving sukuk in the same country or in different countries. That will result in the 
announcement of approved sukuk by a considerable Shari’ah board and in the 
meantime other fatawa will be issued which tend to disallow the structure of the same 
sukuk. Thus, SABIC sukuk had been approved by a considerable Shari’ah board and 
in the meantime Shari’ah based criticism has been raised regarding SABIC sukuk 
structure by well reputed Shari’ah scholars in relation to the products of Islamic 
finance such as Merah (2011). 
The difference in what is happening between Shari’ah boards in the same country or 
from one country to another will expose sukuk to lack of confidence by investors 
which might lead to the decrease in the price of sukuk due to being inconsistent with 
investors becoming aware of such differences. In other words, for example, if a fatwa 
issued by a prominent scholar explaining the fact that SABIC sukuk are inconsistent 
with Shari’ah principles, this will definitely affect its market price. Thus, it becomes 
dutiful that agreement has to be made between Shari’ah boards emphasising standards 
and general principles so that such type of risks should be prevented. 
As the empirical evidence in this research shows, among the risks which SABIC 
sukuk have been exposed to are that some of the members of SBSS have been 
indifferent about reviewing all papers and documents relevant to SABIC sukuk. As 
one of members of Shari’ah board indicated during the interviews that it has not been 
‘important’ to review all the documents in the presence of specialised committees that 
undertake the role of studying the structure in terms of Shari’ah before the structure to 




indicated that the long prospectus of issuance could constitute an obstacle in addition 
to the language barrier so that reading the full prospectus of issuance is not needed. 
Thus, the fact that the SBSS only becoming aware of the summary of the prospectus 
of issuance will expose the SABIC sukuk to the risk of Shari’ah board not being 
aware of some inconsistencies with Shari’ah that have not been originally included in 
the summary of issuance prospectus. According to the SABIC sukuk prospectus “the 
majority of the Marketing Agreements provide SABIC with a non-exclusive right to 
market the relevant products”. In addition, certain articles of the Marketing 
Agreements provide the relevant Specified Counterparty with the right to market and 
“sell its own products directly”. In addition, if SABIC breaches any of its material 
obligations under a Marketing Agreement and such a breach is not remedied within 
the applicable grace period, then the relevant Specified Counterparty “may sell the 
relevant products directly to purchasers”. In addition, the SABIC sukuk prospectus 
also stipulated that under Section (5) ‘Termination’ “The Marketing Agreements 
permit either party to terminate the agreement if the other party is in breach of its 
material obligations. Certain of the Marketing Agreements also permit either party to 
terminate it by advance notice to the other. In addition, certain Marketing Agreements 
are only for a specified term and any renewal of such agreements would depend upon 
the consent of both parties. Accordingly, “no assurance can be given that any of the 
Marketing Agreements will remain in force for the duration of the Sukuk”. Therefore, 
it can be understood that the Marketing Agreements, which will generate the asset of 
SABIC sukuk can be revoked and cancelled. In other words, the “Applicable 
Percentage of certain specified rights and obligations under the Marketing 
Agreements for a period of 20 years”, which represents the asset of SABIC sukuk, can 
be gone as long as the Marketing Agreements, which the sukuk assets based, have 
been cancelled. Thus, since there is no guarantee for the continuation of sukuk under 
the authority of sukuk holders due to the fact that the marketing contracts can be 
cancelled at any time. It should be mentioned that the lack of such important 
information in the summary of the SABIC sukuk prospectus that has been signed by 
SBSS, is considered as one of the main risk that sukuk holders are exposed to.  
Before concluding this section, as a general observation and a key lesson drawn from 
the thesis in relation to Shari’ah governance issues is that Shari’ah governance issues 




words, Islamic finance sector in countries such as Saudi Arabia faces Shari’ah 
governance issue as such countries have not paid the necessary attention to develop 
the necessary regulatory framework dealing with specific issues arising from Shari’ah 
governance. Examining the developments in Malaysian Islamic finance sector shows 
that the Malaysian authorities have carried out extensive work in proactively 
developing the necessary regulations to prevent or at least minimise the potential 
problems might arise from Shari’ah governance in Islamic finance; as this is a very 
specific area of Islamic finance business. However, in Saudi Arabia and some other 
countries in the region, Islamic finance is only considered as a sub-set of conventional 
finance and therefore it is not regulated in relation to its own distinguishing 
characteristics, which includes Shari’ah governance issues. This indeed relates to 
larger regulative issues, as even in the regulation of the conventional banking and 
finance sector lack of necessary regulation seems to be a prevailing problem. 
8.3 ANALYTICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE SHARI’AH RISKS 
ASSOCIATED WITH SABIC SUKUK STRUCTURE 
After reflecting on the SBSS related risks as evidenced in the empirical chapters, this 
section presents a reflection on the Shari’ah risks associated with SABIC sukuk 
structure as established in the empirical chapters. As defined, any inconsistency with 
the rules and principles of Shari’ah will lead SABIC sukuk structure to the risk of 
Shari’ah non-compliance. 
One of the findings established in the empirical chapters is that the structure of 
SABIC sukuk seems to be riba-based structure. After a close examination of the 
SABIC sukuk structure as well as its contents featuring a number of contracts and 
commitments and studying them in the light of Shari’ah principles and comparing 
them with some disallowed riba practices such as ‘wafaa sale contract’ and ‘amanah 
sale contract’, and since the validity of such selling practices in Shari’ah terms has 
already been explained as riba contracts, it could be concluded that the way SABIC 
sukuk structure was drafted is not different to the disallowed ‘wafaa sale contract’. It 
should be noted that as stated by the Islamic Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 66 (4/7) 
regarding bay' al-wafaa; Decision No 188(3/20); Almenea (2011) and Merah (2011) 




Secondly, by reviewing the issuance prospectus and all documents attached to it, it 
could be argued that sukuk holders have not paid the necessary attention to assets and 
whether those assets have really existed. This implies that investors might be focusing 
on the credit worthiness of the issuer while overlooking the assets. In other words, 
investors’ main concern was the financial solvency of the issuer (SABIC Company), 
as the capital and the periodic returns would be based on the SABIC Company. 
Therefore, the sukuk holders will pay attention to the source of guarantee, namely the 
SABIC Company rather than any other fact. 
Another Shari’ah risk area that has been identified by this research in relation to 
SABIC sukuk structure is that the returns and assets seem to be irrelevant to one 
another. In other words, the method by which the profits for sukuk holders was 
worked out has not been explained in the issuance prospectus and by contrast sukuk 
holders have agreed to profit percentage that has been fixed for them by the issuer 
given that actual profits could be far more or could be less. However, as has been 
explained in the empirical chapters, sukuk holders are only concerned with guaranteed 
stable profit as has been assured by one of the members of the SBSS. Consequently, 
lack of relationship between the fixed profit percentage set by the sukuk manager 
(SABIC) and the actual profits produced by the project will create a doubt that the 
profits might have been produced by the issuer who has nothing to do with the assets 
not by the assets itself. This might expose sukuk holders to the risk of not gaining any 
profit in case of any failure or insolvency of the issuer, as the profit is originally 
produced by the issuer regardless of the performance of the asset. Thus, it becomes a 
dutiful that sukuk holders should receive the real profits based on the performance of 
their assets. 
As has been explained in the empirical chapters, no real sharing in profit or loss might 
expose sukuk to become inconsistent with Shari’ah principles. It has become clear 
from the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk that sukuk holders do not take part in 
the real profit in return of not being responsible of the loss of capital or otherwise the 
drop of profits from the approved ratio of the capital. Thus, it becomes dutiful that 
sukuk holders have to bear any lose against the profits they obtain as it has been 




Having no real assets in SABIC sukuk, as established by this study, constitutes one of 
the major risks that sukuk holders might be affected from in case of bankruptcy or 
insolvency of the issuer (SABIC Company). It has become clear during the discussion 
that SABIC sukuk does not depend on assets or real ‘rights’ that can be assessed and 
evaluated. In addition, as found by this study, the assets of SABIC sukuk could neither 
be described as an a tangible assets as it has been noted by one of the SBSS or 
usufructs nor could be described as rights that could be assessed and sold, but instead 
it could be described as a future financial revenues generated from marketing services 
provided by SABIC to its subsidiary companies as would be explained by the 
prospectus of issuance. In this regard, the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk 
stipulates that “SABIC has issued sukuk 1 and sukuk 2 worth SR 3 billion and SR 8 
billion respectively), whereby 77.06 of the total marketing revues gathered by SABIC 
has been transferred to SPV in favour of sukuk holders” (PISS, 2008). This implies 
that SABIC sukuk represent the cash revenues to be generated from the marketing 
services. Therefore, the assets of SABIC sukuk are either the money itself to be 
collected in the future from SABIC subsidiary companies or the right of obtaining the 
money to be gathered in the future from SABIC subsidiary companies; however, in 
both cases the transaction is not Shari’ah compliant as it has been argued (see: Dagi, 
2011; Merah, 2011; Almarshood, 2013).    
Having no transfer of assets should be considered as an essential Shari’ah risk. As 
identified by one of the Shari’ah board members interviewed for this study, SABIC 
sukuk merely represents ‘marketing rights’. However, these rights were not really 
transferred to sukuk holders as has been explained during the discussion in the 
empirical chapters; instead, it has been fixed on the issuer records as debts charged by 
the issuer. Therefore, sukuk holders become subject to losing their assets they own in 
case of bankruptcy or insolvency of SABIC Company. Thus, according to AAOIFI 
standards, it becomes a duty to do real transfer for what sukuk represents whether 
assets or as in our case ‘rights’. 
The existence of guarantying assets and profits, as has already been argued in the 
discussion, tends to expose sukuk to become inconsistent with the Shari’ah principles. 
For that reason, the issuance prospectus has to be free of any type of guarantee 




or by other parties who have been paid for that services or has any kind of business 
interest with the issuer as it has been stated by AAOIFI standards and the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy’s Decision No 188(3/20). 
As the empirical chapters established, the issuer owning the majority of the profits 
through reserve account constitutes an important Shari’ah risk. The presence of the 
reserve account is mainly to set the balance right and insure the regular generation of 
profits to sukuk holders. However, it should be noted that in case of SABIC sukuk, the 
reserve account has been established in the issuers’ favour given that any amount that 
remains in the reserve account when sukuk expire will be given to the issuer as an 
incentive. Thus, it becomes dutiful that whatever remains in the reserve account when 
sukuk expire should go to sukuk holders as it is part of their ownership resulting from 
the assets they own. 
Failure through underestimation of assets, how they have been assessed and whether 
that assessment has been real is another issue came out in the empirical chapters. By 
closely studying the prospectus of issuance, the method and mechanism of evaluating 
the underlying sukuk, which is the right of marketing the products, is unclear.  Thus, 
sukuk holders become exposed to the risk of unfair evaluation of those rights in the 
market and whether or not those rights are really subject to evaluation in Shari’ah 
terms. However, as it has already been explained, sukuk holders are not concerned 
with the real value of what has been represented by sukuk, as the capital and profits 
are guaranteed. 
The critical examination of the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk, hence, 
empirically process that there exist major similarities between SABIC sukuk structure 
and riba-based bonds as depicted in Table 8.1. 
Furthermore, the inconsistency between SABIC sukuk and AAOIFI standards is found 
to be another Shari’ah risk. From the further critical examination of the prospectus of 
SABIC sukuk issuance, it becomes obvious that the SABIC sukuk structure seems to 
be inconsistent with standards issued by AAOIFI as has already been mentioned in 




8.4 ANALYTICAL REFLECTIONS ON FINDIGS RELATING TO THE 
LEGAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SABIC SUKUK 
The empirical analysis helped to identify a number of legal risks identified in the case 
of SABIC sukuk, which are reflected in detail as follows. 
Absence of a special law featuring sukuk in Saudi Arabia is considered to be the main 
legal risks faced by Islamic capital markets in the country. As the CMA has a 
financial securities system including the conventional bonds, nonetheless, all the rules 
and regulations issued by the CMA have failed to provide a specific law related to 
sukuk, which might expose sukuk holders to the risk of treating sukuk as riba-based 
loan bonds. However, failure to differentiate between sukuk and bonds might lead to 
the risk failure of sukuk holders to become incapable of proving their rights regarding 
their ownership of the assets they carry. Consequently, it becomes dutiful to issue a 
special law regarding sukuk due to the fact the nature of sukuk from the legal aspect is 





Table  8.1: Evaluation of SABIC Sukuk Comparing to Riba Based Structure (Bonds) 
Bonds SABIC sukuk 
The basic idea of riba-based bonds is linking the 
returns to the interest rates benchmark 
SABIC sukuk returns are not linked to the actual profit of the asset but rather linked with the market interest rates. 
Bonds holders always take the financial solvency of 
the issuer into account as the issuer gives them 
guarantee of their capital 
It seems that sukuk holders consider the financial solvency of the issuer rather than sukuk assets in terms of its value and the 
revenues it generates, as the issuer gives them guarantee for the capital so that his financial solvency becomes important to 
sukuk holders. 
No assets exist in case of bonds SABIC sukuk do not represent the real assets, usufruct or services or otherwise ‘rights’ that can be financially assessed and 
evaluated in the market rather it represents future generated money or the right of collecting the future money. 
The Capital and Returns are guaranteed by the issuer The Capital and Returns are guaranteed by SABIC Company 
A debtor-borrower relationship It appears to be a relationship between a debtor and a borrower as no real assets exist to be owned by sukuk holders. 
Low risk as the capital and returns are being 
guaranteed. 
Sukuk is originally associated with high risk as the case with the shares as it features ownership and associated with an asset 
subject to gain or loss, and no guarantee is being given for capital or returns. However, as yet in case of SABIC sukuk the risk is 
law as it resembles the bonds in terms of the guarantee being given to the capital and the returns. 
In case of bankruptcy of the issuer, then the 
bondholder should take his capital first hand, and then 
the remaining sums will be distributed between shares 
holders. However, in case nothing left, then the issuer 
will owe the capital to the bondholder. 
Sukuk holders should originally go back to sukuk assets, and yet in case SABIC goes bankrupt sukuk holders have no right to 
take the contracts owned by SABIC as the right of disposal in form of marketing is owned by SABIC as the prospectus of 
issuance stipulates that; ‘in case SABIC fails to undertake the marketing task or otherwise fails to give the periodic payments to 
sukuk holders, it should be committed to purchase those contracts which are actually not being owned by sukuk holders nor 
have they got the right of their disposal’. Moreover, SABIC is not allowed to transfer or otherwise sell those contracts as has 
already been mentioned according to the prospectus of issuance. However, there is no reference in the prospectus of issuance 
that sukuk holders have the right of taking the contracts to give them to another company in case SABIC goes bankrupt. On the 
contrary according to the prospectus of issuance, sukuk holders have no right of disposal of the contracts or even be given any 
information in relation to those contracts and agreements as has already been mentioned. The prospectus of issuance also does 
not refer to SABIC in case of bankruptcy and the subsequent fate of sukuk assets and the procedures associated with its transfer 




Table  8.2: The Inconsistency Between the SABIC Sukuk Structure and the Standards Issued by AAOIFI 
N
O 






‘Investment sukuk represent a common share in the ownership of the assets made 
available for investment, whether these are non-monetary assets, usufructs, 
services or a mixture of all these, plus intangible rights, debts and monetary assets. 
These sukuk do not represent a debt owed to the issuer by the certificate holder’.  
4(4/1) 
P 240 
The SABIC sukuk represents 22.94% of the rights and 
obligations featuring the marketing agreements 
between SABIC and the subsidiary companies for 20 
years. 
2 
‘Investment sukuk are issued on the basis of Shari’ah-nominated contract in 
accordance with the rules of Shari’ah that govern their issuance and trading’.  
4(4/3) 
P240 
The prospectus of issuance failed to refer to that 
matter. 
3 
‘The owners of these certificates share the return as stated in the subscription 




Sharing of gain and loss does not exist as there is a 
fixed profit for sukuk holders and the capital is 
guaranteed. 
4 
‘The prospectus must include contractual conditions, adequate statements about 
the participants in the issue, their legal position and rights as well as obligations, 
such as statements about the issue agent, issue manager, originator, investment 
trustee, the party covering the loss, payment agent as well as others along with the 
conditions of their appointment and dismissal’. 
(5/1/8/1) 
P242 
The contracting conditions are not detailed involving 
generalisation and gharar. 
5 
‘The prospectus of sukuk must include the identification of the contract on the 
basis of which the certificates are to be issued, such as sale of tangible leased 
assets, Ijarah, Murabahah, Istisna’a, Salam, Mudarabah, Musharakah, 
Wakalah, Muzara’ah, Mugharasah or Musaqah’.  
(5/1/8/2) 
P242 
The name of the contract is not mentioned clearly in 
the SABIC sukuk prospectus as there is disagreement 
between SBSS with regard to the name of the 
contract and the legal relationship between SABIC 
and sukuk holders 
6 
‘The contract that forms the basis of the issue must be complete with respect to 
its elements and conditions not including conditions that conflict with its 
objectives and rules’.  
(5/1/8/3) 
P243 
The SABIC sukuk prospectus has failed to mention 
about this issue. 
7 
‘The prospectus must explicitly mention the obligation to abide by the rules and 
principles of the Islamic Shari’ah and that there is a Shari’ah board that approves 
(5/1/8/4) 
P243 
No stipulation made by the prospectus of issuance that 




the procedures of the issues and monitors the implementation of the project 
throughout its duration’. 
sukuk in Shari’ah terms from the onset of issuance 
until maturation. 
8 
‘The prospectus must state that each owner of a certificate participates in the 




The SABIC sukuk prospectus has stipulated that 
there is fixed profits based on the LIBOR and if there 
is any default in the periodic distribution profits then 
SABIC will purchase the underlying sukuk at face 
value. 
9 
‘The prospectus must not include any statement to the effect that the issuer of 
the certificate accepts the liability to compensate the owner of the certificate up 




The capital of SABIC sukuk is clearly guaranteed. 
10 
‘The prospectus must not include any statement to the effect that the issuer of 
the certificate guarantees a fixed percentage of profit’.  
(5/1/8/7) 
P243 
A clear guarantee of profits is given from SABIC 
company to the sukuk holders. 
11 
‘It is permitted to an independent third party to provide a guarantee free of 
charge, while taking into account item 6/7 of Shari’ah standard No. (5) in 
respect of guarantees’.  
(5/1/8/7) 
P243 
It has been argued by one of the members of SBSS 
that SABIC company is considered as a third party 
as this is the reason for the guarantee promised by 
SABIC company. 
12 
‘It is permissible for the issuer or the certificate holders to adopt permissible 
methods of managing risk, of mitigating fluctuation of distributable profits (profit 
equalization reserve), such as establishing an Islamic insurance fund with 
contributions of certificate holders, or by participating in Insurance (Takaful) by 
payment of premiums from the income of the shares of Sukuk holders or through 
donations (tabarru’at) made by the Sukuk holders’.  
(5/1/11) 
P243 
The reserve account has been established. However, 
the excess of profits will go to the manager as an 
incentive as well as the manager has a right to invest 
what is in the reserve account for himself. 
13 
‘In the case of negotiable sukuk, it is permissible for the issuer to undertake, 
through the prospectus of issue, to purchase at market value, after the 
completion of the process of issue, any certificate that may be offered to him, 
however, it is not permissible for the issuer to undertake to purchase the Sukuk 
at their nominal value’.  
(5/2/2)  
P244 
A clear provision exists regarding the promise to buy 
at the nominal value as the calculation that SABIC 
made in the prospectus indicate that after five years 
SABIC will purchase the underlying SABIC sukuk at 
90% plus 10% as extra   from the reserve account. 
14 
‘The certificates may be traded through any known means that do not 
contravene the rules of the Shari’ah, such as registration, electronic means or 
actual transmission by the bearer to the purchaser.  
(5/2/3) 
P244 
None of these methods have been used as the assets 
are still in the record of the issuer. 




obligations of ownership, in real assets, whether tangible, usufructs or services, 
capable of being owned and sold legally as well as in accordance with the rules 
of Shari’ah, in accordance with Articles (2)1 and (5/1/2)2 of the AAOIFI 
Shari’ah Standard (17) on Investment Sukuk. The Manager issuing Sukuk must 
certify the transfer of ownership of such assets in its (Sukuk) books, and must 




Shari’ah rules as there is no control over the assets 
and there is no real transfer of the assets 
16 
‘It is not permissible for the Manager of Sukuk, whether the manager acts as 
Mudarib (investment manager), or Sharik (partner), or Wakil (agent) for 
investment, to undertake to offer loans to Sukuk holders, when actual earnings fall 
short of expected earnings. It is permissible, however, to establish a reserve 
account for the purpose of covering such shortfalls to the extent possible, provided 
the same is mentioned in the prospectus. It is not objectionable to distribute 
expected earnings, on account, in accordance with Article (8/8)3 of the AAOIFI 
Shari’ah Standard (13) on Mudarabah, or to obtaining project financing on 
account of the Sukuk holders’. 
Sukuk 
recommend
-ations     
No (3) 
There is no undertaking of offering loans to sukuk 
holders in the prospectus of SABIC sukuk. 
17 
‘Shari’ah Supervisory Boards should not limit their role to the issuance of fatwa 
on the permissibility of the structure of Sukuk. All relevant contracts and 
documents related to the actual transaction must be carefully reviewed {by them}, 
and then they should oversee the actual means of implementation, and then make 
sure that the operation complies, at every stage, with Shari’ah guidelines and 
requirements as specified in the Shari’ah Standards. The investment of Sukuk 
proceeds and the conversion of the proceeds into assets, using one of the Shari’ah 
compliant methods of investments, must conform to Article (5/1/8/5)7 of the 
AAOIFI Shari’ah Standard (17)’.  
Sukuk 
recommend
ations   
No (6) 
Failure of SBSS to undertake the task of  supervision 
and monitoring of the SABIC sukuk as the role and 
task of the SBSS terminates at the endorsement of the 
issuance prospectus 
The empirical analysis shows that the legal position of sukuk holders is unclear, which is due to 
the absence of law for sukuk as has already been discussed given that sukuk holders will be 
confused whether they own the assets or otherwise become lenders; and each of the two 
situations has its own legal consequences. Thus, the vague legal situation of SABIC sukuk 
holders might expose sukuk holders to become incapable to prove their right of ownership of 
their assets as well as the income of those assets that they are supposed to own as part of the 
money given by the other lenders, as their relationship with the issuer represents that between 
lender and borrower as the case with traditional bonds. 
As has been explained in the empirical chapters, Saudi sukuk market has not experienced any 
failure of any sukuk issued yet. In this regard, according to the interviews that were conducted 
some interviewees believe that sukuk holders are capable to prove their ownership of the assets 
that they have bought from the issuer in case the issuer has gone bankrupt. However, by contrast 
given that sukuk are modern in the Saudi market and it has not been tested to find out the extent 
of the capability of sukuk holders to prove their ownership of assets that they carry as no 
previous cases of failure in the Saudi market have reported that can be considered as a precedent 
and a reference to find out the capability of sukuk holders to prove their ownership. In addition, 
as it has been mentioned in the empirical chapters, there is no law exist in the Saudi financial 
market that differentiates between sukuk and riba-based bonds and all that will make sukuk 
holders become exposed to the risk of losing their assets. 
The findings also suggest that resorting to the non-Shari’ah courts or committees remains an 
issue to be resolved. Shari’ah constitutes the foundation of the Saudi Arabian constitution. As 
has already been mentioned, the Committee of the Resolution of Securities Disputes is the panel 
authorised to investigate cases associated with sukuk and yet given that that panel has no 
judiciary status in the sense its members are not Shari’ah judges. Therefore, the judgment issued 
by those people who are not specialised in Shari’ah law is considered one of the risks that sukuk 
holders might expose to.  
As it has already been mentioned that among the risks facing SABIC sukuk holders is that the 
SBSS decision might not be observed by neither Shari’ah courts nor the CRSD due to observed 




initially be from specialised centres in accordance with observable standards, as has already been 
explained. In addition, commercial courts have to be established with its members from Shari’ah 
judges who are experienced in Islamic finance and that those courts should be in charge of such 
conflicts in relation to case featuring sukuk and other money exchange issues. 
Another issue that is located as a potential risk area is the failure to observe Shari’ah board 
decisions. In other words, among the risks to which SABIC sukuk has been exposed is the 
probability that the decisions of Shari’ah board that approved SABIC sukuk will not be executed 
as that has been provided by the prospectus of issuance which has been explained before. In 
other words, the contract on which sukuk has been established might be invalidated by the 
ACRSC and that all or at least some of issues featuring the prospectus of issuance regarding the 
rights of sukuk holders might not be of any interest given that the decisions of the Shari’ah board 
is not observable by the ACRSC. Thus, it becomes essential that fiqh decision should be 
transparent and there is a need for sukuk structures to be approved by Shari’ah boards and 
dispute panel to avoid conflict in opinions and inconsistency in views as to resume trust of 
investors in sukuk. 
Lack of dependence of the CRSD and ACRSC from the CMA is found to be another essential 
issue causing potential risk. In other words, among the legal risks is that the members of the 
dispute panels, who are authorised to investigate any dispute featuring sukuk, have been 
appointed by the CMA. In this regard, if there is any legal dispute between CMA and SABIC 
sukuk holders, then there is a possibility that the members of the ACRSC will become biased in 
their judgment to the view of the CMA, since those members receive their salary from CMA. 
Thus, it becomes dutiful that CRSD and ACRSC have to have some sort of independence to 
avoid conflict of interests between the CMA and the dispute panels and also keep the rights of 
sukuk holders from being lost. 
The existence of numerous judiciary bodies to investigate cases of dispute in Saudi Arabia 
should also consider creating a particular risk area. It is known that the CRSD and ACRSC 
represent the body in charge of cases of dispute with regard to sukuk. In this respect, the main 
risk is that investors in SABIC sukuk could find another legal body to investigate cases such as 




interviewees. Consequently, one body might conclude with an opposite decision to the other, as 
there might be dispute between those bodies over who might be in charge to investigate such 
cases. Thus, having said, the special commercial courts should provide the legal solution along 
with developing the necessary Shari’ah terms to cope with such risk. 
Imperfection of contract on which the issuance prospectus is based in legal terms is found to be 
another risk exposure area. The prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk featuring the legal 
contract between sukuk holders and the issuer seem to be defective in legal terms. However, the 
prospectus fails to explain the nature of contract relationship between the issuer and sukuk 
holders as has already been mentioned during the discussion. Thus, the legal nature of sukuk 
holders whether they are buyers or otherwise renters might be vague in the sense as to whether 
SABIC Company has severed relationship with assets that it has sold in legal terms or that 
relationship is considered as a third party relationship featuring a free service as that has already 
been mentioned during the discussion. In this regard, according to the balance sheet of SABIC 
company as well as the guarantees which have been given from SABIC (Issuer) to the sukuk 
holders, it seems that SABIC as an Issuer still have the authority upon the underlying SABIC 
sukuk asset which mean there is no real sale has taken place. However, that vagueness and lack 
of transparency might expose SABIC sukuk to many legal risks that have already been explained 
in the discussions in the earlier chapters. Consequently, the design of prospectus of issuance in 
perfect legal terms tends to protect sukuk holders from being exposed to potential legal risks as it 
has been suggested by the Islamic Fiqh Academy’ Decision No 188(3/20).  
The analysis in the empirical chapters show that there has been no mention of what it has been 
sold to sukuk holders, which indicates another risk exposure area. This implies that what has ever 
been sold to sukuk holders is considered one of the issues of conflict between the members of 
SBSS. In other words, whether SABIC sukuk represent privilege contracts or marketing contracts 
or otherwise giving the right for marketing or SABIC sukuk represent money to be collected in 
future or they might represent the right to earn the deserved amounts of money. However, it 
should be mentioned that what it has been owned by sukuk holders has not been explained 
clearly in the prospectus of issuance, which hence represents a major risk to which SABIC sukuk 




The legal transfer of assets is found to be another area of risk exposure. Among the legal risks 
that SABIC sukuk holders has to cope with is that there is no legal document that prove their 
ownership of the assets featuring their sukuk as the documents indicate that the assets still appear 
in the issuer's balance sheet and have not been transferred to the records of sukuk holders. Thus, 
as has been already explained in the discussion it becomes dutiful that a full transfer of assets has 
to take place from the issuer records to sukuk holder's records. 
Failure to estimate the real value represented by SABIC sukuk is found to be another important 
issue. As a matter of fact, the prospectus of issuance of SABIC sukuk has not explained the 
method of evaluation the underlying assets. This might create a doubt, as it has been pointed out 
by one of the interviewee that SABIC Company might have evaluated the underlying assets 
according to the fund that needed. In another words, how the sukuk holders be insured, and the 
value of the SABIC sukuk is accurate according to the market expectation since there is no 
explanation in the prospectus. Consequently, sukuk holders may get shocked when they find the 
value of the sukuk are not true in the case of dispute. Therefore, as a consequence, the prospectus 
of issuance has to explain the methods by which SABIC sukuk has been evaluated and who has 
undertaken that task. 
Failure of sukuk holders to review all documents is another essential problematic issue as 
established in this study. Sukuk holders retain the right to review the prospectus of issuance and 
all the relevant documents particularly marketing contracts signed between SABIC and its 
subsidiary companies. Nonetheless, the prospectus of issuance SABIC sukuk has provided that 
some documents have to be inaccessible or otherwise no copies have to be provided which is 
considered among the risks to which sukuk holders are exposed to. Hence, it will be dutiful that 
sukuk holders have to review all documents that some of which might be not in their favour. 
Another potential risk area emerged from critical discuss is the SPV related issues.  The main 
aim of establishing SPV as part of sukuk structure is to maintain the assets of sukuk away from 
being controlled by the issuer in case of bankruptcy. However, as it has been discussed in the 
empirical chapters, the establishment of a proper SPV is yet to be developed in the Saudi market. 
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that SPV represents a company affiliated to the issuer (SABIC 




CMA has to facilitate the procedure to establish such companies to represent a legal entity 
through which the rights of sukuk holders can be maintained.  
8.5 OVERALL REFLECTIONS ON THE FINDINGS  
It should be mentioned that developments and trends in sukuk market make it clear that there is 
great need for companies to issue sukuk as one of the methods of Islamic financing. Some 
investors show interest in the Islamic sukuk for their consistency with Shari’ah principals. Thus, 
as depicted in Figure 8.1, the companies and investors in general have so many methods of 
funding and investment, which includes Islamic financing ad well as sukuk along other sources. 
This section aims to evaluate their potential impact for business, as follows: 
Figure  8.1: The Methods of Financing for the Issuer 
 
 
(i) Financing through issuing riba-based bonds. This method seems to be preferable by all 
investors as it is less risky even though it is inconsistent with Shari’ah principals; 
(ii) Raising financing through increasing the capital and allowing new investors to become 
shareholders. This method is not popular among the main shareholders of companies as that will 
decrease their profits; 
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(iii)  Raising financing through investing in the stock market. The investment in the stock market 
is highly risky as no guarantee is given for neither the capital nor the profit, and for that reason 
this method is unpopular among companies as most companies are looking for the stable profit 
with guarantee of the capital; 
(iv) Raising financing through issuing sukuk with same features of riba-based bonds. This is due 
to the fact that most of sukuk that have been issued nowadays are similar to riba-based bond 
structure in terms of the guarantee given to capital and profit, and dependence on the benchmark 
to estimate the profits, not to mention the fact that in most designed structures, there is no 
transfer of the assets from the issuer to sukuk holders as it has been mentioned by Usmani (2007) 
and Merah (2011). Nonetheless, those structures have been designed to respond to the demand of 
the companies looking for liquidity as well as investors who are also looking for less risky 
investment. In other words, the current problem with most sukuk structures is that the sukuk 
structure features a complex combination of contracts, promises and conditions. Thus, by 
examining each component of this combination in terms of Shari’ah might prove to be right. 
However, there might be fiqh dispute among scholars in some of the contracts, promises or 
conditions in terms of Shari’ah. While some consider them as reliable and right, but the problem 
is not the inconsistency of contracts, promises and conditions with Shari’ah principals as at least 
some consider them consistent with Shari’ah as has already been mentioned. However, the main 
problem is that such component structures featuring contracts, promises and conditions will 
produce the same outcome as riba-based bonds, in terms of structure. However, it could be 
argued that many such sukuk structures have been approved by Shari’ah boards, which could be 
due to the fact that the Shari’ah boards have been concentrating on the details of the structure 
featuring contracts, promises and conditions and their consistency to Shari’ah principals without 
reviewing the results and the consequences given that such combination has resulted in a 
similarity of that structure to the structure of riba-based bonds in terms of guarantees, 
disallowance of transfer of the assets and dependence on benchmark to estimate profits. For that 
reason, Usmani argues that almost 85% of sukuk structures are inconsistent with Shari’ah 
principals (Shaikh and Saeed, 2010). Due to such reasons that Almenea, who changed his mind 
on his fatwa or judgement in relation to Bahraini Airline sukuk on the ground that the 
consequences of the structure of Bahraini Airline sukuk that has been approved by SSB have 




disallowed. In overall, Usmani, Almenea and Merah argue that most of current sukuk structure 
seems to be inconsistent with Shari’ah principles; 
(v) Issuing sukuk in line with AAOIFI standards. This kind of sukuk will neither be accepted by 
corporations seeking funding nor will it be accepted by investors in the financial market for two 
reasons: 
(a)  Such kind of sukuk is associated with high risk due to lack of guarantee in terms of 
capital and profits. Consequently, investors in this case prefer to invest in stock market 
instead sukuk market given the high returns in investing in stocks compared to sukuk. 
(b)  This kind of sukuk requires a condition to be set that there must be real transfer of assets 
to be sold by the company to sukuk holders. Thus, it follows that in such case it will be 
better for the company' shareholders to increase the capital rather than selling part of the 
assets of the company that will affect the value of the company in the market. Thus, it 
could be argued that SABIC Company has managed to make three trunks of issuances, 
which have been successfully sold in the market for many reasons. First of all, SABIC 
Company is considered one of the largest companies in Saudi Arabia, therefore, the 
robust reputation for SABIC in the Saudi market led investors to be confident towards 
SABIC sukuk. In addition, the SABIC sukuk structure has been designed to be less risky 
due to the promise given by the issuer to purchase at the nominal value and the profits 
have been set based on the LIBOR and that is exactly what investors are looking for. 
Furthermore, in SABIC sukuk structure, the issuer (SABIC) has not been obliged to sell 
anything of its assets or sell his marketing rights of the production of the subsidiary 
companies of SABIC, over which in fact the issuer has no right to sell these rights as it 
has been stipulated in the prospectus of SABIC sukuk. In another words, what it has been 
sold is the right to obtain future gains featuring a certain percentage of the marketing 
process of the products of SABIC subsidiary companies as it has been discussed in the 
empirical chapters. In addition, another reason is that, SABIC has established a 
subsidiary company as a SPV to undertake the task of keeping the assets a matter that has 




control. Finally, among the reasons is that SABIC sukuk has been approved by a Shari’ah 
board featuring the most reputed experts in Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia. 
According to the above, it could be argued that the market remains significantly in need for a 
product that should satisfy all parties, and that such product should be less risky and at the same 
time should be consistent with Shari’ah principles. On the other hand, for instance, that product 
should not match the bonds in terms of structure and outcome in terms of the guarantee given to 
capital and profits. However, having said that, the most suitable contract to satisfy such 
description is the ijarah contract not ‘sale and lease back contract’ as it has been suggested by 
Merah (2008,2011), as such structure makes sukuk resembling to enah sale as well as leading to 
wafaa sale, both of which are disallowed as has already been explained. Therefore, companies 
which seek for fund should concentrate on their needs whether buildings, goods, materials or 
something to be manufactured rather than focusing on how to obtain cash money. In this case, 
under ijarah sukuk agreement, investors through a specific agent will receive an order that a 
particular company needs materials or goods based on certain qualities and features. Then, the 
investors will provide all these requirements and then will lease it to these companies to fill their 
needs. Thus, such contract will be less risky as it will lead to a real economy based sukuk in line 
with Shari’ah principles. 
 
8.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this study, the Shari’ah and legal risks associated with the SSB and SBSS as well as with the 
SABIC sukuk structure are critically discussed through deconstructing the components and 
articulations of SABIC sukuk. The discussion and findings are presented the empirical chapters 
and this chapter provided further critical reflections on the findings so far. Based on the analysis 
and the findings of this study, the following suggestions and recommendations are developed 
with the objective of enhancing the reputation of the Islamic finance industry in Saudi Arabia 
and in particular in the Saudi capital and financial markets: 
(i) It is essential that sukuk should be based on uncomplicated Islamic contracts and the 




(ii) It is also necessary that the regulatory and legislative bodies in a Muslim country such as 
Saudi Arabia should provide a suitable legislative and regulatory environment for the 
issuance of sukuk taking into consideration the legal and Shari’ah risks that sukuk structures 
might be exposed to; 
(iii) Based on the findings, the CMA should issue a special law and regulations for sukuk to 
differentiate between Islamic sukuk and conventional bonds, as there is no specific law for 
sukuk formalised in the country yet; 
(iv) As the findings indicate, unified Shari’ah legitimacy body should be established in every 
Muslim country especially in Saudi Arabia with full authority in reviewing and monitoring 
all the issuances of sukuk. This standardized Shari’ah and legal committee should have a 
positive impact in reducing the negative impact of fiqhi differences to increase confidence in 
the Islamic financial products; 
(v) The duty of the SSB should be extended to participate in the formulation of structuring the 
sukuk and following up from the beginning of the sukuk issuance until the maturity. 
8.7 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although the researcher has put his utmost effort to develop and produce a reliable, 
comprehensive, critical and significant research on the subject of Shari’ah and legal risks faced 
by sukuk issued in Saudi Arabia, it cannot be denied that this study has experienced several 
research limitations.  
First of all, the literature on the topic of Shari’ah and legal risks in sukuk structures extremely 
limited which caused difficulties in deconstructing the conceptual framework of the Shari’ah and 
legal risks in sukuk structures.  
Secondly, a small number of interviewees were considered another limitation when it comes to 
the legal side particularly. However, considering that these interviews were in-depth and elite 
interviews, and the sampled individuals are rather highly reputable and authoritative individuals, 




With regard to the textual method, the results might not be robust as the time period of analysis 
is limited, involving only information and data for just one prospectus, which is SABIC sukuk as 
well as having one case study from Saudi Arabia. However, considering the detailed and 
extensive analysis provided with critical approach through the insider insight provided by the 
participants, it is hoped that such a limitation in reality has been overcome. 
As regards to future research, the present research limited the scope of study by concentrating on 
the legal and Shari’ah risks. In this respect, the scope of this research could be extended further 
to the financial risks as well as involving more sukuk issuances in Saudi Arabia in the future 
research. In addition, since there are many banks and companies seeking finance through an 
Islamic sukuk, one of the areas that need to be covered and developed is that designing many 
different types of Shari’ah compliant structures based on Islamic contracts so that the specific 
demands can be responded with such Islamic structures.  
Regardless of these limitations, it should be strongly claimed that this research has fulfilled the 
research aims, objectives and the research questions. 
8.8 EPILOGUE 
The primary contribution of this research is the exploration and examination of the Shari’ah and 
legal risks associated with sukuk structures that have been issued in Saudi Arabia. In this regard, 
a critical review and investigation were conducted on the most important sukuk issuance, which 
is SABIC sukuk, in Saudi financial market.  
In addition, the study discussed and analysed the SABIC sukuk structure by highlighting the 
essential Shari’ah and legal risks that SABIC sukuk exposed to whether these risks are related to 
the function of the SBSS or the nature of the contract which the SABIC sukuk structure is based 
on. 
Furthermore, the study contributed to the development of a methodology for identifying and 
evaluating the extent to which the current practices of sukuk fulfil the principles of Shari’ah in 
line with AAOIFI standards. In addition, the justifications of the Saudi Shari’ah scholars on the 




framework and financing structures potentially leading to legal risks for SABIC sukuk have been 
also identified. 
It should also be noted that this research also contributes to the understanding and knowledge of 
managing the Shari’ah and legal risks associated with sukuk structures by developing some main 
evaluation parameters when any issuance needs to be examined and investigated. 
Although the empirical findings do not reflect a positive status quo of Islamic finance, it is hoped 
that the results from this research can be utilised to facilitate the improvement as well as 
development of IFB sector by emphasising the importance of following the principles of 
Shari’ah not only through fiqh but also in moral sense. In addition, further implementation of the 
Shari’ah standards such as AAOIFI is the best way to overcome any potential financial failure in 
the industry and reconceptualise the role of Islamic finance in the Islamic financial markets. 
Lastly, as this brief summary in this section indicates, the research has fulfilled its aims, 
objectives and research questions set in the beginning of the journey; which brings this research 
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (ENGLISH) 
 
Questions for Shari’ah Board who Approved SABIC Sukuk (SBSS) 
(i) The function of the SBSS and important related issues with regard to SABIC sukuk: 
(1) What is the function and role of the Shari’ah board drafting the structure of sukuk, and 
whether it undertakes the drafting the structure of sukuk, or is that function limited only to 
the review and approval of the structure of SABIC sukuk?  
(2) Does the Shari’ah board become aware of all the documents in relation to sukuk issuance 
(commitment to purchase, ownership transfer and management agreements of sukuk assets, 
etc)? 
(3) What are the documents that the Shari’ah board should be aware of before issuing the 
fatwa? 
(4) Does the Shari’ah board itself commit and follow the AAOIFI standards? 
(5) Does the Shari’ah board undertake its duties of supervision, control and follow up in 
accordance with AAOIFI standards? 
(6) Does the Shari’ah board take its decision by simple majority or by consensus? 
(7) Do you agree with the idea of standardisation of sukuk issuance (such as AAOIFI 
standards)? 
(8) Are there any problems or barriers associated with the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards in Saudi Arabia? What are those problems? 
(9) As you know fatwa could change before the maturity of sukuk (sometimes from the same 
Shari’ah board that has approved the sukuk).  In this case, what is required from the sukuk 
holder and what they have to do? 
(10) Has there been a clear observance of Shari’ah principles regarding the issuance brochure? 
(ii) The Structure of SABIC Sukuk: 
(1) What is the structure of SABIC sukuk and the nature of the contract? 
(2) Is it important that the name and the nature of the contract should be mentioned in the 
prospectus? (In the prospectus, it has been mentioned that the contract is called marketing 




(3) How does the sukuk issued by SABIC differ from its initial conventional bonds? 
(4) Who are the various parties in the SABIC sukuk, and what are their obligations and rights 
and whether they should feature in the prospectus? 
(5) Is there any determination and differentiation from financial commitments side (financial 
disclosure) between SABIC and its subsidiaries which SABIC signed with them the 
marketing contracts or they are same?  
(6) Does the coverage contractor (most likely the bank) claim commission in return for the 
service it provides, and whether that would be allowed by Shari’ah? 
(7) Do sukuk holders and sukuk issuers really share the gain and loss? 
(8) Is the return on sukuk determined by sukuk assets as well as the expected revenues from 
those assets? Or otherwise depending on the financial convenience of the issuer (the 
traditional bonds)? 
(9) Why is the financial solvency of the issuer more important than sukuk assets (for the 
investor), given that the sukuk assets and their revenues are independent of the sukuk issuer 
(SABIC). 
(iii) Sukuk assets: 
(1) What are the assets of SABIC sukuk? 
(2) Is there a real transference of sukuk assets from the issuer to sukuk holders? If so, how 
could that transference take place from Shari’ah perspective? 
(3) Do the periodical profits given to sukuk holders always consistent with the sukuk assets and 
according to the performance of the assets of sukuk? Or that is only determined by the 
market interest rates rather than the nature of sukuk assets? 
(4) It is noteworthy that the profits given to sukuk holders are linked to the market interest 
rates as well as the financial solvency of the sukuk issuer rather than the performance of the 
assets of sukuk itself. Should that be an indication of the fact that the existence of sukuk 
assets is a formality? 
(5) It is noticeable that the sukuk values after circulation in the secondary markets are not 
affected by the value of sukuk assets, but rather affected by the periodical batches of sukuk 
as well as the market interest rates. In another words, there is no real link between the 
value of sukuk and the assets of sukuk.  Does not that also indicate the existence of sukuk 
assets is a formality? 
(6) The sukuk assets are controlled by the sukuk issuer (SABIC), and also the trustee of the 
sukuk assets is a company affiliated to the issuer.  Does not that indicate the formality of 
sukuk structure as the sukuk holders have no real assets that could be considered in case of 




(7) In case of insolvency or failure of SABIC to meet its financial commitments towards sukuk 
holders, what are the assets of SABIC sukuk (Marketing contracts) that could be 
considered and claimed by the sukuk holders? 
(8) Does SABIC continuously sign marketing contracts with its subsidiary companies or does 
it do that only when the need arises to create assets to issue sukuk (formality of assets). 
(iv) Capital guarantee and returns (recovery of sukuk): 
(1) Has the sukuk issuer (SABIC) the right to make an undertaking to sukuk holders to 
purchase the sukuk assets at the nominal value? Or otherwise at a certain percentage (90%) 
within a specific period of time? 
(2) SABIC gives the right to sukuk holders to recover their sukuk every five years at the face 
value not at the market value.  As a matter of fact that will be inconsistent with AAOIFI 
standards? What is your opinion? 
(3) When the sukuk expire, should sukuk holders sell the sukuk assets to the issuer at the face 
value or based on the market value? 
(4) What is the source of payments for sukuk holders? (Where did the profits come from?). 
(5) Why does the issuer have no right to grantee the capital and the returns, while an 
independent third party has the right of capital assurance in favour of sukuk holders? 
(6) Has the Saudi government (or any of its organisations) as an independent third party the 
right to grantee the capital of SABIC sukuk, given that they owned 70 % of the SABIC 
capital? 
(7) SABIC considers its delay of fulfilling its financial commitments to others as a sign of 
failure to deal with sukuk holders as it has been mentioned in the prospectus, and 
accordingly sukuk holders have the right to claim the full recovery of sukuk from SABIC at 
the face value.  But the question is whether the sukuk assets and their revenues is an 
independent matter from SABIC (not part of SABIC financial commitments), why SABIC 
as an issuer is still interfere while SABIC sold its assets (marketing contracts)? 
(8) Failure to give out the periodical distribution payments to sukuk holders is considered one 
of the failures of SABIC to deal with sukuk holders in which case the latter have the right 
to claim their money back from SABIC and the repurchase of sukuk at the face value. 
Eventually, that should mean SABIC would be committed to pay the periodic distributions 
to the sukuk holders whereas there is no link between SABIC and sukuk holders. How do 
you comment on that? 






(v) Profit Reserve (distribution rate): 
(1) What do you think about reserves of retained earnings to be controlled by the sukuk issuer 
(director of sukuk assets)? 
(2) Are sukuk holders being briefed on the periodic profit rates as well as profit reserve for 
them? 
(3) The director of assets (also he is the sukuk issuer) has the right to deal with the reserve  
profits in his own account, and that all the reserve money will go into his pocket at the end 
of the period as a bonus (provided that he has made all the periodic payments to sukuk 
holders). Comment on that. 
(4) The fact that the profit reserves go to the issuer (or the director of assets) and that the profit 
is predetermined that the sukuk holders will have limited profits with a maximum as agreed 
upon in the prospectus.  However, the loss will be unlimited for sukuk issuer, while they 
would obtain funding without taking any risks or any commitments regarding the periodic 
payments (only he has to pay form sukuk assets).  Comment on that. 
(5) It is common knowledge that sukuk are circulated in secondary markets, so how do they 
determine the share of new sukuk holders as a percentage from the profit reserves?  Also, 
who has the right of ownership of the reserves the seller or the new buyer? 
(vi) The Qhrar (Ambiguity): 
(1) How do the sukuk assets and their market value become well known value and price for the 
issuer himself and the sukuk holders? 
(2)  Does the market value of sukuk assets an exact equivalent of the purchase value to be paid 
by sukuk holders? 
(3) Do sukuk holders become aware of the market value of sukuk assets which they are going 
to buy, and what are the expected revenues from those assets, and the nature of the 
contracts involved (in relation to sukuk assets) between SABIC and its affiliate companies, 
and what are the companies involved in the marketing contracts with SABIC? 
(4) In case of significant variation between the face value and the market value of the sukuk 
assets when sukuk expire (because the issuer when he sold the assets to sukuk holders, he 
did not value the assets correctly), have sukuk holders got the right to claim compensation 
from the issuer regarding the damages they have sustained? 
(5) Is there any risks involving sukuk (lack of knowledge of the assets featuring sukuk, its 






(vii)  Sukuk assets and the use of subscription output: 
(1) Should sukuk assets be 100 % consistent with Shari’ah principles? Some would argue that 
sukuk assets that are inconsistent with Shari’ah should not exceed 33 % of the total value 
of sukuk assets. What do you think of that? 
(2) Should the subscription output be used for purposes 100 % consistent with Shari’ah? Some 
would believe that the use of subscription output for purposes inconsistent with Shari’ah 
should not exceed 33 % of the total subscription output. What do you make of that? 
 
Questions for Legal Participants 
(1) What are the main differences between bonds and sukuk from legal perspective?  
(2) Are the sukuk in Saudi Arabia asset-backed sukuk or asset-based sukuk? 
(3) Do the sukuk holders have full right of ownership over their assets? In other words, is the 
transferring of ownership of the assets from the original owner to the sukuk holder met all 
legal rules and requirements? 
(4) In case of bankruptcy, what is the legal position of sukuk holders?  
(5) How they can claim their rights?  
(6) Is there any specific law regarding bankruptcy?  
(7) What are the risks that might happen? 
(8)  How can we manage the risks associated with the uncertainty of the law in Saudi Arabia in 
terms of the process and the procedures that sukuk holders should go throw after any 
default? 
(9) Do you think that there is a lack of legal experts who have Shari’ah and legal 
specialisation in financial matters such as sukuk?  
(10)  What are the consequences of this upon sukuk market? 
(11) What are the legal implications of the risks of multiplicity of jurisprudence 
fatawa/verdicts?  
(12) What is the effect of the differences in fatwa between the Shari’ah committee of SABIC 
Sukuk and the Members of CRSD and ACRSC in various matters? 
(13) Is it true that both Islamic and Conventional finance are subject to the same rules in Saudi 
Arabia under the main legal bodies (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), and 




(14) Considering that there is no specific rule and law regarding sukuk in Saudi Arabia, what 
are the consequences of this on the issuers, sukuk holders and Saudi Market? 
(15) How can these risks be managed? 
(16) Do you think CRSD and ACRSC have the power to resolve disputes between issuers and 
sukuk holders as those committees have nothing to do with the Shari’ah courts, and their 
members are not members of the judiciary system?  
(17) Do you think the decision of these committees in the financial dispute is binding on both 
issuers and sukuk holders or the final decision is based on Shari’ah courts? 
(18)  Could you surmise what are the main legal risks associated with sukuk issued in Saudi 
Arabian Market?  
(19) Finally; what have been the consequences of legal risks faced by Saudi sukuk structures?  
Questions for Specialists in Islamic Finance and Sukuk 
(1) What is the importance of the Shari’ah supervisory boards? 
(2)  What are the advantages and purpose of having SSB in Islamic finical institutions?  
(3) What is the concept of Shari’ah supervisory board?  
(4) What is the function of the Shari’ah boards in sukuk issuance? 
(5) What are the steps of issuing the fatwa on the sukuk structures? 
(6) What are the consequences of changing the fatwa from SSB? 
(7) What are the criteria of the SSB Members? 
(8) What are the advantages of applying and observing standards such as AAOIFI   by the 
SSBs? 












INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (ARABIC) 
  أوالً: الهيئة الشرعية:
الصكوك، هل تقوم الهيئة بصياغة هيكلة الصك؟ أم تقوم فقط بمراجعة و اعتماد  ماهو دور الهيئة الشرعية في صياغة هيكلة .4
 الصيغة المقدمة لها؟
اتفاقية تحويل ملكية  التعهد بالشراء،على جميع المستندات ذات العالقة بإصدار الصكوك )الشرعية طلع الهيئة تهل ت .5
 (؟موجودات الصكوك، اتفاقية إدارة موجودات الصكوك .... وغيرها
 ماهي المستندات التي تقوم الهيئة الشرعية باإلطالع عليها قبل إصدار الفتوى؟ .1
 هل تلتزم الهيئة الشرعية بالمعايير الصادرة عن آيوفي؟ .1
 في معايير آيوفي؟ مطلوبعلى التنفيذ كما هو والمراقبة  هل تقوم الهيئة الشرعية باإلشراف و المتابعة  .2
 ، بالتصويت أم باإلجماع؟ةالشرعي كيف يتم إتخاذ قرارات الهيئة .1
 هل تؤيدون وجود معايير شرعية موحدة إلصدار الصكوك )كمعايير آيوفي(؟ .1
 ماهي؟و ؟ في السعودية هل هنالك اشكاليات و معوقات في تطبيق معايير آيوفي .5
ماهو المطلوب  كما تعلمون قد تتغير الفتوى قبل انتهاء مدة الصك )وأحياناً من نفس الهيئة الشرعية التي أجازت الصك(، .2
 من حامل الصك؟
 هل هناك إلتزام معلن بمبادئ الشريعة في نشرة اإلصدار ؟ .44
 الهيكلة :
 ماهي هيكلة صكوك سابك، و ماهو طبيعة العقد؟ .4
) الن المذكور صكوك تسويق فأي نوع من انواع العقود يتم ذكر طبيعة )صيغة( العقد في نشرة اإلصدار؟يجب أن هل  .5
 تدخل تحته(؟
 السندات التقليدية التي أصدرتها سابقاً؟ عنالصكوك التي أصدرتها سابك  كيف تختلف .1
 توضح في نشرة اإلصدار؟يجب أن من هم أطراف العالقة في صكوك سابك، و ماهي واجباتهم و حقوقهم و هل  .1
عقود التسويق؟ و هل هل هنالك فصل في الذمة المالية )االلتزامات المالية( بين سابك وشركاتها التابعة التي تبرم معها  .2
 يتطلب ذلك أم ال؟
وهل هناك محظور شرعي في  ؟وظمانه على عمولة نظير تعهده والذي هو في الغالب ) البنك ( هل يحصل متعهد التغطية .1
 ذلك ؟
 هل هنالك مشاركة حقيقية في الغنم و الغرم بين حاملي الصكوك ومصدر الصكوك؟ .1
ى موجودات الصكوك و اإليرادات المتوقعة من الموجودات؟ أم بناءاً على هل تحديد العائد على الصكوك يتم بناءاً عل .5
 المالئة المالية للمصدر )كالسندات التقليدية(؟
ً بأن  .2 موجودات الصكوك و ايراداتها مستقلة عن لماذا تراعى المالئة المالية للمصدر بدالً من موجودات الصكوك؟ علما







 موجودات الصكوك :
 ماهي موجودات صكوك سابك؟ .4
هل هنالك انتقال حقيقي لموجودات الصكوك لصالح حملة الصكوك؟ و كيف يكون االنتقال الحقيقي لألصول لصالح حملة  .5
 الصكوك من منظور شرعي؟
هل العائد/الربح الدوري الذي يحصل عليه حاملو الصكوك ناتج عن و يتوافق مع موجودات الصكوك؟ أم فقط يحدد بناءاً  .1
 لى أسعار الفائدة في السوق و ليس على طبيعة موجودات الصكوك؟ع
ً بمعدل الفائدة في السوق و بالمالئة المالية لمصدر  .1 يالحظ أن العوائد التي يحصل عليها حاملو الصكوك ترتبط أساسا
 ؟الصكوكالصك. أال يوحي ذلك بصورية موجودات 
ً أن قيمة الصكوك بعد تداولها في السوق ا .2 ً و إنخفاضاً، بل يالحظ أيضا لثانوية ال تتأثر بقيمة موجودات الصكوك إرتفاعا
 تتأثر بالدفعات الدورية للصكوك و أسعار الفائدة السائدة في السوق. أال يوحي ذلك أيضاً بصورية موجودات الصكوك؟
ر، أال يوحي تدار موجودات الصكوك من قبل المصدر )سابك(، كما أن أمين موجودات الصكوك هي شركة تابعة للمصد .1
ذلك بصورية هيكلة الصكوك، حيث أن حملة الصكوك ليست لديهم أصول ملموسة يمكن الرجوع إليها في حالة إفالس أو 
 إخفاق المصدر في إلتزاماته تجاههم؟
في حالة إفالس سابك، أو إخاللها بالتزاماتها تجاه حملة الصكوك، ماهي طبيعة الموجودات التي يمكن الرجوع إليها من  .1
 قبل حاملي الصكوك؟
لخلق موجودات تقوم بذلك عند الحاجة هل تقوم سابك بصفة مستمرة بإبرام عقود تسويقية مع شركاتها التابعة، أم فقط  .5
 إلصدار الصكوك )صورية األصول(؟
: ضمان رأس المال و العوائد )استرداد الصكوك(  
او بنسبة محددة مثل  موجودات الصكوك بالقيمة اإلسمية؟هل يحق لمصدر الصك )سابك( التعهد لحاملي الصكوك بشراء  .4
 %(في فترة محددة ؟24)
بالقيمة اإلسمية. علماً بأن ذلك يخالف معايير آيوفي؟  (سنوات 2)تعطي سابك حاملي الصك الحق بإسترداد الصكوك كل  .5
 ماهو رأيكم؟
 لمصدر الصك بالقيمة االسمية؟بعد انتهاء مدة الصك، هل يجب على حاملي الصكوك إرجاع موجودات الصكوك  .1
 ماهو مصدر الدفعات لحملة الصكوك؟ .1
لماذا ال يحق للمصدر ضمان رأس المال و العوائد، بينما يحق لطرف مستقل أن يقوم بضمان رأس المال لحاملي  .2
 الصكوك؟
من رأسمال  %14هل يحق للدولة )أو أي من مؤوسساتها( ضمان رأسمال صكوك سابك كطرف مستقل، علماً بأنها تتملك  .1
 سابك؟
، و بناءاً اإلخفاق تجاه حملة الصكوك تحالة من حاالتجاه اللغير   المالية االتزاماتهأي من تسديد في تأخيرها  تعتبر سابك .1
اليست موجودات الصكوك و ايرادتها مستقلة عليه يحق لحملة الصكوك مطالبة سابك باسترداد الصكوك بالقيمة االسمية. 
 امات مالية على سابك(؟عن سابك )ليست التز
عدم دفع مبلغ التوزيع الدوري يعتبر حالة من حاالت اخفاق سابك تجاه حملة الصكوك وفي هذه الحالة يحق لحملة  .5
الصكوك مطالبة سابك بإعادة المبلغ وإعادة شراء الصكوك بالقيمة االسمية، مما يعني أن سابك ملزمة بدفع التوزيعات 
 تعليقكم؟  الدورية لحملة الصكوك. ماهو





: احتياطي األرباح )معدل التوزيع(  
 دار من قبل مصدر الصكوك )مدير موجودات الصكوك( ؟يماهو رأيكم بوجود احتياطي لألرباح  .4
 لحملة الصكوك؟ و توضيح مبلغ احتياطي األرباح لحملة الصكوك؟هل يتم توضيح معدل األرباح الدورية  .5
ً  مصدر الصكوك الذي هومدير الموجودات ) .1 وتؤول له  . ( يحق له التصرف باحتياطيات األرباح لحسابه الخاصأيضا
صكوك(. ماهو جميع المبالغ التي في االحتياطي في آخر المدة كحافز )وذلك في حالة التزامه بالمدفوعات الدورية لحملة ال
 تعليقكم؟
فإن ربح حاملي الصكوك  ونسبة الربح محددة مقدماً  نتيجة أن احتياطي األرباح تؤول للمصدر )أو مدير الموجودات( .1
محدود )له حد أعلى، حسب ماهو متفق عليه في نشرة اإلصدار(، و الخسارة غير محدودة، بينما مصدر الصك يحصل 
. ماهو أي التزامات بتسديد المدفوعات الدورية )فقط من موجودات الصكوك(على تمويل بدون تحمله أي مخاطر أو 
 تعليقكم؟
من احتياطي األرباح؟ هل  دالجد وكالصك ملةمعلوم أن الصكوك تتداول في األسواق الثانوية، فكيف يتم تحديد حصة ح .2
 ؟ملك للبائع أم للمشترياالحتياطي 
:الغرر   
 ؟ا السوقية ويعرف قيمته م موجودات الصكوكوكيف تق .4
 فعه حملة الصكوك؟ي يدهل القيمة السوقية لموجودات الصكوك مساوية فعالً لقيمة الشراء الذ .5
هل يعلم حملة الصكوك ماهي القيمة الفعلية )السوقية( لموجودات الصكوك، وماهي اإليرادات المتوقعة من هذه  .1
الصكوك( بين سابك وشركاتها التابعة، وماهي الموجودات، وماهي طبيعة العقود المبرمة )ذات العالقة بموجودات 
 برم معها العقود التسويقية؟التي ت   لسابك الشركات التابعة
، هل عند انتهاء مدة الصكوك في حالة أن هنالك إختالف كبير جداً بين القيمة االسمية و القيمة السوقية لموجودات الصكوك .1
 جة للغرر الذي لحق بهم؟يحق لحملة الصكوك الرجوع على المصدر لتعويضهم نتي
 هل هنالك غرر في معاملة الصكوك )عدم معرفة موجودات الصكوك، قيمتها السوقية، إيراداتها(؟ .2
 موجودات الصكوك، و استخدام متحصالت اإلكتتاب :
من يرى أن موجودات الصكوك  %؟ وماهو رأيكم في444مع الشريعة ة هل يجب أن تكون موجودات الصكوك متوافق .4
 % من قيمة موجودات الصكوك؟11مع الشريعة يجب أن ال تتجاوز  ةوافقالغير مت
من يرى أن استخدام  %؟ وماهو رأيكم في444هل يجب أن تستخدم متحصالت االكتتاب ألغراض متوافقة مع الشريعة  .5
صالت % من القيمة االجمالية الستخدام متح11متحصالت االكتتاب الغير متوافقة مع الشريعة يجب أن ال تتجاوز 
 االكتتاب؟
: المخاطر والمعوقات  
 من وجهة نظركم، ماهي المخاطر الشرعية للصكوك؟ و كيف يمكن إدارة هذه المخاطر؟ .4
 هل هنالك عقبات في اصدار الصكوك عموماً و في السعودية خصوصا؟ ماهي؟ وكيف يمكن حلها؟ .5
م تعتبرها أيف محدد لكيفية التعامل مع الصكوك كيف تتعاملون مع المعايير المحاسبية الدولية و المحلية؟ هل هنالك تصن .1
 المعايير المحاسبية مديونية على الشركة )تعاملها كالسندات(؟





 األسئلة الخاصة بالقضايا القانونية
 بين السندات والصكوك من الناحية القانونية؟ماهي الفروق االساسية   (4)
 ام انها فقط مدعومة بأصول؟هل الصكوك المصدره في السعودية صكوك لها اصول حقيقية   (5)
هل انتقال الملكية من المالك  وبمعنى اخرهل حملة الصكوك لهم الحقوق الكامله والتصرف المطلق على اصولهم؟   (1)
  بطريقة سليمة من الناحية القانونية؟االصلي الى حملة الصكوك تم 
 لو حصل  هناك افالس ماهو الموقف القانوني لحملة الصكوك؟   (1)
 كيف يمكن لحملة الصكوك المطالبة بحقوقهم؟  (2)
 هل هناك قانون خاص باالفالس واالعسار ؟   (1)
 في هذه الحالة؟ ماهي المخاطر التي ربما تحصل  (1)
كيف يمكن التعامل مع المخاطر في ظل غياب القانون الخاص بالصكوك في السعودية من ناحية االجراءات واالنظمة   (5)
 والتي بناء عليها حملة الصكوك يستطيعون المطالبة بحقوقهم؟
الشريعة والقانون وخاصة هل تعتقدون ان هناك نقص في اعداد المتخصصين في المالية االسالمية والذين يجمعون بين   (2)
 بما يتعلق بالصكوك؟
 ماهي االثار المترتبة على سوق الصكوك؟   (44)
 للمخاطر التي تحصل من جراء االختالف في الفتوى بين الجهات المصدرة لها؟ ماهي االثار القانونية   (44)
سابك وبين لجان الفصل في ماهي االثار المترتبة على االختالفات في الفتوى بين الهيئة الشرعية التي اقرت صكوك   (45)
 منازعات االوراق المالية؟
الصادرة من السوق  نين واالنظمة على حد سواءاوقليدية واالسالمية تخضع لنفس القهل صحيح ان المعامالت الت  (41)
   المالية؟
 ماهي االثار القانونية التي ربما تؤثر على حملة الصكوك والمصدرين في ظل غياب قانون الصكوك؟  (41)




الن لجان الفصل في المنازعات لها القوة في حل اي خالف ناتج بين حملة الصكوك والمصدرين هل تعتقدون ان   (41)
 هؤالء االعضاء ليسوا من السلك القضائي؟
هل تعتقدون ان قرارات لجان الفصل ملزمه للمصدرين وحملة الصكوك او ان القرار النهائي خاص بالمحاكم   (41)
 لشرعية؟ا
 تخمين ماهي المخاطر القانونية المتعلقة بالصكوك المصدرة في السوق السعودي؟هل ممكن   (45)
  أخيرا ماهي االثار النترتبة على المخاطر القانونية التي تواجهها الصكوك المصدرة في السوق السعودي؟  (42)
  
 االسئلة الخاصة بالمتخصصين في المالية االسالمية
 الشرعية؟ماهي اهمية الهيئات   (4)
 في المؤسسات المالية االسالمية؟ماهي فوائد واهداف تعيين هيئات شرعية     (5)
 ماهو مفهوم الهيئة الشرعية؟   (1)
 ماهي وظيفة الهيئة الشرعية في عملة اصدار الصكوك؟  (1)
 ماهي خطوات اصدار الفتاوى في عملية اصدار الصكوك؟  (2)
 ماهي االثار المترتبة على تغيير الفتوى؟  (1)
 اعضاء الهيئة الشرعية؟ ماهي صفات  (1)
 ماهي الفوائد من تطبيق معايير للصكوك مثل االيوفي للهيئات الشرعية؟  (5)
 على الدعوات التي تنادي بمحاسبة الهيئات الشرعية عند تقصيرها؟ماهو تعليقك   (2)
 
 
 
 
